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Abstract 
This empirical research sets out to explore the complex domestic dynamics that shape 
Pakistan’s contemporary alliance making with China. The study examines the actual and 
potential domestic political challenges to the endurance of Pakistan-China alliance. The 
research also aims to assess Pakistani security elites’ efforts and strategies to overcome 
those challenges.  
The leading approaches in international politics that seek to explain the logic of external 
alliances – Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism – do not elucidate Pakistan-China 
alliance in depth. While there is an inordinate amount of literature concerning the 
Pakistan-China relations, the literature on maintenance of this alliance is relatively scarce. 
Besides, scholars have neglected the way in which Pakistan has promoted its alliance 
with China domestically. 
This work aims to fill this gap in the literature. Interpreting from the perspective of 
Security Elite Domestic Propaganda and International Alliance (SEPIA), this study will 
show that while the alliance with China is essential for Pakistan to contain the military 
threat posed by India, such an alliance meets with overt challenges from the Pakistani 
society. Specifically, the Pakistani popular support for Uighur separatism and terrorist 
attacks against Chinese targets confront the Pakistani security elites with the need to 
promote the alliance on the domestic level through a robust propaganda campaign. This 
study, therefore, evaluates the propaganda strategies of the security elites to cultivate the 
Chinese alliance within the national society. While exposing Pakistani state propaganda, 
the research focuses to highlight the apprehension of the Pakistani elite towards their 
public. 
This works relies on qualitative methods including documentary analysis and elites 
interviews. The sources used include Pakistani cultural textbooks, security elites’ 
newspaper articles and lawmakers’ speeches to investigate the key propaganda themes 
aiming to legitimising the alliance. The autobiographies and other sources held at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also utilised.  
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 Introduction 
The importance of external alliances in international politics cannot be denied. Alliances 
are fundamental arrangements that have happened throughout time. Emphasising their 
significance, George Liska maintains that “it is impossible to speak of international 
relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name.”1 States 
seeking alliances attempt to combine members’ capabilities in a way that promotes their 
respective national security interests. The states assume that they cannot realise national 
policy goals, defend national interests or prevent threatening states attacking them using 
their own resources, and so they rely on power politics. Hans Morgenthau observes “the 
historically most important manifestation of the balance of power… is to be found …in 
the relations between one nation or alliance and another alliance.”2  
The need for alliances is so vital that it is not unusual for nation states to share national 
strategies with a seemingly awkward ally to deal with more pressing security threats. 
Washington’s alliance with Moscow during World War II is a remarkable case of such 
an alliance, mainly because it was an alliance between a Liberal democracy and a socialist 
dictatorship. The two great world powers had little in common other than a mutual threat.  
These controversial foreign policy decisions, (such as the US-USSR alliance) inevitably 
provoke significant domestic challenges, forcing decision-makers to adopt grand 
strategies to counter any objections. Amongst other techniques, decision-makers often 
use domestic propaganda, for example the US administration initiated a widespread 
domestic campaign of publicity to cultivate positive images of Russia where Joseph 
                                                 
1 George Liska, Nations in Alliance, The Limit of Interdependence, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 
1962). p.3 
2 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edn (New York: Knop Alfred, 1959). p.169 
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Stalin - once known as “mass murderer” or a “blood thirty tyrant” - was portrayed as 
benign “Uncle Joe” to garner support for the war time alliance.3  
However, it is worth mentioning that states do not resort to internal propaganda to 
promote all their potential allies but tend to be selective based on their national interests. 
For instance, the US does not appear to make much effort to promote the image of one of 
its long-term allies, Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the US would usually associate with former 
Indian leaders unreservedly, but in the case of the ultra-Hindu nationalist Narender Modi, 
who had been an international pariah for a long time following his role in the Gujarat 
massacre predominantly of Muslims, Washington (and the west generally) needed to 
undertake some publicity campaigns before he was accepted as a trusted partner.4  
The alliance between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of 
China (hereafter China or the PRC) can be considered a strange alliance in modern times. 
Over the past 60 years, the two countries have remained in an awkward duet, making it a 
case of intense curiosity for the scholars of international politics due to striking 
differences in terms of culture, economy and political ideology. David Pilling states that 
“China is communist and religion is tightly controlled. Pakistan is Islamic and religious 
fervour is often out of control.”5 John Blake maintains, “The two nations have virtually 
no shared culture, history, or economic ties.”6 China has leap-frogged from being a poor, 
                                                 
3 For US government efforts See M. Todd Bennett, One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and 
World War II, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012, pp.170-190).; John Gaddis, The 
United States and Origin of Cold War, 1941-47, (Columbia University Press, 2001).pp.32-60  
4 Narender Modi has been denied entry into many capitals of the world due to his involvement in the 
Gujrat massacres. His electoral victory in 2014 has become a notable reversal for an international pariah. 
Quickly he became a favoured partner, courted by world leaders led by US President Barack Obama, who 
congratulated him and vowed to work closely. During his UK tour, David Cameron welcomed him on the 
red carpet, the monarch invited him for a lunch. Modi became the first Indian premier to address the 
British parliamentarian. For detail see, Jay Newton-Small, 'White House, U.S. Senate Congratulate 
Narendra Modi on His Win in India', Time, (2014).; Esther Addley, 'Rock Star Reception Lined up for 
Visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ', The Guardian (2015).; Nicholas watt, 'David Cameron: 
India and Uk Are No Longer Imprisoned by the Past', The Guardian (2015).  
5 David Pilling, 'China and Pakistan Make an Oddball but Enduring Couple', Financial Times (2015).  
6 Jonah Blank, 'Thank You for Being a Friend, Pakistan and China's Almost Alliance', Foreign Affairs 
(October 2015). 
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under-developed country into a prosperous industrial giant while Pakistan has been 
driven by political and economic instability.  
Despite numerous dissimilarities - also visible in their official names - China is Pakistan’s 
closest ally and probably the only reliable friend. Arguably, it is perceived threat from 
India which binds them together, though there are other aspects too which cannot be 
ignored. The two nations have sustained a fairly long history of security and defence 
cooperation, including sensitive nuclear technology. The overemphasis on security 
cooperation has long prevented close economic and trade relations, but this is changing 
with, for example, the launching of large scale projects like the Gwadar deep sea port and 
the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which have strategic 
implications. High level visits have also been a hallmark of the alliance for quite some 
time and most Pakistani leaders have made China their first official destination after 
assuming office.  
The Pakistan-China alliance, however, has not been without internal threats. China is 
very concerned about the rise in extremism and militancy in Pakistan. It has been alarmed 
by the number of terrorist attacks, kidnapping and killings of its citizens working in 
Pakistan, but above all by the close ties between the Pakistani religious elements and the 
Uighur separatists in the Xinjiang region of China. In addition, the so-called separatists 
in the Balochistan province have threatened the safety of Chinese nationals. They have 
attacked the Chinese either to embarrass Pakistani states, or to prevent the Chinese 
carrying out development works, owing to their feeling of marginalisation at the hands 
of the Pakistani state.  
While the state is acting pragmatically by solidifying cooperation, the people are obsessed 
with values and virtues, and hampering the Islamabad elite’s struggles to take advantage 
of its strategic, geopolitical and diplomatic gains accrued by forming alliance with China. 
The values and virtues referred to are mainly the public tendency to adopt the extremist, 
fundamentalist and intolerant mentality.  
China is deeply disturbed by the troubles it faces in Muslim Xinjiang and terrorist attacks 
within Pakistan. It applies several pressures on Pakistan to control these terrorist risks 
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from its land. Pakistan, which is heavily dependent on China’s support, cannot ignore 
Chinese demands. Pakistani elites go to some lengths to promote this seemingly awkward 
alliance with China in a society which oppose their strategy of seeking alliance. It is 
because of these internal fears of facing opposition from their own population that the 
Pakistan’s security elites use various strategies - mainly positive domestic propaganda - 
to make the awkward alliance popular domestically. 
Thesis objectives  
Given the situation above, this empirical research sets out to systematically explore the 
complex domestic dynamics that shape contemporary Pakistan’s alliance making with 
China. It aims to explain the political problems of being an overtly religious state that is 
trying to practice balance of power politics with an atheist ally China. More specifically, 
the research examines the internal challenges in Pakistan-China alliance and the strategies 
of Pakistani security elites to counter those challenges. It essentially means the study 
examines the real and potential challenges to the endurance of Pakistan-China alliance.  
After highlighting domestic challenges to the alliance, the research aims to examine 
Pakistani security elite efforts and strategies to overcome those challenges. It basically 
means that the study evaluates the propaganda strategies of the security elites to cultivate 
the Chinese alliance at the national level. While exposing Pakistani state propaganda, the 
research focuses to highlight the apprehension of the Pakistani elite towards their public.  
Research questions 
Interpreting from a Realist perspective, Security Elite Domestic Propaganda and 
International Alliance (SEPIA), this theoretically informed investigation has following 
research questions:  
• What the real and potential challenges to the endurance of the Pakistan - China 
alliance are?  
• How the security elites in Pakistan promote the alliance with China domestically 
to counter those threats and challenges? And  
 5 
 
• What their propaganda tells us about how they view their own society?  
Research argument 
Considering these fundamental yet important questions, this study introduces realist-
inspired theoretical model namely SEPIA which is based upon the premise that the 
Pakistani security elites choose to have an alliance with China mainly to enhance their 
country’s national security, but also that because the strongly religious Pakistani society 
may oppose their strategy of seeking alliance with China, as a precautionary measure 
strategy of internal propaganda to endorse the alliance is implemented domestically. 
SEPIA further elucidates that this propaganda exposes the security elite’s assumptions 
and apprehensions about their own population.  
The security elites promote the alliance with China as essential. Their propaganda 
strategies range between presenting the Chinese as glorious (China are presented as 
civilised, friend of Pakistan and possessing values which resembles those of Islam) to 
utilising the rivalry with India (Indo-Pak wars are narrated with favourable views of 
China) to legitimise the alliance to the sceptical society. Promotional strategies suggest 
that there is no discrimination in China on the basis of religion or ethnicity, and that the 
Chinese system is based on equality and social justice, and they treat their own people - 
including the Uighur Muslims- well.  
Propaganda strategies reveal great welcomes are arranged when Chinese leaders visit 
Pakistan. The cities are decorated; images of Chinese leaders are displayed around the 
cities. Children and ordinary people are lined up to welcome them. While the rhetoric 
and propaganda regarding the alliance is usually disguised with patriotic and/or 
hyperbolic rhetoric. In their efforts to present Chinese as well-wishers, the American are 
presented as unreliable, the Chinese are depicted as reliable. Pakistani governments praise 
Chinese aid and support and play down US aid and support, even when the latter by far 
exceeds the former.  
India is believed to be an intruder and hegemonic, China is considered a great benevolent 
power. China is perceived as an emerging power that wants an industrialised and 
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developed Pakistan. In their efforts to promote alliance, the security elite relate Pakistan’s 
progress and development with the sustainability of the China alliance. The security 
elite’s promotional strategies present the vast contribution by China to Pakistan’ security, 
defence and economy to demonstrate it is a valuable alliance. 
Another example of the shape the Islamabad security elite’s propaganda approaches takes 
is the naming of buildings, roads and hospital like “China Junction”, “China Road”, 
“China-Pakistan Friendship Hospital” respectively to imprint an indelible mark on the 
memory of people. China-specific “friendship” songs are developed and run 
unremittingly on state television to promote and reinforce the alliance.  
The data sources used for this empirical inquiry are cultural textbooks of the Pakistani 
school, colleges and universities, along with newspaper articles and discussions of the 
Pakistani lawmakers in the parliament. It covers the period from 1990-2010 and is 
presented from the perspective of Pakistan.   
Contributions of the research  
This empirical examination claims to make following contributions to the existing 
knowledge on the current area of interest.  
1. This thesis supplements the existing theoretical literature on the maintenance of 
the alliance. Though not overlooking the significance of external-structural 
limitations, this research argues that the earlier theories ignore the role of 
propaganda in cultivating awkward alliances domestically. Earlier studies ignore 
internal threats to the alliance.  
2. Furthermore, this thesis provides a new empirical study of the political prejudices 
of Pakistani textbooks on the Pakistan-China alliance. To date, a considerable 
body of research has sought to understand textbooks propaganda in Pakistan, 
however specifically, there is not a single published research that has studied the 
Pakistan-China alliance using cultural textbooks of the Pakistani schools, 
colleges, and universities.  
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3. Equally, the present work is designed to be the first to consider the use of the 
Pakistani parliamentary debates to study security elites domestic propaganda to 
promote the Sino-Pakistan alliance. As far as the author is aware, there is an 
absence of study that examined the debates in the National Assembly and the 
Senate of Pakistan to study previously the Pakistan-China alliance. 
Significance of the research  
The search for international alliances has been the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy since its independence in 1947. Pakistan depends a lot on the security and defense 
alliance. It has embraced external alliances due to the threat from India and Afghanistan. 
It has formed many partners over the years, but China is considered closed. It is 
imperative to evaluate this alliance since the earlier literature is not a great help to 
understand it. 
There is an inordinate amount of literature concerning the Pakistan-China relations in 
general, the literature on maintenance of this alliance, however, is relatively scarce. It is 
hard to find literature about how Pakistan has managed to promote the alliance with China 
domestically. The available academic discourse on Pakistan’s foreign relations mainly 
focuses on why a weak country like Pakistan needs to have an alliance7, but what is 
                                                 
7Anwar Syed, Pakistan-China Alliance: Diplomacy of Entente Cordial (University of Massachusetts 
Press 1974).; S.M.Burke, Pakistan’ Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 
1974).; R.B. Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations, (Progressive Publishers 
Lahore, 1977).; L.A. Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, (Council for Pakistan Studies Karachi, 
1980).; Mehrunissa Ali, in Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-1988 ed. by Mehrunissa Ali 
(Oxford University Press, 2001).; John Garver, 'The Future of Pakistan-China Entente Cordiale', in South 
Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, ed. by Michal R Chambers (Strategic Studies 
Institutes, U.S Army War College, 2002).; John Garver, 'China South Asia Interests and Policies', Sam 
Nunn School of International Affairs Georgia Institute of Technology, (2005).; Swarn Singh, 
'Introduction', in China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation Indian Perspectives, ed. by Swarn Singh 
(Manohar, New Delhi 2007).; Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, Second edn 
(Oxford University Press, 2010).; Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India, 
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missing in these studies is the strategy Islamabad adopts to sell the alliance to its overtly 
religious society in the wake of domestic threats. This is an important aspect that has been 
disregarded in previous studies but realised and covered by this research. Particularly, 
this research demonstrates that the Pakistani rulers believe their population is so 
pathologically obsessed with “values” and “religious virtue” that the China alliance must 
be morally legitimised - a kind of pragmatic alliance dressed up as “moralpolitik.”  
While the literature on cultural textbooks has a complete view of the propaganda of the 
Pakistani textbooks, from one angle or the other, and despite their recognition, at various 
levels, of the political biases present in the textbooks, no one has dedicated a treatment 
to highlight the propaganda on the Pakistan-China alliance.8  
Furthermore, the major theories of alliance formation mainly address why states need to 
have the alliances, when states form alliances and with whom states like to form alliances 
but often neglect the question of how states promote and sustain an alliance which is 
necessary for the national security but has been threatened domestically. This research is 
                                                 
(Routledge, 2011).; Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove:An Insider's Account of 
Pakistan's Foreign Relations, (Oxford University Press 2015).; Ghulam Ali, China-Pakistan Relations:A 
Historical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
8 Pervaiz Hoodbhoy and A. H. Nayye, 'Rewriting the History of Pakistan: Hate Promoting Textbooks', in 
Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience ed. by Mohammad Asghar Khan (Zed Books, 
London, 1985). ; K.K. Aziz, Murder of History, A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan 
(Lahore: Renaissance,1998).; K. K. Aziz, Historians of Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1993).; 
Rubina Saigol, Education: Critical Perspectives the Boundaries of Consciousness: Interface between the 
Curriculum, Gender and Nationalism, (Lahore Progressive, 1993); Mubarak Ali, In the Shadow of 
History, (Lahore Fiction House 1998).; Naureen Durrani, 'Schooling the ‘Other’: The Representation of 
Gender and National Identities in Pakistani Curriculum Texts', Comparative and International Education, 
38 (2008); Peter jacob, 'Education Vs Fanatic Literacy', (Lahore National Commission for Justice and 
Peace March 2013).; Hazir Ullah & Christine Skelton, 'Gender Representation in the Public Sector 
Schools Textbooks of Pakistan', Educational Studies, 39 (2013).; Anjum James Paul, 'Biased Pakistani 
Textbooks', (Pakistan Minorities Teachers' Association, October, 2014).; Madiha Afzal, 'Education and 
Attitudes in Pakistan Understanding Perceptions of Terrorism', in Special Report (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace 2015).; Haleema Masud, 'Curriculum, Textbooks and Gender Stereotypes: The 
Case of Pakistan', Worlds of Education (2017).  
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maintaining that the multiple, costly, internal security threats to the alliance often force 
security elites to rely on domestic permeation techniques to sustain the notion of the 
alliance to facilitate state efforts to balance the most threatening state. This study aims to 
bridge this gap by focusing on governments propaganda directed to sustain the notion of 
the alliance.  
The contribution of this research could point towards a wider contribution to international 
relations theory on the nature of alliances and a challenge to the Liberalist, Constructivist, 
and to some extent theories of Balance of Power.9 Hence this research provides not only 
policy relevant but also conceptual stimuli. 
Alliance, Awkward alliance and Propaganda  
Before the study proceeds to review the pertinent literature on the alliance, along with 
literature on Sino-Pakistan alliance, it is useful to succinctly define terms alliance, 
awkward alliance and propaganda.  
As Liska has pointed towards the lack of a single coherent theory of alliances10, there has 
also been controversy surrounding the definition of the alliance.11 Disagreement exists 
over the nature of the alliance; whether an alliance should be written or unwritten. In the 
older literature, alliances are rigorously formal agreements between sovereign states, 
                                                 
9 For a complete review of the theories of Realism, Constructivism and Liberalism of international 
politics, consult the review section of the literature in the proceeding pages under the signpost “A critique 
of previous literature and theoretical conceptualisation.” 
10 Liska maintains that “it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane 
of general analysis”, Liska maintains that “it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to 
alliances on the plane of general analysis”, Liska. Nations in Alliance p.3 
11 Stefan Bergsmann, 'The Concept of Military Alliance', in Small States and Alliances, ed. by Heinz 
Gärtner Erich Reiter (Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer-Verlag 2001).pp.25-39 
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intended to counterbalance the power of an opponent.12 However, some significant 
scholarship on alliances do not feel need for such formality, and define alliances as a 
formal or informal bond between two or more sovereign nations.13  
Pakistan has an interesting case for illustration. Pakistan’s alliance with the US was 
formally written,14 but in contrast there is no written agreements with China, with the 
exception of the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations”, 
wherein both parties agreed not to “join any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party, nor shall it 
take any action of this nature, including the conclusion of treaties of this nature with a 
third country.”15 However, this treaty does not specify a common threat or enemy, it is a 
general understating between them. Islamabad agreed to sign this treaty to dispel Chinese 
concerns that Pakistan was becoming too close to the US.   
While Pakistan’s formal alliance with the US has been subject to tensions and disruptions, 
the informal alliance with China has been consistent. Andrew Small maintains Pakistan-
China has never been a treaty alliance, but the alliance has been close in world politics.16 
As a formal alliance brings binding commitment and may be costly to break or violate,17 
                                                 
12 Morgenthau. Politics among Nations; Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Connell: University Press, 
Ithaca, 1997).p.8 
13 Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances p.12; Robert Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1968).  
14 Pakistan signed the American sponsored SEATO, CENTO in 1950s and separately signed a mutual 
defence agreement with the US in 1954.  
15 Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, 'New Level of Friendship with China', The Dawn 2005.  
16 Andrew Small, 'The Sino-Pakistani Axis: Asia's 'Little Understood' Relationship', Interview by Gabriel 
Domínguez (Germany Deutsche Welle, 2015) p.1. 
17 Breaking formal alliances are costly and they may project a state as being unreliable, and of suspect 
credibility and competence. Alastair Smith, 'Alliance Formation and War', International Studies 
Quarterly, 39 (1995).pp. 405-425; Alastair Smith, 'Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation', 
 
 11 
 
for the security elites in Pakistan an assurance of verbal commitment may be more 
important than a written agreement. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema emphasises, “Since Pakistan-
China relations demonstrate enviable cordiality and remarkable consistency; the need for 
formal alliance was never felt by either side.”18  
Furthermore, if Pakistan desires to solemnise its alliance with China, two factors could 
be very important: a written alliance would have to stipulate the common threats or 
common interests to be achieved, and India would perhaps view it negatively and seek 
counter-alliances. Pakistan’s alliance with the US during the 1950s gave birth to the 
India-Russia alliance, therefore the informal alliance with China could be a tactical move. 
Besides, the Chinese have been very pragmatic and not made any formal commitment: 
they cooperate but don’t make any agreements in written form, which allows them to 
maintain strategic autonomy. The desire to maintain strategic autonomy often leads states 
not to make an official position on alliances; John Miglietta explains that some states are 
loath to “enter into a formalized alliances as a result of the possibility of changes from 
external as well as internal opponents that they are compromising their sovereignty.”19 
On the basis of these observations, this research defines alliance with much more 
flexibility, and considers an alliance to be as an oral or verbal arrangement between two 
or more sovereign states to achieve some shared objectives. 
In sharp contrast to the concept of “alliance”, the “awkward alliance” has not received 
much attention in the theories of international politics. Though the expression “awkward” 
                                                 
International Interactions, 24 (1998).pp.315-343; James D. Fearon, 'Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: 
Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs', Conflict Resolution, 41 (1997).pp.68-90 
18 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'Significance of Pakistan-China Border Agreement', Pakistan Horizon, 39 
(1968).  
19 John P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992 (Maryland: Lexington 
2002).p.2 
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is not new and has been used modestly in previous discussions, the term is not well 
defined and seems to have only vague meanings. David Ignatius of Washington Post has 
described the US-Russia security cooperation in the Syrian civil war as “awkward” 
alliance.20 Emily Boulter has also defined US-Algerian security cooperation as an 
“awkward” association, mainly citing historic mistrust reason for the awkwardness.21 
Similarly, Sushil Seth has used an analogous term, “awkward bedfellow”, to define the 
Australian dilemma in the event that any US-China confrontation takes an ugly turn. Seth 
believes Canberra would find itself in an awkward situation in having to choose between 
a close alliance partners (Washington) and a close trading partner (Beijing). Even Seth 
fails to define the meaning of the expression “awkward.”22  
The most relevant work to explain the term, however, is the work of Raffaello Pantucci 
and David Pilling at The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). While Pantucci uses 
this term only in the topic, “China in Pakistan: An Awkward Relationship”, otherwise 
there is no explanation of the phenomena in the body text, although we can perhaps see 
what awkwardness means when he explains that “the relationship between the two is 
imbalanced, with China the big brother and Pakistan the supplicant.”23 Pilling uses the 
term “odd couple”, and explains the awkwardness emerging on the basis of cultural and 
ideological differences between two states.24 Though we also define an awkward alliance 
along cultural differences, perhaps Pilling still falls short of defining it systematically. 
                                                 
20 David Ignatius, 'Our Awkward Alliance with Russia', Real Clear Politics (2016). 
21 Emily Boulter, 'An Awkward Alliance: Us-Algeria Security Cooperation', Global Risk Insights, (2015). 
22 Sushil Seth, 'Australia’s Awkward Bedfellows', Taipei Times, 2015.; Ray identifies Russia-India 
alliance as awkward due to ideological differences: one is socialist country other is democracy.; Jayanta 
Kumar Ray, Aspects of India's International Relations, 1700 to 2000: South Asia and the World, (Pearson 
Education India, 2007).p.107 
23 Raffaello Pantucci, 'China in Pakistan: An Awkward Relationship Beneath the Surface', RUSI News 
Brief, (2014). 
24 David Pilling. “China-Pakistan Make an Odd but enduring Couple”  
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The related terms which have been used in the earlier literature like “strange 
bedfellows”25 or “odd couples”26, lack definition too.  
What is common in existing literature is that non-existence of a systematic definition. 
They have used it metaphorically, and fallen short of stipulating its proper meaning and 
definition. This research uses it systematically and explains it on the basis of empirical 
investigation. This study assumes that an ‘awkward alliance’ is formed between two or 
more sovereign states that are ideologically, politically and socially antagonistic and that 
their relations in the recent or distant past have been characterised by a geopolitical 
rivalry. 
Propaganda has been around for a long time, going back to ancient Greece. Ancient Greek 
commander Themistocles used propaganda in the war with Xerxes in 480 BC. Even 
Alexander the Great put his portrait on the coins as a propaganda tool. While the Roman 
empire under Julius Caesar became a master in the use of propaganda, in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries Pope Urban II used propaganda to serve religion. Many leaders, for 
example, Martin Luther King, Benjamin Franklin used propaganda to spread their 
message. In modern times during the war propaganda seemed to have become a great tool 
for nations to fight wars. From the Napoleonic wars to the civil war in the United States, 
propaganda was used extensively and effectively.27 
 Nevertheless, it was not until the beginning of 20th century major wars that the 
propaganda was used widely. All the major powers including the US, the UK, France and 
Germany used it to turn public opinion in their support. British propaganda has led 
America to enter the World War I. After World War I, the British had disbanded its 
                                                 
25 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict 1947-1958, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).; Ole R. Holsti, 'The Study 
of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left', 
The American Political Science Review, 68 (1974). pp.217-242 
26 Michal Thim & Misato Matsuoka, 'The Odd Couple: Japan & Taiwan’s Unlikely Friendship', The 
Diplomat, (2014). 
27 “Propaganda through ages” see Jowet, Propaganda and Persuasion pp.49-93 
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propaganda agency, but revived it again in World War II. During the World War II, 
propaganda expanded further. Almost all the fighting nations used it to gather the support 
of their public for their policies.  
The frequent use of propaganda worldwide highlights its significance; repeatedly, state 
elites have shown faith in its utility and effectiveness, despite uncertainty of its worth. In 
Germany, the story that they were defeated in World War I not because they fought less 
valiantly, but because they could not match the propaganda produced by the British, 
became widely accepted. As Adolph Hitler admitted the Germans had failed to use 
propaganda effectively:  
…it was not until the War that it became evident what immense results could be 
obtained by a correct application of propaganda. Here again, unfortunately, all 
our studying had to be done on the enemy side, for the activity on our side was 
modest, to say the least... For what we failed to do, the enemy did, with amazing 
skill and really brilliant calculation. I, myself, learned enormously from this 
enemy war propaganda.28 
For the sake of this research, we borrow Garth Jowett-Victoria O’Donnell and Bruce 
Smith definitions. Jowett and O’ Donnell maintain that “propaganda is deliberate [wilful, 
intentional, and premediated], systematic [precise, methodical, carrying out something 
with organised regularity] attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition and direct 
behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”29  
                                                 
28 Adolph Hitler, "Mein Kampf, a Reckoning, Chapter VI: War Propaganda" 
http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch06.html [Accessed 12 February 2016].  
29 Jowett, Propaganda and Persuasion, p.7  
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Similarly, Smith defines “Propaganda is the more or less systematic effort to manipulate 
other people’s beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols (words, gestures, 
banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs on coins and postage 
stamps, and so forth).”30 Both the authors agree that propaganda is a systematic effort to 
manipulate the behaviours to achieve the desired outcome which we fully agree. In the 
remaining part of the thesis, we will use the term propaganda in similar context.  
A critique of previous literature and theoretical conceptualisation 
International relations (IR) can be a complicated arena. Those interested in international 
politics (IP) face different competing theoretical frameworks aimed at highlighting the 
phenomena of power, security, and international alliances. Caroline Rose argues that in 
the theoretical division of IR, various theories, then division within those theories almost 
make a daunting task to choose between them and prefer one over the other.31  
The following section is an attempt to highlight usefulness along with fallacies, internal 
contradiction, and flaws of the prevailing rival approaches in IR. A close consideration 
is paid to highlight their inability to accommodate internal threats to the alliances and 
leaders’ propaganda to sustain threatened alliances. In the due course, an attempt is made 
to evaluate, and question their explanations mainly to offer a robust, modest but Realist 
focused theoretical framework called SEPIA to analytically assess propaganda role in 
nations’ efforts to sustain odd alliances in global politics. 
                                                 
30 Bruce Lannes Smith, 'Propaganda', (Encyclopædia Britannica). 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda [Accessed 19 February 2016]. 
31 Caroline Rose, Interpreting Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making 
(London & New York: Routledge 1998).p.29 
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In the existing literature, there is an effervescent discussion between mainstream theories 
(Realism and Liberalism)32 and between mainstream theories and alternative theories like 
Social Constructivism (or simply Constructivist).33 The rival theories offer different 
interpretations to similar phenomena’s like state-to-state relations, the concept of power, 
and international alliances. Though the theoretical boundaries of these theories are fuzzy, 
they indeed extend the scope and effectiveness of the field of IR.  
These competing IP theories can be divided according to their focus on the level of 
analysis and the chosen variables to explain the state’s behavior and its results in world 
politics. In this long list of opposing concepts, the aussenpolitik or macro-level theories 
prefer external factors or system-level variables to explain the interaction between states, 
while innenpolitik theories honour the domestic variables to examine the behavior of the 
state.34 And yet in this strict theoretical divide, looser version of Realism, Neoclassical 
Realism (NCR) tends to combine structural and domestic level intervening variables to 
explain the foreign policy choices of states.35 
                                                 
32 For a discussion about Mainstream theories see David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993).; Charles Kegley ed., Controversies in 
International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1995).  
33 See Friedrich Kratochwil and Yosef Lapid ed., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).; Stephen M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', 
Foreign Policy, 110 (Spring, 1998) 
34 Use of the word innenpolitik and aussenpolitik taken from Fareed Zakaria, 'Realism and Domestic 
Politics: A Review Essay', International Security, 17 (1992). 
35 M.W Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1993).; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of 
America’s World Role. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).; Gideon Rose, 'Review: 
Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', World Politics, 51 (1998).; Randall Schweller, 
Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (Columbia University Press, 
1998).; Randall Schweller, 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing', 
International Security, 29 (2004).; Randall Schweller, 'Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A 
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On an analytical basis, some theories favour structural and material variables, while 
others emphasize cultural and ideational factors. To put in a different way, Neorealism 
explains that the structural variable (states relative capabilities) is an important factor in 
the study of inter-state relations36, just as the Liberals believe that the material factor 
(economic interdependence, co-operation, and institutions) are important. Liberalists like 
Robert Keohane believes that collaboration can be achieved globally through the creation 
and backing of multilateral institutions constructed on liberal principles.37 Meanwhile, 
the Social Constructivist, who disregards material and structural explanations, argues that 
ideational and cultural factors better explain the functioning of states and the international 
system.38 Finally, Radical theories (generally called Marxist theories) suggest a complete 
transformation of the international system.39 Out of the fashion have been Marxist 
theories though.  
While the Realist depicts a confrontational nature of the international system in which 
the states are constantly seeking security, the Idealists believe that there are ways and 
means to escape the global interstate conflict. For them, the international system offers 
                                                 
Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of Us–China Relations', The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 11 (March 2018). 
36 Kenneth Waltz, The Theories of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, 1979 ).; John Mearsheimer, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001).; John Mearsheimer, 'Structural 
Realism', in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. by Milja Kurki Tim Dunne, 
Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2013). pp.77-94 
37 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Longman, 2012).; Robert O. Keohane, 'Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism', International 
Relations 26 (2012).; Bruce Russet, 'Liberalism', in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, ed. by  Milja Kurki Tim Dunne,  Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2013). pp. 94-114  
38 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', 
International Organization, 46 (1992).;Martha Finnermore, National Interests in International Society, 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996).;Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National 
Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, (Cornell University Press, 1996).; Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alexander 
Wendt, 'On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics', 26 (2000).; K.M Fierke, 'Constructivism', in 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. by  Milja Kurki Tim Dunne, Steve Smith 
(Oxford University Press, 2013).pp. 187-205  
39 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge Uneiversity 
Press 1968).; Andrew Linklater, 'Marxism ', in Theories of International Relations, ed. by Scott Burchill 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996 ).; See part three “Socialism” of Michael Doyle, Ways of War and 
Peace, (New York: Norton 1997).  
 18 
 
states opportunity to converge on similar interests. Similarly, Constructivist maintains 
there is nothing given or prior setup which defines the working of interstate relations; 
rather it is a result of intersubjectivity.  
In short, the boundaries of IR theories are fuzzy, but they define the discipline of IR. Of 
course, they show obvious absurdities, and are therefore not free from criticism and 
inadequacies. There is always the possibility of highlighting their inability to explain 
certain phenomena. 
 In the next section, we will evaluate Realism and its various variants, then 
Constructivism and finally Liberalism. 
Alliance literature and Realism  
Although there is no small amount of literature on the concept of alliance in international 
politics, it largely does not address the problems identified in this study. The extensive 
literature is dominated by the Realist perspective and covers many aspects of alliance 
practices. For instance, much work is focused on the costs and effects of alliance on inter-
state conflicts including wars.40 In addition, the literature covers the issues within 
alliances for example “burden-sharing” and “abandonment-entrapment.”41 The sub-areas 
                                                 
40 Jack Levy, 'Alliance Formation and War Behaviour: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975', 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25 (1981).; David Singer and Melvin Small, 'Alliance Aggregation and 
the Onset of War,1815-1945', in Quantitative International Politics, ed. by David J. Singer (New York: 
Free Press 1968). pp. 247-286; Brett Leeds, 'Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military 
Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes', American Journal of Political Science, 47 
(2003).;Volker Krause, 'Hazardous Weapon? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defence Pact on Militarized 
Disputes, 1950-1995', International Interactions, 30 (2004).; Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, 'To 
Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios', Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (2003).; 
Smith.; Paul D. Senese & John A. Vasquez, The Steps to War:An Empirical Study, (Princeston University 
Press 2008).  
41 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances,' Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 48 (1966 ).; Jack Snyde, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics, 36 
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like alliances between minor and major powers and their consequences are also 
extensively covered.42 Nevertheless, there are still a number of sub-fields in the alliance 
literature which remain understudied, the study of awkward alliances in international 
politics and the need for the propaganda to sell these awkward alliances is just one of 
them.  
Realist approach  
In international relations, Realism is the dominant theory. It is simple, parsimonious and 
provides less complicated answers to many important questions about the functions of 
the international system and about the state’s behavior. Realism emphasis primacy of 
power and security. In a Realist world, states are fighting for power and position in the 
international system.43  
Despite the predominance of Realism in IR, it is not a unified theory. Edwin Fedder has 
rightly summed up this dilemma when he says, “the concept of the alliance in the 
literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous.”44 Mainly, it can be 
divided into three main variations: Classical Realism, Neorealism/Structural Realism, 
                                                 
(1984).; Christensen and Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in 
Multipolarity', International Organization, 44 (1990).  
42 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Power, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).; Michael 
Altfeld, 'The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test', Western Political Quarterly, (1984).; Heinz Gärtner 
Volker Krause and David Singer in Erich Reiter, Small States and Alliances, (Physica-Verlag, 2001). 
43 Following list is helpful in explaining Realist thoughts. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nation; Walt. One 
World, Many Theories ;Waltz. Theory of International Politics; Sean Lynn-Jones Michael Brown, and 
Steven Miller eds, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemoraray Realism and International Security (Cambrdige: 
MIT Press 1995 ).; Ken Booth and Chris Brown, 'Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human 
Nature', International Relations, 23 (2009); Ednah M Peter, Classical Realism and International 
Relations, (GRIN Publishing 2015).  
44 E.H.Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', International Studies Quarterly, 12 (1968).p.70  
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and Neoclassical Realism. However, despite division within it, following prepositions are 
common in all variants;  
• States are central and rational actors in the international system, 
• The international system is characterized by an anarchy, 
• States pursue their own interests without granting privileges to norms and values, 
• And states aim to maximize their power to ensure their self-preservation and 
survival.45 
While highlighting various variants of Realism an attention is paid to evaluate why 
Realist emphasis the conflicting nature of international politics, and why states seek 
competition. More specifically, we aim to examine why Realist traditionally focuses on 
the state-to-state level of analysis, and at the end, we argue why this focus is insufficient 
for our analysis of the Pakistan-China alliance.  
Classical Realism  
The roots of classical Realism are centuries old. Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the intellectual ancestors and founders of classic 
realistic thoughts. Although Hans Morgenthau laid the foundations of modern Realism. 
One of the main assumptions of classical Realism is that state-to-state relations take place 
fundamentally in an anarchic context because of the absence of a world government 
capable of enforcing peace and order in the international system. Anarchy is considered 
the absence of central or a universal power. 
The Greek philosopher Thucydides masterwork “The History of Peloponnesian War” 
written in 431 BC, maintains that the prime objective of every state is to secure its 
national interests. In reaching these interests, states disregard norms and values only in 
                                                 
45 Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 373; Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 
Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, (The MIT Press, 1995). p.ix  
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the event their welfares are in the balance. Thucydides proposes that international system 
is defined by anarchy where states survive under a constant fear of domination and 
intimidation of powerful states and thus face security dilemma. Thucydides believes that 
there is no supreme authority to deal with the interests of the state. Therefore, states 
practice a balance of power politics strategy. The balance of power means that powerful 
states govern weak states.46  
The 17th century English philosopher Hobbes’ “Leviathan” aptly explains the state of 
nature concept. Hobbes maintains that there is a war of every individual against every 
individual. Life in a state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”47 
Everyone can take fellow individual life and property without penalty. Hobbes state of 
nature represents Neorealist core concept of anarchy which means lack of a central power 
at the inter-state level. Like Thucydides, Hobbes considers states less concerned about 
the norms and values in the conduct of state affairs than about power politics and self-
interest.  
Rousseau “Social Contract” presents a milder version of Hobbes Realism. Rousseau 
believes that although there is an existence of general will at the societal level, it is absent 
at international level. While in Hobbes’s state of nature conflict occurs naturally due to 
the human nature, for Rousseau, it depends on the dynamic forces existing in the 
international system.48 Rousseau assumptions are much like Waltz’s Neorealism.  
                                                 
46 Translated By Richard Crawley Thucydides, 'The History of the Peloponnesian War', (Project 
Gutenberg's EBook #7142, 2009). 
47 Tranalted by Edward White and David Widger Thomas Hobbes, 'Leviathan 1651', in The Project 
Gutenberg EBooks, (2013).  
48 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Create Space Independent Publishing Platform 2014). 
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The Italian diplomat, historian, and philosopher Machiavelli give a new development to 
the classic Realist thoughts in his book “The Prince” written in 1513. Machiavelli urges 
leaders to conquer the world to ensure self-defence. To him, universal dominance is a 
necessary condition for prudent leaders to reduce threats to national security. 
Machiavelli's philosophy is similar to John Mearsheimer’s offensive Realism.49 
Hans Morgenthau and Realism  
Father of modern Realism, Hans Morgenthau arranged Realist thoughts in his essential 
and persuasive book “Politics Among Nation’s” published in 1948. Morgenthau focuses 
on competitive and conflicting nature of the international system. Morgenthau argues that 
states are unitary actors primarily motivated to dominate other states, such as human 
nature, which tend to dominate others. For him, the main purpose of each state is to 
accumulate power, as it guarantees its security in an anarchic system and one without the 
highest authority. Ultimately states’ struggle for power leads to inter-state conflicts. 
Morgenthau explicates gaining material power is a currency to survive in the international 
system. Morgenthau Realism makes international system flawed and dangerous world 
where states feel insecure.50 In sum, Classical Realist like Morgenthau thinks 
“international politics like all politics is a struggle for power.”51 The states are struggling 
for power because they are led by selfish individuals who are directed by their desire for 
power. Naturally, as human beings are power maximizing, so as they want their states to 
be powerful. In such a case, the states are looking for international alliances to balance 
strong states. Alliances for Morgenthau are one of the behaviours of preserving the 
balance of the international system. Alliances are viewed as an important shield to survive 
internationally.  
                                                 
49 Transalted by: W. K. Marriott Nicolo Machiavelli, 'The Prince', (The Project Gutenberg [EBook 
#1232] 2006). 
50 Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations  
51 ibid, p.13 
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Neorealism  
Neorealism is the central theory of international relations that systematically explains 
state-to-state relationships. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are the main advocates 
of this theory. While Waltz talks about it in his very famous book “Theory of 
International Politics” published in 1979 and Mearsheimer, talks about it in the “Tragedy 
of the Great Political Power” published in 2001. Although both Waltz and Mearsheimer 
agree that the international system is the main reason for states behavior and actions at 
international level but differing from how much power a state needs to survive in the 
international system. It is mainly a question of how much power a state needs to survive 
in the international system. Mearsheimer believes that the state should seek power as 
much as possible to eventually seek hegemony in the international system, while Waltz 
believes that a power that gives security to the state is sufficient. 
Theoretically Neorealism departures from Hans Morgenthau Realism. For classical 
thinker’s power is an end itself while for Neorealist power is a means to achieve security. 
Waltz argues “Morgenthau took power to be an end in itself, in contrast, I built structural 
realism theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and that power is one 
of the means to that end.”52  
In sharp contrast to Morgenthau Realism, Neorealist believe that human nature has 
nothing to do with the states’ efforts to seek power, but it is the structure of the 
international system that explains the states’ efforts to seek power and international 
alliances. Waltz international system has two main structural components. Waltz 
maintains, “a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units.”53 It means, there 
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is the main structure called the international system, and secondly, there are sovereign 
“interacting units” known as states.54 Waltz reduces the international system to a sum of 
its parts. The interacting units are not always equal in power, “distribution of capabilities” 
is an important aspect of the international system.  
Waltz assumes “international system is decentralised and anarchic.”55 Anarchy is not 
denoted by the presence of chaos and disorder, rather the absence of supernatural 
authority that regulates interstate relationships and preserves global peace. There is no 
world government that can coerce the entities (states) to act dutifully and peacefully. In 
case states need emergency assistance, they have nothing in the international system 
where they could seek help and file a complaint against the aggressor.  
To clarify the concept of anarchy, Waltz differentiates international system with the 
domestic system of the states. In the domestic context, Waltz argues, “some are entitled 
to command; others are required to obey.”56 Moreover, “domestic politics is centralized 
and hierarchic.”57 It means law provides states necessary power to punish irresponsible 
and law-breaking individuals. Individuals with criminal leaning and wicked intentions 
are punished by the government. The states assure that no one can take the lives and 
property of other individuals.  
However, the international system lacks such hierarchy of authority. In the international 
system, all states are sovereign units without universal command. Waltz suggests, “None 
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is entitled to command; none is required to obey.”58 The states possess equal weight and 
pursue an identical interest. The lack of deterrence at the international level worry states 
about their survival and security. International politics is a zero-sum game, where the 
gain of one state is a sometimes loss of other states.  
The anarchy in the international system makes states to adopt the balance of power 
strategies. The absence of “night watchman” put states in a helpless and perilous security 
situation. In such an uncertainty, states look for a self-help system to survive. Waltz 
believes “survival is based on a state’s material capabilities and its alliances with other 
states.”59 States either balance internally or externally. Internally states increase security 
and defence by building armed forces, economy, and a strong government. Externally 
states look for a potential partner to form international alliances.60  
Thus, specifically, with regard to the Balance of Power politics (international alliances), 
Waltz suggests that the relative capabilities or power of a state is an important variable 
which makes states adopt balancing strategies. He predicts that equilibrium can be 
achieved in the international system when the power is distributed evenly, where no state 
is allowed to dominate. Waltz predicts once an equilibrium has been established through 
the external balancing, the system becomes more stable, secure and prevent aggression. 
John Mearsheimer comprehension of anarchy is much same as Waltz. For Mearsheimer, 
International anarchy is for the most part Hobbesian. In Hobbesian anarchy, the security 
situation is very poor, and states try to achieve security by increasing their relative 
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preference.61 Like Waltz, Mearsheimer believes unlike domestic political system where 
states have developed a framework in view of laws and statues to run states, there is no 
such system at the worldwide level, therefore, states take a stab at helping themselves.62 
Mearsheimer believes though there exist international institutions, national security 
cannot be subsidized to them as they make false promises about national security.63  
Mearsheimer self-help system seeks hegemony in the international system. In 
Mearsheimer words, “Hegemony means dominance of the system, which is usually 
interpreted to mean the entire world.”64 In an anarchic context, states try to enhance their 
power greatly and, in the process, start behaving offensively. Mearsheimer argues, 
“States begin with a defensive motive but are forced to think and sometimes act 
offensively because of the structure of the international system.”65 Mearsheimer argues 
states distinctively are not aggressive but survival make them offensive. Mearsheimer 
states, “Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they 
possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they must seek more power if they 
want to maximize their odds of survival.”66 Specifically, about the alliances, 
Mearsheimer posits that to ensure their survival states enhance their own capability by 
building internal strength and indirectly through seeking international alliances. 
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Balance of Threat Theory  
The seminal work of Stephen Walt offers one of the most detailed and extensive 
developments of the BoP theories of alliance formation in his famous Balance of Threat 
(BoT) theory. Walt’s raises the question “how do states choose their friends” in his well-
known book “The Origin of the Alliances” published in 1987. Walt believes security is a 
problem for all states, and most countries are usually driven by fears and largely defensive 
motives, even when they are using military force or behaving assertively. Walt argues 
Realism “is essentially rationalist in orientation: it is about the constraints that states face 
in a world of anarchy and the incentives this situation creates for the conduct of foreign 
policy.”67 
Walt focus is also competitive nature of the international system in which states aim to 
defend themselves through external alliances. Walt believes that the states are most 
important units in the international system that seek external alliances to protect 
themselves in an anarchic world. Walt maintains “In anarchy, states form alliances to 
protect themselves, their conduct is determined by the threat they perceive, and the power 
of others is merely one element in their calculations.”68 Walt accepts Waltz assumptions 
are sound, but he argues the states balance threats rather than power alone. He believes 
that the greatest threat to the states does not necessarily come from only stronger power 
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since Waltz assumes that the distribution of capabilities is an important variable, but the 
level of threat increases due to other factors. Walt suggests, “states ally to balance against 
external threats rather than power alone. Although the distribution of power is an 
extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.”69  
Walt assumes that states either balance or bandwagon when confronted external threat. 
Walt claims balancing threat is not the only way states behave; some states, under certain 
circumstances, can also decide to bandwagon with the existing threat.70 Walt remarks 
“Balancing is allying with others against the prevailing threats; Bandwagon refers to 
alignment with the source of the threat.”71 So for instance, if Pakistan wants to balance 
India, it means that it will form an external alliance with a third party (China, USA) 
against India, but if it decides to the bandwagon, it will be attracted to India (the source 
of threat). For Walt, “balancing is far more common than bandwagoning.”72 In addition, 
Walt also recommends some other hypothesis of alliance formation, for example, the role 
of foreign aid, ideology, and political penetration. He contends that these are important 
considerations but are not “powerful cause of alignment.”73  
Patricia Weitsman’s overambitious theory of alliances updates BoT theory by adding two 
new concepts along with balancing and bandwagoning: ‘hedging and tethering’. 
Weitsman argues that different levels of threats promote different alliance behaviour. If 
a threat to a state is deadly, it will bandwagon, if the threat is high it will balance but if 
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the state is feeling medium or low-level threat, the security elites will ‘tether and hedge’ 
respectively.74  
Focus of Realist on state-to-state level of analysis  
In the following paragraph, I intend to focus on the reason why Realist focus on state to 
state level and analysis and the reasons it is misleading for Pakistan China Relation. 
Realist focus on interstate relations is due to the following factors. The Realist reduces 
the importance of anything but states. The states are principal and rational actors in the 
international system. Therefore, Realist focuses on states mainly because the competition 
is between states in the international system. Moreover, states function in an anarchic 
international system. The states have failed to set up international institutions which can 
pledge their security. Anarchy increases state vulnerability and put pressures on interstate 
relations. While domestically states have a government, which expresses the will of the 
states, thus, states lack such mechanism internationally. Therefore, Realist focus is on 
state-to-state relations.  
Finally, Realist accepts that states have fixed interest. States look for survival in the 
international system. States interests do not change because anarchy is a constant 
construct. Equally, states perception of other’s states intention does not change. 
Therefore, states rely on self-help system. Self-help system makes states to search for 
international alliances with compatible states. There is uncertainty, fear of the domination 
of other states and competition for the power that forces states to look for alliances.  
Although traditional alliance theories give privileges to international structure variables 
for the formation of external alliances which is clearly misleading for our analysis of the 
Pakistan-China alliances. It is misleading because it does not give importance to states 
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propaganda. Furthermore, it is misleading because it does not focus on the internal 
attributes of the state. It marginalises internal dynamics of the state.  
We agree mainly BoT theory that states leaders balance internal and external threats, but 
we argue this is half-truth and incomplete story. Some states must also sell the alliance 
because of the internal threats to the persistence of the alliance. BoT can explain 
Pakistan’s need for the alliance, why Pakistan needs international alliances, but BoT 
cannot explain how Pakistan secures its alliance with China domestically. By 
incorporating SEPIA, a solution is presented in this research. SEPIA provides a better 
explanation of alliance maintenance than does BoP and BoT. The task of examining Sino-
Pakistan is made easier.   
BoP theories downplay the role of state-society relations in shaping the state’s security 
policies. The BoP alliance models do not explain much about a changing society that 
becomes more religious and perceives the alliance against their beliefs or the sense of 
marginalization of the state. Thus, the BoP theory limitations create space for further 
development of the alliance theory. This research indicates that if two states have formed 
an alliance, they are likely to require some effort, above all, to ensure that the critical 
alliance is not faced with threats internally. By offering SEPIA, this study corrects these 
BoP theories manifest absurdities and flaws. The assessment of this section on alliance 
dynamics has achieved two major goals. It has identified the lacuna that exists in the 
literature, and but more significantly, made a meek attempt to highlight the need to 
include propaganda as an important casual path between internal threats and external 
alliances.  
Looser version of Realism: Neo-classical Realism (NCR)  
In the recent times, an increasing number of scholars have added a new version of 
Realism called NCR. It posits a new approach to studying state’s foreign policy 
behaviour. It suggests a domestic politics role in the foreign policy analysis of the states 
which have been neglected by neorealist. NCR focuses on the interaction between the 
global system and the internal dynamics of states. It seems to clarify the foreign policies 
of the individual states rather than to explain recurrent patterns of world outcomes. Unlike 
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Neorealist, which is generally a theory of international politics, NCR is mainly a theory 
of foreign policy behaviour. Randall Schweller explains:  
Waltzian neorealism is strictly a theory of international politics, which accordingly makes 
no claim to explain foreign policy or specific historical events. Recognizing such 
limitations, a new breed of Realist scholars has embraced the richer formulations of 
traditional, pre-Waltzian realists, who focused more on foreign policy than systemic level 
phenomena.75  
Gideon Rose first coined the term NCR in his 1998 review article “Neoclassical Realism 
and Theory of Foreign Policy.” Its main supporters are William Wohlforth, Thomas 
Christensen, Fareed Zakaria, Randall Schweller, and Jeffrey Taliaferro. They all maintain 
what Schweller considers states; “peculiar domestic and political situations” subtly 
regulate its behaviour and response to its peripheral setting.76 NCR is much appropriate 
than traditional Realist theories as it is hospitable to the internal dynamics of the states, 
despite this being its strength, it fells sort of elucidating Pakistan-China alliance as 
explained in the proceeding paragraphs.   
NCR borrows some aspects both from Classical Realism and from Neorealism and 
formulates a new version with an emphasis on domestic factors. Gideon Rose explains:   
It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical Realist thought. Its adherents 
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argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy are driven 
primarily by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative 
material power capabilities. This is why they are Realist. They argue further, 
however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect 
and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.77  
Also called “Modified Realism”78 NCR does not discredit neorealism main assumptions 
but connect state and society relationship in examining state foreign policy behaviour. 
According to Lobell et al., “Neoclassical Realism builds upon the complex relationship 
between the state and society found in classical Realism without sacrificing the central 
insight of Neorealism about the constraints of the international system.”79 Schweller adds 
to the debates by not ignoring the Waltzian concept of international system, but believes 
it is inadequate:  
While not abandoning Waltz’s insights about international structure and its 
consequences, neoclassical realists have added first and second level variables 
(e.g. domestic politics, internal extraction capability and processes, state power 
and intentions and leaders perceptions of the relative distribution of capabilities 
and of the offense-defence balance) to explain foreign policy decision making and 
intrinsically important historical puzzles.80 
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NCR essentially addresses an important aspect of state behaviour that Neorealist thinking 
has yet to explain satisfactorily. One of the key question that challenges Neorealism at its 
core is why states perform contrarily when faced similar constraints in the global system. 
NCR adherents believe the answer can be found by combining both domestic and 
systemic variables. Fareed Zakaria argues, “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy 
should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the 
policy can be explained by what factors.”81  
Unlike Walt, which takes a distribution of capabilities and systemic pressures as only 
variables, NCR advocate “state motivations”, “state capacity” and “attributes of national 
power” an important consideration in analysing states’ foreign policy. NCR supporters 
are sceptical that there exists any strong and automatic “transmission belt” which assist 
to translate systemic pressures into foreign policy outcomes.82 They argue that the 
opportunities and competitions presented by the global system cannot be demarcated and 
understood through the complex domestic process that serves “to channel, mediate, and 
(re)direct policy output.”83 They further believe the challenges of the international system 
are “murky and difficult to interpret”84 and must be “filtered through the fuzzy prism” of 
the state elites involved in decision making before translating into political decisions.85 
NCR adherents believe that the perception of individuals responsible for the foreign 
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policy making of states is significant with regard to the advantages and disadvantages 
provided by the international system.86 
It essentially means that the parameters of state foreign policy are conditioned by 
systemic pressures i.e. relative capabilities of states, but the impact of such imperatives 
are not direct rather they must be first translated through the intervening variables like 
states elites at the unit level and then analysed for its impact on the states behaviours. 
Specifically, although it matters states are facing external threats and pressures from the 
international system, they can respond or ignore it, keeping in view their own standing in 
the international system, their own calculations about their power and thinking. Taliaferro 
maintains that state elite will make decision keeping in view the advantages and 
disadvantages provided by the international system.87  
Another important intervening variable promoted by the NCR adherents is state domestic 
power which helps or suppress elite’s perceptions about their conduct in the international 
system. Zakaria maintains, “foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by 
its government. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract 
for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decisionmakers can achieve their 
ends.”88 To illustrate his case study of the US government, Zakaria discusses during the 
late 19th century the US administration wanted to enhance its influence globally, but the 
weak central government and powerful states barred federal government efforts to expand 
universally. But the industrial era provided such opportunity to the US government to 
expand. Zakaria maintains,  
The decades after the Civil War saw the beginning of a long period of growth in 
America's material resources. But this national power lay dormant beneath a weak 
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state, one that was decentralized, diffuse, and divided. The presidents and their 
secretaries of state tried repeatedly to convert the nations rising power into 
influence abroad, but they presided over a federal state structure and a tiny central 
bureaucracy that could not get men or money from the state governments or from 
society at large…The 1880s and 1890s mark the beginnings of the modern 
American state, which emerged primarily to cope with the domestic pressures 
generated by industrialization…This transformation of state structure 
complemented the continuing growth of national power, and by the mid-1890s 
the executive branch was able to bypass Congress or coerce it into expanding 
American interests abroad. America's resounding victory in the Spanish-
American War crystallized the perception of increasing American power . . .. 
[and] America expanded dramatically in the years that followed.89  
NCR other unit-level variables are “cohesion,” “consensus within the government,” the 
“role of bureaucracy,” and the “role of political culture.” The domestic structure prevents 
states to adopt certain actions externally, even if the state leaders correctly assess 
conditions of the system. Lobell believes there may be an occasion when states accurately 
perceive the incentive, opportunities, and constraints provided by the states external 
environment, but states may appear handicapped to tailor their foreign policy accordingly 
mainly due to the domestic politics constraints.90 Lobell further argues, “elite perception 
and calculations of international pressures and a lack of consensus within the top 
leadership and national security bureaucracies often slow the process of net 
assessment.”91  
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Furthermore, Schweller describes four important variables which aid or constrains states 
to come to a certain foreign policy decision. The four variables are “elite consensus”, 
“elite cohesion” and “elite polarization”, “social cohesion” and “regime vulnerability.” 92 
Regarding alliances, Schweller’s Balance of Interest (BoI) concept explains that the 
decision on any alliance is based on state motivation or interest rather than power, 
whether states choose to have an alliance or not. Schweller believes that the response to 
threats is dependent on a state’s nature, whether it is a revisionist state or keen to maintain 
the status quo.93 While Taliaferro believes “state institutions”, “state-sponsored 
nationalism” and “anti-static ideology” must be deemed important for their role as a 
mediator between states international environment and states reactions to it.94  
NCR is also cognizant of giving space to the cultural factors in understanding domestic 
dynamics that influences states foreign policy behaviours. Colin Dueck argues, “culture 
shapes strategic choices in several ways. First, culture influences the way international 
events, pressures, and conditions are perceived. Second, it provides a set of causal beliefs 
regarding the efficient pursuit of national interests. Third, it helps determine the actual 
definitions of these interests, by providing foreign policy goals.” 95 Culture in certain case 
help nation to respond aggressively coherently to external challenges. Schweller argues 
fascism nationalism helped Germany to mobilize resources.96  
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NCR in Pakistan-China context  
Indeed, NCR utility, and strength is found in its acceptance of domestic intervening 
variables which have been ignored by Neorealism and complained by SEPIA theoretical 
model. If a theory which is associated more closely with SEPIA, then it is NCR. SEPIA 
like NCR gives preference to the internal dynamics of the states, but there are significant 
differences the way both concepts approach it. NCR explains foreign policy behavior, 
SEPIA explain strategies of domestic propaganda to sustain alliance domestically.  
Precisely, if we apply NCR model on China-Pakistan alliance, it means that external 
variables are important but domestic propaganda as an intervening variable determine 
Pakistani security elite behaviour towards China, but this is not the central argument of 
this research. Andrew Dafty maintains that it is extremely hard to gauge the impact of 
propaganda on the formation of the alliances.97 More precisely, applying NCR model 
means the perception of the Pakistani elites about their own standing in the international 
system and their strength vis-à-vis their own social work as an intervening variable to 
determine their foreign policy behaviour. Yet again this is not the main assumption of 
SEPIA theoretical approach. 
SEPIA theoretical model is about securing external alliance from domestic threats. 
Indeed, SEPIA urge to consider the internal dynamics of the states, but not for the purpose 
of determining external behaviour but to evaluates domestic society challenges to the 
state efforts to maintain alliance and state efforts to secure popular support for the 
alliance.  
Although SEPIA goes beyond systemic analysis, and try to explore states internally, it 
studies states internal attributes. However, it does not use internal attributes to determine 
Pakistan’s behaviours towards China. SEPIA does not mean that Pakistani officials 
making efforts to win over the Chinese citizens but its own society, whose religious 
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tendencies are exposing Pakistani elite’s fears towards their own society. In sum, this 
research is about constructing alliance within the domestic milieu. SEPIA explains that 
the Sino-Pakistan alliance exists, it is mainly its survival, which is at stake, SEPIA aims 
to explain how to secure its survival in the wake of challenges from Pakistani society. 
Therefore, this is a different argument than NCR explanation. This is the main deficiency 
and fallacy of this theory, which makes it unsuitable for the current research.  
Next section explores Social Constructivism, which largely pays attention to the domestic 
variables, whether it is helpful to the phenomena of Pakistan-China alliance.  
Social Constructivism  
Social Constructivism (or simply Constructivism) is an international political theory that 
rejects the prerequisites of Structural Realism. Constructivism, which emerged as an 
alternative theory in post-cold war era, deals key concepts and questions that 
conventional theories of IR have failed to sufficiently elucidate and understand. 
Constructivism premises and variables are completely different from mainstems theories. 
It provides privileges to norms and identities, the ideas that traditional theories consider 
trivial and secondary.98 The cultural-ideational variables (nationalism, culture, and 
identity) that are subject to devaluation in the mainstream theories are fundamental for 
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constructivist. Unlike Neorealist, Constructivists posit concepts like power, anarchy, and 
sovereignty are socially created. It considers material factor unimportant as opposed to 
cognitive factors. 
Though Nicholas Onuf devised the term, Alexander Wendt popularised it. Onuf famously 
argues that states like individuals are living in a “world of our own making.” 99 
Constructivism world is a social world, it is a world of intersubjectivity. It is made of the 
interactions of the individuals and their common beliefs and consciousness about 
different phenomena.100 John Searle argues Constructivism give importance to 
individual’s perception and thinking not the material factors or “brute facts.” 101  
Constructivism assumes that the world’s knowledge and many aspects are not real, but 
that people only relate their meanings to them through negotiations and social contacts. 
States will play differently with their friends and enemies who make their social 
experiences. To illustrate this point, Constructivist argue North Korea may not be a threat 
to China, but it is a threat to the United States. Even in the Neorealist world, Korea should 
threaten both the United States and China with its dangerous nuclear weapons. Likewise, 
500 British nuclear weapons cannot be a threat to the United States, but 5 nuclear 
weapons in North Korea represent a major threat to the United States.102 So, for 
Constructivists, it is not the structure of the international system, but the social interaction 
of the state that counts.  
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Likewise, if the people of the United Kingdom get up early in the morning and say that 
the United Kingdom no longer exists, it means that it does not exist. Similar if the nations 
of India and Pakistan come to an agreement that their rivalry is over it means it’s over.  
Constructivist discards Neorealist distribution of capabilities explanation as “biased 
elucidation” and argues that “the most important aspect of the international system is 
social, not material.”103 They affirm that international system is not a natural phenomenon 
occurring without the interfering of the individuals but a human creation. The 
international system is not a system like a solar system with a physical presence rather it 
is a cognitive creation. In a Constructivist world, the international system does not exist 
by itself, but in the mutual consciousness between the states. This is intellectual and 
ideational creation, “It is a set of ideas, a body of thoughts, a system of norms, which has 
been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.” 104  
For the Constructivist, the international system is not rigid as suggested by the Neorealist. 
It changes with the change of ideas and values. Essentially it is defined by the interaction 
of the states and the meaning attributed to it. In addition, for Realists, anarchy is a natural 
phenomenon occurring without state intervention that leads to the self-help system. but 
the Constructivist does not accept this narrow interpretation. For Constructivist anarchy 
is not given, it is socially constructed. Wendt argues, “Anarchy is what states make of it.” 
105 In short, Constructivist believe that there is no such thing anarchy, and as a result, 
there is no materialistic explanation. It is not a permanent phenomenon that causes 
constant interstate struggle.  
In a Constructivist world, the identities and interests of states can change as they are 
socially constructed. The Neorealist propose the identities and interests of the states are 
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given and fixed. States understand what they are doing. However, in a Constructivist 
paradigm, the interests of the state are not fixed but changing. In a Realistic world, states 
have an assumption about other states, in a Constructivist world, there is no 
presupposition, but everything depends on interactions with other states. 
Wendt argues that the identities and interests of states are basically found when states 
interact with other states. So, interests are not constant and rigid, rather they are changing 
and redefining.106 Thomas Riss-Kappan, argues that the existence of the NATO is due to 
the member's states shared identity which had been non-existent before its formation.107 
Hence, Constructivist international alliances are formed not due to inherent forces 
existing at the international level, but identity is formed by states and individual itself.108  
Criticism on Constructivism  
Constructivism is a good indication of the growing concepts of international politics. It 
provides a convincing explanation about the construction and reconstruction of the 
international system and the concept of anarchy. Despite the sophistication and 
originality of Constructivism, it presents some flaws that cannot be ignored without 
difficulty. Serious defects have been identified in this concept. The main challenge to 
Constructivist has emerged from the ranks of Realism.  
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In the first case, Constructivists often exaggerate their importance, while clearly; they 
cannot sufficiently admit the effects of the external environment and the structural 
material variables on the behavior of states. Constructivism is a normative theory that 
emphasizes the role of ideas, norms, and values in explaining the phenomena of world 
politics; Neorealist are extremely cynical about norms and identities. The Neorealist 
believes that norms have generally been neglected by powerful states. Stephen Krasner 
states “Powerful states have violated the autonomy and the integrity of weak ones.” 109  
Likewise, Neorealist, are not willing to accept that states become friends or enemies 
based on social interaction. They contemplate, it might be good for a thought, but it does 
not work in a real world. The anarchic international structure makes difficult for the states 
to trust each other. Mearsheimer argues that it is an international system that determines 
the behavior of states, not social interactions.110 In spite of everything, a state whose 
security is susceptible will possibly attempt to enhance its relative power. It can either 
increase the defense budget, look for alliances but barely think that the interaction of 
some vague ideas will help to reduce tension. Neorealists believe that states’ intentions 
towards other states are not benevolent and inter-state interaction is not based on genuine 
intentions. Copeland believes states deceive “to serve their own narrow interests” and 
cannot be trusted.111  
A serious flaw is founded in Constructivists failure to explain the formation of norms and 
values. According to Robert Jarvis Constructivists have failed to explain “how norms are 
formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined.”112  
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In short, Constructivism is inappropriate from the perspective of this work that deals with 
domestic politics without ignoring external political factors. Unfortunately, 
Constructivism pays excessive attention to the domestic factor while ignoring structural 
factors. They are solely based on the ideas, norms and do not take into account external 
factors. SEPIA being a Realist inspired framework mainly agrees with Realist’s basic 
assumption that external factors cannot be ignored. In Pakistani case, the threats come 
from its external environment, it is India and Afghanistan which pose a threat to its 
security, Constructivist does not bother to argue about external factors.  
Assumptions of Liberalism  
Although Liberalism is an important IR theory, the understanding of the Liberals of world 
politics is very different from that of the Realists and the Constructivists. Liberals not 
only recognise the states but also identify other actors in the international system. For 
example, a nongovernmental organisation (NGOs), intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) are as important as governments. The 
Realists explain the conflicting nature of the international system; the Liberalists suggest 
how to avoid conflict in the international system.113 Liberals are the other side of the coin, 
which assumes that international conflict can be avoided through inter-state cooperation, 
promotions of democracy and establishment of international institutions.  
While Realists believe that state-to-state cooperation is difficult to achieve as states 
strengthen the power and look at each other with suspicion, Idealists tend to disagree and 
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believe that states are benevolent and believe in cooperation. The Liberals attacking 
Realist’s core assumptions argue that the international system is in peace and that it 
depends on the states and other actors of the international system to benefit from it. They 
believe that the world is not essentially a relative power, but a positive sum game.114  
The Liberal world is not a world of despair and uncertainty as suggested by the Realists. 
Idealists believe that there is a conflict, but there are other things that go beyond that i.e. 
their search for cooperation and global welfare. Liberals offer to develop global economic 
and political co-operation.115 The liberal main objective is to provide economic prosperity 
and stability. In the Liberal world, states do not challenge each other for security gains; 
they try to commit everyone well.116 Collective security and cooperation is the norm of 
the Liberal paradigm. States believe that by cooperation they are better off. State-to-state 
relations based on interdependence make the conflict too expensive and unprofitable as 
states consider mutual benefits in cooperation more attractive than conflicting behavior 
towards each other.117 
Basing their argument on Immunal Kant and Paine, Idealist like president Woodrow 
Wilson argue that spread of democracy and democratic states and/or similar regime 
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spread peace and cooperation. 118 The spread of democracy will make the world peaceful 
as democratic states are intrinsically more non-violent than authoritarian states.119  
While Intuitionalist, largely part of Liberalists thoughts, argues that international conflict 
can be avoided through cooperation and international institutions can help facilitate this 
cooperation. Institutions create incentives for good behaviour and making it costlier for 
states to violate international commitments.120 States observing to the institution pledge 
to the rules and regulations set up by the institution. In summary, the Liberal vision of 
the international system is not bleak and competitive but is characterised by opportunities 
and cooperation among states. Moreover, Liberalism believes that a relationship based 
on states interdependence leads to cooperation in international politics.  
Manifest absurdities of Liberalism  
There are serious problems with this mainstream theory of IR. Liberalism undoubtedly 
provides a different perspective on the state of international politics, but its strong 
dependence on material factors (economy, trade, cooperation, and Institutions) makes it 
relatively unexciting for current research. Only economic interdependence is not enough 
to prevent conflicts at the global level. We also know international institution have 
miserably failed to prevent conflict in international politics. Institution rules and 
regulation have been smashed by powerful nations. Therefore, Liberalists have a hard 
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time in elucidating the conflicts, which occur in the international system frequently 
despite cooperation and institutions. Liberal institutions have lost the trust of many 
nations all over the world. 
Liberalism is challenged by many developments around the world. Roger Cohen of the 
New York Times says that the international organization, such as NATO and the EU, is 
struggling to survive, and that “the forces of disintegrating are on March.” 121 The World 
Economic Forum proposes that the Liberal world order is being challenged by powerful 
authoritarian regimes. 122 The expert of Democracy Larry Diamond painted a gloomy 
picture of the democratic configuration in the world, suggesting that “democracy is 
falling apart” and between 2000 and 2015, democracy fell in 27 countries.123 Stephen 
Walt argues that efforts to build a democratic setup in Afghanistan, Iraq and many other 
parts of the world have failed miserably in recent decades.124  
The Arab Spring has divided Arab countries into sectarian lines. One wonders if the Arab 
world is happier after the revolution. The expert has difficulty answering these questions 
with certainty.125 The Liberal world order that united Europe after the World War II has 
come under attack from within: the people of the UK has voted to leave the EU; Turkey, 
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Poland, and Hungary are moving towards a non-Liberal direction. In the United States, 
the White House is now occupied by President Trump who abuse the nature of African 
states. Thus, the central features of Liberalism are questioned, and Liberalism has 
difficulty explaining these new phenomena. In such a situation, this paradigm is not 
useful in this research. 
Realist paradigm vs Constructivism  
Finally, it is important to state why the Realist paradigm will be the main focus rather 
than alternative theories which routinely pay more attention to domestic variables, like 
Constructivism. Partly, the answer lies in the Constructivist as well as Liberalist fallacies. 
In the previous section, we highlighted their fallacies. Party, the answer lies in the fact 
that SEPIA is essentially Realist focused theoretical framework. It argues that external 
threats make states to look for alliances as advocated by Walt’s BoT. So, SEPIA does 
believe the competitive nature of international politics, but it believes BoT tells the half 
story. Realist theories fail to explain how to secure the threatened alliances.  
SEPIA does believe states are very important actors and operate in a self-help system. 
The international system lacks mechanism which can give an assurance to the states that 
in the event of crisis they will be helped and rescued. In sum, SEPIA does not reject 
Realist assumption about states security, power, and anarchy, it is making to modify them 
to have a better explanation of Sino-Pakistan alliance.  
Moreover, Pakistan alliance making with China clearly support Realist case as Pakistani 
Muslim elite ignore major differences of ideological values with China, extols virtues of 
friendship with atheist China. It is thus a major confirmation of the Realism claim that 
ideology and domestic politics do not matter. Walt says that ideology is an important 
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consideration, but it is not strong factor to make alliances.126 So, it is the main reason we 
choose to write in Realist paradigm.  
As far as the foreign policy behaviour of the states is concerned, Realist theories explain 
with much sophistication and detailed than any other paradigm, this is another important 
reason for writing in Realist paradigm, it is the Realist thinking that states want to secure 
its alliance from domestic threats and make propaganda efforts, this is itself rational 
behaviour than Idealist or normative. 
Bridging the divide: SEPIA - A Realist perspective  
In view of the highlighted limitations, this study advocates SEPIA theoretical framework 
which is hospitable to the phenomena of domestic propaganda to maintain awkward 
alliances. All above theories one or the other way suffer from flaws and absurdities. They 
are unable to explain the phenomena of awkward alliances in international politics which 
face resistance from domestic societies. These theories collectively fail to answer how to 
sustain awkward alliances domestically if a domestic society poses threats to its survival. 
SEPIA is helpful in this regard. 
In the next section, we intend to examine the relevant literature on Pakistan-China 
relations. We try to highlight the fallacies and shortcoming of prior studies and finally 
the need for the sort of research this thesis is carrying and possible contributions of the 
research.  
Pertinent literature on Pakistan-China relations  
The alliance between Pakistan and China is one of the closest in the world; it is also one 
of the least understood. Given the fact that seeking security through external alliance has 
been the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy, it would be expected that there would 
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be much literature on Pakistan-China alliance, but this extraordinary relationship has not 
received much attention. Though the relationship has by no means ignored, scholars have 
instead overwhelmingly interpreted its establishment and significance for Pakistan 
almost exclusively through the lens of prolonged Pakistan-India rivalry. As such these 
studies have failed to position the Pakistan-China relationship within the larger context 
of Pakistan’s internal cleavages vis-à-vis China’s alliance.  
In excessively filtering this bilateral relationship through the lens of India, scholars both 
from India and Pakistan (even American and European) have obscured the degree to 
which Pakistani internal society pay threats to the alliance, including Pakistani elite’s 
efforts to thwarts those threats to the alliance. Undeniably India was the salient factor 
bringing Pakistan and China closer, but India alone can’t sufficiently explain this 
extraordinary relationship. There is much beyond Indian factor, there is much trouble 
beneath which doesn’t appear openly. This research makes effort to not ignore what have 
been ignored in previous efforts. It is therefore critical to consider those issues threats 
and Pakistani elites efforts to overcome those threats to the alliance.  
Indeed the Pakistan-China relationship receives some dedicated coverage in the earlier 
literature. It is not limited to these authors, but Anwar Syed, Rasul Bux Rais, Latif 
Sherwani, Samina Yasmeen, Yaacov Vertzberger, are single author monographs written 
during the cold war, which provide good analysis of the history of how two states of 
varying size and ideology found a common ground: a shared understanding entrenched 
in their mutual hostility towards India. Elaborating on it, the authors believe that the Sino-
Indian war and Pakistan’s experiences with its western alliance made a Pakistan-China 
alliance possible. While Pakistan had begun to resent its US alliance, cordial India-China 
relations had fizzled out due to differences over Tibet issue. India appeared to be an 
enemy which made them to seek closer cooperation in the field of security and defence 
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affairs.127 Though these studies offer a more thorough investigation than some of the 
studies which refuses to look beyond the contextual vacuum of the Indian factor, they 
nevertheless ignore alternative explanations or internal threats to the alliance.128  
Likewise, some Indian authors have published book-length studies on Pakistan-China 
alliance, however, they contain propagandist material with no academic intent.129 A more 
balanced work, however, can be found in the book edited by the former Indian foreign 
minister, Swarn Singh, entitled: China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian 
Perspectives. The volume is contributed to by eighteen authors who challenge the myths 
which exist in Indian traditional policy thinking about Pakistan-China strategic 
cooperation, mainly around sensitive nuclear technology. The Indians generally view it 
as an anti-Indian alliance but Swarn Singh and others argue that though it is a challenge 
for Indian policy makers, it is not entirely Indo-centric. They believe that although India 
did play a central role in bringing two countries closer, other factors have cemented their 
alliance, like Pakistan’s geography which is significant to China, and Pakistan’s need for 
Chinese military and economic aid.130 Swarn Singh edited volume does offer an academic 
value as it goes beyond the obsessive nature of Indian authors looking Sino-Pakistan 
alliance as India centric only.  
Evidently, the earlier literature revolves around one factor: India as the enemy. Though 
analysis shows that some of this work is still valid, much has changed. China has been 
transformed from a developing country to a colossal industrial and military power, we 
have seen the demise of Soviet Union, changing dynamics of Sino-Indian relations and 
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Pakistan’s internal stability, all of which is affecting Pakistan-China relations. This 
research is likely to fill some of the gaps as it is looking at Pakistan’s propaganda as 
evidence of how its security elite views, and specifically fears, about its own population.  
The review of the literature shows that very little has been published in recent years on 
Pakistan-China, and particular no book length study had appeared on the Sino-Pakistan 
alliance since the 1980s. Although many recent compilations of writings by different 
authors address different aspects of China-Pakistan relations, even the most recent single-
author publication, Ijaz Butt’s Focus on China’s Relations with Pakistan, came out nine 
years ago, and does not express any novel ideas: the same Indian factor, Sino-Pakistan 
defence and security cooperation are repeated and emphasized.131  
This literary drought, which existed for almost thirty years, was fulfilled by Andrew 
Small’s ‘The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics’ (2015), and Ghulam Ali.132 
Small’s work is an extensive, covering both old and new ideas, and has been well 
received. India obviously is a central factor in this work, and Small traces the evolution 
of the relationship historically and covers the various developments which have assured 
the continuity and stability of the relationship. Small believes that Pakistan-China 
relations are thriving on new emerging strategic challenges in the form of the Indo-US 
strategic partnership, but more importantly, Pakistan is becoming an anchor of China’s 
‘One Road, One Belt’ strategic initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping. He believes 
that China may have very different needs now, but that it has no other friends that it has 
been able to count on as consistently as Pakistan. 133  
Ali more recent work give a historical analysis of Pakistan-China relations between 1950s 
until April 2015. Ali adopts a historical methodology to study the beginning and 
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expansion of the alliance keeping in view domestic, regional and systemic factors but is 
conscious of giving space to emerging economic and trade relations.  
Similarly, there are few international relations studies within the foreign policy volumes 
that pay specific attention to the logic of the alliance. These discussions generally 
examines Islamabad’s early security predicament with New Delhi China’s reactions to 
Pakistan’s joining of US supported security pacts in 1954; the meeting of the Pakistani 
and Chinese premiers at the Afro-Asian conference; and the deterioration of New Delhi’s 
relations with Beijing and finally the establishment of Pakistan-China alliance and 
dissolution of the Pakistan alliance with the US.134 The chapter length works in the field 
are all but a few examples of a myriad of literature that address one of the key bilateral 
relationships in South Asia. Indeed, some studies on the international politics of South 
Asia pay specific attention to Pakistan relations with China vis-à-vis India. 135  
Since the end of the cold war, a few studies have begun to emerge analysing bilateral ties, 
drawing on the transformations and shifting power dynamics of the post-cold war era. 
John Garver’s comprehensive studies is particularly significant. Garver suggests in his 
series of writings that post-Cold War developments such as the Sino-Indian 
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rapprochement have modified the Pakistan-China alliance, albeit mildly, but that the 
alliance has not been threatened or deteriorated.  
Garver argues China’s significance for Pakistan has not waned rather it has enlarged. 
Garver believes that the geostrategic interest in containing India remains stable between 
the two countries - although Beijing has adopted a neutral stance on the sensitive Kashmir 
issue - but the underlying strategic rationale of the Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale remains 
unchanged: India is still considered to be the common enemy.136 Garver logic of Sino-
Pakistan alliance is consistent with that offered by Ghulam Ali137 but disputes that of 
Devin Hagerty and Willem Kemenade who note that since the end of the cold war, the 
levelling of relations between China and India has reduced China’s interest in retaining 
close cooperation with Pakistan. Beijing has not only improved relations with Moscow 
but emerging Sino-Indian economic relations have reduced tension at their borders 
significantly thus affecting Sino-Pakistan alliance significantly.138  
In line with studies already described, Swarn Singh makes a similar point in suggesting 
that China’s neutral position on Kashmir implies that economic interests have dampened 
historical rivalries and it has started taking strict neutral positions on Indo-Pakistan 
bilateral disputes. Beijing does not support a United Nations plebiscite on Kashmir; 
which amounts to an implicit endorsement of India’s position that the conflict should be 
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resolved bilaterally. He goes to prove his point by stating that during the Kargil War in 
1999, the Chinese leaders remained neutral and rejected repeated Islamabad requests for 
support. 139 Essentially, these studies are suggesting ruptures in the story of the “all 
weather ally” - as does this study by examining the difficult or problematic nature of this 
alliance. These studies are significantly in providing the background to the simmering 
tension, however, these studies fail to suggest what strategies Pakistan may adopt to 
overcome these challenges.  
There is some literature which pays attention to the question of the serious emerging 
strains in the Pakistan-China alliance namely those by Ziad Haider and Issac Kardon, 
Shahzad Akhtar, Ahmad Faruqi, Jayshree Bajoria, and Preeti Bhattacharji. This is 
different category of the literature mainly because it discusses challenges within the 
relationship, earlier literature talks about cooperation, and this list is by no means 
exhaustive. These studies maintain that the unprecedented emerging strains may deeply 
affect the Sino-Pakistan alliance. Beijing is much more concerned about its security: it 
has warned Islamabad to take action against religious militants involved in training and 
supporting the Xinjiang Uighur separatist movement, and to improve the security of the 
Chinese nationals working on various projects in Pakistan.  
Although this set of studies observes that the alliance is likely to remain intact due to the 
emerging Indo-US strategy partnership, it warns that Pakistan has no reason to rejoice 
since China will react strongly if it fails to address militant activities directed at it.140 A 
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similar point has also been made by the veteran observer of Pakistan’s politics Stephen 
Cohen, who maintains that China role in Pakistan is growing immensely. However, 
though the Chinese consider Pakistan to be an important partner in South Asia, they are 
wary of the Pakistani internal security crisis, as they fear for their huge investments in 
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, but despite this, they are not likely to abandon their 
military ties with Pakistan, mainly to balance India.141 
The question that arises is whether this increased friction is leading to the Pakistani rulers’ 
reinforcement of their propaganda efforts to praise China. These studies do not address 
this question, but it does seem to be very much case, as Pakistan cannot afford to lose an 
ally which is so central to her security needs, but the fact that members of Pakistan’s 
population have constantly posed a threat to the lives and security of China is inviting 
Chinese ire and putting pressure on Pakistan, requiring Pakistan’s security to adopt 
counter measures, this is the central point in this research.  
While the literature discussed above has dealt comprehensively with Pakistan-China 
relations regarding India and, to varying degrees, the emerging strains, some studies 
suggest that the alliance has its limitations. The literature suggests that the alliance has 
been overstated by the Pakistani security elites and the actual substance and productivity 
of the alliance is not as considerable as predicted by Islamabad. For instance, Lisa Curtis 
and Derek Scissors describe how US policy makers worry that, if pushed hard, Pakistan 
will seek Chinese protection, however the authors warn that China is equally concerned 
about Pakistan’s stability and its support for the militant groups. This convergence of 
interests creates room for China and the US to concentrate and combine their interests in 
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Pakistan and change Pakistan’s behaviour.142 Curtis and Scissors provide new insight in 
the debate, but opposite may be true.  
Andrew Small’s China Cautious on Pakistan-Afghanistan also sees a commonality of 
interest between China and the US to correct Pakistan’s behaviour but Small sees 
reluctance on the part of China to work closely with the US, China is suspect of American 
intentions.143 In the same way, Michael Beckley, maintains that there are two assumptions 
with regard to Pakistan in the current US foreign policy debate: firstly, that the US policy 
makers believe that if US pushes Pakistan hard it will seek Chinese protection to 
withstand US pressures, and secondly that Pakistan has an enduring alliance with China 
which also neutralised US pressure on Pakistan as Pakistan can seek help from China. 
Beckley believes both these assumptions are wrong, as China and Pakistan do not actually 
share a robust alliance and that they only cooperate on some issues like energy, India and 
terrorism which are diminishing with the passage of time, and therefore Washington can 
take punitive measures to correct Pakistan.144 Nevertheless, recently, strains in Pakistan-
US relationship has suggested that a public bashing of Pakistan and firm US push may 
bring Pakistan into the Chinese orbit. Even if US doesn’t push hard Pakistan, emerging 
Sino-Pakistan economic ties may do so.  
Pakistan-China alliance in the Pakistani textbooks 
From the above literature, it is obvious that the use of propaganda explaining Pakistan 
and China has been a missing link. This current study deals with how the propaganda 
about China reflects the fears of Pakistan’s rulers. This research argues that the 
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propaganda is an important causal part of sustaining alliances: the internal, 
pedagogical/propagandist process of alliance maintenance is a crucial part of the exercise 
that previous studies neglect, i.e. it would be much harder or impossible for Pakistan to 
sustain the alliance with China without the narrative that its elites deliver locally.  
So far as the cultural textbooks are concerned, certainly, some studies have made efforts 
to incorporate textbook propaganda to address the obvious anomalies contained in 
Pakistani textbooks. For example, K.K Aziz “Murder of History”, emphasizes distortions 
of facts, prejudices, xenophobic thoughts and hatred material in cultural textbooks. Aziz’s 
ground-breaking study reviews over 65 textbooks and suggests that the text's objective is 
to indoctrinate young minds with the promotion of knowledge that represents half-truth 
and predominantly lies. Aziz elaborates that the state distorts facts about the Pakistani 
movement, spreads lies about the Jinnah nation's father, legitimises the military rule and 
war with India.145  
Aziz study is by no means the first to highlight these problems. In his well-researched 
and stimulating work, Mubarak Ali also emphasizes distortions, inaccuracies and 
prejudices in the Pakistani textbooks.146 Rubina Saigol conducted an analysis of the 
content of textbooks on social studies to reveal hateful and xenophobic and aggressive 
material in textbooks. 147 Madiha Afzal says that textbooks promote Pakistani Islamic 
ideology and India as an enemy. Afzal believes texts describe the United States as 
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betraying Pakistan on several occasions. 148 In fact, the gender benefits have received 
major representations in previous writings.149 
On a similar note the Pakistani printing press has consistently addressed the textbook 
controversy. Numerous writers relate degeneration in the Pakistani society with the 
substance of the course readings. They argue textbooks glaringly disregard non-Muslims 
religious belief as they are forced to take lessons which are unrelated to their religious 
beliefs.150 Still others have labelled Pakistani textbook promoting the Islamic ideology 
and marginalizing others religious minority. India is portrayed as eternal enemy.151 
Ishtiaq Ahmed illuminates that the distortion of the textbooks is not just a Pakistani issue, 
however, India as well. He believes both nations have distorted their history for patriotic 
purposes that have flourished religious prejudice in their communities.152  
Clearly, these studies have identified political propaganda in textbooks, they have ignored 
the textbook propaganda to promote Pakistan’s alliance with China. Previous studies 
have focused mainly on the promotion of hatred against India, the Islamization of 
Pakistani society, the promotion of Islamic ideology and prejudice against women and 
non-Muslims, but most have not acquired adequate treatment of the Pakistan-China 
alliance. This marginalisation is the result of these studies and their obsession with India, 
which leads them to underestimate China, and therefore proposes their limited scope. As 
a result, they tend to suffer from similar failures and the criticisms made in the above 
studies (literature on the relations between Pakistan and China), namely an excessive 
emphasis on India, but fail to adequately address the efforts of the Pakistani elite to 
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cultivate a favourable image of China. So, these studies are guilty of relegating China in 
favour of India. In sum, these studies tend to take China less seriously. 
In a nutshell, this thesis aims to make following significant contributions. Firstly, there 
is an absence of empirical research on cultural institution's textbook representations of 
China-Pakistan alliance, therefore, this dissertation is comparatively an original 
undertaking. This is essentially, the first study of its kind and breaks away from the 
conventional aspects of the Pakistan-China alliance; rather, it dips into overlooked 
dimensions, it fulfils the serious lacuna, which exists in Sino-Pakistan alliance that how 
Pakistan is maintaining its alliance with a country with such conflicting political, 
economic and cultural value systems.  
Significance of textbooks to study Sino-Pakistan relations 
The preceding section on literature maintains that the principle reason to employ 
textbooks to investigate Pakistan-China relations is under-representation of this data in 
previous studies. As demonstrated above, and to the best of author knowledge, nobody 
has conducted research on this topic using cultural textbooks and lawmakers discussion 
on Sino-Pakistan relations. This is the prime reason we are using textbooks to evaluate 
Pakistan-China alliance.  
Moreover, textbooks are itself very significant for research investigation. Textbooks are 
fundamentally political and partisan, but they are central in any educational system. They 
are a universal means of education and dissemination of knowledge. This modern era of 
information technology, where knowledge is available in a single click, has not reduced 
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its importance.
153
 Textbooks are filled with prejudices and transfer specific knowledge 
from leadership to the younger generation.154 Expert believes textbooks are an important 
way of communicating certain ideological and cultural message to the masses. Texts in a 
way perform the function of teaching states hegemonic ideologies.155 It increases the 
importance of the textbook to explore. Earlier studies have drawn some interesting 
findings as discussed in the literature section, in this study an attempt to study Pakistan-
China alliance is likely to disclose some noteworthy findings.  
Research methods, sources and barriers  
This qualitative study employs documentary analysis, supplemented by elite interviewing 
as the main research methods. Current academic textbooks used in public institutions 
(social studies, history and Urdu literature produced for schools, colleges and 
universities) serve as important empirical evidence to answer research questions. 
Furthermore, the security elite’s contribution to the leading newspapers (in the form of 
articles), and the parliamentary debates of Pakistani lawmakers are used to examine the 
propaganda strategies.  
Primary sources are derived from the official documents available to the public from the 
various ministries (Ministry of Planning) and embassies (for example, official 
publications and annual reports from Pakistan’s embassy in Beijing); and (ii) relevant 
information in various published forms (Official statements and press statements and 
media commentaries via newspapers, magazines, and news monitoring services).  
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Furthermore, the autobiographies of the Pakistani politicians, diplomats and politician 
are used to provide the necessary information for the research problem. Meanwhile, 
secondary sources of the related literature provided basic information, supporting 
theoretical approaches, substantive arguments and critical perspectives that have 
contributed to deepen knowledge and the understanding necessary to address the research 
problem. 
We have used officials’ archives held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
Islamabad. Officials, archives mainly contain speeches, statements and press releases of 
the Pakistani politicians about China. Archives were not available until recently, but 
MOFA is making efforts to organise them and allowing the researcher to benefit from 
them. However, some documents remain in a disorganized form. We wrote to seek 
permission to use them and offered to organise the documents as long as MOFA provide 
uninterrupted access to the documents, but without success. In addition, due to 
administrative red-tapism, there is little help for researchers. The process of accessing 
archives is a very complicated process and the researcher must have a lot of patience to 
deal with it. To overcome this problem, this research has used important data sources: 
elite interviews. 
The expert interviews with the decision-makers (semi-structured and open-ended 
formats) are used to overcome problems concerning restricted access to the official 
records. Five Pakistani administrations served between 1990 and 2010, so an effort is 
made to interview key personnel (For example Ambassadors to China, foreign 
minister/foreign secretaries, and chief of army staff) who served during those 
governments or who had first-hand information of Pakistan-China alliance. Many of the 
interviewees were part of Pakistan-China dealings and meetings.  
We have also conducted interviews with the textbook authors and officials from the 
Ministry of Education, Islamabad to get first-hand information who have been involved 
in the decision-making of textbook production. This will help to give a variety of 
perspectives on the formation of the alliance, and it will help improve the authenticity of 
information.  
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The research is further complemented by employing the memoirs of the eyewitnesses 
(Presidents, Army General, Foreign Minister and Ambassadors.) to substitute for gap in 
other categories of archives as well as newspaper articles. The role and importance of the 
newspaper in defining the political agenda cannot be denied. Therefore, this study also 
focuses on English newspapers in Pakistan. Selecting English newspapers would ensure 
that we obtain data that specifically targets the educated and elite class in Pakistan.  
Limitations of the research  
This inquiry covers the period from 1990- 2010 and is presented from the perspective of 
Pakistan. This study is not an exhaustive and comprehensive history of Pakistan-China 
relations. It may not be a detailed version of the history of the alliance and unlikely to tell 
chronological growths of the alliance. On these subjects there are many dedicated 
volumes, discussed in the literature review, which provide sequential developments of 
events in Sino-Pakistan alliance. This study evaluates the dangers to the alliance and 
promotional strategies of the Pakistani officials to market the alliance between the period 
1990 and 2010.  
The study relies on the empirical data. It tries to identify themes within the dataset to 
analyse how the alliance is cultivated. Nevertheless, the research does strive to make 
bigger picture clear. It discusses various facets of the Pakistan-China alliance: issues, 
challenges, mutual aid in multiple field like economy, security and defence and political 
relations. It does discuss the fundamentals of Sino-Pakistan alliance, its substance, and 
origin to make the argument clear. However, doing so, they may be overlapping and 
repetition of the events due to the nature of the topic.  
It should be made clear that this study concerns itself with the production and formulation 
of the state propaganda, rather than the reception of it or reactions of the people to it. It 
is not in the purview of this research to demonstrate that how the propaganda has been 
received, as it is very difficult to measure the impact of propaganda. For instance, Andrew 
Defty remarks, “It is notoriously difficult to assess the impact of propaganda, particularly 
if it is directed at a foreign audience. One may identify propaganda policies, and assess 
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the output of the propaganda agencies, but it is very difficult to gauge how the propaganda 
is received.”156  
Finally, there are limitations related to the Chinese language. However, as this study is 
from the perspective of Pakistan it may not affect the outcome of the study. 
Content analysis   
The content analysis (CA) offered the methodological foundation to this investigation. A 
close textual analysis of these primary sources will be employed to measure their 
promotion of the alliance with China. Their depiction of China and close analysis of these 
sources in itself will help to answer the research questions.  
CA is a popular research technique which helps to analyse written, verbal and pictorial 
messages.157 It has been defined in many contested ways. Krippendorf positions that 
“content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inference from 
data to their context.” 158 Neuendorf asserts that content analysis “has as its goal a 
numerically based summary of a chosen message set” and that it is an exclusively 
quantitative process.159  
Keeping in view the objectives of this study, we count on Holsti’s definition. He 
maintains that CA must be “objective, systematic and generalizable.” 160 While operating 
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CA, it is critical to choose the unit of analysis. Unit of analysis refers to the elementary 
component of text being classified. We usually use individual themes as the unit of 
analysis. The individual themes are epitomised by word, sentences and even some cases 
whole paragraphs.161 Likewise, in this kind of methodology researchers need to decide 
utilisation of latent and manifest content analysis. In this connection, we applied both 
latent and manifest content to develop codes and categories.162  
Content analysis must be valid and reliable. In CA, the main problem of reliability is the 
validity of the content. Holsti believes validity concern is generally secured by the 
informed judgment of the scholar. The formula he recommends, operated in this 
investigation, to test the validity of the content is:  
PA=2A (nA + nB). 
While PA represents a percentage agreement, A implies quantities of common 
understandings between two coders, nA is the number of units coded by coder A, and nB 
is the number of units coded by coder B. If PA=0.00 it means no understanding between 
coder and if PA = 1.00 it means complete agreement. In the first attempt, we achieved 
82% reliability, but after a conversation and a discussion, the inter-coder reliability 
reached 100%. 
Organisation of the thesis  
This research is divided into seven chapters. Each chapter focuses on specific dimensions 
of the Pakistan-China alliance. Although some events overlap partially across the 
chapters, they address separate issues in the making of the bilateral relationship. The 
introductory chapter deals with the introduction and theoretical framework of the thesis. 
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It is followed by Chapter Two which discusses the need for the alliance. It mainly answers 
the question of Why Pakistan needs to have an alliance with China. It uses Stephen Walt’s 
BoT theory to elucidate Pakistan’s threat perception and need for the alliance. This 
chapter will help understand the rationale behind the alliance.  
Chapter Three evaluates threats to the alliance and resultant concerns and fears of the 
security elite of Pakistan regarding its society as a potential and real threat to the 
endurance of its alliance with China. It argues that Pakistani extremist support of the 
Uighur separatist movement, terrorist attacks on the Chinese, negative images of 
communist China, and Islamabad’s dubious role in the war against terrorism have 
enhanced the Pakistani security elites concerns about their alliance with China.  
Chapter Four is the textual analysis of the Pakistani textbooks which build the benevolent 
images of China and counteract negative views of the Pakistan-China alliance held by the 
general population. This chapter conduct both design and content analysis of the 
textbook. Specifically, in this chapter we explain the process by which government 
decision is translated into the writing, editing, and publishing of the textbooks. This 
chapter also explains importance of textbooks as an instrument of the state policy; and 
the structure and mechanism of the Pakistani state propaganda system, particularly 
highlighting the role of the Ministry of Education Curriculum wing (MoECW) in 
producing propaganda. Finally, this chapter evaluates the propaganda strategies found 
within the selected textbooks. 
Chapter Five is the textual analysis of media content to gauge propaganda. Three English-
language newspapers published in Pakistan will be employed for this purpose: The Dawn, 
the News, and the Nation. Specially, this chapter has two main sections. In the first 
section, we explain the sampling of newspaper articles followed by a general overview 
of quantitative content analysis. The second section explains the analysis of the 
qualitative content of the selected newspaper articles. 
Chapter Six is the textual analysis of parliamentary debates. We evaluate the strategies 
of propaganda found in the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan. This chapter 
section one explains briefly about the Pakistani parliament, its sessions and data 
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collection, while section two, presents content analysis of parliamentary debates both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Chapter Seven is a summary of the findings, and recommendations for future research 
into Pakistan-Chinese diplomacy. Precisely, in this chapter we endeavour to present a 
summary of the findings of the research keeping in view the research questions and 
objectives, followed by the theoretical implication of SEPIA and suggestions for future 
research on the Pakistan-China alliance. The final section of this chapter outlines the 
implications of this study for future international relations related investigations of Sino-
Pakistan and, in general, interstate relations that are clouded by nationally conceived 
problems such as internal threats to the alliance. Perhaps, more intensely, it highlights the 
development of international relations Realism by means of SEPIA in covering its gap of 
awkward alliances, to provide a healthier explanation of state-to-state relations in 
international politics. 
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 Need for an Alliance  
The introductory chapter is informed by the mainstream and alternative theories to reflect 
on role of states in forming and maintaining alliances in the pretext of perceived external 
threat. In case of Pakistan, the dominant motive of its foreign policy has been to rectify 
any imbalances of threat which may exist between Islamabad and its neighbours (mainly 
India, but also Afghanistan to a lesser extent). This chapter attempt to investigate threats 
to Pakistan’s security and the strategies it adopts to counter-balance these threats by using 
Walt’s BoT theory. This theory is particularly useful for examining the behavior of states 
regarding the formation of the alliance. BoT’s strength lies in its power to explain the 
origin of the alliance. 
This chapter attempts to establish what factors lead to the alliance formation. Taking case 
study of Pakistan, it examines why Pakistan requires to build and strengthen an external 
alliance and what is significant of building an alliance with China. Answering these 
questions will help develop deep understanding to unravel Pakistan’s motivations to seek 
and preserve external alliances. I argue that the BoT rightly explains the determining 
factors that trigger Pakistan's drive to form alliances. However, BoT is silent on the 
promotion and maintenance of any alliance. This is further explained in the following 
section. 
BoT theory  
Traditional approaches in IR maintain that states operate as unitary actor in an 
international system and the international system is generally characterised by anarchy. 
In the absence of such a mechanism, states devise strategies of self-help to enhance 
military capability to prevent other states conquering or dominating them. States do this 
either by building up internal capability, or they import power of other states referred as 
external balancing. This logic has mainly given rise to the plethora of realist theories.  
The balancing strategies are manifested in the framework of Balance of Power theories, 
chiefly found in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) and Stephen 
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Walt’s Origin of Alliance (1987). Both scholars have some common as well as divergent 
points. As an illustration, both agree that states seek security through alliance to maintain 
their independent status without being dominated by other states, but their explanation of 
alliance formation is dissimilar. On the alliance formations, Waltz articulates that states 
will consider “distribution of capabilities” most important factor. He argues that states 
pursue balancing strategies primarily for two reasons: Firstly, they try aligning against 
the strongest states to prevent the overall control of the system by any single state or a 
coalition of states, in order to maintain an equilibrium, and secondly, by joining a weaker 
or more vulnerable side, nation-states maximise their relative influence.163 For Waltz, 
balancing, which is a self-protective means of survival, can be pursued both internally 
and externally, although internal balancing is more secure and reliable.164 During the cold 
war the superpowers sought alliances, however they also accumulated a stockpile of 
nuclear weapons to balance internally.  
Stephen Walt appreciates Waltz’s contributions but considers it insufficient. While 
acknowledging Waltz’s systematic variable of alliance formation (where the distribution 
of capabilities is a crucial factor), Stephen Walt expands the concept of BoP by including 
systematic, material and cognitive factors into the perception of threat and formation of 
alliances. Similar like Waltz, Stephen Walt, uses alliances as dependent variables, 
however, he differs at the point which elucidates behaviour rather than outcome. He 
maintains that balancing is far more common than “bandwagoning” as it is more secure: 
“balancing is allying with other against the prevailing threat, bandwagon refers to 
alignment with the source of danger.”165 He argues that the “distribution of power” is an 
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extremely important factor as the level of threat is enhanced by geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities and perceived intentions. Walt maintains that BoP may balance the 
imbalance of power, and BoT is to balance the imbalance of threat.166 Walt notes that 
balancing is far more common than bandwagoning. For Walt, balancing is allying against 
the threat and bandwagoning is allying with the threat.  
Considering the case of Pakistan within the theoretical backdrop of Stephen Walt’s 
theory, Pakistan appears to adopt balancing strategies rather than bandwagoning. 
Bandwagoning means that Pakistan conciliate and reconcile India and seeks its 
protection. In this scenario, Pakistan should have accepted Indian suzerainty in South 
Asia and follow it. However, this is not the case, as Pakistan does not follow India rather 
challenges it and attempts to balance against it. As a result, balancing has been dominant 
factor in Pakistan’s alliance making with China.  
Within this context of balancing of power by Pakistan, which is a mid-power state and is 
mainly concerned about regional imbalance of threat, Walt’s BoT theory is an appropriate 
model for studying Pakistan’s need for the alliance. 
BoT and Pakistan’s Drive for Security 
Nation-states perform numerous functions, but defence and national security are the most 
important and no state can ignore these factors. With no exception to this, Pakistan’s 
security has been challenged since her independence. Carved out of British India in 1947, 
it has been on a continuous search for security. Pakistan faces both external and internal 
threats. Externally, it receives a blend of tacit and real threats from all its neighbours 
particularly India and Afghanistan. Though the catalogue of issues and gravity of threats 
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vary between the neighbours, it considers India to be a permanent and dangerous 
adversary.  
Pakistan and India have been free nations for many years now. At the time of 
independence, the founding father of India and Pakistan had imagined a friendly 
relationship between the two countries. Muhammad Ali Jinnah imagined an Indo-
Pakistani relationship modelled on US-Canadian relations. Two sovereigns but 
independent nations advancing together. However, relationships, have evolved on a 
different trajectory. Both Pakistan and India conflict each other on a wide range of issues 
- ideological to territorial to water. Both sides have committed to perpetual strategic and 
political competition.  
The disputes between the two states are chronic, complex and do not appear to be resolved 
any time soon. Both states have adopted a hard stance on respective issues. For instance, 
on the issue of Kashmir, India believes that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and 
cannot be renegotiated. On the other hand, Pakistan also believes that Kashmir is the core 
issue between Pakistan and Indian and is mother of all troubles between the two countries. 
With the exception of few interactions, their history is full of fighting, allegations, twist 
and turns. Pakistan-India border is one of the world’s most guarded borders. Both have 
fought on land, sea and air. Besides, they possess deadly nuclear weapons enough to raze 
each other from the face of the earth. The intense rivalry endures with intense poverty in 
both countries.167  
Pakistan’s western border is volatile too due to the presence of unruly Afghanistan. 
Pakistan intermittently receives both implied and direct threats from Afghanistan. The 
conflicting views about the demarcation of the international boundary (commonly known 
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as the Durand Line) and Afghanistan propaganda about the Pashtunistan issues are the 
two main enduring issues in their bilateral relationship. Pashtunistan is a concept that is 
based on the assumption that a “greater Pashtunistan” nation should be created, based on 
the Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was mainly driven by some Pashtun 
nationalists from Afghanistan.168 
In addition, the alleged involvement of Pakistan in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan 
has also been a bone of contention. As a result, Afghanistan, individually and from time 
to time in league with India, sporadically generates both tacit and naked threats to 
Pakistan’s national security. Though, Pakistan feels confident in deterring Afghanistan 
as the latter is a weaker state, it is mainly Indian tactical support and presence in 
Afghanistan which is main source of concern for Pakistan.169 Resultantly, both the 
nations are trapped in a security dilemma. India does not have border with Afghanistan 
but Indian gains in Afghanistan are entire loss for Pakistan. Essentially, by associating 
with Afghanistan, India does not increase any strategic benefits except to counter 
Pakistan. Consequently, for historical and political reasons, defence against India is of 
the utmost priority to Pakistan.  
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Elements Upsetting Islamabad’s Threat Level  
Aggregate Power  
The leading scholars of IR largely define power in measurable terms. Waltz believes that 
the fundamentals of power are “size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”170 
Morgenthau provides a long list of elements of power including geography, natural 
resources, strength of industry, military capabilities, the distribution of population, 
demographic trends, national character, morale and finally the quality of diplomacy and 
government.171 While Mearsheimer sees power in military capabilities,172 Similarly Walt 
maintains “the greater a state’s total resources (e.g. population, industrial and military 
capability, and technical prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others.”173  
In that scenario, military strength and economic capability appear to be the most common 
and dominant factors in making states powerful or weak. States endowed with great 
military capability, and advanced military technology can dominate other states. 
Similarly, a strong economy can build up a powerful military state. Considering these 
factors as the most important indicators, Pakistan is clearly a weaker state when compared 
with India. There exists a huge disparity in power, size, resources and population between 
India and Pakistan. Where Pakistan has an area of 803,943 square kilometres, India has 
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3,166,829 square kilometres.174 India is progressive and technologically developed, 
whereas Pakistan is weak and often depend on foreign aids. The World Bank reports that 
Indian GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 2014 was $2 trillion, while Pakistan has only 
$243 billion.175 This gap between Pakistan and India is widening and unlikely to be 
balanced in near foreseeable future. The BBC defence correspondent Jonathan Marcus 
suggests that “In straight numerical terms of population, economic might, military 
manpower and equipment it is almost meaningless to speak about an India-Pakistan 
balance.”176  
From past till present, these gaps have been widening. Although, the current Pakistan has 
focused more on its military capabilities compared to its economy. However, it is worth 
noting that despite Pakistan’s strong investment towards its military capabilities, Indian 
military has far superior capabilities. In terms of its size, the Indian army is twice the size 
of Pakistan’s army. Moreover, it is also equipped well both qualitatively and 
quantitatively (See Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: India-Pakistan Military Capabilities, Source: NDTV & The Economist 177 
Due to the size of its economy, Indian armed forces have sufficient budget to improve 
defence. Every year there is an incremental growth in the budget. Pakistan, of course, 
cannot match Indian defence spending. Compared to India’s budget of more than $40 
billion on defence, Pakistan dedicates a paltry $7 billion on defence.178 It is this enhanced 
defence spending of India which enlarges Pakistan’s fears and disturbance of 
conventional balance between the two states.  
Lastly, both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan considers its nuclear 
weapons a deterrent against India. Arguably, Pakistan has trivial advantage over India in 
terms of nuclear warheads (See Figure 2.1).179 But the same is counterbalanced by Indian 
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conventional military strength which prevents Pakistan’s gains in nuclear weapons. 
These factors indicate the unbalance of power between Pakistan and India. It is, therefore, 
not surprising when Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Lieutenant General (retd) Nasir 
Khan Janjua considers Indian conventional military advantage a threat to Pakistan.180 
 
Figure 2.2: States with Total Numbers of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, BBC  
Geographic Proximity  
Topography and geography condition the political setting of a nation-state. Both Nicholas 
Spykman and Martin Sicker maintain that geography plays a vital role in shaping any 
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nation’s foreign policy.181 It offers both opportunities and challenges to the nation-state. 
On one hand, states utilize geographical location and accrue immense strategic 
advantages. On the other hand, some states face serious security challenge from other 
regional states which harbour hegemonic design. The regional hegemonic designs 
become major geostrategic challenge in the field of security and defence.182  
States having a grand design to dominate regional environment are likely to interfere in 
adjacent weak states to fulfil their foreign policy goals. Walt states that “… the ability to 
protect power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than 
those that are far away.”183 However, the weak states determined to protect their 
dominion and independence find hard either to bandwagon or allow powerful states to 
dominate. In such a situation a development of an adverse relationship between weak and 
regional hegemon is most likely to occur. If a weak state fails to accept regional power 
dictation, weak states are likely to face isolation. In this connection, geographical 
proximity necessitates that if a relationship cannot be perfect between neighbouring 
states, it should at least be cordial. As states can enjoy the luxury of choosing their friends, 
seldom are they able to choose their neighbours. Retired Brigadier Naeem Salik, contends 
that Pakistan would have played an entirely different and much more active role in world 
affairs had it been located in any region other than South Asia.184  
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Essentially, if India was situated far away from Pakistan, Pakistan’s perception of threat 
would have been entirely different as it would not have to face Indian attempts to 
dominate the region. Pakistani establishment keep reiterating that Pakistan wants bilateral 
interaction based on sovereign equality.185 It, however, denies Indian supremacy in South 
Asia which has triggered an adversarial relationship between the two states. 
Figure 2.3: India-Pakistan Location. Source: The Economist 
India’s vast geography provides it with ample tactical deepness from a military point of 
view as Indian territory stretches all the way down to the Indian oceans, and expands 
eastward up to Myanmar (See Figure 2.3). In contrast, Pakistan’s landscape is tapered in 
width with a rough length of 500 km. For the Pakistani officials, it a serious deficit in the 
territory and a significant disadvantage against an attacking Indian army which can easily 
cut across the strip and halt communications systems that exist between the south and 
north parts of the country. 186  
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Additionally, if Islamabad retreats border post, India would be able to conquer Pakistan 
as it lacks depth in territory to escape, regroup and re-launch an attack. India suffers no 
such disadvantage which allows it to evacuate, manoeuvre, recuperate and then re-launch 
attacks. The lack of strategic depth in Pakistan’s territory has made Islamabad security 
establishment to develop erroneous concept of interfering in Afghanistan to establish a 
friendly regime. The strategic shortfall in the territory has affected Pakistan’s nuclear 
policy. Pakistan refuses to sign “no first” use of nuclear weapons fearing India can 
annihilate Pakistan quickly due to lack of depth in territory. The expert of Pakistan’s 
nuclear program Bhumitra Chakma notes that both Pakistan-India should sign no first use 
of nuclear weapons, Pakistan declines to sign partly due to lack of depth in the territory.187  
Additionally, Pakistan’s core defence lines in Sindh and Punjab are areas of strategic 
vulnerability as Pakistan lacks the military technology to cope with such a land during 
wars with India.188 Pakistan permanent representative to the UN, Maleeha Lodhi argues 
that, “the tyranny of geography has imposed heavy burdens on Pakistan. It has influenced 
its security thinking and calculus as well as posed enduring security dilemmas.”189 Thus, 
a region pregnant with tension due to the policies of regional states who aspire to 
positions of power, the survival of neighbouring, weaker states is endangered.  
Indian control over water resources  
Another disadvantage that Pakistan faces due to India’s physical location is the control 
of Pakistan’s water resources by Indian. A huge majority of Pakistanis (Approx. 70%) 
are associated with the agriculture sector. The rivers which irrigate Pakistan’s barren 
lands originate in Indian-held Kashmir (See Figure 2.3). Agriculture being main drivers 
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of Pakistan’s economy depends on uninterrupted supply of water. Therefore, water is a 
matter of life and death for the people of Pakistan.  
From Pakistani perspective, India has been determined to violate the World Bank-
mediated Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. In violation of treaty, India has constructed dams 
on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers to aggravate the economic security of water-starved 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s former Indus Waters Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah stated that “we 
are already a water-stressed country” and that Indian attempts to construct dams are 
“aggravating the stresses.”190 Critics warn a water war is highly likely between the two 
nations. Muhammad Waqas believes that a water war is highly possible between India 
and Pakistan and it may descend their relations.191 Former foreign Minister Shah 
Mahmood Qureshi maintains that “water I see emerging as a very serious source of 
tension between Pakistan and India.”192 In recent times, the position of Indus water treaty 
has come under serious doubts. By threatening to repeal Indus water treaty, Indian prime 
minister Modi has warned that “water that belongs to India cannot be allowed to go to 
Pakistan.”193 Sartaj Aziz, responding to Indian threat, stated in the parliament that 
“Pakistan will not accept Indian aggression in any form and any Indian step for disrupting 
water flow as upper riparian will pertain to considerable risk of war and hostilities.”194 
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Nonetheless, India is trying to exert its power to make Pakistan dependent on it, and 
during critical times it may be likely to invoke the water option to intimidate Pakistan.  
Offensive Power  
Walt maintains that “All else being equal, states with large offensive capabilities are more 
likely to provoke an alliance than are those that are incapable of attacking because of 
geography, military posture, or something else.”195 Offensive capability is associated 
primarily with aggregate power, but it is actually quite different: an aggregate power can 
be converted into an offensive power through building up an enormous mobile military 
capability.196 While aggregate power can partly be due to natural differences (for example 
size, population or natural resources) offensive capability arguably is a measured attempt 
to make a threatening stance towards other states. Pakistan officials do not obscure their 
feeling calling India an offensive power bent to destroy Pakistan.197  
India poses a great threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan with its 
large offensive capability. India represents a tangible threat on the ground by maintaining 
a huge number of forces (about 70 per cent) on Pakistani border constantly keeping 
Pakistan under pressure. The presence of such a force in bulk increases security anxieties 
of Pakistan. For Pakistani officials it is an act of Indian belligerence towards Pakistan.198 
Historically, and on more than one occasion, India has mobilised troops on the border to 
intimidate Pakistan. In 1950-51, India deployed armed forces alongside Pakistan’s border 
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when there was little military cause for doing so; in 1987-88, India carried out the largest 
military exercises, code-named “Brass Tacks”, near the Pakistani border for four months, 
triggering a crisis as Pakistan retaliated with its own total mobilisation. South Asia crisis 
expert P.R Chari stresses that the Indian mobilisation set the countries on a collision 
course, as full-fledged war was a very distinct possibility.199 Seymour Hersh even 
reported Pakistan had put the nuclear option on the table to defuse the crisis.200 Not long 
after that incident, India again assembled troops on Pakistani border in the wake of 
uprising in Indian-held Kashmir in 1990. Yet again Pakistan responded with a counter-
accumulation of its troops on the Indian border.201 These contingencies not only created 
unsolicited worries in Islamabad but put extra strain on the national exchequer. 
India’s aggressive posture also appears in its drive to acquire modern weapons. In its 
2010 edition Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported between 
2010 and 2015 India imported more weapons than any other country in the world (See 
Figure 2.4). In addition, New Delhi is investing $100 billion to acquire new conventional 
force capabilities in the next decades, and which, according to Pakistani military and 
analysts, includes the type of weapons that could be used against Pakistan,202 and in some 
cases, conceivably against both China and Pakistan.203 Thus the items on the Indian list 
for weapons import in the coming decades presents a bleak picture for Pakistan’s defence. 
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Figure 2.4: Share of Top Five Countries in world Weapons Imports. Source: SIPRI 
As a result, India’s drive to strengthen its tremendous war machine is upsetting the 
conventional deterrents in South Asia, as this arms development is providing India with 
a huge conventional military advantage over Pakistan. As Pakistan can’t compete with 
India in conventional weaponry,204 the military imbalance is being redressed with the 
development of tactical weapons. Many critics believe Islamabad’s inability to keep pace 
with India is inspiring it to embrace low yield tactical nuclear weapons that can be used 
in the battlefield to overcome Indian conventional superiority. 205 Indian’s military might 
combined with its drive to acquire weapons has increased the perceived threat to Pakistan 
level, and provoked a new response.  
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Most significant of all the offensive strategies is the Indian military ‘cold start strategic 
doctrine’. Theoretically, the doctrine aims to rapidly move the Indian armed forces to 
punish Pakistan before the international community intervenes and pushes for a ceasefire. 
The central point of the doctrine is the agility and rapid movement of Indian land forces, 
not only to carry out attacks, but to penetrate deep into the Pakistani territory with aviation 
that provides firepower and air cover.206  
Previously, Indian armed forces, stationed in central India, took almost a month to 
mobilise forces on the border, but the doctrine is intended to reduce this time to less than 
48 hours. The doctrine, which is believed based on the German General Guderian’s 
concept of “Blitzkrieg”, is considered by Pakistan to seriously undermine its security.207 
In a nutshell, India, with a huge offensive capability, is seen as serious threat to the 
political independence of Pakistan, which forces Pakistan to seek some balancing 
strategies.  
Aggressive Intensions  
Walt maintains it is intentions, not power, which matters.208 India is powerful, but the 
Indian intentions to undo Pakistan are the primary concern of its policy makers. India has 
not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan. It was the perception of Indian Muslims that 
they would have a better life in post-colonial India, if freed from Indian dominance; they 
were afraid that living with Hindus in a united India would deprive them of their socio-
economic, political and religious set up. The independence did not improve Indian 
Muslims sense of security as India would not accept the birth of Pakistan. To the Indian 
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elite, the establishment of Pakistan represents a tragedy, the dissection of the body of 
“mother” India. After the partition, statements made by Indian leaders cast doubts over 
the viability of the state of Pakistan, with some extreme views expressed about restoring 
“Akhand Bharat” (greater India) by undoing the partition.209 
Commenting on the partition, Nehru said, “It may be that in this way, we shall reach that 
united India sooner than otherwise.”210 The All India Congress Committee announced 
that “The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and our 
hearts.”211 Another prominent Indian leader, Sardar Patel once remarked “That the new 
state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last, and that the acceptance of Pakistan 
would teach Muslim League a lesson, Pakistan would collapse in a short time.”212 While 
another occasion, Patel claimed that “sooner than later we shall again be united in 
common allegiance to our country.”213 Both Nehru and Krishna Menon conceded that 
Congress had accepted partition to get rid of the British.214 Achraya Kriplani, the then 
president of the Congress, expressed, with great anti-Muslim bias, “Neither congress nor 
the nation has given up its claim of a united India.”215 Likewise, Nehru and Patel yet 
again stated that “Pakistan would prove insolvent after it was born and, in the not-too-
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distant future, Jinnah and Liaquat would beg forgiveness and ask for permission to re-
join India’s union.”216  
Pakistan’s mistrust of India's intentions ended in 1971 when India actively contributed in 
the dismemberment of Pakistan. Narender Modi, on a visit to Dhaka, proudly said “The 
establishment of Bangladesh was a desire of every Indian citizen and that was why Indian 
forces fought along with the Mukti Bahani, thus creating a new country.”217 This deep 
reluctance on the part of Hindu leaders to accept the separate existence of Pakistan has 
been a major factor in the growth of Pakistani security concerns.  
Part of India’s attempt to undo Pakistan was a forceful annexation of three princely states 
at the time of partition; Junagadh, Hyderabad and more importantly Kashmir, which were 
to be part of Pakistan, were forcibly annexed by India, only increasing the concern in 
Pakistan that India could repeat similar actions there. Thus as Walt argues “States that 
are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them”218, 
Pakistan has been provoked by Indian leadership since beginning which has made 
Pakistan to seek alliance against India rather than join it.  
Pakistan’s Afghanistan conundrum  
Regardless of Pakistan’s physical proximity to Afghanistan, the two have not generally 
enjoyed cordial relations because of contrasts over the Durand Line and Pashtunistan 
issue. Kabul is a relatively weak state when compared with Pakistan. Afghanistan’s 
military posturing and aggregate power have rarely threatened Pakistan. It is the external 
support mainly from New Delhi and, to a certain extent Moscow (particularly during the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), that has threated Pakistan’s security. Moreover, it is the 
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post 9/11, 2001 Indian influence in Afghanistan which have a profound effect on 
Pakistan’s national security.  
Pakistani-Afghan relations can be divided into two main phases: before the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In both periods, 
Pakistan had a relatively similar set of interests in that country. Before the invasion, it 
wanted friendly if not subservient regime in Kabul. A regime which didn’t allow India 
strategic advantage to the detriment of Pakistan security, and a regime which accepted 
the Durand line as an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 
period following the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan had retained many of the objectives it 
already had, but the prospect of access to the rich hydro-carbon resources of central Asia 
renewed Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan.  
Between 1947 and 1980, the issue of the Durand line and Pashtunistan fed an enduring 
rivalry. During this period, Afghanistan made irredentist claims on Pakistan territory. It 
refused to recognise Pakistan’s UN membership. It is pertinent to mention that it was the 
only Muslim country to vote against Pakistan’s UN membership.219 Unlike the undecided 
India-Pakistan border, Pakistan-Afghanistan inherited an already demarcated border. 
Named after British-India representative Sir Mortimer Durand, this border was 
established in 1893 by Durand, and the Afghan King Abdur Rahman himself who 
considered it “a strong wall of protection.”220 Despite its delineation, approval and 
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ratification by successive Afghan regimes,221 Kabul contested its validity and argued for 
renegotiation. It claimed that the treaty was signed under duress, had no legal standing 
and had expired with the dissolution of British Empire.222 Pakistan repudiated the Afghan 
claims, stating that treaty was valid and could not be renegotiated. As Pakistan inherited 
British power in India, its claim was based on international law of inheritance of 
territory.223 The US, the Commonwealth, and the British all endorsed the treaty as 
legal.224  
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Figure 2.5: Durand Line as it stands of today demarcated in 1893.  
Source: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n18/owen-bennett-jones/across-the-durand-line 
Pashtunistan, a much more complicated and contentious issue but still consistent with 
Durand line, was based on the notion that the Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand 
line should form a separate state under the flag of Pashtunistan, which meant dissolution 
of line. Though the claim varied over time,225 it was offensive to Pakistan as it would 
allegedly deprive Islamabad half of its territory and a substantial share of the population 
(See Figure 2.6). In sum Pakistan failed to achieve its pre-Soviet invasion aims as 
Afghanistan not once accepted Durand line as a de facto border and released intense 
propaganda against the idea of Pashtunistan.  
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Figure 2.6: How Pakistan will look after the dissolution of Durand Line.  
Source: http://www.afghanland.com/history/durrand.html  
Though Afghanistan appeared to be a controllable threat as it was a landlocked state and 
was a militarily weak compared with Pakistan, the Indian backing (and later that of the 
Soviet Union) to the Afghan claim perturbed Pakistan. Despite being an irritant of a 
neighbour, Kabul lacked the strength to forcibly establish Pashtunistan, or to invalidate 
the Durand treaty. Kabul largely remained a political dilemma. Marvin Weinbaum 
maintains until 1979 “Afghanistan had appeared largely as a political irritant for Pakistan, 
a petulant and resentful neighbour.”226 Due to those two issues, there were periodical 
breakdowns in the relationship, and Pakistan occasionally adopted punitive measures by 
applying trade embargos to correct Afghanistan, but Kabul didn’t blink under the barrage 
of blockades of its territory.  
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan  
When on the Christmas Eve of 1979 Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul for the first time, 
Islamabad faced a two pronged threat: it was sandwiched between India and Afghanistan. 
The presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan for almost a decade forced the 
concentration of Islamabad’s attention on its western border. The invasion dramatically 
transformed Pakistan’s geostrategic situation: Moscow’s troops were virtually on 
Pakistan’s border, and the buffer between Pakistan and Russia had disappeared.  
Pakistan managed to avid threat with American alliance. American money, Mujahedeen 
blood and ISI training forced Moscow to retreat in 1989. Russians installed President 
Najibullah government with a promise of military and economic assistance before they 
left Afghanistan. Islamabad’s protracted objectives of having a cordial government in 
Kabul remained an elusive dream. The fighting raged on amongst the varying factions, 
(which gave rise to the emergence of Taliban in 1994), and Najibullah brief period of 
governance lacked central authority, characterised by fighting between different ethnic 
groups, tribalism, and Islamic fundamentalism, all of which was used by Pakistan to its 
advantage.  
Pakistan trained the Taliban and provided them with weapons and financial support.227 
In 1996, one of Islamabad’s ambitions was fulfilled, when it achieved what came to be 
known as “strategic depth”, and the Taliban gained control of the majority of 
Afghanistan. The Taliban government received recognition from the Arab monarchies of 
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, the Taliban could not mitigate 
Pakistan’s security worries, and it was soon clear that the Taliban was nobody’s stooge: 
they did not provide Islamabad with the strategic depth it desired and only became a 
strategic nightmare for it. Taliban were Pakistan’s trained but they did not follow its 
direction. They gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, which brought the global war against 
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terrorism right to Pakistan’s door step. When Pakistan suggested that the Taliban should 
recognise the Durand line, they refused by stating Muslims have no borders.  
However, it was after the 9/11, 2001 that Afghanistan emerged as a serious security 
concern for Pakistan. The presence of al-Qaeda in Pak-Afghan border regions introduced 
an international dimension to the security issues of Pakistan.228 Kabul has allowed an 
Indian presence, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interest. The strategic space 
provided to India by Afghan security forces runs counter to Pakistan’s interests, as India 
is using Afghan territory to destabilise Pakistan, through its support of the Baluch 
insurgency movement and the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group, which 
has been operating from Afghanistan under the tutelage of Afghan and Indian intelligence 
agencies. 
Implication of Walt’s theory for Pakistan need for Alliances  
Using Walt’s BoT theory, we can clearly see that the factor which creates the need for an 
alliance is the security threat from India. To elaborate, the Indian aggregate power, 
geographical proximity, aggressive intentions and offensive capability pose a real threat 
to Pakistan’s security. India, being superior in all fields, outclasses Pakistan regionally 
and internationally, and so Pakistan seeks extraterritorial help to balance the Indian threat. 
Any slight adjustment in Walt’s four factors will basically change Pakistan’s threat 
perception, for instance, if Indian leaders had not harboured aggressive intentions and 
issued anti-Pakistani statements, it was unlikely that Pakistan would pursue balancing 
strategies. Likewise, If India had not forcibly annexed the princely states of Jammu and 
Kashmir, Pakistan had not felt the threat of its survival and whether India had not played 
a central role in the dismemberment of Pakistan, it had not felt the need for an alliance.  
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Furthermore, if India had not continued arms purchases and had not mobilized its troops 
on the Pakistani border on many occasions, and especially had not developed military 
doctrine to hit Pakistan, Pakistan would need less for an alliance to balance the Indian 
threat. Last but not least, had India not considered South Asia its spheres of influence, 
Pakistan would have been reluctant to invite extra-territorial powers into South Asia to 
balance India. 
BoT theory predicts that Pakistan would import the capabilities of a major power to 
balance the threat posed by India. To answer the question, why does Pakistan need an 
alliance, it has been shown that Pakistan needs alliance mainly in order to balance the 
threat from India and Afghanistan. Pakistan looks for alliance to correct the imbalance of 
threat in South Asia and to address Pakistan’s unremitting distress in security and defence 
field. Pakistan response however has not solely been external balancing. Pakistan 
possesses nuclear weapons, cultivates both internal and external balancing (internally by 
securing nuclear weapons and externally, by promoting alliances. In short, the issues that 
drive Pakistan’s need for the alliance are not only India’s preponderant power in South 
Asia, but also its geography, offensive power and aggressive intentions.  
Pakistan-China Alliance 
India has been a driving factor in the Sino-Pakistan alliance. Although the strength of 
India as an enemy has varied over time, the Indian factor has been constant. Historically, 
Pakistan-China relations were mainly strained during the 1950s due to Pakistan’s pro-
west leaning. During this period, Pakistan’s security needs, leadership orientation, and 
internal turmoil had made security elites less enthusiastic towards China, and generally, 
until about 1960 Pakistan had a discreet relationship with China. The international 
developments in the early part of the 1960s brought into clear focus the commonality of 
the state interests of China and Pakistan, pre-empting potential tension and conflict 
between them such as that had occurred between China and India in 1959 as result of 
their border dispute.  
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Warned by this Indo-China rivalry, and Pakistan’s disappointing experience with the 
West, President Ayub took the initiative in 1960 and proposed to China the delimitation 
and demarcation of the border between China’s province of Xinjiang and the northern 
areas of Pakistan Kashmir. China, who had already developed differences with India over 
the Tibet issue, and later fought a brief war with India, made a positive response to 
President Khan’s overtures. China had also been feeling isolated with both Super Powers 
opposed to it with the advent of Sino-Soviet rift in 1959. India manipulated Chinese 
isolation by approaching both major powers.  
India had proximity, an offensive power, and had expressed aggressive intentions towards 
both China and Pakistan, and so an alliance between Pakistan and China was required to 
balance India. Both Pakistan-China sorted out their boundary differences in 1963 by 
signing an agreement, largely in as a means to balance the threat from Indian. As a result 
of these developments, China’s sympathy lay with Pakistan during its conflict and wars 
with India. The Chinese weapons began to arrive in Pakistan but more significantly the 
Chinese gave support to Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute. In 1964 when the Chinese 
President visited Pakistan, he openly called for the people of Kashmir to have the right 
of self-determination.  
Beijing also proved to be very helpful for Pakistan’s security and defence requirements. 
China supplied weapons to Pakistan’s military, and helped it to build its own defence 
infrastructure by establishing ordnance factories in East and West Pakistan. To the 
advantage of China, Pakistan adopted the “One China Policy” and refused to recognise 
Taiwan as the lawful government of China. The expert of Chinese grand strategy, Thomas 
Kane, quotes a Pakistani ambassador that “Pakistan has always extended unconditional, 
consistent and strong support for China on the issue of Taiwan, Tibet, human rights and 
the WTO (world trade organization) and that “in return, Pakistan has received invaluable 
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principled support from China on various issues at the international level.”229 
Nonetheless, mutual support created a room for close a closer alliance.  
The 1970s and 1980s were marked by the steady development of the bilateral relationship 
and enhanced cooperation in several areas, including science and technology. Pakistan 
championed Beijing’s entry into the United Nations, as well as acting as a genuine broker 
in the Sino-US rapprochement. The close China-Pakistan relationship was exploited by 
President Nixon to affect a US rapprochement with China using Pakistan as an 
intermediary. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 elicited prompt 
condemnation from China and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from that country 
remained an important pre-condition for the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. Until 
the end of 1980s, Pakistan and China maintained particularly strong relations and in the 
words of Ahmed relations were “smooth as silk.”230 
Nonetheless, strategic transformation and structural changes in the post-Cold War 
international relations have made Pakistan-China relations tense. The appearance of the 
Taliban as the rulers of Afghanistan, Taliban support to the Uighurs separatists in 
Xinjinag and terrorist attacks on Chinese in Pakistan interrupted the delicate Pakistan-
China alliance. Despite what appears to be good relations, their overall security ties 
remained, at best, tepid. Indeed, bilateral relations between them reached an 
unprecedented nadir in May 1999, in the wake of the outbreak of a small-scale war on 
the hills of Kargil between Pakistan and India. The Kargil war unexpectedly elicited 
China’s neutrality towards Pakistan-India disputes. Although both governments 
endeavoured to give the impression that their fragile relationship was still strong, tested 
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by adversity, as the Pakistani and Chinese like to say, it was far from the reality. As 
discussed above, bilateral issues (the terrorist attacks on Chinese and Uighurs 
separatism)
231
 have not prevented their security and defence cooperation, it still continues 
to exist, but it has also induced Chinese pressure on Pakistan and ultimately stimulated 
the Pakistani security elite’s worries. 
This chapter has appraised Pakistan’s security challenges and the need for the alliance 
using Walt’s BoT theory framework. We have noted that the security threats are severe, 
and mainly emanate from Islamabad regional environment, which is charged with ill will 
and tension. Pakistan was born one of the most insecure states in the world, and it has 
lived in a constant fear of India dominance. Therefore, the main objective of Islamabad’s 
foreign policy is to seek national security through external alliances.  
Although the idea of an alliance is relatively basic, seeking external alliance is of prime 
importance to the national security of any state. Despite the need of the alliance, 
Pakistan’s alliance with China is coming across serious internal threats. Any internal 
threat, in the form of attacks on the Chinese that might endanger the Pakistan-China 
alliance, is expected to have some response from Pakistan as the need for alliance is 
extraordinary and utmost. In the wake of threats to the alliance with China, Pakistan has 
adopted promotional strategy of propaganda to teach the Pakistani population that the 
alliance is necessary, crucial and meeting security requirements.  
In the next chapter we aim to discuss the real and potential threats to the alliance and 
fears of the security elite which have been the main reasons for conducting propaganda 
within Pakistan, in order to nurture the alliance domestically. It also demonstrates and 
explains how Pakistan’s inability to control the flow of extremism into China’s Xinjiang 
province affected its close alliance with China.  
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 Threats to the Alliance and Fears of 
Pakistan’s Security Elites  
The previous chapter examined the threats to Pakistan’s security using the framework of 
Walt’s BoT theory. It remarked that India as a neighbouring state, having offensive 
capabilities and harbouring unpleasant intentions, poses a serious security threat to 
Pakistan’s national sovereignty. To counter the Indian threat, Pakistan seeks alliances 
with major powers, in particular China. It noted that although the Pakistan-China alliance 
is characterised by close security and military relations, the alliance faces both real and 
potential threats. Subsequently, this present chapter elaborates those internal threats to 
broaden our understanding of the challenges to the Pakistan-China alliance.  
The theoretical underpinning, SEPIA introduced in the introductory chapter as an 
alternative to the mainstream and alternative theories of IR, in support of this study 
emphasises that in international politics, it is not surprising for the states to synchronise 
their security policies with the uncertain allies in an attempt to promote their national 
interest. However, such an alliance invites some unsolicited consequences. Certain 
internal groups (religious, nationalist) who shelter an entirely different outlook resorts to 
violence and target the alliance partner. To overcome these grave threats to alliance 
security, security elites feel the need to do some propaganda work at the domestic front 
to protect the alliance from domestic hostile groups.  
Specifically, with regard to this study, the main preoccupation of the Pakistani elite has 
been to neutralise some tangible and probable threats to the survivability of the alliance 
with China. The strategies to promote the alliance are discussed in three ensuing 
empirical chapters (four, five and six), in this chapter we deal with threats and challenges 
to the alliance. Essentially, this chapter deals with one of the main research question: 
what are the real and potential challenges to the existence of Pakistan-China alliance?  
The security challenges China faces from Pakistani soil are complex and multifaceted. 
This chapter finds three areas of conflict which pose problems for the ideology of a 
natural alliance with China. While the issue of terrorism, perpetrated by Pakistani 
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religious elements and Baloch sub-nationalists, presents a real danger, the anti-
communism views prevalent in the Pakistani society pose a potential threat to the 
alliance. The presence of three evils of extremism, terrorism, and fundamentalism within 
Pakistani society, and Baloch sub-nationalism, feature in Islamabad’s economic, political 
and strategic engagement with world community. These three evils restrict Pakistan’s 
drive to accomplish economic, political and strategic objectives.  
Firstly, the activities of its Islamic militants, both in and outside of the country, created 
and nurtured by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-i-Islami (JI) Deobandi deeni 
madrasah (religious seminaries) based on Saudi Arabia’s Sallafi (puritanical) tradition of 
Islam, have both destabilised Pakistan domestically, and undeniably affected Pakistan’s 
relations with important neighbours, and especially with China. To put another way, the 
Islamists try to export fundamentalist beliefs to China’s Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang 
province. Uighur have established an organisation knows as the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) which seek independence from China. China has designated ETIM 
an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisation. Pakistan ungoverned tribal belt provides 
shelter to the ETIM terrorists to train and launch attack on Chinese security forces in 
Xinjiang in league with the Pakistani militants.  
The terrorist attacks on the Chinese pose another’s serious challenge to the maintenance 
and sustenance of the alliance. Traditionally, separatist tendencies in Balochistan 
province have run high. More recently since the launching of Chinese funded projects in 
Pakistan, the ethnic Baloch have demanded more say in the development projects. 
Sensing the dissident elements in Balochistan challenge the writ of the state, General 
Pervez Musharraf installed many military cantonments across the province. It had 
promoted a feeling of antagonism towards state. Therefore, they have rejected military 
cantonments. Due to their feeling of marginalisation at the hands of Pakistani state, 
Baloch rebels express their grievances targeting the Chinese citizens. Baloch nationalist 
actions embarrass the Pakistani state and prevent the Chinese undertaking development 
projects.  
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Finally, traditional anti-communism views act as a potential threat to the alliance. 
Generally, anti-communist views which have sustained mutely since Pakistan’s 
independence in 1947, arguably, they can prove potentially disruptive to the efficacy of 
the Pakistan-China alliance. Pakistani society perceive communism anti-Islamic, and 
unlike their own Islamic culture.  
Prominent scholars endorse these views that Pakistan-China alliance faces real threats 
that can derail alliance stability. For example, Huma Yusuf warns:  
Pakistan can also expect increasing pressure from China to tackle the Uighur 
militancy. Our country is ground zero for militants from across the region to train, 
network and plan financing…China has already warned Pakistan about this issue 
on several occasions, and further militant attacks in China could lead to bilateral 
tensions.
232
  
Likewise, Andrew Small maintains: 
The ETIM issue has been the biggest source of tension between China and 
Pakistan in recent years, and behind closed doors the pressure from Beijing at a 
number of different junctures has been pretty strong.233  
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Similarly, President Donald Trump advisor on South Asia, Lisa Curtis highlights that 
“Tension has also surfaced between Islamabad and Beijing in recent years over attacks 
by Islamist extremists on Chinese workers, which number about 10,000 in Pakistan.”
234
 
The Pakistani security elites openly express nervousness about the potential of those 
factors to disrupt Pakistan’s crucial alliance with China. General Pervez Musharraf 
maintains that the alliance with China is essential, and that Pakistan must act to stop the 
support of the Uighur Muslims within Pakistan.235 Kamal Matinuddin, an ex-military 
General of the Pakistan army, states plainly that the religious extremism in Pakistan can 
potentially have a “damping effect on our relations with Beijing.”
236
  
While killings of Chinese have evoked similar concerns from Pakistani officials. Retired 
ambassador Ghayoor Ahmad maintains that the violence against the Chinese in Pakistan 
“would be detrimental to Pakistan’s long-term strategic interest if Chinese support waned 
because of these mishaps”,
237
 while the leading Pakistani newspaper the Dawn showing 
alarm, observe, for example, “The fanatics must not be allowed to sabotage a relationship 
that has weathered many a storm and holds even greater promise for the future.”
238
 
In essence, the preceding chapter has summarised the perceptions of threat of the 
Pakistani state, which in turn helps us to understand its rationale in pursuing a strategy of 
alliance, the current chapter seeks to examine the concerns and fears of the security elite 
regarding its society as a potential and real threat to the endurance of the alliance. Both 
chapters differ in the sense that the preceding chapter discussed why Pakistan needs the 
                                                 
234 Lisa Curtis, "The Limits of Pakistan-China Alliance".  
235
 See Editorial "Routine Promises in Beijing," Daily Times, 22 February 2006. 
236 Kamal Matinuddin, "President Musharraf Visit to China" The News, 3 March 2006. 
237 Ghayoor Ahmad, " Reinforcing Ties with China" The Dawn, 20 February 2006   
238
 Editorial "Threat to Chinese Nationals," The Dawn, 10 July 2007. 
 101 
 
alliance, this chapter finds what are the internal threats and challenges to the alliance 
itself.  
In the remainder of the chapter, an attempt is made to trace the evolution of the three 
negative forces of extremism, terrorism, and fundamentalism within the Pakistani 
society, and the regional and international implications of these forces, in particular the 
way they have endangered alliance and enhanced the Pakistani security elite’s worries 
about its own society.  
Evolution of extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistani 
society  
Pakistan is an overtly religious society, and the presence of three evils (radicalism, 
terrorism, and fundamentalism), denoted as the “Talibanisation of Pakistan”239 or 
“Taliban syndrome”240, intensifies this. General Musharraf’s concept of “enlightened 
moderation” was aimed to fight extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism of the Muslim 
society in general, and Pakistani society in particular. General Musharraf criticised those 
who perverted Islamic faith. He urged Muslims to shun these three evils and adopt 
moderation in their behaviour and thoughts. Equally, he urged the west to play its role to 
resolve lingering disputes involving the Muslim world, for example in Indian held 
Kashmir, and Palestine.241 
This does not mean that traditional Pakistani society has always embraced these negative 
values. For most of its history, the Pakistani public has been relatively peaceful. There 
has been an absence of violence in the social order. The dynamics of society altered 
during the 1980s or more specifically under the Zia-ul-Haq regime. He used Islam as a 
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political cover to achieve strategic and political objectives. He introduced many Islamic 
laws to conquest Islamic parties support, which made the Pakistani society 
fundamentalist and extremist. 
The creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947 was a remarkable tribute to the supreme 
leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the nation. The Pakistani nation 
rewarded him with the title of Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) for his ceaseless contribution 
to the freedom movement of sub-continent Muslims. Jinnah effectively united them under 
the platform of the All India Muslim League and achieved unanticipated Pakistan. 
Stanley Walport wrote in his biography of Jinnah: 
Few individuals significantly alter the course of history, fewer still modify the 
map of the world, hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah did all three…Jinnah virtually conjured that country into 
statehood by the force of his indomitable will.
242  
Jinnah envisioned a moderate, democratic and secular Pakistan. Talking to the members 
of the constitutional assembly in 1947, entrusted with the task of framing nation’s first 
constitution, he observed emphatically:  
You are free, you are free to go to your temples, [and] you are free to go to your 
mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong 
to any religion or cast or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the 
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State. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find 
that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease 
to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each 
individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
243
 
In sharp contrast to the current bigotry in the Pakistani society, Jinnah had clearly 
separated politics from religion. In an interview with Reuter’s correspondent in New 
Delhi (1946), Doon Campbell, Jinnah clearly asserted that Pakistan would be a 
democracy not theocracy, “the new state [of Pakistan] would be a modern democratic 
state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation, having 
equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste and creed.”244  
Appropriately, during his short spell as Pakistan’s first governor general, he rejected 
Islamist groups’ agenda of imposing their dogmatic views on the state and society. Such 
as, when a group of Islamists approached him for the declaration of sharia law in the 
country, he not only snubbed them, but labelled them as misguided ulema (scholars) and 
informed them that the people of Pakistan were not going to follow their assertive 
views.
245
  
With Jinnah’s death a year after Pakistan’s birth, his ideals vanished quickly. A bitter 
struggle broke out between the secularists and Islamists over the status of Islam in the 
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future constitution.
246
 This wrangling negated the essence of Pakistan, delayed 
constitution making, endangered national integration, and halted socio-economic 
development.
247
 A fragmented political leadership created room for the army to intrude. 
Consequently, four military interventions derailed the democratic process and weakened 
the national institutions, and established military control over the matters of the 
country.248  
The Islamist agenda of seeking a role for Islam in state affairs notwithstanding, these 
interventions were relatively calm. They did not resort to violence to achieve political 
and religious objectives. Farooq Hasnat and Rasul Bux Rais argue that the traditional 
Pakistani society has been tolerant and avoided violence to achieve religious and political 
objectives.
249
 The mass movements of 1968 (to topple General Ayub Khan) and 1977 
(against rigged elections) were largely non-violent. In reality, these efforts were meant 
for supremacy of the rule of law: the former to topple a dictator, the latter to correct the 
corrupt system. In 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq deposed the civilian government and 
imposed martial law in the country, the whole setups of the society started to change. 
                                                 
246
 G. W. Choudhury, "Constitution-Making Dilemmas in Pakistan," The Western Political Quarterly Vol. 
8, No. 4 (1955). pp. 589-600  
247
 A timely constitution assigns rights and duties of rulers and ruled. Almond et al maintain that a 
constitution is “a set of decision rules – the basic rules governing how decisions are made, setting up 
agencies and offices with special powers, assigning them territorial and functional jurisdiction”, Gabriel 
Almond et al, Comparative Politics Today (Pearson 2004 ). p.101 
248 For a detailed role of army in Pakistan see Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military & Politics in Pakistan 
1947-1997 (Sang-e-Meel, 2009).; Ayesha Siddiq, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy 
(Pluto Press, 2007).; Stephen Cohen, 'Pakistan: Army, Society, and Security', Asian Affairs 10 (Summer 
1983).  
249
 Hasnat, "Global Security Watch".pp.49-79; Rasul Bux Rais, "Religious Extremism and Terrorism in 
Pakistan, Challenges for National Security" in South Asia: Beyond the Global Financial Crises ed. 
Amitendu Palit(Singapore World Science 2011). pp.117-130  
 105 
 
Military coup d'etat, the Afghan war and the transformation of Pakistani society 
The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan occurred two years after General Zia-ul-Haq 
overthrew the civilian government. Zia’s military junta faced challenges both at domestic 
and foreign fronts. Internally, Zia needed legitimacy (for his deceitful rule), and 
externally Pakistan faced threats from the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. General 
Zia used Islamic parties to meet both internal and external challenges. Internally, a mass 
movement against deposed Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s alleged rigged election had 
stimulated society politically. General Zia needed legitimacy in the eyes of the newly-
stirred public. Zia used Islam and Islamic parties (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat-e 
Islami) to prolong his de jure rule.  
The Islamic parties supported Zia but secured some concessions from him. On the Islamic 
party’s insistence, Zia introduced many Islamic laws, criminalised alcohol, and some 
aspect of sexuality and introduced infamous blasphemy laws. It was a win-win situation 
for both: Zia prolonged his rule, and the Islamic parties’ influence penetrated deep down 
through society. Hassan Askari Rizvi argues, Zia “used the state apparatus and patronage 
to implement Islam on fundamentalist and orthodox lines. This helped Zia-ul-Haq to win 
over the support of a large section of the political far-right and religious circles to 
undercut opposition to his rule by the mainstream political parties.”
250
 The Islamic laws 
have serious consequences for the society. Hassan Abbas maintains “For Zia, these 
measures worked as a bulwark against the democratic process and freedom of the 
common man; and for religious groups it was a clean sweep against all liberal groups and 
thoughts, be those democratic or socialist.”
251
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Externally, to counter the combined Soviet-Afghan threat, General Zia backed the Islamic 
parties’ recruitment of mujahedeen from the Pakistani society for the “international 
jihad”, a term coined by American intelligence agencies. “International jihad” attracted 
over 35,000 Muslims from the Middle East, Europe, and central Asia, including Chinese 
Uighur Muslims.252 With financial support from the US and Arab states, training from 
Pakistan’s ISI, indoctrination in Fazal-ur-Rehman JUI and JI madrasah, the military junta 
raised fanatics mujahedeen to fight “atheist/infidel” Soviets. Former CIA director Frank 
Anderson said in an interview (2001) with Cable News Network (CNN) “it is entirely 
true that this is a war that was fought with our gold, but with their blood.”
253
  
The conclusion of the Afghan war could not stop Pakistan’s interference in Afghan 
affairs. Successive Pakistani regimes failed to reduce their influence in Afghanistan 
which strengthened the forces of religious extremism.
254
 Under state patronage, religious 
parties expanded their influence and changed the face of Pakistani society. Thousands of 
new rival madrasahs thrived in the country with support from Iran and Saudi Arabia. A 
culture of militancy, bomb blasts and suicide bombings thrived in Pakistan. Hasnat 
suggests that the Afghan war introduced a very distressing culture of “militancy, bigotry” 
within the Pakistani society which “played havoc with the social fabric of the country, 
badly disturbing its equilibrium.”
255
 The disruption in the society had global reach. An 
editorial of Daily Times (2007) maintains “under General Zia ul Haq, China first began 
to feel the heat from our religious parties engaged in plans of reconquering Muslim areas 
under Communism.”256 
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The fundamentalist intruders, almost medieval in their thinking, are very influential now. 
They can comfortably draw huge crowds at short notice, mainly from their controlled 
seminaries. Their power base is in the existence of more than 40,000 registered and 
unregistered madrasahs located throughout the country but most prominently in the 
suburbs of Quetta and Peshawar. The madrasah is their hiding complex, their 
indoctrinating chamber: they are terrorists’ nurseries.  
The religious extremists have become a state within a state, Pakistani society’s traditional 
fabric has been blemished and it has become immensely tough for the state to eradicate 
them without adopting a holistic approach. Extremism has become a strategic dilemma 
for Pakistan. Jinnah’s Pakistan has changed considerably. Describing Pakistani militants 
influence in Pakistani polity, Stephen Cohen maintains “Militants-whether you call them 
anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular-seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, 
but they can’t govern the state. The parties control the elections but they can prevent 
others from governing, and they may prevent the military from governing as well.”
257
  
Talibanisation, Islamic brotherhood and export of fundamentalist ideology 
The Taliban are strict in their disposition and ideology because of the influence of the 
JUI and JI madrasahs. Ambreen Javid suggests that almost all Taliban leadership have 
attended JUI and JI madrasah.
258
 These madrasahs are known for their promotion of 
fundamental Islam based on the Saudi Arabia Sallafi tradition of Islam, where the 
teaching is not allowed to deviate according to the changing circumstances. Ehsan Ahrari 
(2000) maintains, “Since the chief thrust of this education [madrasah education] is on 
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Islam and the need for jihad (holy war) to establish an Islamic government, the Taliban 
members become firm believers and fervent practitioners of this training.”
259
  
For these extremists states’ borders are imaginary, ethnicities and nationalities obscure. 
Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi, a renowned anti-Chinese fighter declared in South Waziristan 
“We should all be aware of the fact that there is no border between Pakistan and 
China…the border that is along the Gilgit-Baltistan region is actually a border with East 
Turkestan.”260 Their obscurantist ideology is not restricted to the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
region, their agenda is transnational. For them, if Muslims around world are in need or 
trouble, they should be helped, as they consider all Muslims as brother and sisters. So if 
it is central Asian states, Indian-held Kashmir and Chinese Uighur Muslims struggling to 
maintain their distinct Muslim identity, the Taliban is likely to support them passionately.  
For them, if the Uighur Muslims helped them in ousting Russian from Afghanistan, it is 
their religious duty to help them in establishing their state.261 Mainly they share combat 
experience, which they have gained in Afghanistan, and keenly provide arms and 
ammunitions, but they also inject much needed financial support to the fellow Muslims 
uniquely on the basis of “Islamic Ummah” (brotherhood). Whatever they possess, the 
Taliban believe, it is their religious duty to share with all Muslims including Xinjiang 
Uighurs. Since the 1990s, the Taliban have been sharing their combat experience, and 
providing training and sanctuary to the Uighur Muslims.  
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Talibanisation and Uighur Separatism  
Talibanisation globally has tarnished Pakistan’s image. Talibanisation of the Pakistani 
society and its implication for China’s Uighur Muslim community notwithstanding, it has 
created a fissure in the alliance and can possibly have extended bearing on the alliance 
feasibility. Pakistani state inability to check the flow of extremism into China poses direct 
threat to her security and national integrity. Jeffrey Reeves maintains that “Islamabad’s 
inability to control its society directly translates into insecurity for its neighbouring states, 
including China, as it is unable to manage the flow of people across its borders.”262 
Beijing has not hesitated to register its displeasure with Pakistan. The gist of their 
contention is that the separatist elements-the Uighur Muslims-in China’s Xinjiang 
province have close ties with Pakistan’s extremist groups, who provide them with 
support, training and arms for subversive activities inside Xinjiang. The international 
community consider Pakistan a land inhabited by terrorists, extremists and 
fundamentalists, and even Pakistan’s closest partner China share this troubling view. 
Chinese apprehensions are striking blow to the Pakistan-China alliance. Since Pakistan 
ties with Washington have tainted, Pakistan has turned to China for serious civilian and 
military aid. 
Beijing counterterrorism anxieties are driven primarily by its concerns over its Uighur 
Muslims community activities. China believes that the ETIM and its splinter group, the 
Turkistan Islamic Movement (TIP), are terrorist organisations and responsible for the 
forces of terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in China. Chinese officials suggest 
that Uighur militants are part of a network of international jihad who want to establish an 
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Islamic state under sharia law.
263
 Brian Spegele sustains that ETIM militants receive 
training and financial support from Pakistan-Afghan border areas which are the 
stronghold of Islamic militants allied with globally oriented al-Qaeda.
264
 
Al-Qaeda international jihad is also an inspiration for Uighur. Siegfried Wolf emphasises 
that the Uighur conflict needs to be looked “in the context of Islamic jihad and 
fundamentalism.”
265
 In this connection, al-Qaeda has facilitated the spread of Islamic 
ideology into the Xinjiang and movement of Uighur militants. For instance, the most 
wanted Chinese terrorist and former ETIM commander, Hasan Mahsuma, killed by the 
Pakistani security forces in 2003, is believed to have met Osama Bin Laden in 
Afghanistan and a member of the al-Qaeda Shura council.
266
  
In Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, the Islamic militants treat the Muslim Uighur as 
guests of honour. A senior Taliban commander categorically announced that “the Uighur 
live with us, but are always concerned about their mission in China. They are nice, good 
Muslims and the best fighters.”
267
 In 2013 the Pakistani intelligence agencies reported that 
there are between 300 and 400 ETIM militates living in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
268
 Mufti 
Abu Zar al-Burmi in a video message urged all Taliban faction to target China. Burmi 
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said “The pull-out of U.S. forces from Afghanistan is a victory for the Taliban movement 
in the region, and our next target will be China.” In the similar message he also supported 
carrying terrorist attacks on “Chinese embassies and companies and kidnap or kill 
Chinese nationals.”269  
ETIM, which the US consider a threat to US homeland security,270 operates through the 
Karakorum Highway (KKH) to launch terrorist attacks in Xinjiang province, and when 
pushed back by the Chinese security forces it finds sanctuary in the lawless and rugged 
mountain Pak-Afghan border areas. The Pakistani state discourages the Uighurs’ 
presence in Pakistan, and in fact captures them and hands over to the Chinese 
government. But being the godfather of the Taliban, Pakistani religious parties are more 
likely to favour of Taliban than being considerate of Pakistan’s closet partner’s national 
security. 
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Pakistan-Afghan borders areas has clearly 
worried Islamabad that domestic elements might dent Pakistan-China alliance. President 
Asif Ali Zardari expressed serious concern that militants can “draw a wedge” between 
Pakistan and China.
271
 Hu Shisheng, a South Asian expert at the China Institute of 
International Relations in Beijing, finds “The Pakistan and Afghanistan Taliban are 
sympathetic towards the Uighurs. So we absolutely have to pay attention to this, in a way 
that perhaps we did not before.”272  
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We will return to these fears, as it is pertinent to first evaluate what ails the Xinjiang 
region. 
The situation in Xinjiang  
In the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjinag, the Uighur are particularly vulnerable to 
separatist aspirations; indicators of unrest have been visible there for some time. Conor 
Gaffey (2015) reports that there may be as many as 23 million Muslims in China, 
approximately 1.8% of China’s total population.
273
 Uighur are Muslim and ethnically of 
Turkic origin. They can be found throughout the country but are particularly concentrated 
in the sensitive border regions. They find in religion both leadership and focus for long 
held grievances. In 1949, the Uighur population was more than 90% of the region, 
however today they make up between 45 and 50% of the total. According to an analyst 
familiar with the region, Uighur reduced population has happened due to Beijing’s 
deliberate policy of placing hundreds of Han Chinese in the Xinjiang region.
274
 Its current 
name, Xinjiang Uighur autonomous Region, (XUAR) was specified in 1955.  
Essentially, not all Islamic Uighur resort to violence and want to establish a separate state. 
Those who avoid violence demand fundamental rights and access to greater economic 
opportunities. Also they want to prevent Chinese security forces killings of innocent 
Uighur. The critics often blame Chinese government repressive policies have restricted 
Uighur freedom and liberty. John Gitting (1999) reports that the Uighur have limited 
access to their worship places, and in some case their religious places (mosques and 
Quranic Schools) have been closed and burnt down.
275
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It is notable that the Xinjiang region is indispensable for Beijing due to its abundant 
hydrocarbon resources and strategic location at the convergence of central Asia, South 
Asia and Europe. It embraces one sixth of China’s total land mass and is teeming with 
natural wealth. When compared with the Chinese eastern coast, it is very much 
underdeveloped. Physically, it is China’s gateway to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “One 
Road, One Belt” (renamed as BRI-the Belt and Road initiative) strategy, which is a 
reminder how important this region is for China. CPEC connects Gwadar with Xinjiang. 
Yet, Beijing efforts to untapped Xinjiang natural resources and aggressive development 
have been interrupted and plagued due to Uighur violent activities an extension of 
Talibanisation of the Pakistani society. Despite its geopolitical importance and potential 
to become China’s gateway to prosperity, the peace and security has been a scarce 
commodity due to its proximity with one of the most troubled regions of the world: 
Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and Pakistan’s northern areas.  
Traditionally, separatist tendencies have run high in the Uighur community. Since the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912, Xinjiang has remained in and out of the Chinese 
suzerainty. Twice in history, Uighur had bid to establish separate state. In 1933, they 
declared the establishment of East Turkistan Republic but the following year the Chinese 
government reabsorbed it. Then in 1944, the Uighur, capitalising on Japanese 
imperialism and the fighting between nationalists and communists, announced East-
Turkistan Republic but met a similar fate. Once the communist party established its 
control over government affairs, it quickly crushed Uighur aspiration for separate 
homeland.  
Uighur Islamic identity, cultural and ethnic Han migration into Xinjiang are believed to 
be major reasons for a separate Turkistan. The Chinese state has tried to reshape the 
Uighur Islamic character upsetting Uighur. Nicholas Bequelin maintains Chinese policies 
to “refashion their [Uighur] culture and religious identity” have made Uighur to resent 
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Chinese policies in Xinjiang.
276
 Whereas Chinese philosophy of changing Xinjiang 
demography to the advantage of state has created Uighur resentment. Anthony Howell 
and Cindy Fan (2011) report that Han population have climbed from meagre 6.7 percent 
in 1949 to 40 percent in 2008,
277
 making it a serious reason for Uighur resentment towards 
Beijing authorities. Uighur resent the migration of the Han Chinese into Xinjiang will 
ruin their identity.
278
 The Han are more educated than the Uighur. They have acquired 
control over major jobs, businesses and trade. Increasing population have put strains on 
sharing of resources like water, health and school thereby distancing Uighur. The Han 
consider the Uighur ignorant and illiterate, while the Uighur consider the Han as rude and 
arrogant.  
The communist victory in 1949 brought the confiscation of religious properties, the 
closure of many mosques and restriction on religious practices. Active opposition was 
supressed but continued to smoulder. Uighur Muslims observed fasting during the holy 
month of Ramadan and their children learned the Quran in evening classes with an imam 
(Quranic teacher).
279
 Uighur Muslims planned attacks on local authorities during the 
Cultural Revolution and rose in a revolt that took nearly 1700 lives in Yunnan 1974. 
Ahrari suggests that the Chinese security forces “used not only guns but also air 
bombings” to overpower a cumulative surge of Islam, which only enhanced the Uighur’ 
alienation.
 280
 Chinese state brutality could not continue as it failed to make visible change. 
Soon government would introduce liberal policies mainly regarding religion.  
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The post-Mao government brought drastic changes in Chinese policies towards Uighur 
as brutal force, rather than inhibiting Uighur resistance, fed it. Faced with such an 
apparently indigestible minority group, pragmatic Deng Xiaoping regretted excessive use 
of force in Xinjiang. The repentance of the new government was translated into policies 
favourable to the Uighur. Beijing attempted to draft Muslims into national service. It tried 
to use its Muslim citizens to promote political, strategic and business ties with Arab and 
other Islamic states to develop its credentials in the third world.  
Beijing permitted resumption of the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in an effort to reassure its 
Islamic community about their welfare. To perform the hajj pilgrimage, Uighur were 
allowed to travel to Pakistan, and from Pakistan to Mecca. The people of Pakistan 
welcomed them and made their journey painless by providing Uighur guarantee form to 
the Pakistani state. Justin Rudelson confirms, “The Uighur travel firstly by Karakorum 
road to Pakistan and then travel to Mecca by boat or plane. Many Pakistani people provide 
affidavit form for the Uighur which the Government of Pakistan requires for them as a 
guarantee.”281After completing pilgrimage to Mecca, not all Uighur returned to Xinjiang, 
rather several settled in Pakistan’s borders areas.  
However, the significant aspect of Deng’s policy of opening up borders for the Uighur 
was the encouragement of Muslim-to-Muslim relationship. Many Uighur landed in the 
camps and madrasahs in Pakistan and fought together with the mujahedeen against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. The Chinese authorities now wished they had been more cautious 
with Afghan jihad. Until that point, the Uighur had no interaction with the religious 
parties in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but once they met and fought alongside these 
religious groups, they learned guerrilla fighting tactics, and often became strict followers 
of militant Islam. Those links appear to be permanent as they still exist today, and many 
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Uighur fight alongside the Taliban against the international security forces in 
Afghanistan.   
Xinjiang uprising  
The end of the Afghan War in 1989 must have been lamented by the Chinese, not because 
the Russians were defeated but because combatant Uighur returned to Xinjiang, 
exacerbating Chinese worries. Confident with their recent combat experience in 
Afghanistan and victory against a much stronger army, many Uighur retuned to Xinjiang, 
picked up arms and joined the separatist movement to establish East Turkistan, free from 
Chinese domination and control. Chieng pen Chung believes that the Soviet defeat 
fascinated Uighur separatists and they tried to emulate those strategies in Xinjiang.
282
 
Since then, violence has rocked Xinjiang. While Uighur blame Chinese security forces 
for torture, the Chinese believe that the Uighur are seeking inspiration from the Pakistani 
militants.  
Uighur violent activities were soon identified by the Chinese as outside inspired. Veteran 
journalist and award winning author of “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and 
Fundamentalism in Central Asia” (Yale University, 2010) Ahmad Rashid emphasises 
that the minute the Uighur joined the international jihad during the 1980s, an element of 
worry was added to Pakistan-China relations.
283
 Hasan Rizvi likewise states that the 
Chinese started complaining to Pakistan before the Soviet Union terminated its combat 
mission in Afghanistan,
284
 but because the Chinese were more concerned about the 
Russian presence in Afghanistan than the Uighurs’ participation, they did not raise the 
                                                 
282
 Quoted in Wang, "Talibanization of Tribal Areas of Pakistan." pp.74-100  
283 Rashid, "Taliban Exporting Extremism". 
284 Author interview with Hassan Askari Rizvi, Lahore (2011).  
 
 117 
 
Uighur threat officially with the Pakistani establishment. In addition, John Cooley 
establishes that Beijing trained the mujahedeen along with the Pakistani intelligence 
officials.285 
Not all Uighur returned to their homeland in the post Afghan war. Haider (2005) suggests 
that some Uighur wanted to stay in Pakistan, with different objectives. While a few of 
them preferred to complete their Quranic education at the Fazal-ul-Rehman Deobandi 
madrasah, others settled in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where they 
married local women and acquired Pakistani citizenship.
286
  
The Uighur combat experience in the Afghan war notwithstanding, two parallel 
developments reinvigorated their aspirations: the emergence of five independent central 
Asian states, and the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, which provided an added impetus 
to move. The Soviet departure should have provided peace and tranquillity in 
Afghanistan, but this was not the case. A devastating civil war, ethnic cleansing, 
tribalism, and fundamentalism ascended in Afghanistan. With Pakistan’s support, the 
Taliban emerged victorious in 1996. As China’s Xinjiang region was near Afghanistan, 
it became more vulnerable to destabilising forces of Afghanistan. Ahmad Rashid (2010) 
argues that the Taliban’s rise to power led them to aspire “to install an Islamic 
government across the region.”287  
Stimulated by events in central Asia and the increased contact with Islamists in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Uighur Muslims showed signs of escalating agitation under 
communist rule. Reports suggest that between 1990 and 2013, more than 500 people have 
been killed in the region, and similar numbers injured. (See Table 1)  
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Table 1: Timeline: Terror incidents in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2013. Source: Xinhua  
Year Places of incident  Killed Injured 
1990 Baren  6 0 
1991 Kuqa  1 13 
1992 Urumqi 3 23 
1993 Yecheng, South Xinjiang  2 30 
1995 Hotan  0 0 
1996 Jangilas,Xinhe, Qunas  10 3 
1997 Urumqi, Baicheng  22 268 
1998 Kashgar 3 12 
1999 Zepu 4 2 
2000 Wushi, Xinhe 11 4 
2001 Shufu 1 0 
2002 Bishkek  2 0 
2003 China-Kyrgyzstan  21 0 
2006 Urumqi  0 2 
2007 Pamir  19 1 
2008 Kashgar, Urumqi 30 0 
2009 Urumqi  0 100 
2010 Aksu  7 14 
2011 Kashgar, Hotan  37 50 
2012 Yecheng  20 0 
2013 Kashgar, Tiananmen  115 61 
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A small town, Baren near Kashgar, witnessed the first event of terrorism in which six 
people were killed, and soon the violence spread across the entire region. In 1994, the 
publication of an anti-Islam book rocked the region again. The book written by Salman 
Rushdie had inflammatory content mocking prophet Muhammad. Figure indicates, the 
worst violence erupted in the year of 1997 when Uighur carried out mass bombings in 
the Xinjiang capital Urumqi, killing 22 people and injuring 260.  
The increasing incidents of violence have prepared Chinese government to confront 
terrorists in Xinjiang; where according to them security situation is far more serious than 
Tibet and a matter of “life and death.” 288 China retaliated by initiating a “strike hard” 
strategy to combat “imported” terrorism.
289
 Under the disguise of strike hard strategy, 
Chinese security forces carried out some of the worst human rights violations including 
torture, unlawful detention, and execution, disbanding religious practices, and forced 
abortion.
290
 
As the Chinese authorities are eager to exploit the natural resources of the region and 
develop it at par with other parts of the country, they have combatted to alleviate the 
region and control the spread of violence and extremism mainly effected by the Pakistani 
elements. Arguably, the difficulties of sustaining an alliance in the face of Islamist 
disruption on the Chinese border indicates that the Pakistani-China alliance cannot avoid 
the contradictions of Pakistan’s own foreign polices, whereby it both feeds and fights the 
Islamist beast. 
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China’s Dissent with Pakistan 
The rising tide of terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in Xinjiang is not a small 
concern for China. Home grown extremism is extremely hard paradox of Pakistan’s 
policy. Pakistan has allegedly looked both ways. In particular, it has conducted 
contradictory polies after 9/11, both feeding and fighting the extreme Islam. Essentially, 
Pakistan’s dual role in fight against terrorism has become a major episode in posing 
problem to the alliance, as the war on terror has had significant impact on both countries 
in different ways, and increased the pressure on the alliance. It is increasingly becoming 
far more difficult for China to tolerate such happenings and it does not auger well for the 
sustainability of the alliance.  
Essentially, Beijing has regularly displayed discontent with Pakistan. In 1992 China first 
showed its unhappiness to president Ghulam Ishfaq Khan in a low-key manner, but in 
1997 the Chinese lodged a strong protest with Pakistan. Javid Hussain, a former diplomat 
part of the meeting between Pakistani and Chinese officials in Islamabad, recalls that “the 
Chinese made a strong protest with us, they were dissatisfied with our Afghan policy, as 
the Taliban were supporting and training Islamic Uighurs separatists”, Hussain further 
elaborates that “the situation was very complicated because the Chinese have gathered 
all information and knew the Uighur whereabouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They also 
knew that the Uighur were getting an Islamic education in Pakistani madrasahs.”
291
 
Undoubtedly, it would be too much distressing for Pakistani officials to have such 
development appear in the Pakistan-China alliance. 
A most troubling incident occurred during 1999, when the Chinese authorities captured 
22 Uighur in Xinjiang. Haider (2005) maintains that during interrogation, the captured 
militants revealed that they were trained in Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal regions.
292
 China 
                                                 
291
 Author interview with Javid Hussain, Lahore (2011). 
292
 Haider, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjinag Uighurs." p.532 
 121 
 
accused and again landed hard on Pakistan. Beijing accusation would suggest it was 
doomed with Pakistan. It wanted to show that the problem lies in Pakistan not China. 
More recently, in 2009 violence in the ethnically divided city of Urumqi killed almost 
200 people, mostly Han Chinese, and again the Chinese state authorities vociferously 
blamed Pakistan-based militants. To alleviate Chinese concerns a perturbed President 
Zardari told Urumqi's Communist Party leader, Zhu Hailun, “Pakistan will have even 
greater cooperation with China at fighting terrorism and together we will strike against 
terrorist forces.”
293
  
Increasing the pressure is not the only way Chinese have displayed animosity towards 
Pakistan, their severe dissatisfaction has also been expressed in the form of tangible 
Chinese actions. In the past, Beijing has threatened to close the Karakorum Highway, 
landing a severe blow to the Pakistan-China alliance. Ahmad Faruqi argues that the 
Chinese wanted to send a strong signal to Islamabad that Beijing would not hesitate to 
freeze the all-weather alliance if Islamabad failed to stop backing Islamic militants in 
Afghanistan.
294
 In addition, Beijing appeared to be reluctant to implement a renewed 
agreement of upgrades to the KKH in 1995. Ahmad Rashid believes that the Chinese 
feared that it would further facilitate Taliban movement in the Xinjiang region.
295
  
Given the Chinese resentments and pressures on Pakistan, and emerging portentous 
political clouds within the alliance have appeared visible. At one point Beijing raised the 
idea of fencing the border with Pakistan to stop the flow of Talibanisation into Xinjiang, 
another major blow to the all-weather alliance. It is common for neighbouring states with 
                                                 
293 Quoted in "China Says Attacks Thwarted As Pakistan President Visits Xinjiang" The Dawn, 31 
August 2011  
294 Faruqi Ahmad, "China Card Could yet Trump Musharraf," Asia Time Online, 25 May 2002  
295 Quoted in Haider, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjinag Uighurs." p.532 
 
 122 
 
tense relations to fence borders, for example the India-Pakistan border is partially fenced 
in the disputed Kashmir region, fencing border with what is called “all-weather partner” 
is hardly a good premonition.  
In another example of difficulty in the alliance, 1963 border agreement which was due 
for renewal in 2000, but China dragged its heels throughout the process and eventually 
signed the agreement reluctantly in 2005. Pakistan’s most read English Newspaper the 
Dawn (2003) speculated that “China’s lack of interest in the agreement is related to the 
intrusion of our religious elements in the affairs of Xinjiang.”
296
 More recently, Beijing 
has applied visa curbs on Pakistani travellers. Riffat Husain maintains “Ten years ago - 
it was easy for the Pakistani national to get Chinese visit visa, but the Chinese have 
imposed a very strict visa rule, and they monitor traffic very closely.”
297
  
Nevertheless, Chinese pressures have created a major intra-alliance dilemma. Persistent 
violence in Xinjiang and consequent Chinese actions must have found Pakistani security 
elites reeling as China applied varying degree of pressures to show its animosity towards 
Pakistan. Pakistan in particular has behaved contradictorily, both feeding and fighting the 
Islamist militant. Pakistan created the Taliban to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan, but 
the Taliban also tried to nurture the Uighur Muslims’ Islamic movement and attacked the 
Chinese inside Pakistan. The Taliban rebellion has placed Pakistan in an awkward 
situation. During the 1999 Kargil war, China distanced itself from Pakistan mainly due 
to the fact that the militants fighting India were also posing a security challenge to China 
in Xinjiang. 
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Pakistan’s fears and worries 
China’s actions were a new, unfamiliar thing in the Pakistan-China alliance. When 
Pakistan and China inaugurated the KKH in 1982, Chinese leaders stated, “it will allow 
us [China] to give military aid to Pakistan.”
298
 KKH closure exposed the unity of the 
alliance that they were ready to risk their military ties with Pakistan. Other Chinese 
actions had similar implications, for instance, the visa curbs on Pakistani travellers. In 
Islamabad’s eyes, this was an all-weather partnership but lamentably, its citizens were 
not allowed to travel China individually on a tourist visa, and they were only allowed to 
travel as part of a group.
299
  
Chinese actions added to Pakistani fears and worries towards its own society that had the 
potential to rupture the time-tested alliance that Islamabad had enjoyed with Beijing. 
There is no ambiguity in Pakistan that religious fundamentalism can affect Islamabad’s 
strategic relations with Beijing. For instance, retired Lt. General Talat Masood states that 
the growing militancy in Pakistan and how it affects the security of regional and major 
powers including the foremost ally, China, is a deepening concern for Pakistan.
300
 Former 
envoy Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, stresses “Pakistani militant support to Islamic Uighur is a 
very disturbing development. It a serious concern to us as the Chinese are not happy 
whatsoever. If our extremists continue to support Uighur Muslims, we fear damages of 
an important alliance partner who supports us economically, militarily and politically.”
301
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Ambassador Qazi further maintain that “they [the Chinese] want to help us, they want us 
to progress”, but “we [Pakistan] must curb militants activities failing to do so will badly 
affect our alliance with them.”
302
  
There is a tangible nervousness in Islamabad about the potential of those factors to disrupt 
Pakistan’s crucial alliance with China. General Musharraf maintains that the alliance with 
China is essential, and that Pakistan must act to stop the support for the Uighur Muslims 
within Pakistan.303 General Matinuddin (2006) states plainly that the religious extremism 
in Pakistan can potentially have a “damping effect on our relations with Beijing.”
304
 These 
statements are an indication of the fears of Pakistani elites towards their society. 
Killings of Chinese in Pakistan have evoked similar concerns from other officials. Retired 
ambassador Ghayoor Ahmad maintains that the violence against the Chinese “would be 
detrimental to Pakistan’s long-term strategic interest if Chinese support waned because 
of these mishaps”,
305
 while the Dawn (2007) showed alarm, observing, for example, “The 
fanatics must not be allowed to sabotage a relationship that has weathered many a storm 
and holds even greater promise for the future.”
306
  
Aside from Pakistan’s expressions of concern, the best way to judge Pakistani security 
worries is to look at several steps it has taken to moderate the Chinese concerns. They 
                                                 
within our borders have supported Uighur Muslims and it is a serious worry for Islamabad”, Author 
interview with Khalid Mahmood, Islamabad (2011). 
302
Author interview with Ashraf Jahangir Qazi Islamabad (2011). 
303
 See Editorial "Routine Promises in Beijing." Daily Times, 22 February 2006 
304
 Matinuddin. “President Musharraf visit to China”  
305
 Ahmad, Ghayoor, “Reinforcing ties with China”, The Dawn 20 February 2006  
306
 Editorial "Threat to Chinese Nationals." The Dawn, 10 July 2007 
 
 125 
 
include carrying military operations against the Uighurs, to the conduct of propaganda 
(this is the subject discussed in proceeding chapters). In a noteworthy move, on occasion 
Islamabad has assisted direct talks between the Taliban leadership and China. For 
instance it has been extensively reported that Islamabad had arranged a meeting between 
Chinese officials and Taliban extant leader Mullah Omar in Afghanistan in 1997, and 
again in 2000 in which the Chinese requested that the Taliban stop backing the Uighur 
movement.
307
  
Though Talibanisation is a cause of instability in Xinjiang, the Pakistani state has 
contributed significantly to Chinese security. Since this issue has entered the Pakistan-
China bilateral equation, Pakistan has never espoused the Uighur cause or expressed any 
desire to meet Uighur leaders. Rather, the Pakistani leaders have been visiting Beijing to 
assure them that Pakistan will not allow Uighur to settle in Pakistan. Musharraf assured 
his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao that “[his] country will never allow anybody, including 
the terrorist force of “East Turkestan”, to use the territory of Pakistan to carry out any 
form of anti-China activities.”
308
 Pakistan is as committed to Chinese security as it is to 
its own, and appreciates the gravity of the issues. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
told President Xi, “China’s security is as important to us as Pakistan’s security.” 
309
 
To eliminate Uighur terrorism, the Pakistani state has never hesitated to go to the extent 
of launching military actions against the Uighur. Two examples demonstrate this is 
unprecedented insofar as China is concerned. Firstly, the US has long urged Pakistan to 
eliminate the Haqqani network –a major destabilising factor in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s 
failure to catch Haqqani terrorists has ruptured US-Pakistani relations. Secondly, other 
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than the rivalry between the two countries, the biggest issue which has brought India and 
Pakistan to the brink of the war has been Islamic militants targeting India.  
Keeping these two cases in mind, Islamabad has unprecedentedly fulfilled Chinese 
demands. In sharp contrast to these two cases, in a special military operation, Pakistani 
security forces killed some of the most-wanted Chinese terrorists, and ETIM commander 
Hasan Masuma in North Waziristan on Chinese instigation in 2003. In the same year 
Pakistan agreed to sign an extradition treaty with China. It permitted Islamabad to hand 
over the fierce ETIM fighter Ismael Kardar, and Ismail Semed, one of the founders and 
main perpetrators of 1990 Baren uprising, to the Chinese security forces. 
In another occurrence, the Chinese authorities urged Pakistan to deliver twenty ETIM 
militants hiding in tribal areas of Pakistan.310 Upon their extradition to China, they were 
executed by Chinese security forces outside the due process of law. In 2010, Interior 
Minister told Beijing that “We treat ETIM not only as an enemy of China, but also as an 
enemy of Pakistan”, and claimed to have killed ETIM commander Abdul Haq (alias 
Memetiming Memeti).311 It indeed suggests security elites’ urgency for China’s alliance, 
above all threats to the alliance which Pakistani state want to avoid at all cost.  
Pakistan has arranged direct meeting between the Chinese and Pakistani religious parties) 
to patch up their differences. In the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Taliban’s 
“godfather” JI met in Beijing. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding that 
the Taliban would not interfere in Chinese internal affairs.
312
 A similar campaign has been 
reported in Pakistan in which Islamabad urged its Islamic parties, such as JUI and JI, not 
to accept the Uighur in their madrasahs, albeit with less effect. 
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 In another significant step, Islamabad has responded to Chinese pressures by helping and 
aiding its counterterrorism efforts in Xinjiang by closing Uighur centres in Pakistan. For 
example, Islamabad closed two Uighur centres-Hatotanabad and Kashgarabad-in 
Rawalpindi in December 2000. The Centres had existed since the late 1980s, following 
the Chinese state policy of allowing the Uighur to perform hajj using Pakistani routes.  
Finally, Pakistani officials have conducted public diplomacy both in Pakistan and China 
to assuage Chinese concerns. Pakistani security worries have led them to travel Xinjiang 
quite frequently, to assuage Uighur feeling towards the Beijing authorities. The 
arguments the Pakistani leaders used to attempt to moderate the Uighur’ views towards 
the Chinese authorities are worth noting. In 2001, General Musharraf visited Xinjiang’s 
capital Urumqi to meet the imam of the grand mosque. He urged the Uighur to shun 
violence as Islam forbade violence, be patriotic, and to work for their country,
313
 while 
President Farooq Leghari said in 1996, “you are first Chinese, and then Muslims.”
314
 
Terrorist attacks on the Chinese in Pakistan  
Another serious threat to the alliance has unprecedented incidents of terrorist attacks on 
the Chinese citizens working and living in Pakistan. There are about 300 Chinese 
companies (employing 10,000 Chinese citizens) in Pakistan involved in excess of 250 
development projects including noteworthy projects like Gwadar deep sea port, dams, 
and more recently, CPEC. Chinese workers are scattered across the country, and 
providing security to such a widespread group of people is a real concern for Pakistan. 
Chinese work in tough conditions and become a soft target for the extremists.  
Although the Uighur separatism problematic, the Islamic separatist militants are directly 
involved attacking Chinese in Pakistan. There is no point in claiming that these attacks 
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are carried out by Uighur militants; the terrorist attacks are partially because of 
Talibanisation, and partially ethno-nationalist elements from Balochistan. Religious 
fanatics target China due to the deprivation of what they call their Muslim brethren in 
Xinjiang. In an attack on a Chinese woman in Peshawar, Mohammad Afridi, Taliban 
spokesperson for Darra Adam Khel area had confirmed that Tehreek Taliban Pakistan 
had carried the terrorist attack to kill the Chinese women to “revenge for the Chinese 
government killing our Muslim brothers in their Xinjiang province.”
315
  
Clearly, there is a degree of sympathy for the plight of Uighur Muslims in Pakistan. A 
Pakistani newspaper also claimed that religious militants’ attacks on Chinese nationals in 
Pakistan are part of their revenge for the killing of Uighur Muslim in China.
316
 It has also 
been confirmed by the militants. An IMU leader, al-Burmi, in a Friday sermon in the 
Pakistani tribal region, made it mandatory for fellow Muslims “to abduct and kill Chinese 
people.”
317
 Similarly, al-Qaeda has issued a fatwa to target Chinese nationals abroad in 
revenge attacks for their killing of Uighurs.
318
  
Baloch separatists represent a political rather than religious challenge. They attack the 
Chinese to embarrass the state. Historically, Balochistan has had an antagonistic 
relationship with federal movement at Islamabad, who have been accused of conducting 
numerous military operations to supress Baloch separatism with force. While the Political 
solutions to resolve the situation have largely been ignored, the Baloch separatists carry 
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attacks on Chinese support for Islamabad. Chinese support for Islamabad have given rise 
to anti-Chinese sentiments at societal level. Reeves suggests, “China’s state support for 
Islamabad puts Chinese workers in Pakistan at risk as domestic terrorist groups attack 
them as proxies of China’s foreign policy. This has affected China’s economic security 
and fosters anti-Chinese sentiment at a social level.”319  
Islamabad worries that if the terrorist attacks on Chinese citizens persist, Beijing may 
terminate its interests and withdraw its workers, ultimately endangering billions of dollars 
of Chinese investment in Pakistan. Many Chinese funded projects are aimed at improving 
Pakistan’s energy situation. Pakistani fears are not unfounded, for instance in September 
2009, after attacks on Chinese citizens, a private Chinese company abandoned a hefty 
$19 billion project in Sindh province without stating a date for resuming work on the 
project.
320
 Former ambassador to China Riaz Khan laments “The Chinese would have 
invested 10 times more in Pakistan over the last few decades, if the security situation 
had been better.”
321
 
For the Pakistani security elite, attacks on Chinese are a serious fear, bigger even than 
Uighur separatism. The China-Pakistan Director at the Institute of Strategic Studies, 
Islamabad, Fazal-ul-Rehman, articulates that “the terrorist attacks on Chinese have not 
only huge symbolic value, but left a huge scar on the Pakistan-China alliance.”
322
 
Moreover, a serving general of the Pakistan army told this author on the condition of 
anonymity that the terrorist attacks on the Chinese, having both a religious and sub-
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nationalism dimension, are “a serious worry, even bigger than Uighur separatism.” 
General Matinuddin maintains that Islamabad cannot “afford killings of our friends. No 
country would like to invest, not even our friends from across the Himalayas, in a country 
where its workers and its property is not safe. The militants who carried out these 
dastardly acts must be traced and given maximum punishment.”
323
  
Although an isolated terrorist attack took place in 1998 when a Chinese national, Geo 
Yiming, was injured and his wife killed in Islamabad, no further Chinese came under 
attack until May 2004 when the banned Baloch Liberation Army detonated a remote-
controlled bomb in Gwadar which killed three Chinese engineers, and injured eleven 
other people, including nine Chinese and two Pakistani. The terrorist attack shocked the 
Pakistani leadership, and condemnation poured in. President Musharraf and Prime 
Minister Zafrullah Jamali spoke to the Chinese leadership, and assured exemplary 
punishment for the culprits.
324
 Pakistan immediately promoted Chinese national security, 
and a few days later Pakistan announced a breakthrough related to arrest of the Gwadar 
attackers.  
The Pakistani leaders’ response shows the gravity of their concerns and the importance 
of the alliance with China; for the Pakistani state, the developmental projects, like 
Gwadar deep sea port are immensely important. Gwadar is a deep-sea port situated in the 
Balochistan province of Pakistan. Gwadar construction started in 2002 with an initial 
amount of $248 million paid by the Chinese government. Gwadar could change Pakistani 
fortune, and strategically, it improves Pakistan’s security. It provides its navy an 
additional port far from the range of India, enabling Pakistan to avoid Indian blockades. 
Economically, it has the potential to become the regional hub for trade. Many regional 
states, including the land-locked central Asian states, Afghanistan, and India could 
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benefit from it. Pakistan can earn huge revenues through transit taxes if these countries 
decide to trade through the Gwadar port. 
It can strengthen the Pakistan-China strategic alliance. Indrani Bagchi provides that 
Pakistan and China can transform it into a strategic naval port and subsequently display 
their presence in the Indian oceans. India’s strategic position would be relatively 
vulnerable if such a scenario emerged.325 To offset this, India finances and trains Baloch 
separatist with the agenda of destabilising Balochistan and disrupting its development. 
China’s financial contribution to the Gwadar port construction emphasises these trends: 
while China has funded around 80% of the development costs, Pakistan has contributed 
just 20%. The Gwadar port development also challenges Iran’s Chabahar port, which is 
being constructed with Indian help. Reports have frequently emerged in Pakistan that Iran 
is involved in subversive activities to deter the Chinese from carrying development works 
in Pakistan.326 
China has huge stake in Gwadar becoming both functional and peaceful. The emerging 
Chinese economy needs an uninterrupted supply of oil to maintain its growth,327 
However, China is challenged by the Malacca Strait dilemma. China conducts much of 
its trade this way, and imports oil from the gulf region using the South China Sea, which 
is surrounded by states which are hostile to China. Hamzah argues that this dilemma 
enhances the significance of the Gwadar port to China, as it would reduce the need to use 
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the risky Strait of Malacca.328 China will be able to use Gwadar to import oil and gas, 
transporting it to its western region using Pakistan’s network of rail and road routes which 
it is constructing with a $48 billion investment called China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor.329  
China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a leading scheme of President Xi Jinping’s one Belt 
and Road strategy, is believed to revive ancient silk linking more than billion community, 
major regions and focuses on building infrastructure: roads, railways, energy routes, and 
economic zones. Significantly, The Gwadar port development will reduce the distance 
that Chinese imports have to travel from 15,000 km to a mere 5000km; at present it takes 
two to three months to ship oil from the gulf to Shanghai port, but using Gwadar as a port 
and then CPEC as an overland route, Beijing will be able to reduce the time to around 
few days. Gwadar is not only option for China to overcome the Malacca dilemma. China 
is constructing ports in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh, described as the “string of 
pearls” strategy, mainly to contain the Indian navy. So viewed in the context of Gwadar 
strategic importance, the speed of the Pakistani security elites response suggests the 
importance of the alliance.  
Even before the Gwadar port incidents, in an ambush with Baloch separatist, three 
Chinese were killed in the Hub town of Balochistan.330 Balochistan senior politician 
Mairaj Khan expressed “deep concern and dismay” over the killing, termed it “shameful” 
and called upon government “to immediately stop military operation in Balochistan and 
make a peaceful settlement.”331 Though the audacious attack on Chinese took place in 
2007, it was preceded by an incident in 2004, when two Chinese engineers, Wang Ende 
and Wang Peng, working on Gomal Zam dams in the South Waziristan agency of FATA. 
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It was carried out by former Guantanamo Bay detainee and al-Qaeda linked Abdullah 
Mahsud. Security forces launched an operation in an attempt to secure the kidnapped 
Chinese engineers, but in the process one engineer was killed and the other freed. After 
the attack, the Chinese company suspended work on the project.  
 In 2007, al-Qaeda affiliated Lal (red) mosque militants abducted Chinese acupuncture 
clinic workers in broad day light in Islamabad, which invoked a strong reaction from the 
Pakistani state. Determined to impose Sharia in the country, the kidnappers suggested 
that the Chinese were involved in immoral activities.
332
 General Musharraf called it the 
“most embarrassing and shameful”
 333
 event in the Sino-Pakistan alliance, as was the 
Chinese embassy in Islamabad: “We are shocked and surprised on such an unlawful 
incident.”
334 To avoid further embarrassment, security forces launched a brutal application 
of force to crush the seminary students. Although the kidnapping of the Chinese was 
condemnable, it did not justify such a powerful military response, given the fact that the 
captives were released eventually on the same day; the Pakistani state’s strong response 
suggests its doubts about its own society. The entire world saw the drama unfolding in 
the capital, which remained besieged under military operations representing a war-like 
situation.  
After the Lal masjid incident, terrorist attacks on Chinese surged. In a revenge attack, 
three Chinese were gunned down in Peshawar, just days after Islamabad kidnapping. 
Rashid Khan contends it was a reaction to the Lal masjid assault as the killers were 
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chanting Islamic slogans whilst attacking the Chinese.
335
 What worried Pakistan most was 
that Chinese workers started leaving Pakistan, placing several development projects’ fate 
in jeopardy.
336
  
Similarly, the Chinese embassy in Islamabad cautioned Chinese workers against 
unnecessary movement in Pakistan, thereby delaying the much needed energy projects.
337
 
Pakistan’s Foreign office spokesperson, Tasnim Aslam, reacting to the incident, said, “It 
is a vital relation for Pakistan but it appears that somebody wants to damage it,”
338
 Retired 
ambassador Khalid Mehmood maintains it was a “regretful event” and that the Chinese 
were “helping us, making Pakistan prosperous”, but they were being targeted by 
extremists. Pakistan “needs to beef up Chinese national security to create a safe 
environment” for them.
339
  
The audacious attacks required extraordinary measures which both Pakistan and China 
vowed to take in 2007 when they jointly established a task force to provide “fool proof 
security” to the Chinese citizens.
340
 However, it could not stop militants targeting Chinese. 
A Chinese telecoms engineer was kidnapped just days before President Asif Ali Zardari 
visited China in 2008. China threatened to withdraw its personnel from Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s inability to protect Chinese nationals had worn down Chinese patience. 
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According to military officials, pressure from the Chinese was “of a kind there has not 
been before.”
341
  
Anti-Communism views in Pakistan 
Anti-communist views in Pakistan have been less obviously putting the alliance in 
danger, but nevertheless, they are a potential threat. The people of Pakistan have 
undoubtedly always regarded India as the greatest and most imminent source of danger 
to their country, and the problem of defence against India has been uppermost in their 
mind. Communism has also been considered as running counter to Islamic thoughts; 
according to the strongly religious elements of society, Islam and communism are 
fundamentally incompatible and cannot be reconciled.342  
Pakistan’s national poet Muhammad Iqbal, regarded as influential a figure as Jinnah, is 
considered to have strong anti-communist prejudice. He expressed his anti-communist 
feeling in his Poetry, where he painted a very dismal view of a nation which does not 
believe in God:  
Denied celestial grace a nation goes 
 No further than electricity or stream; 
 Death to the heart, machines stand sovereign, 
 Engines that crush al sense of human kindness. 343  
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Furthermore, he was known to have said that “to hold a Bolshevist view, in my opinion, 
is to place oneself outside the pale of Islam.”344  
As noted above, Iqbal, like Jinnah, occupies a central position in the Pakistani ethos and 
thoughts, mainly because both had played significant roles in spearheading the Pakistani 
movement. It is believed that Iqbal envisioned Pakistan, and Jinnah fulfilled his 
visualisation. In this context, Iqbal’s comments are significant, and although it is 
unknown just how much Pakistani society is influenced by his views, he is followed, 
loved and read by millions of Pakistanis. Taloo Islam, an influential Islamic think-tank 
based in Pakistan, maintains that “Iqbal was a strict Muslim, never upheld communism 
in any form, for him, communism is a disease that a Muslim should avoid.”345  
Taloo Islam also presents a very dim view of communism. It believes that communism 
is inconsistent and incompatible with Islam: “To be a communist, you need to be atheist 
and atheism is contrary to Islam”, and continues, “A Muslim can never believe in 
communism and a communist cannot be included into the fold of Islam and that it denies 
human freedom and fundamental rights.
 
It has miserably failed in the world.”
346
 Indeed, 
these views penetrate deep down the society. As Taloo Islam represents Islamic literature, 
and has clear links with religious political parties,
347
 it is clearly influential on Islamic 
parties’ thoughts.  
Maulana Maududi, founder of the explicitly and avowedly anti-communist organisation 
Jamaat-i- Islami and a well-known scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, categorically 
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condemned socialism’s concentration of all means of production in the hands of the 
government, stating that it was un-Islamic. Maududi had firm beliefs that communism 
deprives individual freedom and basic rights, while Islam guarantees freedom to all 
individuals and allow personal ownership to everyone.
348
 It can be assumed that JI’s 
support of Uighur Muslims is to be influenced by the Maududi Islamic thought which 
sees communism as against individual freedom. Another Islamic cleric, Maulana Hamid 
Bhashani, a well-known freedom activist, said “I cannot accept a godless system”, 
because the struggle for Pakistan was to set up an Islamic state according to the dictates 
of Islam.
349
 Such extreme opinions are likely to have increased the Pakistani decision 
maker’s fears of their own society, which has developed a prejudice against communism 
based on religion, and will affect state efforts to sustain the alliance with China.  
It is not without significance that the ban placed on the Communist Party of Pakistan in 
July 1954 has not been lifted until now. This is not because there is less freedom when 
compared with other similar countries, but because the lifting of the ban would have 
brought great uproar within Pakistan, mainly from the Islamic parties who do not want a 
“godless system” to flourish in Pakistan. It is worth noting that during the early days of 
Pakistan’s independence, the liberal and secular agenda of the communist party were 
denounced by the Islamic parties as kafir (infidels).  
Not only has society in general held such extreme beliefs, the Pakistani leadership has 
also expressed strong anti-communist feelings. President Iskandar Mirza told British 
Prime Minister that he would never allow a communist system to flourish in Pakistan.
350
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Former Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan suggested to British Foreign Secretary Sir 
William Strange that there should be an anti-communist bloc from Turkey to Pakistan.
351
 
He likewise recommended that the US support both India and Pakistan to fight the 
potential threat of communism. It is quite interesting to note that even General Ayub 
Khan, who established the links with Beijing, was not admiring of communism. He 
notably stated that “the Chinese have their ideology, and we have our ideology, they have 
no faith in our ideology and we have no faith in their ideology.”
352
 Though these could be 
categorised as politically motivated statements rather than an actual bias against 
communism, the fact is they exist.  
Furthermore, a member of Pakistan’s National Assembly stated that Islam is against 
communism and Pakistan cannot allow communism to capture one county after 
another.
353
 Prime Minister Suharwardy said in the parliament that the “cold war was due 
to the communist’s attempt to impose their ideology on rest of the world and Pakistan 
will not allow this extreme ideology to flourish.”
354
 Muhammad Ali Bogra, former Prime 
Minister and ambassador to the US had a firm belief that “atheistic doctrine of 
communism was raising its head like a hydra-headed monster and Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity who have belief in God were faced with a challenge.”
355
 In later years when 
Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became Prime Minister, he espoused 
a new ideology based on the amalgamation of communist-Islamic ideology called 
“Islamic Socialism” based on secular traditions. The conservative Islamic parties were 
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strongly opposed to Bhutto’s Islamic-socialism. They charged that Islamic socialism was 
nothing short of “fraud perpetrated on Islam, a superficial and dishonest attempt to 
spiritualize socialism.”
356
  
In this chapter we have highlighted threats to the alliance and Pakistani security elite fears 
emerging from those threats. Evidence of Islamic Uighur receiving training and 
sanctuaries in Pakistan border region is serious. Chinese officials have expressed alarm 
at the apparent links between Pakistan jihadi militates and Uighur Muslim in China. 
China believes their safe heavens are Pakistan’s rugged mountain tribal areas. We have 
noted that the threats to the alliance and Pakistani security fears are not without evidence 
and largely originate from three major factors. Firstly, it is mainly due to the Pakistani 
militant support (training and sanctuary) to Uighur Muslim in China’s Xinjiang province 
since the early 1990s. It also highlights Pakistan’s dubious role in the war against 
terrorism, Pakistan both pump and fight the Taliban. Secondly, it relates to the several 
terrorist incidents in which Pakistani Taliban, separatist militants are accused of attacking 
the Chinese citizens working on various development projects in Pakistan. The overtly 
conservative and vicious “Tehreek Taliban Pakistan” has issued fatwas (an Islamic 
ruling) to conduct jihad (holy war) against the Chinese to revenge Islamic Uighur 
suppressions and killings. Finally, the anti-communist views held by the Pakistani public 
along with some of the leaders, that communism has no place in Islam and a Muslim can 
never hold communist ideology in high esteem, has added to their fears. 
The preceding discussion suggest that the issue of militancy and intolerance in Pakistani 
society is a real phenomenon. Pakistan’s Islamic and conservative society sometimes rise 
to a more prominent level in bilateral relationship with China and present a wide array of 
serious problems for the Pakistani decision-makers. Unprecedentedly, such issues have 
become an irritant in Sino-Pakistan alliance. There are threats and challenges to the 
sustainability of the alliance, as well as there is a need for the alliance. These threats have 
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partially been countered through a military operation against the terrorists, however, 
domestic public diplomacy and propaganda strategies have been a key strategy to market 
and promote the alliance to the overtly religious society. This is the subject discussed in 
following chapters: Textbooks and Propaganda, newspapers and propaganda and the 
National Assembly debates.  
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 Textbooks and Propaganda  
Having highlighted the threats to the alliance and concerns of the Pakistani security elite 
about the attitudes of their overtly religious population towards the alliance with China 
in the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the propaganda strategies produced by 
the Pakistani government to counter these threats to the alliance. Essentially, both 
chapters deal with questions: How the security elites in Pakistan promote the alliance 
with China domestically to counter those challenges. This chapter also examine 
associated question, what their propaganda tells us about how they view their own 
society. The answer to the second question will be ascertained by analysing the 
propaganda strategies of the security elites.  
This chapter argues that the Pakistani officials are alarmed about the sustainability of the 
alliance with China, and as a corollary, are employing multi-pronged strategies to 
promote it. In principle, security elites use both soft and hard strategies. Since this 
research is restricted to the evaluation of soft strategies, the present chapter aims at 
demonstrating how Pakistan is using the instrument of textbooks to make Chinese 
acceptable as enduring allies to the public. In their efforts to market the alliance, multiple 
propaganda approaches, representing various themes, project China as magnificent 
country that loves Pakistan and its people, practice values which resembles with Islam. 
Textbooks propaganda educates that the Islamic Uighur are leading prodigious lives 
along with the majority Han Chinese.  
The promotional strategies emphasis Pakistan-China alliance grounded on common 
enmity with India. While US is portrayed as having betrayed Pakistan on several 
occasions, China is assumed to be steadfast. Finally, Pakistani state issued textbooks 
promote alliance by employing catchy slogans. The Pakistani officials’ propaganda 
exposes their assumptions and apprehensions about their own public.  
This empirical chapter is based on the content analysis of social studies textbooks used 
in cultural institutions to identify propaganda for the domestic audience. The results of 
the analysis are presented both in quantitative and qualitative findings. While the 
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examination and interpretation of the propaganda is informed by a knowledge of the 
general techniques of propaganda, in particular the appeal to the emotions of hope, love, 
hatred, fear, and beliefs.
357 
Moreover, identification of the specific techniques of 
propaganda such as name-calling, substitution of names, transfer, selection, repetition, 
testimonials, card stacking and bandwagons is carried out, in order to interpret the data.
358
 
These terms are explained in more detail, and with examples, in the section on 
propaganda messages, as a brief preliminary example, consider the propaganda technique 
“repetition” whereby the propagandist frequently repeats similar statements, slogans or 
key words with the aim of getting these accepted by his audience.
359
  
The results of the chapter are presented both qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
methodology is one of the main challenges that researchers face by studying textbook 
analysis. In this regard, Falk Pingel states that quantitative and qualitative content 
techniques are complementary in conducting content analysis. He argues that the two 
techniques should be consolidated with the aim that the investigation will reach an 
adequate breadth and depth.360 Quantitative techniques are focused on subjects, for 
example the recurrence of topics and the space dedicated to the distinctive points of the 
content. Qualitative analysis strives to understand the meaning of content through a more 
top to bottom logical investigation. 
The chapter has following sections:  
1. Section one explains factors that make Pakistan and China awkward partners,  
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2. Section two explains the process by which government decision is translated into 
the writing, editing, and publishing of the textbooks.  
3. This section also explains importance of textbooks as an instrument of the state 
policy; and the structure and mechanism of the Pakistani state propaganda system, 
particularly highlighting the role of the Ministry of Education (MoE) in producing 
propaganda; and  
4. And finally, section three, evaluates the propaganda strategies found within the 
selected textbooks. 
Pakistan-China: An awkward alliance 
In the introductory chapter we have defined that an awkward alliance is one which is 
formed between states that are ideologically, politically, economically and even 
culturally diverse or geopolitically antagonistic. The Pakistan-China alliance is 
uncomfortable due to the glaring differences in ideology, political system and culture. 
Pakistan shares little with China except the one major factor of having India as a common 
threat. While Pakistan is a devoted Islamic state, China is communist. Heritage 
Foundation visiting scholar Huma Sattar maintains “Much to the befuddlement of the rest 
of the world - and as ironic as it is - Communist China and Islamic Pakistan are fast 
friends.”
361
  
In addition, despite the two countries claiming to be the all-round friends, many people 
do not know much about China’s geography and language. A student at a prestigious 
Pakistani university replied to a question that “Japan was the largest island in China.” 
This misunderstanding of Pakistan’s closest ally is so prevalent that other students of 
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same university believed that “Japanese and Chinese were same languages.” 362 Andrew 
Small maintains that despite Pakistan-China share a deep security bond “both do not share 
any cultural references and points or values.” 
363
  
The English language is as much in use in the Pakistani political circle as it could be in a 
country where it is not the language of the people. Given the close alliance, one might 
expect more use of the Chinese language, English is actually the most widely used and 
studied foreign language. The majority of the students select Western subjects and 
providers for modern knowledge acquisition and intellectual guidance. Pakistan’s army 
conduct, culture and training style are more closely aligned with those of the British than 
the Chinese. The differences between the two nations are highlighted by the fact that 
Beijing has leapfrogged from being a poor underdeveloped country into a prosperous 
industrial giant, while Pakistan has faced a serious economic and political crisis since her 
independence. Finally, the issue of Uighur separatism has been a source of contention 
between these allies.  
Textbooks as an instrument of state supremacy 
In following section, we elaborate propaganda institution in Pakistan, importance of 
textbooks as a disseminator of propaganda and textbooks as an instrument of state 
authority.  
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In every form of propaganda, there must be an organization, an individual or department 
responsible for its existence, so which office is responsible for conducting propaganda in 
Pakistan? Propaganda does not happen in a vacuum; behind all propaganda, there are 
certain objectives and values which need to be achieved, and those objectives and values 
are represented or are associated with some individual. Traditional propaganda in the 
west has been conducted through the creation of specific propaganda departments. For 
instance, Nicholas Cull discusses during the World War II Britain’s “Ministry of 
Information” (MOI) moved America from an isolationist position to war intervention. 
The MOI was also at the forefront of selling the idea of a people’s war to the home nation 
in order to gain support for the war.
364
 Equally, Bennet Todd discusses American efforts 
to disseminate propaganda through its “Office of War Information” (OWI) to improve 
the image of the Soviet Union and Britain within the US to facilitate the supply of military 
aid to those countries during the World War II.
365
  
In certain cases, an institution created for some other purposes was also responsible for 
propaganda. For instance, apart from its role as sole ruling political party, the Communist 
Party of China plays a significant role in disseminating propaganda domestically.
366
 
However, not all states want to, or are able to, create a propaganda department, bearing 
in mind the resource constraints and finances involved in establishing such a huge 
bureaucratic structure. In some cases, the education system appears to be an established 
platform for propaganda, for example in Pakistan, textbooks are used as an instrument of 
state, to educate children about the alliance with China. 
                                                 
364
 Nicholas Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American Neutrality in World 
War II, (Oxford University Press, 1995).; Susan A. Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the 
US During WWII (Cornell University Press, 1997).  
365 M. Todd Bennett, One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and World War II. (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 
366 David Shambaugh, "China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy" The China 
Journal 57, (January, 2007). 
 146 
 
Before examining Pakistani textbooks and the role of the Ministry of Education in 
producing these textbooks, we must first look at the wider picture of educational materials 
as an instrument of state policy.  
Textbooks are fundamental in any education system. They are a universal means of 
education and dissemination of knowledge. This modern age of information technology, 
where the knowledge is readily available in just one click, has not reduced its 
significance. Philip Altbach maintains “in the age of computers and satellite 
communications, the most powerful and pervasive educational technology is the 
textbook.” 
367
 Despite the availability of knowledge from the internet, textbooks will 
remain an important source of knowledge as they are accessible to all and do not require 
any specialist equipment or communications technology.  
Textbooks occupy a significant space within the classroom setting. Almost all activities 
revolve around it. Most importantly, texts represent the curriculum. Sleether and Grant 
believe that textbooks are most important “conveyor” of the curriculum within the 
classroom.
368
 Teachers’ lesson plans are based around them, and children carry and read 
them both in the classroom and at home. It is generally agreed that textbooks consume 
between 70 and 95% of student’s time while they are in the classroom.
369
 Jack Zevin even 
suggests textbooks are in more use than a teacher in the classroom.
370
 Textbooks bring 
scattered knowledge into one place. Textbooks may be solitary, but they can be a 
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significant source of knowledge for the students, for example in cases where the teachers 
are untrained, inexperienced or incompetent.  
Textbooks and state hegemony  
Not only are textbooks the oldest technology used in cultural institutions, they are 
distinctive in another way: they are imbued with authority. Textbooks matter as an 
instrument of the state, as its way of getting into the minds of the young, and against 
competing or overlapping sources of authority, such as the family or the Mosque. 
Textbooks are not just commodities sold in the market for commercial purposes, states 
regulate them for achieving their objectives. Fitzgerald maintains that the function of the 
state curriculum is telling its “children what their elders want them to know.” 371 
Curriculum expert, Michael Apple, suggests that textbooks are “conceived, designed, and 
authored by real people with real interests.” 372 De Castell emphasises that textbooks are 
embodiments of cultural messages and functionally, are not that different to government 
policy documents.373 Textbooks are biased, produce detailed factual knowledge, match 
government policy documents and transfer specific knowledge from leadership to the 
younger generations. 
The textbooks develop and reflect a wider political struggle about power and identity. 
The textbooks considered to be the best source of knowledge are produced to serve 
powerful groups within states. Apple, in his pivotal scholarships, considers the links 
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between education and prevalent political, cultural and economic discrimination within 
societies. He urges education and the development of curriculum to be perceived as a 
social phenomenon, and not psychological, as it embodies class, race, and gender 
dynamics that establish society. Apple believes Texts are partial sets of values which 
represent conflict and comprise over power and control. He continues to reason that the 
hegemony within the texts have been enacted through explicit and implicit curriculum of 
cultural institutions.
374
  
Likewise, Jean Anyon states that despite textbooks claim neutrality, they actually perform 
an ideological function. They appear to be an instrument in the hands of the ruling group 
to dominate a subordinate group. Anyon believes textbooks are a social construct which 
throughout the manufacturing process excludes and includes various groups’ competing 
interests and expectations.
375
 Textbooks are social phenomena which introduce young 
children to specific historical, cultural and politico-strategic order to achieve the goals of 
a regime. Through the medium of education, the powerful group seeks to dominate the 
society. Curriculum offers dominant group an opportunity to control the sub-ordinate 
groups. There is a link between political, economic and cultural factors and textbook 
adoption policies. 
Selective tradition in Textbooks 
Textbooks transmit more than informal knowledge and content. Textbooks reproduce 
selective knowledge carefully chosen from a larger collection. Raymond Williams 
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considers it a “cultural hegemony” since the contents are carefully selected from a wide 
range of knowledge and only the contents that promote the interests of the powerful group 
are allowed.
376
 Furthermore, textbook knowledge is an “official’ knowledge”: despite 
knowledge promoting controversial ideologies, once approved by the state it acquires the 
status of “official knowledge”,
 377
 and as such, it is less likely to be challenged. It implies 
what appears in the textbook is accurate and true. In nutshell, the textbooks are the 
product of a “conscious choice” to maintain the legitimacy of certain controversial 
ideologies and the promotion of historical factors as true and accurate. As textbooks are 
state’s prerogative, textbook pedagogy is legitimate as compared to another source of 
knowledge. 
Profit-hungry publishers 
Once the texts are approved by a government board, they enter into another crucial stage 
of publication where states continue to maintain control. The production of textbooks is 
a remarkably complex process. From publishers to the classroom, the process is highly 
partisan. Critics believe that “indeed, from publisher to the student, textbooks move 
through a political world.” 
378
 The process is made complex due to the competing interests 
between a state’s regulatory directives and the publisher’s pursuit of profit. Textbooks 
are as a commodity within the market, and while the Government strives to maintain 
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hegemony over the textbooks contents, publishers are looking for profit and new 
business. 
Billions of dollars are spent annually on textbook production around the world. The 
profit-hungry publishers, who aim for profit, not the promotion of knowledge, look for 
their stake in a highly lucrative and competitive market.
379
 Publisher’s hunger for the 
business is entirely exploited by the text endorsing committees. Committees concerned 
with text publication, regularly introduce guidance for publishers to follow, and failure 
to do so results in the cancellation of contracts. As the publishers are logically concerned 
with bottom line, they adhere to the government policies to ensure profit in an 
increasingly difficult marketplace.
380
 Thus, the whole textbooks production process 
allows states to wield immense influence over the adoption as well as publication of the 
textbooks. The publishers are not in an ideal position to defy state directives as doing so 
would deprive them a huge chunk of money. Government committee involvement at each 
stage of the publication of the textbooks ensures that texts are published without any 
change, deletion or amendments.  
Process of textbook approval in Pakistan  
The ultimate control of the contents of textbooks in Pakistan can be established by its 
official origin. It is the responsibility of Ministry of Education Curriculum Wing 
(MoECW) in Islamabad to plan, prepare and publish entire textbooks for grades 1-12 
(ages 4-18). According to the rules established by the Constitution, provinces do not have 
the authority to control or direct education policy, they only implement and distribute 
textbooks once they have been approved by the MoECW. The provincial textbook 
boards, following MoECW instructions, get written textbooks through registered 
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government teachers. Once the textbooks are written, the boards send them back to the 
ministry for scrutiny and final approval. MoECW approves textbooks only if the authors 
have followed ministry instructions. Once approved, the curriculum is officially 
standardised throughout the country. The curriculum for universities is designed by the 
university syndicate in association with the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, 
which is headed by a chairman appointed by the government.  
Structurally, the Education Ministry is headed by a minister who is a political appointee. 
The second ranking officer is the education secretary, who is a civil servant. Likewise, 
the provincial education departments, which mainly implement national education 
policy, are headed by an education minister and senior provincial executive civil servants. 
The propaganda agent in Pakistan is the Education Ministry which is facilitating 
messages directly to the people through the textbooks it produces, in a covert way using 
its constitutional powers. This close association with the pillars of the states (bureaucracy 
and political rulers) is inevitable when the texts are premeditated by the government 
officials, written and edited by teachers who are government employees, approved by a 
committee in the federal Ministry of Education, and issued by a board which is an official 
institution.  
Examining the use of textbooks highlights the target of the propaganda: the audience. 
The importance of textbooks is much enhanced in developing countries. For instance, this 
study deals with a developing country, Pakistan, where a significant number (almost 
70%) of the people live in remote areas. Jowett suggests an audience located in a remote 
region without access to major media will have to be reached in appropriate ways.
381
 
Communications were not strong and widespread during the 1990s and early 2000s; the 
mushrooming of TV channels did not come until the mid-2000s (during the reign of 
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General Musharraf), so before then textbooks were the most suitable resource to reach 
the maximum number of people to disseminate messages.  
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Process of textbooks development and approval 
   Khalid Mahmood has explained the process382 of textbooks development and approval in 
Pakistan. (See Figure 4.1 )  
 
Figure 4.1: Process of textbooks development and approval in Pakistan.   
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The third phase of textbook development explains how the Pakistani state maintains its 
hegemony over the contents of the textbooks. Textbook authors receive some instructions 
that they must follow while writing the textbooks. The instructions to the authors reveal 
the actual process by which the government’s decision is translated into writing, editing 
and publication of textbooks. We interviewed some textbooks’ authors and officials from 
Ministry of Education. The interviewee gave us interesting information about the entire 
process of the textbooks production with the condition that their names are not mentioned 
while they are cited, except for one author. 
The making of the textbook in Pakistan can effectively be linked with the government in 
power under which textbooks are created and distributed. Pakistani state maintains its 
hegemony over the contents of the textbooks. MoECW tries to control the contents of 
textbooks to achieve foreign policy goals. Textbooks author Hassan Askari based in 
Lahore stated that textbooks are written by a college, and university teachers and, as such, 
are under the control of the government and are not free to write against the official 
line.383 While another author lamented that ideology dictates the writing of textbooks. He 
argued If a private author produces an independent book that neglects prescribed 
instructions, school or college will be reluctant to allow students to use in the classroom 
unless there is a stamp from the provincial textbook board.384  
In certain cases, failure to comply with MoECW rules often leads to termination of 
authorship and contracts. For instance, Oxford University Press (OUP-Pakistan)’s failure 
to comply with Education Ministry directives led to the cancellation of its contract.385 
Each text contains the author’s name and the imprint of MoECW and official notice that 
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it is the only prescribed textbook. In some cases, a warning is issued by the chairman of 
the textbook board that the students must not buy or use any textbooks other than those 
officially approved.  
Specifically, with regard to the Sino-Pakistani relations, we posed these questions to the 
textbook authors and the officials of the Education Ministry. One of the senior ministry 
officials said that MoECW indeed instructs the textbook’s author to produce pro-China 
contents. While an author (secondary school level) based in Lahore admitted that “The 
ministry directs us to portray China as a great friend of Pakistan.”386 Another author 
recognised “we are mainly asked to discuss the Chinese contribution to Pakistan’s 
defence and security. He added “though it is true China contributes massively in our 
country, the instructions from the government are relatively inexplicable.”387 Clearly, 
there is an ideology at work which portrays China as a great friend of Pakistan. 
Regarding the cultural differences between China and Pakistan and their absence within 
the textbooks, an author based in Islamabad stated that the government requires authors 
to avoid highlighting cultural differences between the two nations.388 Clearly, Pakistani 
cultural textbooks are based on selective knowledge. In essence, it suggests that security 
elites are aware of the tension that exists between Pakistani society and China. It can be 
deduced that there are some fears in their mind that if the Pakistanis are taught the cultural 
differences between China and Pakistan, they could create more problems for the 
sustainability of the alliance. Otherwise, there is no plausible description for explaining 
the decision of security elites to eclipse cultural differences within textbooks. Even one 
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author accepted that teaching Pakistan and China cultural differences can increase anti-
Chinese sentiment.389  
Likewise, we put questions to the text’s authors about the violation of Uighur Muslims 
rights. One author replied, “we are directed to highlight the Chinese government 
development polices in Xinjiang. We are also responsible for writing that Uighur enjoy 
equal rights together with the Han Chinese.”390 It clearly indicates that a well-considered 
policy is implemented and recommended by the government. Once again it can be argued 
that discussing the policies of the Chinese security forces against the Uighur will create 
more problems for the alliance.  
Exceptionally some interviewees have their own perception of China. For example, two 
authors, one based in Islamabad and one in Multan, said it is entirely justified to teach 
Chinese contributions because China helps Pakistan against rival India. One of teacher 
added, “We know Chinese face life threats in Pakistan, however, teaching the 
contributions of the Chinese is not wrong and unjustified.”391 An official stationed at 
MoECW made similar comments. Referring to the Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1965 he 
maintains that “in the darkest hour of our history, it was China’s resolute support that 
provided a source of strength to the government and people of Pakistan.” 392 
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We also asked a question about which the best partner for Pakistan was [we asked mainly 
the United States and China]. Interestingly both the Ministry official and texts authors 
made some profound comments. An author based in Lahore stated:  
I wrote a textbook in which I tried to give a critical analysis of Pakistan's foreign 
relations. I wanted to write that China remained neutral during the Indo-Pakistani 
war of 1971. I wanted to say that Chinese contributions were exaggerated and 
those of Americans were underestimated. I was removed from the list of 
authors.393 
An official from MoECW stated in obvious terms, “Students are brainwashed to accept 
certain ideologies about Pakistan's foreign relations in which the United States is 
demonized while China is praised.” 394 One of the authors maintained “We were asked to 
highlight the betrayal of the United States following Pakistan’s wars with India and the 
sanctions US imposed on Pakistan. Likewise, Chinese support during and after the wars 
was directed to be fully highlighted with positive contents.” 395  
It is obvious to say that the Pakistani state tries to maintain its hegemony over the content 
of textbooks. It tries to educate the public that fulfils its strategic goals: the promotion of 
the alliance with China. It also suggests that security elites are aware of the cultural 
differences between Pakistan and China. To overcome these differences, the government 
maintains its hegemony over the writings of textbooks so that it can pass on its official 
and selective knowledge to the public. 
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Propaganda themes: The contents and messages  
In the next section, we discuss how the textbooks are designed and what propaganda 
approaches are employed to propagate alliance domestically.  
In the following discussion we will apply “design analysis” to examine how textbooks 
are designed and organised, and how its different parts relate to each other. All pupils 
attending school are required to have social studies textbooks for the compulsory 
subjects: Pakistan History, Pakistan studies, Social Studies, Urdu, English and Civics as 
compulsory subjects. These textbooks focus on government, and its institutions, ideology 
and two nation theory, laws, educational system, welfare associations, the army, and 
poetry but these textbooks are a category into which anything can be placed if it fails to 
fit into other disciplines. Texts start with three important messages: the Father of the 
Nation, and the serving President and Prime Minister. The messages urge the students to 
follow the textbook’s contents with love and care. In addition, each textbook clearly 
carries the official seal of the ministry to reinforce its official status.  
Each of the textbooks has a chapter on Pakistan’s foreign relations. This chapter does not 
exclusively discuss Pakistan-China relations, Pakistan’s relations with other countries are 
also discussed. The government has clearly “Chinese” the “official knowledge.” Within 
this framework, China is treated exclusively and assigned a large amount of curriculum 
space. The chapter spans an average of ten pages, with the alliance with China covering 
at least five of these pages, and the remaining pages given to a range of international 
relations (India, the US, Iran and Afghanistan and others). This of course means that the 
children leaving the classrooms will have spent a lot of their time reading about the 
alliance with China.  
There are some textbooks that have no relevance to international politics, they still have 
a chapter on China. Urdu and English literature texts, for example, are an entirely 
different genre and teach poetry, prose and fiction, and employing what is known as the 
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“selective tradition”, the Sino-Pakistan alliance has been made part of it.396 Though the 
discussion in those texts occupy on average six or seven pages, which seems trivial when 
compared with the overall structure, the inclusion of China in texts that deal largely with 
poetry, rhymes and prose makes them an interesting source of propaganda.  
When introducing foreign policy chapters, texts “position” the alliance with Beijing in a 
strategic way, making alliance look enormously dominant. The arrangement, or order of 
the chapters – that is, whether the Sino-Pakistan alliance appears before or after India-
Pakistan relation - has been widely discussed. In either case, whether students learn about 
the alliance before or after the troubled relations between India and Pakistan, the 
importance of the alliance is enhanced by linking it with India. The Pakistan-China 
alliance follows Pakistan-India relations ten times (62.5% of occurrences studied),
397
 
while the alliance appears before Pakistan-India relations in six (25%) textbooks.
398
  
This systematic structure is likely to push children to believe that China is friendly, while 
India is the enemy. The order emphasises that China is imperative for overcoming 
security threats emanating from India policies in the region. Even when the Sino-Pakistan 
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alliance appears before Indo-Pak relations, students would have already read about 
“outstanding” China and having that understanding in mind, they would read about 
“enemy” India. Running through this structure is the logic that in both cases a world of 
differences is created upon which a particular identity (China alliance) is constructed. 
The selective tradition allows state to exercise hegemony over the curriculum 
development to construct alliance with China. The young minds may ignore (or be 
unaware of) the awkwardness of the alliance, and be likely to believe that a communist 
country is helping them.  
In some textbooks, China is described in a way which makes it appear central. A text for 
grade five, entitled “Pakistan and Its Neighbours”, introduces Pakistan’s foreign policy 
in following fashion: 
Geo-strategically, Pakistan links South Asia with West and Central Asia. In the 
West lies brother Muslim nations Iran, and Afghanistan, and in the East lies 
traditional enemy India. In the North lies Pakistan’s traditional and deep-rooted 
friend China, we share a long border of 600 km with her which helps us during 
difficult times.
 399
  
Though the above statement ignores the issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, China 
clearly emerges as the most overwhelmingly positive of all Pakistan’s neighbours. 
Examples of this emphasis of the strength of the alliance are common; in a history text 
entitled “Pakistan’s relations with China and India” we can read that:  
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China and India are our neighbours. In the following pages, we discuss Pakistan’s 
relation with both countries. Since Pakistan’s independence, our relations with 
India have been hostile, but China is our great neighbour. In the beginning China 
was friendly with India, but when it came to know of India’s ambitions to become 
a major power of South Asia, it extended her friendship to Pakistan.
400
  
The authoritative proposition is justified by itself and there is no room for argument. Even 
before children reach the main part of the discussion, an affirmative statement is made in 
China’s favour to prepare the reader to accept the propaganda that makes up the rest of 
the chapter. The children will read the remaining text with strong “enemy” and “friend” 
images already planted in their minds.  
Finally, it is pertinent to mention that in 2006, the curriculum was reviewed. Attempts at 
change failed as the evaluation was conducted without introducing many amendments.
401
 
The majority of texts retained the positive content on China, with it only being removed 
from two Urdu texts. Textbooks are reprinted yearly, and even then changes are not often 
made, often only the order of the chapters is changed to make it appear to be a completely 
new edition: we have seen examples where textbooks have been described as the 1st, 2nd 
or 3rd editions but there is little change in the substance between each edition.402 Salman 
Ali maintains “Our present generation is learning the same knowledge that the previous 
two have learnt.” 403  
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Propaganda frequency across the Education Levels  
The statistical results from examining the texts show interesting patterns of propaganda. 
It fluctuates across the four levels of education. For instance, the great majority of 
propaganda is taking place at Secondary and Higher Secondary level of education, as 
shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. At this level it stands at slightly over 70% (13 texts), 
but there is a difference between these levels and others: it stands 11% [2 texts] both at 
lower secondary and higher education level, and at just one text (5.6% of the total) at 
primary level.  
 
Figure 4.2: Propaganda Percentage 
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Figure 4.3: Textbooks & Education Level 
We can see that propaganda is mainly concentred at the Secondary and Higher Secondary 
level of education. The security elite have concentrated their efforts at this level due to 
the complexity of topic. Politics being is a complex phenomenon, and needs to have an 
audience which can grasp the ideas behind the messages. Moreover, Secondary and 
Higher Secondary are the most critical levels, where students are exposed to maximum 
level of education in order to develop their critical thinking.404 This is not unique to 
Pakistan, this level of education (or age range) is often targeted for shaping opinions 
around the world. 405 However, civic education is also taught both at Primary School and 
Lower Secondary level. Logically, a nine year old will not be able to enter into a 
conversation on the same level of sophistication as a fifteen year old, so the education 
system has to adapt to the age of the children.  
In Pakistani textbooks, eight and nine year olds are being taught political factors but in 
very simple fashion, for instance, it is taught at grade five that both China and India are 
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Pakistan’s neighbour but India is an enemy. However, when it comes to the Secondary 
and Higher Secondary, the style is different as the discussion involves a much wider 
debate about the threat to national security and need for the alliance. The theme is the 
same but the level of detail has changed. In higher education, where the youngsters are 
more mature, the propaganda is still present, in order to maintain the continuity of the 
message until education is completed.  
Content analysis (major themes within textbooks)  
The content analysis of the selected textbooks revealed following five major propaganda 
themes: the glorious Chinese (Chinese culture, Islam and Uighur separatism), the 
historical relationship, security narratives, reliable China & unreliable US, and poetic or 
hyperbolic phrases. We will consider each of these themes in turn. 
The glorious Chinese (Chinese culture, Islam and Uighur separatism) 
The glorious Chinese propaganda scheme included three main themes: the Chinese 
having values which resemble Islam; that the Chinese love Pakistan and its people; and 
finally that the Uighur Muslims enjoy equal rights, similar to the Han Chinese. 
In quantitative terms, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that six (33.33%) of the textbooks 
convey this theme. The results indicate there is less emphasis on this compared to other 
themes, however presenting communist China as glorious and having certain qualities 
equal to Islam rings loudly. Statistically, all levels of education discuss this theme, except 
primary school. Graphs show similar amounts at both at Higher Education and Lower 
Secondary, while again much higher at secondary and higher school level.  
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Figure 4.4: Glorious Chinese theme percentage in the textbooks  
 
Figure 4.5: Glorious China and various Educational Levels 
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Qualitatively, an array of interesting strategies are utilised to push the “glorious” Chinese 
identity. The propaganda technique of “transfer”406 is used within texts to associate the 
Chinese with values, characteristics and beliefs which are not only emphasised by 
Pakistani state laws, but approved of by the overtly religious society, for instance those 
surrounding the consumption of alcohol. A textbook for grade 12 emphasises that the 
Chinese social system has a unique approach, that it is a creation of a new world and a 
new man, and is free of three main evils: money, sex and alcohol. Chinese people are 
succeeding without consuming alcohol, and sex is not part of art and culture in China.407 
In Pakistan, certain sharia laws ban the consumption of alcohol and pre-marital sex is not 
permitted and is stringently punished, this propaganda approach resonates with Pakistani 
practices.  
Invoking these laws, another text attempts to manufacture an illusion which portrays the 
Chinese in a way which is similar to the religious practices of the majority of the 
Pakistanis. A Lower Secondary level Urdu textbook suggests that the Chinese women 
eschew femininity, and do not like beauty products and ornaments, and that the Chinese 
are free of alcohol. They do not like to have alcohol as enunciated by our religion of 
Islam, that their perspective on life is simple, and that they lead a very active and hard 
life.408 The textbook rhetoric and efforts to equate the Chinese with the Pakistani 
population and its commonly held beliefs is likely to echo with this religious society.  
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Not only do the textbooks equate the two countries culturally and socially, the lessons are 
heavily loaded with opinions that urge the students to accept all those values 
unquestioningly because they also occur in their own beloved religion, Islam.409 The 
young minds may feel a sense of connection with China as they can realistically see these 
characteristics within their own society.  
Although the Chinese complain that Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) does not serve 
alcohol, so that’s why they prefer not to travel by it,410 Pakistani government-issued 
textbooks continue to make a deliberate effort to target the audience with the implication 
that these beliefs and mores appear to be not only upheld but strictly followed widely in 
both countries to make it look like a natural alliance. Essentially, equating two unlike 
countries cultural values expose Pakistani elite’s worries about their own society, equally, 
by equating Pakistani society’s firmly held beliefs with those of the Chinese, the security 
elites are trying to sustain support for the awkward alliance by a presenting a positive 
ideological construction of Beijing. 
The Propaganda strategies also wilfully attempt to equate the Chinese social values with 
those of the Pakistani Islamic culture using the “testimonial” propaganda technique411, 
though there can be no comparison. To illustrate this, a chapter has been included in a 
Secondary and Higher Secondary Level Urdu textbook which describes the famous poet 
Ibn Insha’s travels in China, under the title “Go To China If You Really Want To.” 
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Narrating Ibn Insha’s journey, the lesson describes the feeling which the poet developed 
while visiting various famous places in China including the Great Wall. The text states: 
When we visited the famous places, astonishingly, we had developed a different 
feeling, as if we started to remember the great Muslim work of art and culture. 
The visit to the famous Chinese sites very much reminded us of the ‘Saddi 
Temple’ [a Muslim Sufi saint] and remarkably, we never had such great feeling 
before.412  
Depicting Ibn Insha’s feelings, the same textbook continues to compare the visit to the 
Great Wall of China to famous Muslims religious places. Text adds:  
When we visited the Great Wall, it left a very strange feeling on us, similar to the 
one we experienced when we visited Abi Waqas’s temple [a companion of 
Prophet Muhammad].413 
Comparing the famous places of China with the Islamic Sufi saints, the ethos and 
heritage, is an astonishing, divulges Pakistani elite’ festering worries about their own 
society, and significant example of ingratiating the Chinese into Pakistani society. 
Essentially, given the Pakistani society deference to the Sufi saints and companions of 
the prophet Muhammad, nothing would justify an awkward alliance more than the 
inclusion of such technique in the propaganda strategy. The majority of the population of 
Pakistan follows the Sufi saints and their teachings devoutly.  
In addition, the Sufi saints hold a significant place in Pakistan’s independence movement, 
so comparing Chinese traditional buildings with those of the Sufi saints is likely to 
enhance the message vigorously. Though there is actually no comparison between 
China’s famous places and buildings relating to the Sufi saints, when the textbook 
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suggests that a famous personality had such experiences and was reminded of our great 
religious leaders who served Islam, it is obvious that it is using cultural (and religious) 
aspects to enhance the credibility of the alliance domestically. While the title of the 
textbook chapter “Go to China if you really want to” is itself attempting to unite China 
and Pakistan mainly because it is urging the students to go China. The students are 
expected to arrive at the conclusion that China is the only country with which to seek 
alliance because it is followed by the famous people.  
A very significant aspect emerged during the text analysis regarding the use of modern 
drinks like Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola. Ibn Insha’s book also highlights that the people of 
China do not know much about modern drinks, and that they are progressing without 
consuming those drinks.414 Again, the attempt is being made to suggest that their alliance 
partner does not like to have those drinks, which are rejected and hated by the Islamist 
extremists. In his book Patrick Porter quotes an Afghan Taliban fighter, “American love 
Pepsi Cola, but we love death.” 415 So by developing an argument around facts which are 
opposed by the overtly religious elements, the textbooks are suggesting that Pakistan has 
formed an alliance with a country which behaves like us.  
In the selected textbooks there is discussion about the cultural aspects of the societies, 
their norms and values, how they behave with their elders, and how they associate each 
other. An Urdu text proclaims that the Chinese make sacrifices for fellow human beings 
and are good with their family; they give respect to their elderly and are free from external 
displays of showing off. They do not like having all the luxuries of life and their view of 
life is simple.416 As Islam urges its believers to lead a simple life, to never attach 
importance to external appearances, to give preference to others’ welfare over your own, 
and treat the elderly with kindness, the fact that the Chinese also appear to have these 
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characteristics creates a common feeling and bond between two states that are culturally 
and socially poles apart. Even though the countries differ in many ways, the textbook 
implies that a close affinity exists between the two societies. Though the notion of 
simplicity, generosity, care for elders and children are universal beliefs and not confined 
to Islam or the Chinese, the texts only compare China and Pakistan which again give us 
a hint that the Pakistani officials fear their own society. And, more importantly, the texts 
approved by the MoECW essentially seek to promote the alliance on the basis of similar 
traits.  
The strategies of the propaganda have also been devised around “family” and “kinship” 
metaphors: they are creating an environment in which the alliance between the two 
countries feels just like family in order to create an emotional allegiance and familiarity 
between the two states. With regard to this theme, the texts assume a vital role in 
promoting the rhetoric and the image of a strong “familial alliance.” Through a famous 
personality, texts are creating the impression that the alliance between the two countries 
is just like an alliance between family members. The most vocal exponent of this view is 
the Urdu textbook for class seven. Narrating Ibn Insha’s visit to China, it maintains: 
When we [Ibn Insha and his accompanying friend] landed at the Shanghai airport, 
the Chinese hosts smiled and were happy to see us. Likewise, we were pleased to 
meet them. What has delighted us most was their welcoming behavior. They 
greeted us with a big smile, offered a bouquet and took us to a café for a 
ceremonial tea. The meeting with them was no less than a family gathering. In 
fact, the Chinese love Pakistan and the Pakistani people.417 
This long quote portrays the Chinese as civilised and hospitable, and most of all, 
Pakistani-loving. There is a talk about the local customs and traditions resembling a 
family relationship. The family roots are strong in the Pakistani culture, and the 
propagandist is aiming to leave an impression upon the reader that the Chinese treat 
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Pakistanis like family members, and the happiness that such relationships can bring. 
Though there can be differences within the family, the fundamental bond remains strong.  
Family relations are blood relations, and the propaganda essentially suggests that the two 
nations are like blood brothers, which seems extraordinary. Symbolically, it means that 
although Pakistan and China can differ, their alliance is unbreakable and full of 
happiness. It is not only texts which depict the two countries as family members, the 
security elite’s statements describes them as “iron brothers” too.418 An interviewee 
reiterated the textbooks theoretical view; for example a former diplomat told this author: 
“If you visit China and meet people and tell them you come from Pakistan, they would 
greet you with great love and pleasure.” 419 Through the familial example, it is likely to 
make the children to feel that China is a country of glorious people who love the people 
and nation of Pakistan.  
Also, if we analyse the propaganda strategies of the security elite, the strategies clearly 
show us how the security elites are looking at their society. It can be argued that they 
consider their society as a threat and a challenge to maintain the alliance. Otherwise, the 
propaganda strategy may not have been conceived around the factors that are important 
in Pakistani society. The Chinese are portrayed with traits that resemble them with Islam. 
The Chinese are told to have characteristics of Muslims, such as antipathy to alcohol, free 
sexual society, aversion to modern drinks, etc. This clearly answers our second question, 
that is, what propaganda tells us about how security elites’ view their own society.  
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Uighur Muslims, propaganda and China  
Another aspect of creating the glorious Chinese identity is the issue of the Uighur Muslim 
rights. Part of the discussion in this study are the key issues that worry the security elite, 
including China’s mixed record as an ally, the disadvantages and maltreatment of 
Muslims in China, and Chinese atheism and the resultant terrorist attacks on them by the 
jihadi elements. The textbooks are methodically produced partly to counter increasing 
Pakistani concern about the sustainability of the alliance. There is a discussion about the 
presence of the Muslims in China and their political, economic and cultural rights 
guaranteed and protected by the Chinese system.  
For example, a higher education level textbook states that Islam came to China by land 
and sea, starting soon after the time of Prophet Muhammad and that there are a substantial 
number of Muslims in China, notably in the western part of China living comfortably.420 
Providing a conflicting view, a text underlines Uighur Muslims are treated well, and that 
the religious groups who attack the Chinese claiming the Uighur are being maltreated by 
Chinese security forces does not sit well with reality as the Uighur are one of over 55 
nationalities living in China enjoying rights equal with the majority Han Chinese.421  
Another text draws attention to the Uighurs’ religious liberty by suggesting that profound 
changes have taken place in China. The government have developed a friendly 
relationship with them and have made efforts to facilitate their freedom to express their 
religion, specifically with regard to Pakistan, and the text adds that the Uighur Muslims 
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often visit Pakistan uninterrupted.422 These statements lead the reader to believe that the 
Uighur are not suffering under the Chinese rule, when, by most accounts they are living 
and working under incredible duress. Independent reports suggest that the Chinese 
security forces are flagrantly torturing, killing and putting them behind the bars for just 
growing a beard, wearing a veil, and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.423 
However, memoranda in the texts are attempting to convince those sceptical religious 
groups who like to carry attacks, or support Uighur separatism on the plea that their 
Muslims members are being maltreated by the Chinese security forces.  
Having established that the Uighur are treated extraordinarily, texts pay tribute to the 
Chinese security forces for encouraging Uighur’ participation in the development of their 
own region and raising their standards of living. In this regard, a text tries to dispel the 
notion of the Han Chinese taking over Xinjiang resources and dominating the region. It 
emphasises the Chinese government have encouraged Uighur’ to not only take part in the 
development of the region but ownership of their resources too.424 Equally, there is no 
strength in this argument as the Han migration into Xinjiang is one of the factors fuelling 
separatism and counter attacks on the security forces. Uighur allege that the Han Chinese 
have taken over white-collar jobs resulting in rising Uighur unemployment and an 
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increase in the number of Uighur forced to take on manual work,425 Pakistani officials 
deliberately and systematically not teaching this information in the cultural institutions.  
Another text gives credit to the Chinese security forces and maintains that the 
establishment of the basic rights of the Uighur is a tribute to the supreme statesmanship 
of the Chinese leadership. They claim to have united discordant elements in Xinjiang 
under the banner of the communist system and to have achieved a united Xinjiang.426 It 
would appear to the reader that the Chinese are performing an arduous task with 
extraordinary skill and ensuring the survival of the Uighurs. Arguably, the textbooks are 
sympathetic to the rights of the Uighur Muslim, and insist that the Chinese do treat them 
as equals. Indeed propaganda is hitting the core of the issue mainly because it is creating 
an opposite narrative to what the militants believe and attack Chinese.  
In this section, we have observed that the texts are making efforts to portray the Chinese 
as glorious utilising numerous promotional strategies, and target those religious elements 
who attack Chinese or support Uighur separatism. Entire strategies, whether they claim 
that the Chinese love Pakistan, or that Chinese society closely resembles that of Pakistan, 
or that they are good to the Uighurs, lead us to believe that the state is making efforts to 
discourage those elements which adopt violent ways to place the alliance in danger. 
Likewise, this propaganda is basically highlighting that Pakistani society is overtly 
religious, and believes strongly in the fundamentals of Islam.  
In the end, it is important to conclude that the discussion of textbooks about the rights of 
Uighur Muslims tells us about security elites thinking about their own society and answer 
the second question raised in this chapter. The best way to infer that thought is to judge 
security elites’ propaganda strategies. For example, they try to tell people that Uighur 
enjoy greater rights and that the Chinese treat Uighur well in Xinjiiang. Why they feel 
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the need to explain this to their own society, no doubt to sell the alliance, but to eliminate 
the suspicion of society vis-à-vis China. Essentially, it shows elites’ feeling towards their 
own society. They know that people should be explained about Chinese policies in 
Xinjiiang so that people's antagonism towards China can be reduced. 
The historical relationship  
Another propaganda strategy to conduct propaganda is related to the creation of a 
narrative which portray the alliance in historical context. Statistically, the pie chart in 
Figure 4.6 indicates that 66.7% (12 Text books shown in Figure 4.7) textbooks talk about 
historical relationships. Noticeably, Secondary and Higher Secondary level is the main 
target where 9 textbooks deliberate this theme, while primary school texts have been 
excluded, and only a little propaganda is retained at Lower Secondary and Higher 
Education level. Though there is inconsistency across the four levels, the qualitative 
analysis suggests that this category is quite significant in propagating the alliance.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Historic Relationship Percentage within the Textbooks  
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Figure 4.7: Theme of historical relationships across four academic levels 
Qualitative investigation suggests that the historical relationship theme is the most 
troubled within the textbooks. Although consistent in presenting the alliance as normal, 
it uses the propaganda technique “card stacking” to display an exasperating degree of 
confusion as to when and where to begin cataloguing the alliance.427  
Textbooks construct the discourse of the historic relationship from two major 
perspectives: firstly it is taught that Pakistan and China share ancient links, and secondly 
once they established their diplomatic relations in 1949 their relations developed 
smoothly. Among the two concepts the ancient links view presents a real dilemma, as it 
traces links between the two countries since ancient times even though Pakistan did not 
exist then. The idea of Pakistan was born only in the All-India Muslim League’s Lahore 
Resolution of 1940. Disregarding this fact, one undergraduate textbook states that 
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Pakistan and China are great neighbours and have been linked together since historic 
times. Texts claim that culturally and ethnically, Pakistan’s northern areas and China’s 
Xinjiang province links go deep into history, and that the two areas have had friendly 
relations for over 2000 years, when their forefathers initiated the silk route and ancient 
Chinese traders would visit the land of the Indus river (currently in Pakistan) for 
commercial purposes.428  
Another text conveys that there have been state-to-state contacts through the exchange of 
emissaries dating back to the 2nd century BC, but that the most meaningful interaction 
took place from the 5th century AD when Buddhism arrived in China from South Asia. 
Some of the leading centres of Buddhist culture are in what is now Pakistan.429 Finally, a 
textbook maintains that the traditional friendship stands on ancient trade and cultural 
relations. The history of peace between the two states has been an asset which is helping 
both states in modern times to establish close links.430 Prime minister Yusuf Raza Gillani 
maintains:  
Since times immemorial the people of our two countries have interacted and 
developed special and unique bonds of friendship. Both Pakistan and China 
treasure their great civilizational heritage and the mutually enriching interaction 
that has shaped our vision of peace and prosperity and has so beautifully blended 
our respective cultures and traditions in perpetual harmony. Most importantly it 
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has created sincere sentiments of everlasting friendship and brotherhood between 
the peoples of Pakistan and China.431 
By alleging a causal relationship between past and present, however, children’s attention 
is turned away from the known animosity between the leaders of two countries. In fact, 
the leadership of the two countries had no political links nor did they know each other’s 
ideology. For instance, when Chiang Kai-Shek, paid a visit to the Indian subcontinent in 
1942, he openly supported the Indian nationalist movement, and disregarded the Muslim 
League’s demand for a separate homeland. This partisan attitude prompted an immediate 
response from Jinnah, who criticised and urged Kai-Shek to respect Muslim demands for 
a separate homeland.432 Yet by giving the relationship a historical strength intentionally, 
the children would take pride in it and would think to protect this relationship established 
by their forefathers. By suggesting that Pakistan and China have historical ties, children 
will think that it is not a new alliance, but a historical and long-standing. 
The other view of a smooth initial beginning is less extreme, but an equally exaggerated 
claim, using the “card stacking” technique by providing unrepresentative information. It 
stresses that Pakistan-China relations began smoothly in 1949. In reality, Islamabad was 
inward-looking and not paying much attention to events and happenings in China; it was 
instead pre-occupied with the legacy of partition, disputes with India, and internal 
reconstruction. Textbook asserts that Pakistan did not make any hostile statements on the 
emergence of revolutionary China. It states when Pakistan recognised China in January 
1950, it was the first Muslim country to recognise China, the second non-Communist and 
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the third Commonwealth country to do so. The Pakistani gesture, it is said, laid the 
foundation of an enduring friendship which has successfully withstood the challenges of 
changing geostrategic scenarios.433  
Indeed Pakistan recognised China early, however experts who follow the alliance closely, 
draw varying conclusions from textbooks. Riffat Hussain maintains that the initial days 
of Pakistan-China relations were not marked by any significant development. Indeed, 
Pakistan did recognise China, but it did not really emerge as a key factor in Islamabad’s 
strategic calculations until 1963. Pakistan was preoccupied with the problem of internal 
stability of its own. Therefore, attention was more focused on India, from where 
Pakistan’s main threat was perceived to come.434 Even Pakistan’s decision to recognise 
China was influenced by the Indian decision to establish diplomatic links with China. 
India had already recognised China, Pakistan realised that if it failed to recognise China, 
it may go against Pakistan’s interests.435  
Likewise, Pakistan had a policy of ambivalence toward China. The best way to judge 
Islamabad’s policy is on the question of China’s UN membership at the time. When the 
question of Chinese representation in the UN was raised at the session of the General 
Assembly held in 1949, with India moving a draft resolution that China should be allowed 
to be represented in the UN, Pakistan voted in favour of this resolution. But in 1953, 
Pakistan voted for the postponement of this question’s consideration, even though the 
instructions were for abstention, maintained Tayyub Siddiqui.436 In 1954, Pakistan joined 
South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and from then onward its attitude on the 
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question of China’s representation showed scant regard for the real position in China, and 
it never voted until 1961 when the things begun to change and Pakistan adopted a more 
independent foreign policy towards China. So the idea that the Pakistan-China 
relationship had a smooth start has the purpose of projecting the alliance in a positive 
way. 
On the question of the Korean War (1950-53), two textbooks teach children that 
Pakistan’s sympathy rested with China.437 Although Pakistan remained neutral, her 
sympathy remained with the west. In 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan happened 
to be in the US for a medical check-up when the question of Korea came up for discussion 
in the UN; from hospital, he talked endlessly about the Korean conflict and even showed 
readiness to send armed forces to Korea. A former foreign sectary maintains that an army 
battalion was ready to fly Korea, but a last minute thought avoided the diplomatic gaffe, 
which China would have considered an extremely unfriendly gesture.438 This analysis 
clearly illustrates that Pakistan had neither smooth beginnings nor ancient links with 
China. As propaganda is a considered attempt, teaching otherwise may disclose the 
discomfort in the alliance which has been a fodder for extremists to perpetuate their 
ideology, and given Pakistani elite uncertainties towards their own society, they want to 
avoid it escalating.  
Pakistan spoiled her relations with China when it joined the SEATO pact in 1954. 
Pakistan joining of the SEATO caused considerable discomfort and questioning in China, 
textbooks play down Beijing’s reactions. A textbook for Higher Education students 
maintains that the Chinese, which logically should have considered Pakistan’s act as 
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hostile, displayed “remarkable” patience and “forbearance” towards Pakistan. It did not 
subject Pakistan to criticism, rather understood logic behind joining the alliance.439 In 
fact, China considered Pakistan’s participation in the American war machine a 
catastrophe for its security and sovereignty. The Chinese newspaper People’s Daily or 
Renmin Ribao considered Pakistan’s choice a “dangerous decision”, and claimed that 
Pakistan’s decision would threaten Beijing’s security.440 Also Haibin Niu, a Chinese 
scholar at Shanghai Institute, believes that Pakistan-China relations could not be 
developed for the better because Pakistan had joined the western security alliance and 
had close relations with the US.441 
 These factors cannot be ignored, and it is dishonest of the textbooks to dismiss the 
contradictions in which Pakistan-China relations were established. So, propaganda is also 
a distortion of history. Why the propagandist needs to distort history, it is to sell 
something that is not popular. It also tells propagandist mind about society, the 
propagandist fears that society can oppose its unpopular foreign policy, so society must 
be educated about it. During the World War II, the American government efforts to teach 
public the formation of the alliance with Russia was motivated to avoid American public 
obstruction to the alliance.442  
In the textbooks, the meeting between the Pakistani and Chinese premiers in Bandung 
(Indonesia, 1955) is considered to be a milestone in the smooth initial beginning. 
Highlighting the significance of the summit in removing suspicion between the two states 
about each other’s intentions, these texts maintain that Pakistani premier Muhammad Ali 
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Bogra assured his Chinese counterpart Chou En-lai that Pakistan had joined SEATO not 
because it was hostile to China but to balance India..443 Though the texts are not incorrect, 
the Bandung summit cleared some air between the two states.444 Nonetheless, the 
enthusiasm emerging from the Bogra-Chou meeting appeared to be short-lived and 
fragile. The developments that followed vanquished Bandung’s spirit and failed to make 
any headway towards improvement. While Prime Minister H.S. Suharwardy had strongly 
criticised communist China in 1957, Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon said in the national 
assembly that the world was insecure due to communism.445  
The decline in Sino-Pakistan relations, a feature of the Suharwardy and Noon 
governments, continued through the first two years or so of Ayub Khan’s presidency. 
With his inauguration in 1959, Pakistan’s strategic perception took a strange and as yet 
unexplained somersault. Alarmed by the Chinese incursion into Tibet, President Khan 
made an astonishing but equally ludicrous offer of a joint defence with India citing a 
“communist push from north.” 446 Nehru rejected Ayub’s offer, asking “defence against 
whom”447, and Pakistan-China relations slipped further downwards. The Chinese 
government protested about Khan’s offer and questioned it with almost the same words 
as used by Nehru against whom the common defence was needed.448 Nevertheless, 
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children attending schools do not get a proper understanding of the complexities of the 
relationship, mainly the narrative of the notion of a smooth alliance in the textbooks is 
developed with a lot of selectivity exclusions of official knowledge.  
It was in 1960s when the things begin to change and Pakistan adopted a more independent 
foreign policy towards China. During the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, Pakistan was 
disappointed by its experience with the west, and internal turmoil created an atmosphere 
suitable for normal relations to resume between the two states. In the wake of those 
developments, Pakistan began to look at Chinese UN membership favourably, textbook 
mention this factor with great emphasis.449 Leading to these developments was the 
signing of a landmark agreement which demarcated Pakistan-China’s disputed border. 
School texts correctly suggest that border demarcation was a breakthrough in forging 
closer ties between them.450 The border agreement was followed by an air and trade 
agreement, which created much trepidation in the US. Andrew Small correctly 
summarises Pakistan-China relation during the early years: Pakistan-China’s “path to the 
all-weather friendship had been a tortuous one”, and even though Pakistan had the 
distinction of being first Muslim country to recognise to China, it was not until the early 
1960s when the relationship between two countries began in earnest.451 This narrative is 
missing from the texts in order to present the alliance as having a smooth start and with 
no problems sustaining it.  
Construction of Security Narratives: Militant Hindu India and China  
The theme of the security narrative which has the largest representation within textbooks 
appears to be emphatic promotional propaganda stratagem. Pakistan’s relations with 
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China have developed largely in response to its security needs, which is clearly evident 
from analysis of the texts. In measurable terms, as  
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show, the discourse of security has appeared in fourteen 
textbooks (72.2%) out of a total of eighteen. 
 
Figure 4.8: Security Narrative weightage within Textbooks.  
It is mostly represented at Secondary and Higher Secondary level of education with 11 
texts dealing with it, with the second most common age for teaching security is Higher 
education. The topic is missing at lower secondary level, but present in one text aimed at 
primary schools.  
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Figure 4.9: Security Narratives & Four Education Levels 
The security narrative theme is very precise and systematic propaganda effort to trade the 
alliance natively. This category has fairly two main parts: the fear of India and China as 
a balancer. It is based entirely on emphasising the Chinese contribution to Pakistan’s 
security, and mainly on Beijing’s contribution, real or imaginary, during the Indo-
Pakistan crisis. There are references to imperialist and secular Hindu India trying to 
dominate Islamic Pakistan and sponsoring terrorism in various areas of Pakistan. The 
strategy utilised to demonise India and value China is based on propaganda technique 
“pinpointing the enemy.”452 The propaganda techniques such as love, hate, fear, and hope 
have also been employed. The propaganda is wrapped in nice, delicate words involving 
a little religion. The articulation of the theme has been designed along the ideas of 
differing right from wrong, just from unjust and good from bad.  
Making China an integral part of the security narrative is not a great challenge for the 
security elites as they utilise the existing negative images of India. For instance, a June 
2012 Pew survey indicates (See Figure 4.10) a large majority of Pakistani (72%) think 
India is a staunch enemy and biggest threat, much ahead of the Taliban (23%). Similarly, 
the supporters of the party currently in government, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-
N) and the main opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) see India as being the 
biggest danger (71% and 61%, respectively).  
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Figure 4.10: Pakistani view of India Source: Pew Research Centre 
Thus, because the Pakistani have already hold firm beliefs that the Indians are enemies, 
and the root cause of the security problems, the Pakistan elites are able to effortlessly use 
the rivalry with India in the security narratives. This category has following themes: the 
Indian threat and China alliance, Indian hegemonic tendencies, and Indo-Pakistan wars 
and China’s role.  
External threats and China alliance  
The textbooks teach the evolution of Pakistan-China alliance on the basis of an external 
threat, particularly from India. India is believed to have an ongoing mission to crumple 
Pakistan through applying pressure tactics. The psychological rhetoric propagated by the 
texts is presented in such a fashion to make the population aware of the gravity of the 
genuine threats posed to the nation, and thereby increasing the importance of China. For 
instance, a civics textbook clearly sets the rationale for the alliance by stating: 
Bharat [India] has never accepted Pakistan’s existence wholeheartedly. In the 
post-partition period, the Hindu leaders thought Pakistan would not last very long. 
They applied numerous pressure tactics to weaken Pakistan in her infancy. Their 
designs to erode Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have not subsided 
even today. Consequently, perceiving India’s nefarious design, the ultimate 
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objective of seeking alliance with China has been to look for security and defence 
against India.453  
India is the foremost threat to the Pakistani survival, though true to a larger extent, it 
would appear that the text is justified alliance on the strategy of “fear India” by stating 
that India has not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan, therefore, China is needed to 
overcome that threat. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US Hussain Haqqani 
maintains that “China is a high-value guarantor of security against India.”454 Arguably, 
the presentation of India may be deemed factually right, but the placement of India along 
with China, and a compassion between India and China suggest propagandist intentions.  
Further examples from the texts introduce religious elements for the justification of the 
alliance; the texts discuss all the religious differences which existed between Hindus and 
Muslims before the partition. The neighbouring country is referred to as “Hindu India” 
bent on destroying “Islamic Pakistan.” One textbook states that Hindus attitude towards 
the Indian subcontinent Muslims was the main reason for seeking a separate homeland. 
Since independence, “Islamic Pakistan’s” survival has been under threat from intolerant 
“Hindu polity”, all of which necessitates balancing strategies to protect the distinct 
Islamic identity. Pakistan’s relations with China are a reflection of those threats and 
protection against India.
455
 The use of word “Hindu” has significance and historical 
connotations as it reminds people of Pakistan their forefathers’ historic struggle and 
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immense sacrifices both in terms of men and material in seeking a Pakistan independent 
from the Hindus.  
Therefore, to persuade the Pakistani public to think about China's alliance in terms of 
balancing India, security elites will link China to historically defined Pakistan enemy 
such as India. This propaganda tactic is based on the Social Proof Theory, promoted by 
psychologist Robert Cialdini in which people seek justifications to quickly form their 
beliefs.456 Therefore, linking to a country that Pakistan already has enmity quickly allows 
one to associate with it.  
Explaining the alliance on this historical basis is likely to have a greater impact on the 
reader; one scholar suggests that “messages have greater impact when they are in line 
with existing opinions, beliefs and disposition”, and further maintains that “messages 
appear to be resonant, for they seem to be coming from within the audience rather than 
from without.” 
457
 Propaganda based on the current view of Indian image, is potentially 
effective and likely to penetrate deeply among the consciousness of the people because 
it will assimilate with their existing philosophies. Though the alliance is being promoted 
on the basis of traditional theories of alliance like external threats, essentially, it is their 
appearance in the cultural institutions and official knowledge which highlights 
propaganda efforts and the overt devoutness of the society.  
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India’s hegemonic power  
The conflation of India with Hinduism, making it the enemy of Islamic Pakistan appears 
frequently in the narratives, but the textbooks also passionately discuss India as an 
imperialist country which tries to dominate Pakistan. Indian attempts to acquire greater 
power is considered in sharp contrast with the foreign policy goals of Pakistan. One 
textbook underlines that India’s ambition to become a major power is in line with its 
forefathers’ dream of achieving higher status in world affairs and making South Asian 
states subservient, which runs counter to Pakistan and its all-weather ally China’s policy 
of opposing hegemony.
458
 There is an element of truth as India does aspire to a more 
powerful role in South Asia. Hassan Rizvi dubbing it a “Nehruvian model of foreign 
policy”, believes that Jawaharlal Nehru had envisaged a major role for India in world 
affairs. Nehru and his successors have been convinced that India must have sufficient 
military power to assert its leadership role in the region. To fulfil that role, India has 
striven to acquire military muscles and try to dominate weaker states.459 This notion is 
also found in John Graver’s assertion that the Chinese believe that India wants the smaller 
states of South Asia to coordinate their foreign policy with what New Delhi “defines as 
its security interest in that [South Asia] region.”460  
Almost all smaller states of South Asia, with the exception of Afghanistan, fear Indian 
dominance,461 but Pakistan is at the forefront in opposing it. Islamabad maintains that all 
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states are sovereign entities and that relationships should be based on mutual respect. This 
argument is found in texts too. For instance, an undergraduate textbook suggests that the 
Indian model of security is unattractive, and that it does not guarantee Pakistan’s security 
and welfare. India is stubborn in its attitude, adopts delaying tactics in negotiations and 
tries to dominate Pakistan.462  
Another text suggests that the Indian approach is “hegemonic approach”, and that it 
amounts to intervention in neighbouring states’ internal affairs.463 Consequently, a 
textbook skilfully justifies Islamabad’s policy of seeking security beyond the region with 
China to balance the imbalance and to resolve the perennial problem plaguing South 
Asian peace and security.464 While there is a strong abhorrence for the Indian system, 
based on fears and dominance, an additional textbook recommends that the Chinese 
system guarantees not only peace in South Asia but a bulwark against the threats and 
hegemons.465 As the Pakistani state has struggled to challenge Indian dominance, texts 
justify balancing strategies on the basis of that threat, and messages are given authority 
as they are disseminated through educational institutions.  
India as an imperialist state does have unpleasant intentions towards Pakistan. India is 
using Afghanistan as its launching pad to perpetrate the acts of terrorism in Pakistan. It 
stimulates terrorist activities in Baluchistan, Karachi and tribal areas. Above claim is not 
without evidence. A BBC in its report has alleged that Indian espionage agency Research 
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and Analysis Wing (RAW) is involved in supporting certain political groups to conduct 
terrorism in Pakistan,466 which has been confirmed with the arrest of Indian spy in 
Balochistan.467 Pakistani policy makers, who have long been appeasing India to avoid 
further aggravating relations, have recently been forthcoming in blaming India. Nawaz 
Sharif on his visit to Washington exposed Indian terrorist activities in Pakistan.468 The 
most forceful and strong statement has come from former US defence secretary Chuck 
Hegel’s speech at the Brookings Institution, in which Hagel stresses that “India finances 
troubles in Pakistan.”469 In this connection, one text highlights the involvement of RAW 
in terrorist activities in Pakistan.470  
An emerging modern India, which claims to be a secularist, seems to be a threat to 
Pakistan. Pakistan is challenging its dominance through a policy of seeking alliance with 
China. Pakistani offices teach this development to their children. However, as Pakistan 
has certain elements within its border, which challenge its balance of power strategy 
Pakistan respond it with alliance promotion strategies.  
Indo-Pakistani wars and China 
This balancing strategy is justified against India, a neighbour which has frustrated the 
people of Pakistan on multiple occasions. This theme deals Indo-Pakistan wars and 
explains the role of the Chinese during the wars; the alliance has been made meaningful 
by teaching its depth and utility using the narratives of the wars and diplomacy. The 
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alliance is justified by presenting the Chinese role in the wars as being highly positive; in 
the discussions, India appears to be the villain, while China is the hero. The following 
passage on the events of 1965 appears in a history textbook:  
Beijing’s role during Pakistan war with India should not only be appreciated with 
the highest regard, but it is a testimony that China will never let Pakistan down in 
its conflicts with arch rival India. China condemned Indian aggression and 
threatened to attack India. Once the hostility come a halt, Beijing supplied tanks, 
fighter jets and essential military weapon to enhance defence to meet the future 
Indian threat. It was historic moment, which could never be forgotten as China’s 
bold decision won the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.471  
States trying to practice balance of power politics need to make extra efforts to sustain 
the alliance, especially if they have certain concerns about the viability of the alliance. In 
this study, this has appeared one of the core elements in justifying the alliance. According 
to two other textbooks, China is considered to be “unwavering” in helping out Pakistan 
during the wars with India. China is considered a best friend who has helped during 
adversity.472 The textbooks are not alone in this view: former foreign secretary Tanveer 
Khan told this author in an interview, “China spoke loudly in favour of Pakistan amongst 
all its friends.”473 Rizvi added “Chinese support had a lot of psychological impact”,474 
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and still another member of foreign office maintains “China’s help was significant in the 
war which prevented India to inflict heavy damages.”475  
China’s tangible move in Pakistan’s favour during the 1965 war was the September 16, 
ultimatum to India which is a subject of discussion in three additional textbooks; although 
accurate in their analysis, the texts celebrate the significance of the Chinese ultimatum to 
India. For instance, one of those three texts states that the ultimatum warned India to 
dismantle its aggressive military works on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim 
boundary within three days, otherwise it bears full responsibility for all the grave 
consequences arising therefrom.476 It is believed that the ultimatum had influenced the 
Indian decision not to launch an attack on East-Pakistan or prolong the war.477  
However, despite the ultimatum, the textbooks overlook the lack of coordination between 
the two allies over the tactics of the war. The hallmark of an alliance is that the states 
coordinate their strategies, and tactics to encounter common threats. Patrick Quirk 
maintains when an alliance partner agrees on common tactics, strategies, it creates not 
only a cohesive and effective alliance, but it helps them to meet common threats more 
emphatically.478Andrew Small explains during the 1965 war, China directed Pakistan to 
adopt guerrilla tactics which Pakistan flatly refused to do as.479 Disregarding that, 
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textbooks give a half account of cooperation mainly because nothing can better justify an 
awkward alliance more than associating it with hard times.  
The discussion about the 1971 war is no different. The Chinese support during the war 
remained subdued as compared to that in 1965. There are several ways to describe and 
explain the East Pakistan crisis, but textbooks offer their own interpretations. Undeniably, 
India had played a central role in the crisis, but Pakistan’s own policies were also to 
blame. Though India had aided and trained the Mukti Bahini movement, Pakistan had 
worsened the situation by applying force to supress the separation movement and denying 
the Bengalis’ political, economic and cultural rights.480 Another view is with regard to 
the Indo-Russian treaty of August 1971 which inhibited Beijing choices481: Beijing 
advocated that Islamabad show restraint, seek a diplomatic resolution, and appease the 
estranged Bengalis. Tayyub Siddiqui maintains that Beijing thought Pakistan was 
“fighting a wrong war, at a wrong time, for a wrong cause with a wrong enemy.” 482  
Ignoring a variety of possible explanations and China’s restrained role, two textbooks 
present a strikingly narrow view of China’s role in the war. To give credence to this 
argument, one text suggests that during Indian covert and overt military operations 
against East Pakistan and the subsequent Indian attacks, China provided diplomatic and 
material support to Pakistan as she had always done before.483 Another text suggests that 
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the Chinese came in a “big way” to help Pakistan against India’s naked aggression.484 
These statements give the (inaccurate) impression that China supported Pakistan, when 
in reality there was no “big way” support: obviously Beijing condemned India verbally 
by making aggressive statements,485 but it never backed Pakistan through any action.  
Texts may have chosen these particular arguments to secure support for the alliance 
domestically, even though many experts describe what really happened. Michael Beckley 
states that “Chinese leaders watched as India literally tore Pakistan apart, lopping off East 
Pakistan and turning it into the Independent state of Bangladesh.” 486 P.R. Chari contends, 
“Despite Islamabad’s fervent hope, however, that it [China] would open a new front to 
relive Pakistan’s beleaguered troops in East Pakistan”, China was not involved 
militarily.487 Two of the textbooks examined go even further, stating that China supported 
Pakistan’s recovery in the aftermath of the war. While the texts inflate the Chinese role 
during the war, their description of Beijing’s role after the war is factually correct. China 
supported Pakistan’s recovery, supplying weapons and help to secure 90,000 Pakistani 
POWs from the India-Bangladesh custody. Both India and Bangladesh have threatened 
to put POWs on trial for war crimes.488 At Islamabad’s request, Beijing cast its first ever 
veto to withhold Bangladesh’s UN membership until all prisoners of wars were released.  
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Significantly, the textbooks skip the grave crisis in the subcontinent in May 1999 (the 
Kargil war), with the exception of only one example. This solitary text claims that China 
supported Pakistan’s policy of defusing tension. It “fully supported” Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity with earnest.489 Security elite opinions are also 
consistent with the textbooks. For example, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Minister during the 
Kargil crisis and who currently holds an advisory role on security and foreign affairs to 
the government told this author: “China assured deep abiding support for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Pakistan, both sides agreed for de-escalation of tension in the 
region.” In reality, during the crisis Pakistan found itself relatively isolated globally, as 
international pressure had mounted on her, and Islamabad found even Beijing on the 
Indian side. Swarn Singh, Indian’s former foreign Minister, endorsed this view:  
China’s continued posture of neutrality provided and the most decisive input in 
convincing the Pakistani leadership of the futility of continuing to back up its 
losing armed forces [and] also of seeking to internationalise the Kashmir issue in 
the face of Pakistan’s growing global diplomatic isolation.490  
However, everything within the texts has been described as a success and everything is 
said to be going in Pakistan’s favour. Any admission of failure or lack of support would 
perhaps damage the alliance’s reputation domestically. The elite do not want their 
children to know that China was neutral and betrayed them during the crisis. When the 
Pakistani security elite says that China supported Pakistan over the Kargil crisis, it 
essentially suggests their feeling of insecurity about the alliance. It clearly suggests that 
the lack of Chinese support or neutrality during the crisis is leading Pakistan’s rulers to 
reinforce their propaganda efforts to praise China. 
Hence, the ideologically-driven propaganda strategy has both internal and external 
dimensions. Externally, that Islamabad has Beijing’s support as a deterrent towards India, 
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and just as importantly, a justification for the alliance internally to influence those 
sceptical Pakistanis who may view the alliance as culturally and socially unbalanced. The 
internal dimension of the propaganda strategies gives credence to the argument that the 
Pakistani security elites have concerns about fundamentalist elements. This aspect of 
propaganda gives us answer to the security elites’ perception of the Pakistani society.  
Nevertheless, this appears to be realistic approach as far as the Pakistani security elites 
are concerned because putting “Hindu India” as a threat and China as saviour is likely to 
be accepted within Pakistan without being subject to criticism. It may dissuade those 
elements which attack the Chinese mainly because they are being taught that Chinese are 
helping against India which is traditional enemy. If Pakistanis agree on one point it is that 
India is the enemy, and anybody, even China so different to Pakistan, portrayed helping 
Pakistan against arch rival India is likely to be viewed positively.  
Reliable China and the unreliable US 
The debate about reliability and unreliability is another significant propaganda strategy 
adopted by the Pakistani officials issued textbooks. The cultural institutions actively 
promote a narrative which paints the US as unreliable, and China as reliable. Within the 
textbooks, the idea of American unreliability and Chinese reliability comes to the fore in 
the way the two countries’ policies towards Pakistan are described. Textbooks use the 
propaganda technique of “name calling” to portray Pakistan as a victim of unfulfilled US 
promises, while China is considered to be extraordinarily cordial.491  
There are three key elements that make up this theme: Washington’s preference for non-
aligned India and neglect of aligned Pakistan, American neutrality during the Indo-
Pakistan wars, and finally Pakistan’s role in the war against terror; the policies are 
developed on the propositions that Beijing appreciates Islamabad’s tremendous and great 
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sacrifices in war against terrorism, while Washington insufficiently appreciates 
Islamabad’s efforts. Essentially, security elites are arousing positive feeling with regard 
to their alliance with China by portraying the US negatively. Nevertheless, Islamabad 
believes China is reliable and US is not, arguably, Islamabad’s needs to be acquainted 
with the fact China support has certain parameters mainly during its crisis with India.  
In statistical terms, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show that this theme is second only to 
the security narratives in terms of number of appearances in textbooks. Thirteen 
textbooks out of total of eighteen (or 72.7%) elaborate on Pakistan’s flirtation both with 
China and USA. It essentially means that children in Pakistan spend lot of time reading 
about the disloyalty of the US and loyalty of China.  
Figure 4.11: Reliable Theme percentage within the Textbooks 
 
Figure 4.12: Reliability Theme and Education levels 
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 As with the security theme, this theme is also heavily concentrated at Secondary & 
Higher Secondary level of education, is absent at two levels, and only lightly represented 
at in higher education.  
Washington, non-aligned India and Pakistan 
Although the US and Pakistan have stayed on favourable terms, the alliance has been a 
challenge at times. It is a complex relationship, the two countries diverge on several 
policies, leading to some tempestuousness. Indisputably, alliances have existed to meet 
common threats like in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to fight war 
against terrorism, even if the alliance lack stability. Equally, Pakistan has never been the 
US’s first choice in South Asia due to the presence of India as a major and powerful state, 
both during and after the cold war. During the cold war, Washington wanted New Delhi 
to be part of its containment strategy, but India’s first Prime Minister and the father of 
India’s non-alignment strategy, Jawaharlal Nehru, had refused to be part of American 
George Kennan’s containment strategy.492 Although Nehru’s refusal did not write him 
off completely in Washington’s strategic thoughts, the US turned to security-starved 
Pakistan to fill the gaps, which devotedly accepted an American alliance in 1954. In post-
cold war era, Indo-US strategic partnership endorse the notion that India is preferred over 
Pakistan.  
Though the circumstances had established a Pakistani-American alliance during the mid-
1950s, Washington never ignored New Delhi’s strategic significance. The opportunity to 
rope India in came when John F. Kennedy became president. As a senator, he believed 
that India occupied a position of pivotal importance in the American strategy of 
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containment of communism in Asia.493 Once he acquired presidency, he began 
implementing his plans, and negotiations were undertaken to augment Indian security and 
defence. The US, along with Great Britain, offered a whole lot of military and economic 
assistance to New Delhi.494  
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 firmed the process of weapons delivery to India. As India 
became a recipient of a large amount of American assistance, Pakistan became 
disillusioned. What irked Pakistan was the continuity in the supply of security and 
military aid to India once the war was over. Ayub Khan maintained that once the Sino-
India conflict was over, China did not seem to prolong the conflict with India and so the 
military and economic aid given to India by the US could not be justified as it would be 
detrimental to Pakistan’s security.495 Following these developments, Pakistan-American 
relations came under greater strain. 
This is considered to be the first betrayal in the Pakistan-American alliance, and it came 
about because, despite Pakistan’s protests, America seemed to prefer non-aligned India 
over faithful Pakistan. The criticism of the US policy within the Pakistani textbooks is 
found resolutely, as they teach this sense of betrayal to the children. For instance, a text 
designed for Secondary and Higher Secondary school suggests that President Kennedy 
had favoured India; he was the instigator of renewed American interest in India, and once 
he became president, he adopted policies to the disadvantage of Pakistan. He armed India 
immensely, shifting the balance of power in favour of India.496An additional textbook 
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emphasises that Pakistan had an alliance with the US, but the US offered a lot of 
assistance to India, showing America’s choice of India over Pakistan.497  
One textbook states that American military aid to India had endangered Pakistan’s 
security as India was more likely to use it against Pakistan than against China in the 1965 
war; the text states that this was the first explicit betrayal in the Pakistan-US alliance.498 
Pakistan’s feelings of disillusionment towards the US were not without reason though. 
The American military aid hardened the Indian attitude towards Pakistan and a peaceful 
solution of the Kashmir issue became almost impossible. Nehru said that any change in 
the status of Kashmir would have “disastrous consequences.” 499 The gulf between 
Pakistan and the US widened which developed a feeling of abandonment among the 
Pakistani.500  
Indo-Pakistani Wars  
The Pakistani-US alliance had been jolted by Washington’s arms aid to New Delhi, and 
then on September 6, 1965 India crossed international borders and attacked Pakistan in a 
failed attempt to regain its pride, which had been dented in the1962 war with China. This 
war further damaged the Pakistan-American alliance. The US, instead of coming to the 
aid of its ally, adopted an attitude of neutrality, and cut off military aid to Pakistan. In 
contrast, China had chosen to condemn India. Therefore, the discussions about the wars 
are reduced to almost exclusively describing China’s significant role, while the US 
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adopted a neutral stance. The US is believed to have betrayed Pakistan during the war, 
whilst China is considered to have spoken loudly in Pakistan’s favour. Two texts, written 
by the same author for different education level, maintain that  
The seventeen-day Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 exposed friends and foes. Pakistan 
had signed defence pacts with the US, and it was against the spirit of those pacts 
that the US remained neutral, it should have come to the assistance of Pakistan. 
In contrast, China delivered an ultimatum to India with military consequences, 
which resulted in a ceasefire between the two countries.501  
Though the US has assisted Pakistan’s economic development and military capabilities 
on a much larger scale than China had, the Pakistani logic of obligation to the Chinese is 
much greater. The language of two other Pakistani textbooks is not ambiguous in 
portraying the US as unreliable and China as largely innocent.502 The textbooks appear 
to be exploiting the feelings of an American betrayal to teach its future generations the 
rationale for seeking an alliance with China.  
Criticism within the textbooks also springs from the way both China and the US treated 
Pakistan after the war, which reinforces the texts’ perception of American unreliability 
and Chinese reliability. Basically, the war with India had exhausted Pakistan’s stockpile 
of weapons and if the war had not come to an end Pakistan would have been in a 
precarious situation. The American decision to cut off Islamabad’s military assistance for 
going to war had only enhanced its security elite worries. Pakistan desperately needed an 
uninterrupted supply of weapons to repair and restore damages it had endured during the 
conflict. Though the US had punished the belligerent states of India-Pakistan equally by 
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imposing an arms embargo, the textbooks are very critical of US actions as the embargo 
appeared to be a severe blow for Pakistan, which was solely dependent on the US military 
supplies, while New Delhi could still make purchases from the USSR.  
With the backdrop of Pakistan’s weapons loss and America’s arms restriction, China 
offered to supply weapons to Pakistan. One textbook complains that the Americans 
disqualified Pakistan for purchasing arms, and instead China unequivocally agreed to 
supply weapons. While India continued to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union, 
Pakistan’s only source of acquiring weapon had ceased to exist. The text further adds that 
the Chinese decision to furnish Pakistan with the latest weapons had won the hearts of 
the Pakistani and to a certain extent offset the impact of American ban.
503
 China exploited 
Pakistan’s disenchantment with its former ally by furnishing military assistance, which, 
although insufficient, actually had great impact. Security elite necessarily make part of it 
their official’s propaganda to augment Chinese worth in the eyes of the future 
generations. Moreover, two other texts suggest that the Chinese military backing was 
timely, direct and robust enough to bolster Pakistan’s defence and sovereignty and 
essentially, foiled the Indian threat.504  
China’s overtly pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian stance during the war earned great praise 
from the Pakistani textbooks. China’s support had made an impact on Pakistani analysts’ 
reasoning too. In evaluating the Chinese role, Anwar Syed has articulated the view that 
“the Chinese have fostered among the great powers a sense of urgency about terminating 
the Indo-Pakistan war” and “inhibited some of the great powers, especially the Soviet 
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Union from siding openly with India.” 505 Raziullah Azmi believes that during the crucial 
time, the US attitude was disappointing. It treated both India and Pakistan on same 
footing by suspending arms supplies, a step which hurt Pakistan much more than India.506 
The texts are important vehicles for airing grievances about Washington’s unreliability 
and China reliability vis-à-vis 1971 war. When discussing the 1971 war, the textbooks 
may perhaps provide a balanced review of America’s role, but the perspective is offered 
is very narrow. The textbooks ignore President Nixon’s bias in Pakistan’s favour and the 
US’s role in preventing India from attacking West Pakistan. Prime Minister Gandhi had 
an active plan to attack West Pakistan, but the US (and also the Chinese) made such an 
attack impossible for India.507 Texts also state that there was an alliance between Pakistan 
and the US, morally and politically Washington should have helped Islamabad, but it was 
China who supported Pakistan, condemned Indian aggression and backed Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.508  
In reality, the US had supported the integrity of Pakistan, as had China; in fact the Chinese 
response was tepid and not so very different from that of the US. Despite China’s much 
more subdued role in 1971 as compared with 1965, the textbooks consider it a further 
example of US untrustworthiness and China’s steadfastness only to portray China as a 
better ally than the US to augment Chinese images within Pakistan. Beijing’s tepid 
response is also established by the Pakistani analyst. Mehrunissa Ali is of the view that 
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Beijing could not do anything extraordinary as it did not want to risk a conflict with the 
Soviets, and it actually had advised Pakistan to hold talks with the disgruntled Bengalis 
to resolve the crisis.509  
Alliance theory suggests that when the risks of military commitments are too high, the 
chances of honouring the alliance are low,510 but the textbooks defy this logic. States 
avoid participating in a conflict to assist a partner if it would invite its adversary’s 
intervention into the conflict. China preferred to stay away from the conflict, even though 
it condemned India, and it advised Pakistan to resolve the dispute amicably; China could 
not manoeuvre the situation in Pakistan’s favour in any form because it wanted to avoid 
confrontation with the Soviet Union which had mobilised her troops on the Chinese 
border.511 Nevertheless, despite the Chinese fell short of helping Islamabad when it 
needed most-Pakistan’s dismemberment was imminent, the texts present a propaganda 
campaign to improve Beijing’s image domestically.  
US sanctions and Chinese military supplies  
Washington’s unreliability and Beijing’s steadfastness have also been associated with the 
post-Cold War era. In the wake of the Soviet forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
Islamabad’s strategic importance to Washington had diminished. Washington no longer 
needed Islamabad to counteract Soviet offensive forces stationed in Kabul. In 1990 
President Bush refused to issue an annual certificate to the Congress (a practice he had 
fulfilled diligently every year since 1985) that Islamabad was not developing nuclear 
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weapons.512 Deplorably, it abandoned its ally and imposed many layers of sanctions 
under the Pakistan-specific Pressler non-proliferation amendment due to its nuclear 
programme.513 Under the sanctions, the US refused delivery of F-16 fighter jets, and 
stopped military and economic aid thereby endangering Pakistan’s military 
modernisation drive.  
Pakistan found herself struggling to meet its security and defence needs in the wake of 
American sanctions. Sandy Gordon maintains that Pakistan’s security went from bad to 
worse, partly due to halting of US supply of weapons.514 China agreed to supply weapons 
to fill the void left by the US sanctions. Pakistani children are taught insistently that it 
was the second worst US betrayal. One textbook without elaborating further the nature 
of China-Pakistan cooperation maintains:  
Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistani support 
was no longer required by the US. Disappointedly, Islamabad came under US 
sanctions yet again, though this time for secretly developing nuclear weapons; an 
issue to which the US had turned a blind eye for a decade during the Afghan war. 
Nevertheless, in the wake of this development [American sanctions], Beijing 
emerged as Islamabad primary supplier of military weapons and hardware.515  
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US abandonment and imposition of sanction are covered in many of the texts: one more 
text portrays the US sanctions in a fashion which serves to only highlight the Chinese 
helps to Pakistani defence. It states that in the wake of Pressler amendment, China’s 
relations with Pakistan had continued to flourish at the military level. With the cessation 
of US economic and military assistance, Pakistan’s dependence on China’s political and 
military support have increased immensely. It argues that China on the other hand never 
disappointed Pakistan. Without stating the particulars of China’s help, text further 
maintains that China fulfilled Pakistani defence requirements which enhanced the 
significance of Pakistan-China alliance.516 Though the US later partially relaxed the 
sanctions courtesy of the Brown amendment, and allowed Islamabad to make a few 
military purchases, it did very little to redeem the perception of the US as being 
unreliable. The Pakistanis cite this as a clear proof of American perfidy to emphasize the 
fact that Washington is not a reliable ally.  
The US decision was excessive which has been regretted by US official. In a Congress 
hearing, former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton maintains “The problems we face now 
to some extent we have to take responsibility for, having contributed to it. We also have 
a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan,” she added, “Let’s remember here... 
the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago... and we did it because 
we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union.”517 Naturally, the Chinese who 
helped during adversity appeared to be reliable. Pakistani officials have not been shy of 
conveying American behaviour to its younger generations to achieve their strategic 
objective.  
The war against terrorism 
The war against terrorism is another sub-theme which the textbooks make use of to 
compare Pakistan’s alliance with the US and China. Since 9/11, 2001, Pakistan has been 
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in the front line of the US war against terrorism, the alliance has never been short of 
challenges in the alliance. Though China has not been directly involved in the fight 
against terrorism, it has heaped praises on the Pakistani role acknowledging its sacrifices 
which has stood in sharp contrast to the American criticism of Islamabad role sometimes 
praising it but mostly alleging Islamabad complicit with the Taliban.  
Although no Pakistanis were involved in the terrorist attacks on the US soil, the event has 
significant implication for Islamabad’s foreign policy due to the latter’s support to the 
Taliban government. America threatened “to bomb Pakistan to the stone age” if it refused 
to help the US in dismantling the terror infrastructure in Afghanistan.518 Musharraf made 
a massive U-turn on Afghan policy, condemned the “carnage” in New York and assured 
the US that Pakistan would provide “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” 
519  
Overnight, personally the decision made Musharraf an international pariah to an 
appreciated partner in the global war against terrorism. By and large, Washington waived 
decade’s old sanctions, promised military and economic assistance worth billions of 
dollars to Islamabad. It also conferred Pakistan a non-NATO ally status.520 With 
Islamabad’s logistic support, the Kabul regime fell to the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in a matter of weeks.  
Though Pakistan has been fighting at the front of the US-led war against terrorism since 
then, lamentably, the prospects of developing better relations between the two states have 
appeared dim. The hallmark of the alliance has been periodical breakdowns, and marked 
by deadlocks. The pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other, between 
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friendships and distancing. Washington contends that Pakistan has conducted 
contradictory policies, both feeding and fighting the Taliban, Pakistan laments US 
oblivion to Pakistani security needs.  
Islamabad regrets Washington’s unjustified demand of “do more” despite Pakistan great 
sacrifices. The events like US Navy Seals raid on the Bin Laden compound in 
Abbottabad, NATO attack on the Salala check post (killing 24 Pakistani troops), and CIA 
contactor Raymond Davis’ criminal act of killing two Pakistani in a broad day light in 
Lahore, has taken the relationship to the lowest point.  
With regard to the discussion within the textbook, there is no meticulous discussion on 
the war against terrorism. The texts merely present a brief description of the international 
war against terrorism, albeit providing a Pakistani perspective. The texts accept the 
audacity of the terrorist attacks, and pertinently approve the Pakistani decision to fight 
the war without any precondition.521 The texts value the non-NATO ally status given to 
Islamabad.522  
Interestingly, though China is not directly involved in the war, the texts discuss its role 
with reference to the appreciation of Pakistan’s sacrifices. One text suggests quite 
explicitly that  
Undoubtedly, Pakistan has been fighting with the US in war against terrorism, but 
the relationship has never been reliable. America does not recognise Islamabad’s 
sacrifices, and rather repeats the mantra of ‘do more’. In contrast, the Chinese 
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government appreciates Pakistan’s sacrifices and it urges the world community 
to do the same.523 
One other text suggests that:  
Every time Pakistan came under pressure to do more, an explicit reference to the 
US, China reprimanded and reminded the US Pakistan’s untiring and sincere 
efforts, which shows what a strong bond exists between Pakistan and China; 
Pakistan and China are true, reliable, and strategic partners.524  
As far as losses and sacrifices are concerned, textbook analysis is accurate: Pakistan's 
losses, both in terms of men and materials, have no precedent. In 2018 the Pakistani 
government reported that terrorism has killed over 74,000 people over the past 14 years 
and cost $ 123 billion in economic losses.525 These statistics are much larger than any 
other nation fighting in the war.  
The textual analysis, however, shows complete disregard of the American contribution 
to Pakistan’s economy and security, which stands at $23 billion.526 The only times the 
texts acknowledge US contribution is just a single example albeit very narrow and short. 
One textbook says that US has provided little military and economic help.527 While the 
textbooks protest about American behaviour, and disregard American aid, Pakistan does 
have to share some responsibility. It is equally important for Islamabad to remove 
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Washington’s suspicions regarding Islamabad dual role in fighting terrorism war; 
Islamabad has been accused of taking a half-hearted approach, taking up the fight against 
the bad Taliban, but sparing the good Taliban.528  
While war against terrorism, and despite the Uighur separatists allegedly finding 
sanctuary in Pakistan, unlike the US, Beijing does not push it hard on the issue of 
terrorism. Though Beijing worry Uighur presence in Pakistan’s tribal belt, and presses 
Islamabad to fight Uighur and flush them out, Beijing has passed praised Pakistan’s 
sacrifices.529 It also urges the world community to acknowledge Islamabad’s actions. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release states, “The Chinese side held the view that 
Pakistan has made great efforts and endured great sacrifices in fighting terrorism, and 
reiterated that it respects the counter-terrorism strategy constituted and implemented by 
Pakistan in light of its own national conditions.”530 The Chinese appreciation of the 
Pakistani sacrifices and fight against terrorism have essentially enhanced China’s 
steadfastness in the eyes of the Pakistani leaders, and they flatter China through their 
propaganda in order to prevent the possibility of developing perception of an awkward 
alliance to teach younger generation.  
Poetic phrases  
Poetic phrases serve significant part of the propaganda strategy utilised by the Pakistani 
officials to market alliance to overcome their fears towards their own society. Islamabad’s 
alliance with Beijing gets very extravagant support and coverage within the textbooks in 
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the form of magniloquence. The alliance is celebrated within the textbooks with 
appropriately poetic and hyperbolic terms. The rhetoric of an ‘all-weather alliance” is 
built and emphasised while appearing thoroughly and too frequently within the textbook. 
Using the propaganda techniques of “assertion” and “repetition”, there is a 
pervasiveness of positive terms, phrases and adjectives which proudly create the notion 
of a time-tested alliance.531 The textbooks’ habit of shoring up with adjectives and 
overstated words make this a truly remarkable programme of propaganda. The 
overwhelming positivity about China’s alliance within the texts is unprecedented, and 
criticism of the alliance within the textbooks is a rare commodity. 
 
Figure 4.13: Poetic Relationship 
Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 show that ten texts out of a total eighteen employ hyperbolic 
statements to market the alliance. This technique is represented at all levels except LS 
level of education.  
                                                 
531
 In assertion, the propagandist makes bold claims in favour of the phenomena. In repetition, a 
phrase/word/ sentence is repeated to get the message through. See Brown, Technique of Persuasion, 
pp.27-28 
44%
56%
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Figure 4.14: Poetic Relationship and four Levels of education 
With regard to the first theme, terms or phrases are employed to link the alliance with 
natural things which exist but have abstract meaning, like “green tree”, “mighty rivers”, 
“mountains” and “seas.” For instance, a text designed for grade five children, who are 
unlikely to grasp the notion behind such statements, likens the Pakistan-China friendship 
to a “lush green tree”, and a “shinier success.” 532 Then there is rhetoric comparing the 
alliance with a “mighty river which cannot be stopped by any hurdle.” 533 Another text 
continues this theme, reflecting that the alliance is “higher than Himalayas, deeper than 
sea and sweeter than honey.” 534 The use of poetic words might be unclear for young 
children (i.e. “all-weather”, “time-tested”, or “honey”) and no explanations provided.535 
                                                 
532 Fazal Hussain, Islamic Republic of Pakistan p.4 
533 Rahmanullah Ch. and Aftab Dar, Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the World p.104 
534 Ibid.  
535 These statements are not just for the younger generation, these are also found in the MOFA press 
releases. The president Zardari told the president of China in 2010 “Our friendship is all weather and time 
tested” and that “The people of our two countries are united in their determination to take our friendship 
and partnership to new heights.” See Message by the President of Pakistan His Excellency Asif Ali 
Zardari to the President of China His Excellency Hu Jintao ', in Latest Press Releases/Speeches 
(Islamabad Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 31 December 2010). p.1 
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Nevertheless, associating the alliance with natural things occurring without human 
interference would suggest that alliance is also flourishes naturally. Though the terms are 
nothing more than eye-catching slogans, and hardly represent the diplomacy and 
international politics involved, the florid language and natural connotations are likely to 
permeate children’s minds.  
It is worth noting that the children not only read these lyrical statements in the texts, they 
routinely hear them from their leaders. These statements have become entrenched in the 
Pakistani discourse that the leadership habitually describe the alliance in these exuberant 
terms. In the words of currently serving army general Raheel Sharif, the alliance is an 
“all-weather friendship…sweeter than honey, higher than the Himalayas and deeper than 
oceans.”536 Former President Asif Zardari maintains “China has proved to be our 
unwavering and reliable friend, partner and neighbour…Our relationship is a role model 
for countries all over the world.” 537 The current Pakistani Ambassador to China, Masood 
Khalid, asserts “The rock-solid cooperation between China and Pakistan reflects the two 
countries' all-weather and multifaceted strategic partnership.”538  
Yet another textbook, defying international politics, suggests “Pakistan-China friendship 
is everlasting.” 539 This statement can hardly be justified as alliances cannot exist forever, 
and considering it everlasting is unsustainable. Every student of politics learns that 
international politics is inherently impermanent, and not everlasting. But that a state’s 
national interests are. Essentially, “everlasting”, “all-weather” and “time-tested” are 
                                                 
536 "Attempt to Obstruct CPEC Will Be Thwarted, Gen Raheel Tells China," The Dawn 1 August 2015  
537 President Zardari Greets President Hu on 60th Anniversary of Pak-China Diplomatic Ties (Islamabad 
Embassy of China in Pakistan 2011). 
538
 Pu Zhendong, "Pakistani Ambassador Urges Much More Trade" China Daily 25 March 2013. 
539 Farooq Malik and Ghazala Bashir, External Relations of Pakistan, p.188  
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poetic flourishes and relations between states just cannot be evaluated by that measure. 
Asia experts Andrew Small and Michael Beckley have criticised the use of “florid 
language” to describe the alliance.540 However, the security elite’s urge to defend the 
peculiar alliance from being scuttled by the overtly religious elements have prompted 
them to continue to represent the alliance with natural, abstract descriptions.  
The textbooks complement each other, adopting a highly expressive approach, repeating 
these sentiments to highlight the vitality of the alliance. A new textbook expresses 
uniquely by suggesting that Pakistan and China celebrate joyous moments together, share 
the distress of time together and will stand together for safety of the future generations.541 
Readers would feel that the friendship has been entrenched and fortified by past 
generations, and it will go on into the future. If Pakistani students hear these flamboyant 
statements consistently and repeatedly, it is highly likely they will be absorbed, 
irrespective of social and cultural differences, and children find will themselves believing 
that China is their nations “time-tested” friend.  
Finally, the notion that the Pakistan-China friendship is a model to follow because both 
adhere to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs is also 
exaggerated, and an interesting illustration of contradiction. For instance, a text 
emphasises that the hallmark of the Pakistan-China alliance has been firm adherence to 
the principles of non-interference, upholding sanctity of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.542 The rhetoric emerging in this and two other texts543 puts the alliance in an 
extraordinary context. The words attract the reader, sound good to the ear and suggest no 
                                                 
540
 Andrew Small, "China-Pakistan: A Strategic Relationship in the Shadows," Yale Global (2015).; 
Beckley, "China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends."  
541
 Abdullah Malik. Relations with India and China p.274  
542
 Hassan Askari and Javid Iqbal. Pakistan and World Affairs p.135  
543
 While one text considers it a model alliance, others see unity in diversity by stating that it is a model 
alliance between two countries who are neighbours and friends, despite having different sizes and 
ideology. Aftab Dar and Zubair Siddiq, Pakistan's Relations with Neighbours p.36 ; Bhatty, Pakistan-
China in 21st Century p.212 
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sourness in the relationship, yet in reality, these statements are nothing more than shallow 
slogans. The effort to associate the alliance with concepts like “non-interference” or 
“model alliance”, suggest how they view their own society. It suggests their fears of the 
Pakistani security elite and effort to naturalise what is in fact a most awkward and 
culturally odd alliance. 
In this chapter, a modest attempt has been made to evaluate propaganda strategies utilised 
by the Pakistani officials. It has tried answering three main question raised in this 
research. The chapter has scrutinised cultural textbooks in use in the schools and colleges 
of Pakistan by students of classes 5 to 14 to seek answer to these questions. It has 
discussed their contents at length, and explored the dimensions, implications and 
ramifications of Islamabad’s alliance with China. Pakistan’s rulers have systematically 
controlled the messages published in the texts used in their cultural institutions in order 
to enhance and perpetuate the strength of the alliance with China. We see the turning and 
twisting of historical facts, and the errors and exaggerations, and the guiding philosophies 
behind the promotion of the alliance. The honest and effective answers are lacking within 
the texts. For instance, China’s dubious role during various crisis have ignored or 
exaggerated. In essence, the textbooks are a collection of subjective, prejudiced, and 
partial narratives which actually give us a sense that providing objective analysis within 
text may enhanced further security elites anxieties and concerns towards their own 
society.  
The education system in Pakistan is used an instrument of state policy to achieve political 
and strategic objectives. In Islamabad’s official education system, political factors are 
noticeable. The state acts as a hegemonic entity and produces selective knowledge to 
market the Chinese alliance. The government has systematically distorted social studies 
texts to create a place for their claims and the perpetuation of the alliance with China. 
There is a conscious process of the manipulation of historical facts and events as well as 
the guiding philosophies behind them. The Pakistani state creates an identity for China, 
exclusively portraying China as glorious and reliable. The picture of India as an enemy 
is very much emphasised, and the other major power - the US - is portrayed as having 
betrayed Pakistan at key points in their history. Students are exposed to extensive 
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information and are taught what to think, what to do, how to feel and how to behave about 
and towards the alliance. Hyperbolic language is used to propagate young minds to make 
them open to and accept the alliance with loyal China.  
The texts currently used only project carefully selected facts to support the dominant 
propagandist’s line, and there is a lack of objective and dispassionate reporting and 
correct interpretation of the facts about the Pakistan-China alliance. Although school 
texts are usually expected to impart knowledge, here political propaganda and education 
are not separate, and the textbooks concentrate on indoctrination of the pro-China view 
among Pakistani students. The dynamic subjects like history and social studies, which 
are important subjects for creating a strong civic sense, are actually full of contents which 
are promoting the state’s strategic and political interests. Unless there is some change in 
the contents of the textbooks used in the schools across Pakistan, it could feasibly be 
expected that the younger generation will not become literate. The presence of 
propaganda in the texts authenticate this thesis argument that Pakistani officials have 
certain fears towards their own public which are being countered through a use of 
selective and official propaganda.  
In the next chapter we continue to present a content analysis of Pakistani elite’s 
newspaper articles to identify themes aim to legitimise the alliance domestically.   
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 Newspaper Articles and Propaganda 
In this dissertation we are using three sets of data - textbooks from cultural institutions 
the security elite’s newspaper articles and parliamentary debates- to examine Pakistani 
domestic propaganda. The previous chapter examined texts, and in this chapter, we offer 
an investigation of the most persistent themes within the newspapers to demonstrate that 
Pakistani officials use propaganda to promote alliance with China domestically. Despite 
using different data sets, both chapters investigate the same research questions: how the 
security elites in Pakistan promote the alliance domestically, and what their propaganda 
tells us about how they view their own society.  
Using the theoretical framework SEPIA, this chapter argues that officials concerned 
about the sustainability of the alliance with China use various strategies to perpetuate it 
domestically. While some of the themes seen in the textbooks are repeated (for example 
the Uighur issue, the role of India, conforming Islam and Communism), some additional 
strategies emerged during the analysis of the content of articles, such as propaganda on 
notable events (for example diplomatic anniversaries) to legitimise the alliance, and the 
linking of Pakistan’s future with an emerging China. The elites propagate the relationship 
as vital and wonderful at home, exaggerating it in rhetoric and propaganda which is 
systematically spread to the larger Pakistani public through newspaper articles. When the 
Chinese leaders and officials’ come on a state visit to Pakistan grand welcome are staged 
to promote the alliance internally.  
This chapter has two main sections. In the first section, we explain the sampling of 
newspaper articles followed by a general overview of quantitative content analysis. The 
second section explains the analysis of the qualitative content of the selected newspaper 
articles. 
Sampling of newspaper articles  
Using the purposive sampling technique, this chapter examines a sample of 82 articles 
published in three main English dailies (The Dawn, The News, and The Nation) written 
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by serving and retied Pakistani officials. Some articles have also been written by the 
Pakistani lawmakers. For any article to qualify for the research, I set following criteria:  
• The article must be published between 1990 and 2010.  
• The article should explicitly discuss at least one aspect of the Pakistan-China 
relationship. 
• The author should be one of the following: retired or serving armed personnel, 
diplomat, parliamentarian, foreign secretary and or an educator.  
 
Figure 5.1: Representation of Articles in three Newspapers 
The Dawn , 38,
46%
The News, 
22, 
27%
The Nation , 
22, 
27%
ARTICLES DIVISION IN THREE NEWSPAPERS
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Figure 5.2: Numbers of articles appearing under each Governments 
Figure 5.1 shows the breakdown of article by newspaper. The majority of articles (38, 
46%) were printed in The Dawn, whereas an equal number of articles (22 or 27%) were 
printed in The Nation and The News. The appearance of maximum articles in the Dawn 
was just because of the way sampling worked. 
Figure 5.2 shows that more articles were published during General Pervaiz Musharraf’s 
tenure. The plausible explanations for frequent use of propaganda during Musharraf rule 
could be the impact of enhanced threats to the alliance. The terrorist attacks on the 
Chinese had soared, so to quell threats the security elite increased efforts to promote the 
alliance. Musharraf also provided a boost to economic and trade ties with China. 
Musharraf had been of the view that “…one thing which needs to be further enhanced to 
really cement the bond between the two countries is economic collaboration, which, to a 
41
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degree, is still wanting.” 544 He allowed Chinese investment to develop the Gwadar port, 
and agreed to sign the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Beijing, leading to increasing 
work to popularise these achievements.  
 
Figure 5.3: Article ratio between civilian and military regimes 
Figure 5.3 shows that equal numbers of articles were published under military and 
civilian regimes, which suggests that Pakistani officials concerns about the alliance and 
society were constant.  
After selecting the newspaper articles, the next phase was to identify the major themes 
appearing. In order to do this, I read selected articles and identified several small 
categories using both manifest and latent content analysis techniques.545 While I used 
inductive reasoning as an approach to divulge main categories546, there were mostly 
unequivocal comments by the authors. After accumulating multiple sub-categories, I 
grouped them into broader categories, which resulted in five major themes:  
                                                 
544 "Musharraf for Strong Trade Ties with China" The Dawn 24 December 2001  
545 Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook pp 23-25 
546 Philipp Mayring, "Qualitative Content Analysis," Qualitative Social Research 1, No. 2 (2000). 
MILITARY
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• Pakistan-China mutual Security  
• Sino-Indian rapprochement and its implication for Pakistan-China alliance  
• Chinese officials’ state visits and public propaganda  
• Evolving China and Pakistan  
• Compatibility of Islam and Communism.  
 
Figure 5.4: Frequency of five main themes  
Figure 5.4 shows how frequently each theme has appeared in the newspapers. It is evident 
that the Sino-Indian rapprochement and Security themes appear largely. This thesis 
argues that the Uighur issue and terrorist attacks on Chinese worries the elites, so an 
emphasis on security theme (which involves discussion on these issues and the resulting 
damage to the socio-economic development of Pakistan) indicates that articles are 
produced to counter what sounds like increasing anxiety about the sustainability of the 
alliance. Similarly, the Indian factor is emphasised to promote the alliance to a society 
which views India as its number one enemy. The efforts to show commonality between 
Islam and communism appear slight but are significant.  
In the next section, I will present textual analysis of the five themes in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms.  
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Security  
Propaganda is a means of communication used to manipulate or influence the opinion of 
groups in support of a given cause or belief. Propaganda is also the result of security 
needs and continues to be an effective tool, particularly now in this advanced world of 
media and information flow. With the changing world, the understanding of the terms 
security and propaganda has also changed. Security in this modern setting refers not only 
to the conventional security of borders, but also involves economic and social issues. In 
this section, I will use the term security to refer to both traditional and more modern uses 
of it.  
It is important to understand what is meant by the Security theme. It includes the 
following sub-themes:  
• Pakistan-China common security  
• Role of religious parties  
• Pakistan’s socio-economic development  
• Conspiracy concepts  
• Discourse of security and military ties  
 
Figure 5.5: Security theme representation between civilian and military regimes  
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 Figure 5.5 illustrates that security officials made consistent efforts to present the security 
theme, with only very slightly more appearances during periods of military government 
than civilian. We also found that officials wrote mainly for The Nation and more 
frequently during the Musharraf administration (15 articles) than any other government. 
Figure 5.6: The position of Security theme across five governments 
Common Security  
As discussed in chapter three, the Uighur separatists’ links with Pakistani militants is a 
real challenge to Islamabad’s ability to sustain the alliance with Beijing. To counter this 
challenge, officials try to convince the public that the two nations have a common 
approach to security issues. The security elite in their writings suggests reciprocation in 
augmenting Chinese national security the way China has contributed to Pakistan’s 
security. They imply that China’s security is Pakistan’s security, China’s enemies are 
Pakistan’s enemies, and that if Chinese security is threatened then ultimately so is that of 
Pakistan.  
Air Marshall Asghar Khan states that Chinese support for Pakistan’s security was “a 
living reality” which needed to be “appreciated and reciprocated.” It has been a “critical 
factor for the preservation of peace and security in South Asia”, therefore, “Chinese 
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needed to be supported on Uighur separatism.”547 Academic Hassan Rizvi elaborates: 
“China has consistently supported Pakistan…of late, China is perturbed by the efforts of 
the militants Islamic groups based in Pakistan to penetrate the troubled Xinjiang region. 
The government of Pakistan and its people has a role to play to assure Chinese national 
security.”548 Clearly, they argue for returning Chinese security. They fail to suggest how 
to respond but imply they want their public to cease in the support for Uighur separatists. 
Use of rhetoric such as “living reality”, “critical factors” and “China’s consistent support” 
indicates that China is trustworthy, and a real partner. From their arguments, it appears 
that they are making a real effort to create a feeling of obligation and commitment among 
the public to repay Chinese security. Similarly, showing that China is already fulfilling 
some of Pakistan’s security needs, Pakistan needs to act.  
Others underline what China has sacrificed for Pakistan’s national security, and how 
China’s enemies should be recognised as Pakistan’s enemies. Air Marshall Ayaz Khan 
(retd) states “The great people of China are great friends of Pakistan. They have sacrificed 
for Pakistan’s security. Anybody harming their national security [by supporting the 
Uighur] is the enemy of both countries…Chinese security is Pakistan’s security.”549 In 
international politics, countries rarely forfeit national interest for linked states, a custom 
which China follows stringently, and although the Air Marshall fails to identify Chinese 
sacrifices specifically the implication may increase the value of the alliance.  
                                                 
547 Asghar Khan, "Pakistan’s Security- the China Option" The News 12 August 2001  
548
 Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Foreign Policy and Proxmity Factor" The Nation 7 September 1997; For related 
discussion see Hassan Askari Rizvi, "China Factor in South Asia" The Dawn 27 July 1994; Rizvi also 
argue “The spill over of Islamic fundamentalism into China”, which is destabilising Chinese national 
security can be contained with the cooperation of Pakistani society, Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Sino-Pakistan 
Security Relations" The News 8 October 1992.  
549 Ayaz Ahmad Khan, "Terrorism against Foreign Nationals" The News 1 October 1999   
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Likewise, former IPRI (Islamabad Policy Research Institute) head Maqsudul Nuri claims 
“Pakistan-China have similar aspirations, common goals and common challenges …in 
fact, Chinese security is Pakistan’s security… The national security of the two countries 
is combined.”550 Essentially, it is not unusual to see Pakistan’s security associated with 
that of China, which highlights the importance of the alliance but also reveals officials’ 
concerns towards their own public.  
Historically, states have combined national security with others in an attempt to repel any 
attack from a third party; whilst NATO is the most famous example of this type of 
arrangement, states have also made arrangements to combine security, defence, and 
economy, under confederations.551 Nevertheless, when Pakistani officials combine Sino-
Pakistan security, it implies there are two different countries but they are interconnected. 
People would likely to reason that it is inevitable to think of Pakistan-China disjointedly.  
Pakistani officials do not distinguish between Pakistani and Chinese counter-terrorism 
goals. Many in Pakistan believe that the “war against terrorism” is not Pakistan’s war552, 
but Chinese terrorism concerns are owned by the officials. Former IPRI head P.I. Cheema 
argues that  
The Chinese are concerned with the activities of separatists groups in the Chinese 
province of Xinjiang. To deny sanctuaries to these groups, Pakistan’s cooperation 
is deemed necessary…Pakistan cooperation would prove to be an effective 
                                                 
550 Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Pak-China Entering New Millennium" The Nation 1 February 2000.; Also, 
Abdul Sattar maintains that both countries share common struggle against threats to their security. 
Pakistan considers China security as her own, and “China strength is Pakistan’s strength.”; Abdul Sattar, 
"Pakistan Hold China in High Esteem" The Nation 22 December 1998   
551 Between 1776 and 1789, thirteen US colonies had a confederation.  
552 Saeed Shah, "Pakistanis to Clinton: War on Terror is Not Our War" McClatchy Newspapers, 30 
October 2009   
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deterrent to those elements of the society that were indulging in undesired and 
unlawful activities [fomenting unrest in Xinjiang] and using the border areas as 
their hideouts.553  
Rashid Khan also implies “Pakistan-China have common threats, common security, 
common aspirations, and common destinations. Both face the challenge of extremism, 
and terrorism. Chinese terrorism concerns are Pakistani concerns.”554 This ownership of 
Chinese terrorism concerns is significant: the US, despite billions of dollars of aid, has 
unable to receive such treatment from Pakistan. These firmly embedded arguments once 
again reinforce the strength of the alliance, and show the officials’ fears about their own 
public.  
The analysis of the articles showed no discrepancy among Pakistani officials on this 
point. Speaking on the occasion of the Chinese army’s 88th anniversary, Pakistan’s Army 
Chief General Raheel Sharif said: “Your enemy is our enemy. Eliminating the East 
Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) is its manifestation.”555 Following talks with 
President Xi in 2015, Nawaz Sharif stressed “I have assured Xi, China’s security is as 
important to us as Pakistan’s security.” During his tenure as an army chief, Ishfaq Pervaiz 
Kayani stated “Honestly, Chinese security is very dear to Pakistan.”556   
                                                 
553 P.I.Cheema, "Further Strengthening of Ties with China" The News 9 November 2003  
554 Rashid Ahmad Khan, "Pak-China Relations" The Nation 17 December 2004   
555 "Attempt to Obstruct CPEC Will Be Thwarted, Gen Raheel Tells China" 
556 Urdu VOA, 2011."Pakistan China Military Ties", Youtube 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8Dp8UsoHvA [Accessed 29 December, 2015].  
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Plea to Islamic parties  
In chapter three, we argued that the Talibanisation of Pakistani society, fostered in JUI 
and JI madrasah, indirectly encourages Uighur separatism.557 Former JI Chief, the late 
Qazi Ahmad, openly said “we should not ignore them [Muslims in China]”, as “There is 
ideological vacuum in China and we must fill this vacuum” by accelerating efforts to 
encourage promotion of Islam.558  
In response these challenges, security elites made a strong plea to Islamic parties not to 
undertake indoctrination, promote the Uighur cause, or provide jihad training. The retired 
Ambassador Afzal Mahmood argues that nothing is more important for the religious 
parties than the stability of the alliance:  
The Chinese are very sensitive about the intrusion of Islamic fundamentalist into 
Xinjiang. The religious leadership, irrespective of their party affiliation, should 
keep national interest supreme than any other consideration [jihad in Xinjiang].559  
Ambassador Abdul Waheed implies that the success of the alliance hinge on the 
involvement of the religious parties. Waheed writes “Pakistan has many friends, but 
China is pre-eminent, nothing can be more consoling for the Pakistani nation… Islamic 
parties should eradicate Chinese nervousness by discouraging Uighur presence in their 
madrasahs.”560 Essentially, the Islamic parties are urged to feel calm and comfortable to 
have China as Pakistan’s trusted partner, and to decline refuge to Uighur in the 
                                                 
557 In 2001, up to 10,000 Uighur arrived in Pakistan to receive religious education and military training in 
those madrasah. Huma Yusuf, "Effects of Uighur Unrest" The Dawn 13 July 2009   
558 "Pakistan's Jamaat-I-Islami to Preach Islam in China" The Dawn, 4 April 2009  
559 Afzaal Mahmood, "Chill in Sino-Indian Ties" The Dawn 3 January 1999. 
560 Mian Abdul Waheed, "Need to Revitalize Pak-China Ties" The Nation 4 November 1995.  
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madrasahs. Lt. General Kamal Matinuddin (retd) argues strongly that the religious parties 
should ensure that the Uighur are not accepted in their madrasah, just in case they come 
to join madrassahs they “should not be converted into religious fanatics.”561 Matinuddin’s 
argument clearly identifies the elites’ concerns about the militants’ efforts to convert 
Uighur into religious fanatics as the root cause of the problem. Ambassador Maqbool 
Bhatty (retd) proclaims that the religious parties’ interference in China internals’ affairs, 
like support to Uighur separatism, is against the spirit of Pakistan-China alliance.562  
By appealing directly to religious parties’ elites aim to generate the value of the alliance 
as Islamic parties allegedly control religious fanatics who support Uighur separatist 
through madrasah teachings. The most significant point to gain from these pieces is that 
this discussion about religious parties highlights the elite’s fears and concerns about their 
public, and presents a counter argument promoting the alliance.  
In the previous section, we witness that security elites appeal to the public not to attack 
the Chinese, we also see efforts to equate Pakistan's security with Chinese security, these 
efforts make us understand how Pakistani officials see their own society. In fact, a 
counterargument that China's national security is Pakistani security is promoting the 
alliance but tells us elites perception about their own society. 
Terrorist attacks on Chinese and socio-economic development of Pakistan 
Efforts to market the alliance to the Islamic population using only the message of joint 
security arrangements were not enough, so the elite also included socio-economic 
components in their propaganda strategies. Given the amount of threat and Pakistani 
security worries towards their own society, therefore, security elites make extra efforts to 
                                                 
561 Matinuddin, “Musharraf Visit to China”; Also see Rashid Khan, "Pak-China Relations"  
562 Maqbool Ahamd Bhatty, "China Emerging World Role" The Dawn (1999); In another article 
Ambassador Bhatty argues “All political parties [Islamic] in Pakistan realize the need to follow the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs, notably those of China [not to fuel agitation in Muslim 
majority areas], which has consistently honoured this principle.” Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, "Stable Ties 
with China" The Dawn 23 June 2004.  
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highlight the alliance. As the significant part of their propaganda highlight China’s 
contribution to Pakistan’s infrastructure development (development projects, funded and 
completed with Beijing’s financial and technical support, such as the Gwadar deep sea 
port) to present a positive image of the alliance publicly. In doing so, they warn that 
terrorist attacks on the Chinese will place the fate of development projects, necessary for 
Pakistan’s socio-economic security, in jeopardy. Cheema states:  
China is an extremely useful partner of Pakistan as it is involved in many major 
developmental projects such as Gwadar, Chashma II nuclear power plant, Saindak 
and Thar coal projects etc. In addition, new areas of cooperation are being 
explored… it is imperative that security measures particularly for all those 
foreigners working in Pakistan on various projects need to be enhanced…An 
insecure expert is unlikely to give his best because of haunts of the insecurity. As 
a matter of fact, even the people of Pakistan must ensure that such an incident 
[terrorist attack on Chinese] does not reoccur…Therefore, it is our collective 
responsibility to ensure the safety of guest experts and workers.563  
Cheema’s use of phrases like “useful partner” and “new areas of cooperation”, shows 
optimism, but his warning tone suggests that this positivity hinges on a secure 
environment. Cheema emphasises that the public need to be vigilant to secure Chinese 
national security. The use of word “collective reasonability” implicate it is a national duty 
or responsibility to protect Chinese so that the alliance can be secured and promoted.  
Apart from polices of persuasion, the Pakistani officials warns the dangers of putting 
Chinese under threats. Lt. General Matinuddin praises Chinese contributions in the socio-
                                                 
563 P.I.Cheema, "An Unfortunate Incident" The News 24 October 2004   
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economic development of Pakistan, but laments the swelling terrorist attacks damaging 
Pakistan’s economic security. To overcome it, Matinuddin suggests; 
Improve the overall security situation in Pakistan and specially ensure that the 
Chinese workers in our country remain safe. We cannot afford any more killings 
of our friends. No country would like to invest, not even our friends from across 
the Himalayas, in a country where its workers and its property is not safe…It is 
prime duty of the people of Pakistan to help improve Chinese workers’ security.564 
Matinuddin’s argument is formulated to stimulate public awareness of the fact that the 
terrorist attacks can impede Chinese investment. Rather it will discourage Chinese to 
invest in Pakistan that means it will be a great setback. This argument is likely to get the 
public thinking about why a country crucial for economic development is subject to 
terrorist attacks. It is likely to ease u pressure being put on the Chinese in form of terrorist 
attacks. Matinuddin then urge people of Pakistan to take the security of the Chinese a 
prime duty.  
Parliamentarian Marvi Memon argues “On the security front, an immediate end to 
Chinese nationals’ kidnappings, providing extra security to all Chinese in Pakistan and 
treating them as very special guests is time critical…and condemnation of any Uyghur 
hideouts in FATA needs to be continued, not shied away from.” 565 For Memon Chinese 
are special guests, and needs extra security. It is itself significant. While Memon is 
considering immediate end to the violence against Chinese she called upon Pakistani to 
discourage Uighur militants presence in Pakistan.   
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Lt. General Talat Masood (retd) reiterates this argument:  
Chinese assistance in infrastructural projects has been of immense value. The two 
most significant projects are the Karakoram Highway and the Gwadar Deepwater 
port…There is no doubt that China has been deeply concerned about the growing 
radicalism in Pakistan. The abduction and killing of some of its nationals has 
further exacerbated its fears…Pakistan must ensure the safety of Chinese 
nationals and fully cooperate in areas of anti-terrorism and intelligence-sharing.566  
These officials really link the security of Chinese citizens with Pakistan’s progress. It can 
be inferred that terrorist attacks on Chinese would mean no investment, and ultimately 
the stalling of socio-economic progress of Pakistan. Yet again the appeal is to persuade 
assailants (militants and separatists) to relinquish terrorist activities to ensure the 
consistency of the alliance and therefore Pakistan’s strength.  
In another article, Gen Matinuddin warns:  
Chinese investments into Pakistan will only happen if there is no serious law and 
order problem in the country…Pakistan must ensure that overzealous and 
extremist elements amongst us do not encourage this tendency in any way 
whatsoever. We should not allow them to harm our time-tested friendship with 
China.567  
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Some writers even attempt to make the public understand that Chinese aided projects will 
benefit the public welfare. Ahmad Malik opines: 
The People of Balochistan will be the chief and direct beneficiaries of this 
[Gwadar] project…The Sardar who oppose Chinese presence or development of 
the province wanted to keep people of Balochistan under their subjugation…The 
successful completion of Gwadar Port will play a key role in promoting social 
and economic progress in the region and provide new opportunities.568  
Necessarily, it connotes Nawab’s are against Balochistan progress, while Pakistan with 
the help of China trying to develop Balochistan. The argument that the developments 
projects will benefit people make sense too. People will feel integrated and will own the 
projects. The officials’ discussion creates and reinforces the link between Chinese 
nationals’ security and Pakistan’s development. The reader will get impression that 
attacks are damaging the alliance. Thus, one the one hand Pakistani officials are 
sustaining the alliance domestically and on the other hand it suggests Pakistani officials’ 
concerns about their own public.  
The Chinese political system and Uighur Muslims  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, one of the security elites’ key priorities is to 
make the public understand that it does not make sense to support Uighurs’ separatism 
when they are not actually being maltreated. The officials describe the Chinese authorities 
as protecting Uighur rights by taking all actions possible to improve their security and 
welfare, and that China has embarked on an “aggressive development” in Xinjiang to 
improve the Uighurs’ economic and social welfare. In the newspaper, like in the 
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textbooks, the security elite emphasise that Beijing’s policies do not discriminate against 
Uighur, that they value and encourage their participation in Xinjiang’s expansion.569 
Officials represent China is working for the betterment of Uighur and that it genuinely 
cares for the Uighurs’ quality of life. It implies Beijing’s straight nature, and its 
responsibility to confront issues which bring melancholies in Uighur lives.  
In the newspapers, the security officials assert that “Uighur have been protected by the 
Chinese constitution” and have been “allocated a separate province and are considered a 
proud national of China” and that the “Chinese government does not interfere in their 
faith” and “strictly prevents imposition of Han culture” on them.570 China is referred to 
as a propagator of harmony and freedom, who wishes to spread peace and encouragement 
by applying the law and the constitution. It is suggested that China’s policies have made 
Xinjiang a better place to live. Other officials write that China is “not going to come hard 
on the Uighur Muslims which might embarrass their relations with Muslims world.” 571 
Using these arguments, the officials are trying to convince society that China would avoid 
any issues with the Uighur lest it unsettle its relations with the Muslim world, to unite the 
public behind the alliance. Moreover, projecting Chinese working for the betterment of 
the Uighur Muslim will reduce the anger and resentment of the Pakistani militants who 
believe that Chinese authorities discriminate Uighur Muslim religiously, politically and 
socially.  
Conspiracy theory  
Another sub-theme, based on conspiracy theory, gives a new outlook to the propaganda. 
It makes it difficult for the reader to understand what is the Xinjiang problem. Pakistani 
have already struggled to survive with continued conspiracy notions throughout their 
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political history, and then some officials believe that foreign terrorists carry out attacks 
on Chinese to stimulate hostility in the Sino-Pak alliance. Cheema’s statements reflect 
this:  
Nobody in Pakistan likes such incidents [terrorist attacks], especially if a Chinese 
is involved. It would not be too farfetched if I write that the entire Pakistani nation 
joins the Chinese to share their grief. Among the foreign nationals the Chinese 
are held in very high esteem. 
Cheema goes on to say that “it is somewhat unthinkable that any Pakistani would pick up 
a Chinese for vengeance”.572 Cheema’s surprise reaches new heights as he maintains “As 
a matter of fact, when one hears such an incident [terrorist attack on Chinese] disgust set 
in as no one expects that a Pakistani could undertake such a despicable act.” In reality, 
Chinese are “engaged in building dams, which would eventually be beneficial for the 
people of the region”, it is implausible to believe Pakistani are involved as “The Chinese 
are state guest and friends, admired and loved by the government and people of Pakistan.” 
573 Though it looks convincing that why would its public attack a country which is helping 
Pakistan, but militants have acknowledged the attacks. China also blame Pakistani 
militants and most importantly, Pakistani state kill and capture the Uighur militants which 
shows that the problem is home grown not foreign funded.    
Retired Ambassador Wajid Hassan continues this theme when he remarks that  
It is being observed that some internal and external forces have been at pains to 
put a spanner in the envious Sino-Pakistan relations that have grown from strength 
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to strength over the years…The beneficiary of such untoward incidents is not 
Pakistan but those who want China …out of Pakistan… Is it a conspiracy to shoo 
China away from Pakistan or to pressurize it to abandon Gwadar…
574
  
While these writers cleverly do not blame any foreign nation, Ahmad Malik implicates 
India. He suggests that the executions of Chinese nationals are “extremely shocking for 
both the Pakistani government and the citizens since they [Pakistan] consider Chinese as 
their closet and time-tested friends”, and that it appears “to be a “third factor” conspiracy, 
an act of subversion, sabotage, and terrorism…to create a wedge …and damage the 
friendly and ever-growing relations between the two countries”, however, a “possible 
‘third factor’ could be India….”575  
Yet, if India is involved, it has done so quite successfully. Chinese companies have left 
Pakistan due to security threats, but counter evidence suggests that China has never 
hesitated to register its frustration with Pakistan over the export of Islamic 
fundamentalism into its territory. China has also not blamed India, which is a significant 
factor to consider as Chinese are the chief target of terrorist activities.576 Evidently, the 
Uighur have admitted their training and support in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders 
region. It virtually would be very embarrassing for officials to admit that the ostensible 
warriors of Islam have been supporting Uighur separatism.  
The discourse of security and military ties   
Finally, another part of the broader security theme, is the discussion about Sino-Pakistan 
security and military ties. Indeed, China has enhanced Pakistan’s defence and military 
capability significantly. Pakistan has been a major recipient of Chinese weapons and 
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military technology including armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and submarines. This is the 
area where Pakistan-China relations have run deeply and closely.  
Officials state emphatically that Pakistan has benefitted immensely from Chinese 
provision of weapons and technology. They highlight China’s traditional contributions to 
Pakistan’s defence industries to produce strategic weapons indigenously in such a way to 
stimulate a positive public response. Ambassador Afzaal Khan (retd) underlines how 
China had facilitated the construction of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at 
Kamra, Heavy Industries at Taxila (HIT) and Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF) at 
Wah, providing both financial and technical assistance which were a “landmark 
contribution” to Pakistan’s defence.577 Cheema submits “by helping Pakistan to construct 
this huge factory [HIT], the Chinese assisted Pakistan to move closer to self-reliance as 
Pakistan’s army main battle tank Al-Khalid has been produced by Heavy Industries 
Taxila.”578 It implies China is not unaware of Islamabad’s military and security needs as 
it has provided technology which makes Pakistan self-sufficient in domestic defence 
production. This discussion about military collaboration creates a positive image of China 
for the public.  
Remarkably, officials in their efforts to market the alliance publicly acknowledge the 
transfer of sensitive Chinese missile technology to Pakistan. Rizvi highlights how China 
has been “actively assisting Pakistan’s missile programme”579, Ambassador Mahmood 
explains how “supply of M-11 surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan” strengthened 
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Islamabad’s security, a “testimony to the depth of Sino-Pakistan relations.”580 Equally, 
Ambassador Bhatty believes “supply of missiles were vital for the Pakistani drive to 
manufacture missiles indigenously.”581 Certainly, the missile transfer was a significant 
step as the M-11 missiles helped Pakistan to develop the Shaheen missile/Hatf III as 
tested in 1998.582 Kane argues that China has militarily helped Pakistan, particularly the 
transfer of missile technology.583 
To convey the message effectually, they pronounce that the missiles transfer happened to 
US opposition. Former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stresses that “No other country 
would sell missiles, China provided defying American pressure and incurring costly 
sanctions for Pakistan sake.” 584 While Afzaal Khan suggests that “The deal upset the 
American and they tried to pursue the Chinese not to supply the missiles to Pakistan, but 
China proceeded ahead.” 585 Yet again, the security elites highlight Chinese sacrifices for 
Pakistan’s security and the complications in its relations with the US.  
Likewise, promotional strategies enormously publicise the jointly developed multirole 
fighter jet JF-17. While some believe it a “tangible output,”586 a “shining example”587 and 
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“a powerful symbol” of the Pakistan-China friendship,588 others exaggerate the jets’ 
effectiveness, for example comparing it with F-16s. Air commodore S.M Hali (retd) 
implies “the JF-17 Thunder… performance is matched only by F-16s”589 while General 
Matinuddin proclaims “It [the JF-17] is a commercial loss to the United States as the F-
16s are no longer the hot topic” in Pakistan’s security establishment.590 Explaining the 
JF-17’s qualities is one thing, but comparing it with the F-16 can only be seen as an effort 
to market the alliance. It is true that the JF-17 is economically viable jet than F-16 which 
costs around $85-90 million per unit.591 The security officials highlight that the “Pakistani 
nation should be rightly proud of this great achievement.”592 General Talat Masood 
considers Chinese military technology to be “not cutting-edge” and “generally one or two 
generations behind US and western sources”, but he considers the multi-role JF-17 as the 
air force’s “main line of defence.”593  
Another blistering campaign of propaganda to market the alliance is the discussion about 
the construction of four F-22P sword class anti-ship submarines for the Pakistani navy. 
Yet again the elite consider it a “shining example” 594 and “an important component” to 
enhance the navy’s defence capability.595 They maintain from a “defence point of 
view…the F-22P Frigates projects are a major step forward in the quest for indigenization 
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and modernization of our armed forces.” 596 They believe that “the F-22P frigates will be 
equipped with organic helicopters, especially designed for use in anti-submarines 
warfare, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and numerous associated with self-
defence systems.”597  
Although there is rationale behind Pakistan’s seeking of military help from China, it 
would not be Pakistan’s first choice. One Lt. General told this author, on condition of 
anonymity, that “although Chinese weapons fulfil our needs, they are not cutting edge 
technology, American weapons are more advanced and much better.”598 In fact, Pakistan 
procures Chinese weapons “out of poverty or necessity, not as a matter of first choice.” 
If Pakistan had money it would shop for “F-16s from the US, Agosta submarines from 
France, and “tanks from the Ukraine.” 599  
Nonetheless, this is not suggesting that Pakistan-China defence ties will be weakened. 
Defence ties with China are likely to grow, partly because of the traditional ties between 
the two militaries, and partly because of Chinese terrorism concerns about the Pakistan-
Afghan region. China’s latest military supplies are meant to increase Pakistan’s counter-
insurgency capacities to meet the Taliban’s threat.600 However, apart from weapons, 
China is strict. Unlike America, China does not provide bail-out packages; China has 
never fired a shot for Pakistan in its crisis with India, and is highly unlikely to do so in 
the future. Despite this, discussions about the military and security ties are likely to 
propagate the alliance to a public sceptical about China. Once again, this repeated 
discussion reinforces the concerns the security elite have about their public. 
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Sino-Indian rapprochement and the Pak-China alliance  
In the newspapers, the security elites examine the possible implications of a Sino-Indian 
rapprochement on the Pakistan-China alliance, and in particular they examine whether 
the changes in the global security environment since the end of the Cold War have diluted 
the strategic partnership between Pakistan and China. This is very interesting theme as it 
divides the security elite’s responses. A few see the rapprochement as having modified 
Beijing-Islamabad alliance, whilst others take a different position, stating that 
reconciliation has not affected relations at all.  
Figure 5.7: Rapprochement theme and various leaders  
Figure 5.7 shows 37 of the 82 articles studied discussed the theme of the rapprochement, 
predominantly appearing in the Dawn. (Figure 5.8)  
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Figure 5.8: The frequency of Rapprochement in selected papers 
Before we move on to a qualitative analysis, a brief discussion of the Sino-Indian 
rapprochement is required.  
Sino-Indian rapprochement  
India and China, two of the regional powers of the Asian landscape, have not always been 
hostile to each other. Once their relations were described as “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” 
(Indians and Chinese are brothers).601 However, the outbreak of Tibet’s rebellion in 1959 
soured their relations. Following the rebellion, the Dalai Lama fled and sought refuge in 
India, which aroused Chinese suspicion that the rebellion was being instigated from 
Indian soil. It let to open confrontation between them, and a brief but bloody war was 
fought in 1962.602 John Garver maintains “The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict was a 
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watershed moment for the region.”603 Between 1962 and 1988, Sino-Indian exchanges 
remained incredibly truncated, and this hostility advanced Sino-Pakistan entente.  
Ding Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978 ended a revolutionary era in Beijing’s foreign 
policy. Xiaoping launched a programme of modernisation, increased international trade 
and market reforms.604 Beijing adopted a strategy of active and deeper engagement in the 
global system, obviously driven by the phenomenal success of its export led growth 
strategy. Because of the growing influence of these new elements on Chinese thinking, 
coupled with Beijing’s desire to be perceived as a reasonable power, China displayed 
greater concern towards the question of order and stability in South Asia. China’s adopted 
an approach in international politics which was based on engaging economically with 
regional states.  
This policy of activism not only imparted a status quo impulse to Beijing’s overall 
strategic behaviour but also motivated it to pursue policies of cautious pragmatism in its 
dealing with immediate neighbours including India. China stressed the need for adopting 
confidence building measures as important means to maintain peace and stability 
regionally. The major thrusts of China towards India, argues Isaac Kardon, were 
influenced by Beijing’s foreign policy goals of peaceful neighbourhood and pursuing of 
economic development.605  
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In contrast, New Delhi’s patron, the Soviet Union, as a whole had begun to show signs 
of crumbling, it prepared India to ease tension with China too.606 Reciprocating in 
pacifying China, Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988 – the first visit by 
an Indian premier in three decades. Gandhi captivated his host by asserting that “It is now 
time to look to the future, I have come to renew an old friendship.”607 Xiaoping 
maintained “if there should be an Asian age in the next century, then it could only be 
realized after both India-China becomes developed economies”608 while agreeing that the 
two countries “should forget the unpleasant past and set their eyes on future.”609  
Gandhi’s visit transformed their relations, and the rapprochement provided an 
opportunity to set aside historical differences and cultivate a productive relationship. The 
leaders have interacted more frequently, signed multiple agreements and created a 
mechanism to sort out border differences.610 The most important manifestation of this 
rapprochement is visible in their greater but expanding economic ties.  
Though this is not end to their border problem-border maps still do not match611 -this 
political rapprochement has certain implications for Pakistan. For example, China has 
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become neutral on Indo-Pakistan disputes, such as that over Kashmir. Beijing has 
rebuffed Islamabad’s requests for support during the Kargil crisis. Garver contends “With 
the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, Beijing also began expressing private 
disapproval and public non-endorsement of some of Islamabad’s more assertive 
[Kashmir insurgency, Kargil war] efforts to challenge India.” 612  
It is pertinent to mention that China has shown some flexibility in its position on Indo-
Pak disputes. For instance, when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of 
India cited the Chinese threat as a reason for nuclear tests in 1998613, Beijing revived its 
pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir. Indian media had criticised Chinese which had baffled 
them, causing Beijing to revive its old position on Kashmir, though not necessarily as a 
show of solidarity with Pakistan. Nonetheless, this is not a customary Chinese strategy in 
South Asia. In the wake of the Mumbai crisis of 2008, China took a very low key role 
towards diffusing Indo-Pak tension.614 This Sino-Indian rapprochement, perhaps 
logically, led the many of the Pakistani elites to conclude that Pakistan can no longer 
count on Sino-Indian resentment.  
China’s neutrality on Indo-Pakistan disputes 
The real concern of this thesis is not just that Pakistan idealises China, but that few 
alliances could live up to such an ideal, and that the pressure to deliver must then heighten 
the anxiety of the alliance makers. There appears a sense that some of the Pakistani elites 
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are themselves questioning the alliance. This section explains how the Pakistani officials 
behave when they come up against inconvenient or contrary information, and, to be exact, 
what happens when China behaves in a challenging or unexpected way. Indeed a few 
elites acknowledge noticeable changes in Sino-Pak alliance due to Sino-Indian 
reconciliation. Fundamentally, it validates their feelings of anxiety about the existence of 
the alliance. Former ambassador and foreign secretary Tanveer Khan elucidates that after 
the cold war “Beijing’s priority has been ensuring a peaceful neighbourhood while India-
Pakistan rivalry presents a challenge for her foreign and security policies…China has 
diluted its position on Kashmir to cultivate normal relations with India.”615  
Maqsudul Nuri explains that China considers Kashmir to be an issue left over by history 
and the best way to settle it is peaceful negotiations and mutual consultations between 
the parties to the dispute.616 Though both Khan and Nuri remain subtle in expressing their 
resolve in not condemning Chinese neutrality, just expressing it, clearly they describe a 
major shift in China’s Kashmir polices. Chinese support on the Kashmir issue has been 
an important factor during the Cold War. It is a realistic analysis, but elites put it in a way 
which shows their concerns about the viability of the alliance.  
Air Chief Marshall Zulfiqar Khan (retd) maintains that due to the rapprochement with 
India, China has declined to indulge in the Kashmir dispute and getting it resolved in 
Pakistan’s favour; Islamabad cannot expect China to help on Indo-Pakistan disputes in 
general, and Kashmir in particular.617 Lt. General Ghulam Sarwar (retd) maintains that a 
visible shift in Beijing’s foreign policy is “likely to have a direct bearing on the entire 
gamut of Pakistan foreign relations” and that Islamabad “will not be able to play China’s 
card against India in future.”618 Yet again, while analysing Pakistan’s expectations of 
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China as an ally, officials appear to be worried about the changes in Chinese foreign 
policy. Clearly there is a sense of apprehension developing among the Pakistani officials 
that Islamabad is unlikely to get Chinese help on Indo-Pakistan disputes. 
Former Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) head Shirin Mazari offers an 
excellent account of changing dynamics of South Asia. She envisages that with “new 
Chinese proactive diplomacy” in South Asia, Beijing is engaging with Pakistan, but 
increasing its interaction with India, both in economic and politico-diplomatic relations, 
and that “Pakistan can no longer rely on the historic legacy of its relationship with China, 
or on the old Sino-Indian antagonisms” and that the historic “lay of the land has altered 
for Pakistan vis-à-vis China.”619 Similarly, Ambassador Tayyub Siddiqui (retd) reflects 
that Beijing “will not permit any contentious issue [Kashmir] to be an obstacle in this 
[Sino-Indian rapprochement] path.”620 The ultimate test for the reliability of the alliance 
would be China’s position on Kashmir, and obviously the security elite are doubtful for 
the future. Given the centrality of Kashmir in Indo-Pakistan rivalry, and the strength of 
Kashmir in the ethos and psyche of the Pakistani nation621, Chinese neutrality would 
surely increase the Pakistan elites’ anxieties.  
However, there are others who take a different position, speculating that improving Sino-
Indian relations have not affected Sino-Pak relations, even marginally. For them, the 
underlying strategic rationale and components of the Pakistan-China entente cordiale 
have remained strong despite the rapprochement. Unconvincingly, they suggest that 
China’s support on Kashmir is complete and educate public the Sino-Indian border 
differences, and suggest that the existence of the Indo-US strategic partnership and the 
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fact that the two nations wish to acquire major power status are limitations likely to 
seriously hinder their rapprochement to the benefit of the Pakistan-China alliance. They 
suggest “neither duplicity nor expediency has ever been the trademark of China’s foreign 
policy…Rise and fall of regime, reshuffling of leadership or shift in policies has had no 
bearing on the continuing process of mutual trust and cooperation.”622  
Support on Kashmir 
In a few of the articles, officials clearly overstate China’s stated position on Kashmir. 
They believe that China considers “Kashmir a core dispute”623 and highlight its “disputed 
nature”624 and does not concede that “Kashmir belongs to India.”625 They believe China 
wanted a just solution in accordance with the genuine wishes of the people of Kashmir 
and in light of the UN resolution.626 Retired Ambassador Ghayoor Ahmad maintains 
“Beijing has always publicly endorsed Pakistan’s position on Kashmir… being a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council from Asia, China is expected to 
contribute to facilitating the resolution of the long-standing Kashmir dispute which has 
the potential of endangering world peace.”627 However, as described, China urges India 
and Pakistan to resolve the dispute bilaterally which favours the stance of India; Pakistan 
would prefer third party mediation while India wants bilateral resolution. This would 
seem to suggest that on Kashmir issue, China supports India.  
During the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, and the 
Mumbai terrorist attacks 2008, India placed pressure on Pakistan and mobilised its troops, 
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but China exhibited utmost neutrality. The luxury of Pakistani elites’ evaluation is based 
on wilful exaggeration, expectations and utmost failure to understand Chinese policies 
and priorities, however by repeating the message of Chinese support on Kashmir, they 
are both showing their apprehension and trying to market the alliance domestically.  
Sino-Indian border differences  
Maqbool Bhatty has produced a series of articles to demonstrate that the undefined Sino-
Indian border is favourable to the Sino-Pakistan alliance. He argues “though the Sino-
Indian boundary dispute [has been] put on backburner, it is not likely to be resolved 
without a major shift in India’s rigid stance. India’s stance on Tibet continues to be 
ambivalent” and that the Dalai Lama “continues to enjoy Indian sanctuary to destabilise 
China”, while the “Sino-Pakistan friendship has acquired deep roots, and is time-
tested…any impression that China has downgraded its relations with Pakistan due to 
rapprochement is totally unjustified.”628  
Bhatty, in another article, symbolises that “China’s relations with India have not 
developed in a manner that could threaten the time-tested Sino-Pakistan friendship…The 
improvement in Sino-Indian relations has enabled cooperation in the economic and 
cultural fields, the political and strategic relations are not tension-free.”629 Likewise, 
ambassador Afzaal Mahmood (retd) considers the undecided border to be a “basic 
limitation that will continue to affect their bilateral ties and retard any progress in 
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rapprochement.”630 These examples show that Pakistani officials are expecting a lot from 
the Indo-China border differences.  
Though the India-China border remains unresolved, experts believe it will continue to 
haunt their relations631, however it does not mean it will work in Pakistan’s favour. The 
border issue is not a precondition or an impediment in their bilateral cooperation. The 
Chinese state emphatically that with India they have attained a “new period of 
comprehensive cooperation.”632 As mentioned before, both nations have established 
teams and process to determine the boundaries comprised of diplomats, military and 
senior officials mainly to deal with eventualities, conduct negotiations, endorse their 
government’s possible solution, and work as a bulwark to avoid flare ups on the border.633 
Essentially, China’s intent is clear, but Pakistani officials sustain the improbable 
assumption that Beijing’s support is available in the case of a crisis with India. It is clear 
that while China may disagree with India, it will not do so in support of or for Pakistan, 
yet again giving a real sense of insecurity about the alliance.  
Officials also draw an analogy between Sino-Indian border differences and those of 
Pakistan and India. Former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, for example, claims that India 
has been as belligerent as it has been towards Pakistan. Sattar maintains that the “Sino-
Indian lingering boundary dispute [Tibet and Sikkim] are favourable to the Pakistan-
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China alliance… Indo-Pakistan boundary dispute indicates that India does not want to 
resolve the boundary dispute amicably. India has been belligerent and openly claiming 
Chinese territory as its own. China cannot afford such an outright threat to her 
sovereignty.”634 Using terms such as “belligerent” and “not amicable”, (presumably 
towards both countries) suggests that Pakistan and China have a similar problem with 
India, and therefore that the alliance will survive to confront India. Former foreign 
secretary Shamshad Khan remarks that  
Pakistan and China’s exemplary relationship, underpinned by commonality of 
interest, has over the years grown in its dimension and scope. It is not based on 
expediencies or transient interests [Sino-Indian rapprochement] … It is a long-
term partnership for peace, stability and prosperity at the bilateral, regional and 
international levels.635  
Interestingly, while the security elites describe Sino-Indian differences, they avoid 
discussing India-China trade relations: India is China’s largest trading partner in South 
Asia. During his visit to India in 2010, Wen Jiabao spoke highly of India-China relations: 
“We are friends, not rivals…We will always be friends and will never be rivals. This 
should be the firm conviction of every Chinese and every Indian.”636 The problem is that 
Pakistani officials are making wilful exaggerations and setting extreme expectations of 
China, which actually demonstrates their fear that any rapprochement between India and 
China might reduce the significance of the Sino-Pakistan alliance.  
                                                 
634
Abdul Sattar. “Pak Holds China in High Esteem”; Also see Ikram Sehgal, "The China Factor" The 
News 30 May 1998. 
635 Shamshad Ahmad Khan, "A Special Friend Calling Home" The Nation, 25 November 2006   
636 Jim Yardley, "In India, Chinese Leader Pushes Trade" The New York Times 16 December 2010  
 
 252 
 
Major power aspirations 
A few officials see India and China as rivals in the international system, rather than 
partners. Advocating a classical balance of power strategy, they argue that India and 
China will compete which is likely to enhance the importance of the Pakistan-China 
alliance. Ambassador Mahmood argues that China will need Pakistan as “One mountain 
cannot accommodate two tigers.” India-China will “differ rather than cooperate because 
both nations aspire a major power status… the Pakistan-China alliance is deep-rooted and 
time-tested. Sino-Indian Rapprochement is unlikely to weaken the Pakistan-China 
vigorous alliance.”637 Equally, ex-envoy Bhatty states “Sino-Indian rapprochement is 
neither a threat nor a reason to worry as India aspires a hegemonic and leading role in 
world affairs, it will continue to erode Chinese power either by augmenting her defence 
and seeking help from west to contain rising China.”638  
It implies that India and China are bound to face the problems of rivalry and competition 
that neighbours of their size usually encounter, and that this will create opportunities for 
Pakistan-China to cooperate. While a degree of competition between them for power and 
influence is inevitable and understandable, it is not plausible that China will require 
Pakistan to contain a rising India, or even that their relations will turn for the worse due 
to competition for major power status. The deep Sino-Indian economic integration 
actually suggests the opposite to this notion. Zubeida Mustafa considers that the Indo-
China commercial ties have reached such a level that there would be a “solid reason” for 
any major conflict between the two states.639 It is an unrealistic calculation on the part of 
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the security elites to view potential confrontation and rivalry in Sino-Indian relations as 
a benefit of Pakistan. Ambassador Bhatty further suggests; 
India considers herself heir to the British Raj in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. 
This runs counter to China principle stance to hegemony of any kind, whether 
regional or global. China will not certainly accept any limitation to its power. It 
will refuse to accept Indian hegemony and continue to cooperate the time-tested 
and deep rooted friendship with Pakistan.640  
The Pakistani elite are optimistic and expecting much from the Sino-Indian rivalry. 
Contrary to Pakistani official’s views and wishes, India and China have plenty of reason 
to cooperate. They conduct joint military exercises to meet the probable threat of 
terrorism. Their cooperation both at regional and international fora suggests that they 
want to work together.641 Apart from bilateral interactions, both are influential members 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS), Group of 77 (G-77), and Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). Pakistan’s expectations of China as a friend and ally should take 
these factors into consideration. India may appear a more viable and better option for 
international cooperation for China than Pakistan. 
Pakistani officials may continue to harbour a feeling of utmost cordiality towards China, 
but we can see that the feeling might not be reciprocated. Jing-Dong Yuan suggests that 
Chinese journals discuss Sino-Indian relations, but on very little appears on the Pakistan-
China relationship.642 While the Pakistani leadership may assume that Islamabad’s 
unique relationship with Beijing will remain constant and unwavering, these expectations 
are evidence of their failure to recognise the transformation that have taken place in 
China’s foreign policy. Like any major power, China‘s foreign policy is dictated by its 
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national interest. If they can change their policy on Kashmir to please India, they may 
cease military support too.  
Today, China is more engaged internationally than at any other time in their history. The 
age old clichés such as higher than the Himalayas, sweeter than honey or as deep as 
oceans are beginning to sound ritualistic, relations between two have to be structured 
around more substantial issues. This is not to suggest that the Chinese have totally 
abandoned Pakistan, but for ties between two states to be meaningful, the bonds must be 
stronger. 
Indo-US strategic partnership  
There has been a remarkable transformation in India-American economic, military and 
defence relations, or “strategic partnership”, particularly since the 2005 Indo-US nuclear 
deal. Kevin Knodell notes that it is a slow process but “historic changes” in are happening 
Indo-US relations.643 Chinese observer Liu Zhun maintains 
The transformation of the geopolitical landscape is the major driver drawing the 
US and India much closer. Washington’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific makes the 
US realize India's strategic significance, economic potential and ideological 
commonality. India hopes that by consolidating its relationship with the US, it 
could gain leverage in the development and forge an international status that is 
worthy of its potential.644  
Pakistan has publicly responded to the growing Indo-American agreement, but Beijing 
has not, though it may not want an Indo-US alliance to flourish to its detriment. Pakistani 
security élites envisage an evolving Indo-US partnership, and are watching to see if this 
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will affect the Sino-Indian rapprochement and/or the Pakistan-China alliance. They 
describe it in different ways. Some draw an analogy between past and present 
development in the Sino-Pakistan alliance, others believe that the strategic alliance 
presents a common security challenge for both countries, still others recommended 
expanded and revamped dealings with China.  
Analogy is a process in which information such as events or situations are linked or made 
to appear connected to some other events or situations that are occurring or have occurred 
in the past.645 Rashid Khan and Shamshad Khan draw an analogy between the 1960s, 
when the India-Russia nexus materialised encouraging Pakistan and China’s close links, 
and now, when the India-US partnership is bringing Pakistan-China closer again.646 The 
1960s was really challenging for Pakistan’s security: the alliance with the US collapsed 
and Islamabad was in a weaker position than now, so comparing the twenty first century 
with that era will only enhance the necessity of the alliance in the eyes of the public.  
Nevertheless, China has refrained from expressing its concerns publicly. Although it 
keenly watches the swiftness and scale at which US-India relations are progressing647, it 
has chosen to reduce India’s temptation to play the China card by increasing the economic 
ties with India. This approach is totally different from that of the 1960s when Beijing 
branded Indian discussions with Russia as offensive and threatening. Traditionally, India 
has acted pragmatically. During the Cold War, it joined neither the Soviet Union camp 
nor the American, but effectively obtained economic and military profits from both sides. 
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China has the option to confront India or normalise relations with it, and it has chosen 
the latter option, as confrontation may only push India towards the US. 
Others figures suggest that an Indo-American strategic alliance will increase Pakistan-
China cooperation. Ambassador Bhatty states  
A close look on Indo-US and Sino-US relations reveals that China is seen as an 
adversary…the Indo-US strategic alliance, with containment of China as its major 
objective, rules out any chance of Sino-Indian relations overtaking the all-weather 
friendship between China and Pakistan.648  
While Rashid Malik states that the Indo-US nuclear deal is likely to broaden the 
parameters of the Pakistan and China friendship.649 Brigadier Farooq Khan (retd) 
considers “In the face of any new Indo-US maneuverings in South Asia, a strong Sino-
Pak strategic partnership, however, remains the best bet for peace in the region.” 650 
General Matinuddin represents that “Bush’s agreement to provide India technology for 
civilian uses of nuclear energy… would need to be studied carefully, both in Islamabad 
and Beijing.”651 Others appear confident that the history of Sino-Pakistan collaboration 
suggests that common security challenges (such as the Indo-US strategic partnership) 
have been endured by two countries.652 
Still others promote constructing closer ties with China stand as a pertinent choice for 
Pakistan. Retired ambassador Javid Hussain states “India is, and is likely to remain so for 
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a long time, the centrepiece of the US policy towards South Asia”, therefore, broadening 
relations with China should be a “linchpin” of Islamabad’s strategy.653 Former Foreign 
Minister Agha Shahi seeks a similar solution by stating that there is a serious limitation 
in Pakistan-US relations due to emerging Indo-US relations: “Pakistan’s comprehensive, 
long term and stable friendly ties with China have been a factor of stability in an otherwise 
volatile region. Strengthening these historic ties is the need of the hour.”654 Tariq Fatemi 
warns that the US is containing China’s rise with India’s help, and that Pakistan needs to 
value China’s friendship. Fatemi asserts:  
As China rises to a colossus on the world stage, the US would like to see a stronger 
India that can keep the Chinese off balance…we must refrain from any action that 
could even remotely hurt our relations with China, time and events have proven 
the value and worth of out tie to Beijing.655  
Politically, Indo-US nuclear cooperation should have encouraged China to sign a similar 
deal with Pakistan. Despite Islamabad having been actively taking up this issue, and its 
increasing urgency in the wake of the Indo-US deal, no confirmation has been made by 
the Chinese. Pakistan wanted more, but China remained silent. China took a much more 
reserved tone, not committing to anything or denying it.  
Even if China did sign a nuclear deal with Pakistan, it would have to navigate its Nuclear 
Supplier Group (NSG) requirements. China is a full member of NSG, and according to 
its rules if a member signs nuclear agreement with a third country, it will firstly seek 
permission from it. It remains to be seen how far it will go with Pakistan. But noticing 
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the impact of the Indo-US deal, China may stand up for Pakistan. Pakistan will continue 
to make demands, it has soaring electricity deficiency to a larger extent, but it has become 
a political issue too. India has shown objections. In public, China may support Pakistan’s 
needs, and more abstractly condemn the idea of exceptionalism being the principle of 
nuclear cooperation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave a nuclear 
deal to India, not Pakistan. Indeed a discussion about nuclear cooperation will legitimise 
the alliance, as nuclear program in Pakistan is considered to be a sacred weapon to be 
protected at all cost.656   
Significant events and public propaganda 
This theme examines the dynamics of one of the most frequent occurrences of public 
propaganda in Pakistan: the visits of Chinese leaders to celebrate diplomatic 
anniversaries. Three events are vital: in 2001 Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited 
Pakistan to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations; in 2006 Chinese president Hu 
Jintao visited Islamabad to mark the 55th anniversary of political relations, and finally, in 
2010, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao undertook a visit to Islamabad to mark 60 years of 
relations. These visits allowed Pakistani officials to project their wishes, and extol the 
virtues of the alliance with China openly. Pakistani officials exploit Chinese dignitary 
visits for alliance agenda setting.  
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Events during Chinese officials’ visits  
 
Figure 5.9 Public propaganda theme division between civilian and military regimes 
Pakistan’s security elites used diplomatic anniversaries for political gains. Travel to 
Pakistan by a Chinese notable became a focal point of media and public attention. The 
established pattern suggests that on the day of a Chinese delegates’ visit to Islamabad 
almost the entire leadership (both military and civilian) rushed to the airport to receive 
them, a unique situation.  
It makes a unique situation above all because no such treatment is granted to delegates 
from other countries such as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. For example, in February 
2015, the Turkish president visited Pakistan, although the portraits were put on the roads, 
the reception was much less fanfare than the reception reserved for the Chinese 
delegates.657 Thus, by comparison, the Chinese delegates receive a wider welcome than 
other friendly states of Pakistan. 
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Propaganda during these visits became a massive event, with the public engaged with 
several tactics and events. Huge billboards and posters are displayed on major roads and 
roundabouts imprinted with catchy slogans such as “Long live Pakistan-China 
friendship”, “Together we built a community of shared identity”, “Our hearts beat in 
unison”, and “Pakistan-China friendship is all-weather and time-tested.” While visiting  
delegates made their way to summits, school children and members of the public are lined 
up to welcome them chanting slogans and throwing rose petals on the convoy.  
Figure 5.10: “Long live Pak-China Friendship” slogan on show in Islamabad.  
Source: The Dawn 
The government controlled Pakistan Television (PTV) runs a friendship program to 
“bring people of the two countries closer to each other”, and celebrates the anniversaries 
by producing “documentaries on latest developments in both the countries” to promote 
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friendship and to get along the message of the alliance.658 In addition, it also runs daily 
friendship songs with lyrics like “Pak-Cheen dosti wang woye, wang woye, wang woye, 
wang woye, Pak-Cheen dosti zindabad, zindabad, zindabad” (Pak-China friendship long 
live). 659  
 
Figure 5.11: “Together we build a community of shared destiny” displayed Islamabad 
Source: The Dawn   
The alliance is also cultivated in other unique ways. The (state-run) Post Office issues 
commemorative stamps to mark the relationship, for instance, to celebrate the 60th 
anniversary, it issued a commemorative stamp showing both nation flags, public and 
leaders (Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13), while the state Bank of Pakistan circulated special 
coins nationwide.  
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Figure 5.12: Postal stamp celebrating Pak-China friendship. Source: Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Commemorative coin marking Pakistan-China friendship Year 2011.  
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
The visiting dignitaries visit schools, where the children are encouraged to perform 
tableaus or skits representing the two states’ culture and cooperation, with proceedings 
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conducted in both Urdu and Chinese languages.660 The audience, chiefly made up of 
school children, are encouraged to take part joyfully, waving flags from both countries, 
even if they do not understand what is going on. This can be termed as a soft approach 
this is the most far reaching and interactive strategy to cultivate alliance domestically.  
These diplomatic events often feature leading Pakistani singers and poets to tell the story 
of the alliance creatively and emotionally, for example at one event, the Pakistani singer, 
Jawed Ahmad sang to leaders from the two countries about the alliance, in both Chinese 
and Urdu: 
O my friend, this friendship should last forever, I say under oath, we will never 
separate from each other. O my companion, you become strong and our friendship 
should last forever.661  
This is an innovative form of propaganda, as the public is likely to listen to these popular 
and widely followed musicians and poets.  
Figure 5.14: School girls taking part to celebrate China’s national day 2011.  
Source: Nihao-Salam 
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Indeed, visits and celebrations are defining moments in conducting propaganda. While 
the textbooks teach the alliance theoretically, the decision makers attempt to influence 
student’s opinions by establishing China-related events in cultural institutions, as part of 
their broader propaganda strategies to provide them real exposure to the alliance. Events 
known as Peace walks are organised by officials organise to motivate and equip the 
children with the values and behaviours to effectively participate in the sustenance of the 
alliance.  
Figure 5.14 shows school children walking on Islamabad’s streets to take part in “Friends 
of China Peace and Harmony Walk”, which was arranged by the Pakistani Directorate of 
Education with the aim of paying tribute to the “long lasting Pakistan-China alliance.” 662 
The flag-waving children were chanting slogans such as “Long live Pak-China friends”, 
“Our faith, the Loving China”, and “We are proud of Pak-China friendship.663 The 
children may not truly understand the meaning of the slogans, but they are likely to 
resonate in their entire life. The former ambassador to China, Akram Zaki, leading the 
walk, told the children: “youth is the hope of our nation”, advocating “Pakistani 
youngsters should be enlightened about the long journey of Pak-China friendship that is 
spread over six decades.”664  
The government also celebrates “Chinese Youth Day” events to “better understand the 
Pak-China relationship and promote friendship among the Pak-Chinese youth.” A 2008 
event was held in National University of Modern languages (NUML) Islamabad, once 
again attended by students. The federal secretary for youth affairs Ishfaq Mehmood, 
speaking on the occasion, said: “There is brotherhood in our genes [Pakistan-China] and 
we cannot be separated…but we have one world and one dream.”665 Students are given 
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the opportunity to visit China on summer camp programmes to learn more about Chinese 
culture.666 Richard Lebow suggests that events that involve personal experience can be a 
powerful determinant of image formation.667 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15: President Xi Jinping waves to school children upon his arrival in 2015 
Source: The Dawn  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: A road named after the Chinese Premier in Islamabad 
Source: The Dawn  
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Another way of exposing society to the alliance and its importance is the naming of roads 
and roundabouts after China and Chinese leaders. One of Islamabad’s busiest road is 
named after former Chinese leader Zhou-En-lai. In the major cities of Lahore and Sialkot, 
roundabouts are named “China Chowk” (China Roundabout). This strategy shows the 
people of Pakistan that China is close to Islamabad. The euphoria and celebration very 
clearly shows the efforts to market the alliance but also reveals their fears about society. 
The socialisation of the society through the use of grand symbols and gestures is a 
significant way to create positive images of allies; Holsti shows that images, once formed, 
are hard to change.668 
As described, the elite attempt to engage the people of Pakistan and market the alliance 
through some unusual methods of propaganda. The objective now is to cast light on the 
communication aspects of three visits- the way visits are represented, and their success 
and achievement presented, even exaggerated. 
50th anniversary of diplomatic relations and Zhu Rongji’s Visit  
Economic and trade relations have been the weaker link in the Sino-Pakistan alliance due 
to the overemphasis on security ties. Cheema states “While the Sino-Pak relations have 
often been classified as all-weather and time-tested relationships, one cannot help but 
noticing the not-so-impressive trading interactions.”669 When Zhu Rongji visited 
Islamabad to celebrate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties, the two countries signed 
seven agreements, including Chinese investment to develop the Gwadar deep sea port.670 
China also agreed to improve the railway system and finance and develop Thar coal 
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projects. Pakistani officials’ writings before and after Zhu Rongji’s visit reflected these 
developments, acknowledged the irregular pattern in economic links but correctly 
suggested the need to inject economic elements into the relationship.  
Khalid Mahmud illustrates how Sino-Pakistan economic relations had been ‘lopsided’ 
which needed to be “improved and reinvigorated.” Mahmud argued Zhu Rongji’s visit 
was a step in the “right direction” which will “deepen economic ties” between two 
states.671 The discussion that economic relations have been a weak link in the relationship, 
and it is being prioritised implies that the importance of such ties had been recognised, 
which is likely to create a positive image of the alliance. Not all authors were impressed 
with the history of economic relations, they stress the importance of fulfilling agreements 
to increase economic relations. They warned against the over-excitement emerging from 
visit and suggested that pragmatic content is required in the relationship.672  
Maqbool Bhatty maintains that the multiple agreements signed between the two countries 
indicated that they were moving in the right direction to produce “crucial economic 
cooperation” to make it “truly a strategic alliance.” For Bhatty, Zhu Rongji’s visit 
appeared to be a “new beginning in the right direction” and predicted it will “go long way 
to transform economic relation” between them.673 Bhatty’s choice of words – “crucial”, 
“beginning”, “strategic alliances”, “transformation of alliances”, and “new heights” - are 
calm but encourage thought about the utility of the alliance.  
However, it was the agreement on the construction of Gwadar which made up much of 
the officials’ propaganda. Ambassador Bhatty suggests that the Gwadar port development 
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will transform Pakistan’s economy, and will usher in a new era of economic prosperity 
and regional connectivity.674 In another article, Ambassador Bhatty maintains that  
The celebration of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2001 was memorable 
on account of the fillip received by economic and technical cooperation with China. 
Premier Zhu Rongji announced credits exceeding $1 billion for such mega projects as the 
construction of the Gwadar Port, the installation of coal-fired power stations in Sindh, 
and the modernization of the railways.675  
Retired ambassador Sultan Khan also reports that Zhu Rongji’s visit will help Pakistan’s 
economy in a big way.676 In reality, Gwadar has great potential in terms of strategic and 
economic benefits to Pakistan. It can potentially transform Pakistan into an economic 
hub, but its full potential is yet to be realised. These arguments appear modest, but the 
effort to establish and promote China’s image cannot be hidden.    
55th anniversary of diplomatic relations and Hu Jintao visit  
When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan to celebrate 55th anniversary of the 
diplomatic relationship, Pakistan displayed a lavish welcome. A red carpet received him 
while “A 21-gun salute boomed as the Chinese president alighted from the special Air 
China 747-400 plane. President Hu was presented bouquets by two children attired in 
national dress.” 677 In an unprecedented move, General Musharraf conferred the highest 
civilian award upon Hu Jintao in recognition of his “outstanding services” to the cause of 
the Pakistan-China alliance, in a lavish ceremony held at the convention in the centre of 
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Islamabad. President Hu was also asked to appear on radio and TV to assure Pakistan of 
China’s assistance.  
Figure 5.17: Girls Holding Sino-Pak flags while greeting President Hu in 2006.  
Source: China Daily. 
The enthusiasm to enhance trade relations continued, as during President Hu’s visit 
eighteen agreements, and thirteen memoranda of understanding (MoU), including the 
FTA, were launched. The FTA looked to be the biggest breakthrough for officials to 
promote the alliance. They exaggerated its potential and predicted good years for the 
national economy.  
To the reader, the Pakistani officials’ writings appear unquestionable: Pakistan-China 
economic relations will no longer be a low priority and it will achieve new heights. Sultan 
Ahmad maintains that Hu’s visit was’ historic and will open up new avenue of 
cooperation’ between the two nations. He claims that the historic FTA will enlarge 
Pakistani “exports to China in a big way and may solve some of the export problems of 
Pakistan” as Pakistan will enable to send “a great many Pakistani goods” in the coming 
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five years.678 The Ambassador Ahmad’s argument implies a durable, great and 
accomplished alliance. Plainly, he believes that the FTA will “open new avenues”, to 
resolve Pakistan’s export problems. Nothing else can promote and validate an alliance as 
well as the argument that Pakistan economy will progress. 
Tariq Fatemi emphasises that “Islamabad had high hopes from the Hu visit therefore these 
hopes have been met to a large extent as many agreements have been signed and 
understandings have been reached”, for Fatemi the FTA appeared to a landmark deal to 
“boost bilateral trade from $4.2 billion….to $15 billion within the next five years.” 679 
Fatemi’s expressions “high hopes” and “satisfaction” are crucial words. It infers Pakistani 
expectations have been met, and Pakistan’s needs have been fulfilled; essentially, it 
presents the visit as being perfect.  
Former foreign secretary Shamshad Khan’s introductory remarks are seeking reader’s 
attention, while the argument about the achievement of the visits present the propaganda 
message comprehensively: 
In our oriental culture, one always feels happy when a friend comes calling but 
when the visiting guest is a special friend, the feeling of happiness also sets aglow 
a special sense of pride and buoyance.  
Having introduced the visit, secretary Khan explains the visit’s outcome to generate a 
positive response about the alliance:  
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Nearly thirty 30 ground-breaking agreements and MoUs are expected to be signed 
during this visit. These notably include a free trade agreement, five-year 
development program on trade and economic cooperation, an agreement on 
economic and technical cooperation, [and] establishment of a joint investment 
company.680   
The language used by the security elites is rigid, noticeable and contented. The officials’ 
propaganda presents facts, albeit with excessive positivity and ignoring challenges which 
accompanied FTA. For example, the FTA was signed and a target of $15 billion over the 
next five years was set, but this was unrealistic. Despite the initial (over-inflated) 
statement, trade had barely touched $7 billion by the end of 2010.  
Pakistan could not send as many goods as they had promised, and Pakistan’s economy 
could not match China’s. In reality, China sent more goods to Pakistan than vice versa. 
The FTA appeared to be of great benefit to the Chinese economy as Chinese goods – 
including electrical goods, shoes and toys - flooded the Pakistani market, wiping out 
small Pakistani industries in the process681 Even Pakistan’s prime textile industry came 
under stress due to Chinese competition. Deplorably, the trade imbalance remained 
heavily in Beijing’s favour too: in 2010 it had a gigantic $3.256 billion trade surplus with 
Islamabad.682 In essence, the FTA provided China a new market to send goods without 
the barrier of tariffs, which seems to be a great deal for China not Pakistan. Trade 
liberalisation and facilitation are generally good for achieving economic globalisation, 
and ratification of FTA should have lessened costs to local industries and improved their 
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production and innovation, but the Pakistani economy remained stuck with slow growth 
rate. In addition, due to the Chinese quarantine policy, Pakistan could not send many 
goods to China.683  
The effect of the FTA agreement was misunderstood or miscalculated. India, whose 
economy was stronger than that of Pakistan and had a keen desire to increase economic 
relations with Beijing, significantly had not signed a FTA with China, fearing trade 
imbalance and free flow of cheap Chinese goods,684 but Pakistan had agreed to sign 
without realising the harmful impact it would have. Moreover, Pakistan has not signed a 
FTA with India for similar reason, fearing that Indian goods will overwhelm the local 
economy. When Pakistan and China agreed to enhance bilateral trade, no efforts were 
made to introduce banking services to support trade operations. The business community 
has also criticised goods agreed under the FTA.  
Wen Jiabao’s visit to Islamabad to mark the 60th anniversary  
In December 2010, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s aircraft entered Pakistani 
airspace to kick start the 60th anniversary celebrations, jointly developed JF-17 fighter 
jets escorted his plane, a very vivid visual example of propaganda in the air.   
Premier Yousuf Gillani told Wen Jiabao “We have unprecedented relations with China. 
The whole nation is proud of the Pakistan-China friendship.” 685 A nineteen-gun salute 
roared to welcome Wen, and, for the first time, a Chinese premier addressed a joint sitting 
of parliament.  
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Officials writing at the time specifically highlighted 35 agreements and 8 MoUs signed 
during Wen’s visit. Pakistani officials claimed that these agreements would lead to 30- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18: Propaganda in the air: Chinese Premier Plane escorted by JF-17 fighter jets 
Source: Pakistan’s embassy in China  
36 billion dollars of Chinese investment in Pakistan, while agreeing to increase bilateral 
trade to $15 billion in the next five years.  
Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi refers to agreements “worth an estimated $30 billion were 
signed during the visit…Current bilateral trade remains modest at $7 billion but is 
expected to more than double in five years [$14billion].”686 Similarly, Farooq Khan 
underlines that “PM Jiabao’s visit has opened opportunities worth around $35 billion in 
a five-year economic development programme.”687 These words aim to instil and build 
optimism among the public, that these vast investments would solidify Pakistan’s 
economy. While these figures seemed very welcome, there were discrepancies: some 
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mentioned $30 billion of Chinese investment, but others believed to be $35 billion. The 
gap in their estimates and figure shows an element of confusion among the officials.  
Other officials argued that the massive trade assurances demonstrate how much the 
Chinese cared about Pakistan. Legislator Karamatullah Ghori epitomises  
… That Wen was generous to a fault in promising economic assistance running 
into billions of dollars, in addition to the private sector men in his entourage 
sewing up deals running into tens of billions of dollars- is a measure of deep 
concern our Chinese friends feel in their hearts about Pakistan being in the 
doldrums and saddled with a moribund economy.688  
This passionate description is outlining the Chinese contribution in Pakistan, and his 
choices of phrase are a certain expression that the Chinese have an unrestricted, generous 
obligation to build Pakistan economic stability. However, in reality, when the Chinese 
premier’s visit took place, Pakistan’s economy was stagnant. Islamabad had sought a 
bailout package from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) as its all-weather friend 
(China) had rejected a previous request for financial assistance in the economic crisis. If 
China really was Pakistan’s friend and ally, why was Islamabad forced to seek IMF 
assistance?  
The public declaration of these billion dollar agreements was likely to make the 
population believe that a great success has been achieved. However, half of the $36 
billion deals was to be made up of a doubling of bilateral trade (from the existing $7 
billion to an anticipated $15 billion). A similar target had been set during President Hu’s 
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visit which had not been achieved and was therefore agreed again. This time, the target 
really was ambitious and far from achievable due to security concerns in Pakistan and 
power blackouts closing down industries, affecting industrial growth.689 Yet again, it was 
unlikely that Pakistan would be able to increase trade in its favour, the reverse was highly 
possible. 
Another element which Pakistani officials used to promote the alliance was the promise 
of Chinese financial assistance for the construction of the multipurpose Bhasha-Diamer 
dam.690 However, finances promised in 2010 are yet to be seen. It is not appropriate to 
suggest that Pakistan should be entirely dependent on Chinese largesse, rather that 
Pakistan should cultivate domestic capital to undertake such development, however it 
would have been a very welcome development if China had fulfilled its pledges.  
Much of the promised $36 billion investment was detailed in memoranda of understating 
(MoUs). The MoUs have a notorious history in Pakistan: hundreds have been agreed with 
China over the years but very few have been implemented. Famous TV analysist Najam 
Sethi believes that “Pakistan is a graveyard of MOUs.”691 Essentially, the MoUs were 
expectations for the future. They agreed that if the situation remains conducive on the 
ground, mainly in the security sector, China will invest in Pakistan. Companies or the 
government do business keeping in mind both the profit and peaceful environment, 
however Pakistan was fighting a war against terrorism and the Chinese had also come 
under terrorist attacks. In such a tense environment, it was unrealistic to expect 
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investments worth billions of dollars to be made.692 In addition, it was not clear from any 
evidence or commitments how long any investment to reach Pakistan’s economy, and 
even if it were realised, whether it would be in the form of money or hard investment.  
Furthermore, it is to point out that Premier Wen Jiabao had not come directly to Pakistan 
but firstly he visited India with an entourage of 400 businessmen where the two countries 
had agreed to increase their bilateral trade from $60 billion to $100 billion by the end of 
2015. The news of the Sino-Indian trade agreements perplexed Pakistani leadership and 
they requested that China take all 400 men to Pakistan too, “otherwise the people of 
Pakistan will not spare us.”693 To the dismay of Islamabad officials, Wen came to 
Pakistan with only half of the group (the other 200 went back to China), but once he was 
in Islamabad, the security elites started the biggest propaganda campaign with the inflated 
investment claims.694  
Critics suggest the businessmen were “rushed to Islamabad” and forced into agreements 
with China, and that they did not even know what these MoUs were about. At the end of 
the visit, the Government presented all the agreements together to demonstrate that great 
things had taken place during Wen Jiabao’s trip.695 Sethi maintained that to complete 
these agreements worth $36 billion, the government called upon those private 
businessmen, who have already established links with China’s private sector, to 
participate in the ceremony and sign MoUs with Chinese delegates.696  
So just how much did the Chinese premier promise during the visit? There are two 
announcements worth mentioning. Firstly, he announced very little actual money: he 
promised $10 million for the flood victims, significantly less than $300 million assistance 
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for the flood victims given by “unreliable” America. Secondly, Wen announced a “soft” 
loan of $400 million, when in reality this was a regular annual occurrence but given a 
much grander announcement and the suggestion of new money. Although the offer of 
assistance cannot be a substitute for nations’ own efforts to bring about economic 
progress and prosperity, this was much less than Pakistan needs. Even the announced 
$400 million was not being used at Pakistan’s own free will, the Chinese have specified 
the project. The Chinese earmarked this $400 million for the widening of the KKH 
linking Pakistan and China through the land.  
Though there was no binding agreement that the government would allocate KKH 
construction to a Chinese company, given its strategic significance, it was almost a given 
that Chinese companies and labour would work on it.697 So in a way the money which 
China gave to Pakistan as a soft loan was only spent on Chinese labour and companies. 
Though the KKH would benefit Pakistan in the long run, all the announced investment 
was taken back by China and Pakistan’s debt increased. It implies that the Chinese made 
investment only in those areas which benefit them. Superficially, Pakistan felt happy that 
that the Chinese are supportive friends, the money ultimately went back to China and 
Pakistan remains indebted to China.  
There is a huge Chinese investment in Pakistan. Specifically, the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) worth $62 billion opens new avenues of cooperation between 
the two states. China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a huge, long project to revive fragile 
Pakistan. Beijing is involved in constructing dams, building roads and installing multiple 
energy projects to boost Islamabad’s energy requirements. The massive Chinese 
investment is making Pakistan dependent on China. A little fluctuation in Chinese 
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finances promised under these schemes will leave a huge impact on Pakistan’s economic 
development. 
China’s experience in Africa suggests that this possibility is very real. The BBC reports 
that the Chinese economic slowdown had not only led to a fall of about 40 per cent in 
Africa-China exports, but also saw Chinese investment in Africa fall by a similar amount, 
placing African nations’ currencies under stress.698 Chinese policies have led to 
joblessness and uncertainty in countries like Zambia. Chinese investment has enhanced 
the gap between rich and poor. Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, and Mozambique amongst 
others have experienced the negative impact of Chinese investment. In Sri Lanka many 
projects have come to a halt due to change in government.699  
Pakistan can experience similar troubles. Asad Abbasi of London School of Economics 
cautions Pakistan can experience similar issue African countries have faced.700 
Washington based agency symbolises: “a prolonged slowdown in China could diminish 
financial inflows under the CPEC.”701 Media comments suggest that some projects have 
been postponed and suspended and even canceled due to disagreements on funding and 
reimbursement.702 The Chinese experience suggests that China is a less reliable ally, but 
it is not reflected in the propaganda of the security elites.   
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Pakistan and world power China  
 
Figure 5.19: World power China articles produced during five Governments  
In the Pakistani security elite’s propaganda, there is an effort to suggest that an evolving 
and global China is better for Pakistan, that Pakistan is closely associated with an 
evolving major power.  
China may have been called “sick man of Asia” in 19th and 20th century due to internal 
divisions and foreign power encroachment on its resources, its emergence is undisputed. 
Kane classical book on Chinese strategy quotes Napoleon Bonaparte forewarning that 
“Let China sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world.”703 The sleeping giant’s 
emergence onto the world stage has indeed been a phenomenal development. China 
receives a great deal of attention globally; some perceive its rise as an opportunity, others 
consider it a challenge to their own power and hegemony.704 The US, truly the supreme 
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power on earth, has been keenly watching its rise and making efforts to allegedly contain 
it, but equally with some cooperation.  
Since it launched its economic liberalisation plan in 1979, Beijing has experienced an 
imposing economic growth. China of today is globally orientated, economically booming 
and intellectually acclaimed, and recently announced $2 billion dollars to fight global 
poverty.705 It has established financial institutions equivalence to the World Bank and 
IMF to advance its own national interest.706  
 
Figure 5.20: Rate and space allocated to Emerging China theme in three papers 
To highlight China’s journey to greatness, security elites firstly elaborate on the 
challenges and issues faced by it at the time of its independence in 1949. In their 
description, they present a bleak picture of a China facing great internal and external 
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challenges. Internally, they believe that China was devastated by civil war, her economy 
was “shattered and burgeoning population needed to be fed.” Its infrastructure was in 
shambles and it had a poor “industrial base”, and a “primitive agriculture” and Imperialist 
powers had “impinged” on its resources.707 Externally, China had much more difficult 
task to fulfil. It fought for her due status in the international system as “for a long time, 
Beijing lay forgotten and its own province [Taiwan] represented” her in the UN.708  
Having described the challenges, they argue that China’s competent leadership 
overpowered these challenges following socialist principles. Muhammad Aslam asserts 
that “The whole Chinese nation have been reinvigorated and historic changes [modern 
infrastructure, development in science and technology and developed economy] have 
been witnessed” and that there is “political stability and unity in China” and more 
than a billion human’s basic needs are being assured.709 They believe, Chinese 
leadership “takes Marxism as a guide to action, makes practice the only test for truth, 
emancipates the minds, seeks truth from the facts, values the initiative of the masses 
and builds socialism with Chinese characteristics”,710 further believing that 
“fundamentally, socialism has liberated and developed productive forces, eliminated 
exploitation and polarisation and ultimately achieved common prosperity.”711  
Khawaja Masood sustains “more than a billion people are now enjoying the fruits of an 
ever increasing flourishing economy, Chinese tried and tested leadership following 
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socialist principles has made China as one of the major power worldwide.”712 
Ambassador Iqbal Khan (retired) considers that China will “soon surpass Japan, its 
neighbour and historical adversary” and “if the economy continues to grow… it surges 
past that of the United States”, while highlighting that the like of China’s economic 
growth has never been “accomplished in human history…”713  
Essentially, a fairy tale has been created that there was a China devastated by half a 
century of civil wars, and colonialism, and that it then developed internally and acquired 
worldwide status due to the wisdom of its leadership and the communist doctrines. As 
we noted in chapter three, communism is often believed to be against human freedom, 
unprogressively denying freedom to the individuals, but the Pakistani officials’ 
propaganda argues against this view. The propaganda aimed to make the reader 
understand that China has been rescued from a desolate and gloomy position to that of a 
new found companionship, common purpose and discipline of mass-organisation, and 
that there would have been no development had China not followed socialist ideals. The 
description of Chinese communism and its progress implies an ideal and attractive 
behaviour: a highest level of success and progress.  
Having established China’s progress, there is a strong desire to have a link with it on the 
basis of its emergence. The argument is established by presenting China as being pursued 
frequently by world leaders to secure the benefit for their own populations and economy. 
Tariq Fatemi articulates “delegates after delegates going to China”, besides adding “The 
entire world has been monitoring developments in China with either excitement or 
worry, depending on how it views its relations with that country.” 714 While Aslam 
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sustains that “Every country is seeking Beijing’s association for their own benefits. 
Hundreds of delegations make their way to China to seek benefits from Chinese 
progress and development.”715  
While highlighting that “the world leaders find economic relations with China a panacea 
after frequently recurring bouts of illness followed by economic crisis and political 
upheaval”, and that “China has become most favoured nation around the world. For 
Pakistan, China is not the last resort but a priority for national progress, military 
development and economic consolidation.” 716 General Matinuddin states  
Now China is a global economic and military power. Countries all over the world 
are bending backwards to enter into deals with China. Geo-economics today is 
gaining greater significance than geo-strategy. The nations that offer greater 
economic opportunities are cultivated these days than those which only have 
strategic significance and in such a case Pakistan must effort to maintain military 
and economic relationship with a modern and emerging China.717 
Running through this rhetoric is the logic that China is fashion, every nation is seeking 
its cooperation and association, including Pakistan. It also implies that if the world is 
going to have this interaction with China, why should Pakistan be left behind, why do the 
people of Pakistan continue to differ with China over ideological issues? Moreover, the 
suggestion that the “world is following China” is very alluring. It creates an urge or desire 
and makes a strong case for having an alliance with China. The officials’ propaganda 
positions the alliance as true, factual and well worth having. The elite’s propaganda 
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makes the alliance more desirable by stressing how much the rest of the world is seeking 
benefits by having an association with China, and how Pakistan can benefit from this too. 
The hope is that this will essentially neutralise the negative view of communism held by 
the public.   
The elites also stress that Pakistan can learn and emulate Chinese characteristics of 
unity, progress, self-reliance and economic policies. Air Marshall Ayaz Khan highlights 
China’s progress and development as a great example of learning “great character, simple 
living, and unity.”718 Foreign minister Mushtaq Ahmad articulates that “Pakistan can 
learn self-reliance from China”,719 while former envoy Sirajuddin Aziz enunciates 
“Pakistan can gain from China’s significant success in the launching of special economic 
zones.”720 When they talk about learning, they basically suggest that communism is not 
bad, it has enabled success in China, and that Pakistan can also have success by 
associating with China.  
In their propaganda attempts, they even link Pakistan’s future with that of China. Retired 
ambassador Sultan Ahmad asserts “China, it appears, is the answer to Pakistan’s many 
problems. Not that the leadership in Pakistan wants to emulate China in the social, 
cultural or political spheres, but they want to benefit from the free market policies of the 
Chinese government which is eager to help Pakistan in every possible way to make it a 
total strategic partnership”721 Parliamentarian Marvi Memon expresses “China’s progress 
is fascinating” and it is a proud moment for every patriotic Pakistani.722 This indelible 
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linking of the two nations suggests a very long-term relationship. Still others sharing their 
personal experience of visiting China maintain that “We felt at home in our second 
home.”723 
Significantly, officials suggest that China is not oblivious to taking Pakistan along in its 
drive to modernisation. Air Marshall Ayaz Khan elaborates “…China has been at the 
forefront to help Pakistan politically, economically and militarily. Modern China 
unreservedly wants to take Pakistan together in its journey to greatness.”724 Ambassador 
Sultan Ahmad says that Beijing “is eager to help Pakistan in every possible way to make 
it a total strategic partnership”,725 while former secretary Gauhar Altaf considers “A 
greater and prosperous China will only be a great and good friend of Pakistan. It will not 
become indifferent to Pakistan. It will take Pakistan along in its drive to 
modernisation.”726 Karamatullah Ghouri believes that “China is prepared to help us, if 
we have the will. It’s ready to walk the extra-mile holding our hand and showing us 
the path to salvation.”727  
An implicit ideology is embedded in security elite’s argument. When they say that 
Pakistan’s future is linked with China, and China wants to take Pakistan along, it 
establishes that the people of Pakistan are better off having this alliance with China and 
that they should be very content. The logic that runs through this is that the alliance with 
China is good, and any attempt to change is doomed to failure. It also set up to make 
readers believe what the government wants them to: believe in the greatness of the 
alliance with China. The theme and orientation in their argument suggest Pakistan has 
worth having the alliance with Beijing, otherwise there is a danger which Pakistan should 
avoid. However, the hidden message is that the status quo should be accepted and not 
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questioned: when they say that Pakistan’s future is completely linked with China, it 
essentially means that the alliance should not be changed, discouraged or altered or it will 
lead to failure for Pakistan and its people. 
Compatibility between Islam and Communism 
 
Figure 5.21: The position of articles during various Governments. 
 
Figure 5.21 illustrates that the frequency of the theme of Islam and Communism appears 
least of all the themes. Only three articles talk about this topic. These three articles were 
published during the governments of General Musharraf and Nawaz Sharief. However, 
it is significant as it presents two unnatural partners as the legitimate partners on the basis 
that Chinese ideology has some common features. This is surely hard thing to sell in a 
devoutly religious society, however they use the propaganda to counter anti-communistic 
views in the general population. 
For instance, Khalid Mahmud describes  
The basic belief of communism and Islam is to create an egalitarian society. Both 
Islam and communism recommended an equal distribution of wealth and 
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discourage concentration of wealth and prevent exploitation at the hands of 
wealthy and powerful  
and  
both stand for a complete social revolution, and a different kind of civilisation. 
For both ideologies, human nature is not bad, but it is the society which 
determines the conduct of man.728  
Though different to Samuel Huntington’s idea of clash of civilisation, the security 
officials’ comparison has clearly assimilated Confucius and Islamic civilisation. Islam 
prohibits the concentration of wealth in only a few hands, and there are no privileges to 
an individual on the basis of wealth or status, rather the person possessing good values 
and virtues; similarly socialism ultimately aims to create a classless society. These 
comments are likely to promote the alliance domestically to a society which practices 
Islam to the letter.  
Gilani Kamran maintains that Chinese communism is based on moral values which are 
seen in China’s social values. The Chinese social system is based on simplicity, 
relinquishing wealth for the good of the society. Kamran continues: 
The Chinese idea of leadership is based on the principles of conscious poverty, 
which has been a major feature of Islamic Faqar (poverty). Faqar mean 
renouncing of wealth and easy living. The Chinese leadership does not own any 
property. Islamic principles of Zakat and equitable distribution in socialism are 
analogous. 729  
                                                 
728 Khalid Mahmud, "Old Friends Learning New Way" The News 21 June 1998. 
729 Gillani Kamran, "Pakistan-China Friendship" The Dawn 7 December 2000. 
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In Islam, the collective good, and spirit of serving others’ happiness is an important 
teaching. Moreover, Zakat (the obligation of all rich Muslims to pay 2.5% of their wealth 
annually to be distributed among the poor) is the basic tenet of Islam. This argument is 
significant when explaining the alliance to Pakistani society. The reader will think that 
there are so many shared principles between communism and Islam, that Pakistan can 
seek an alliance with China. It is likely to change people’s views who have felt that 
communism is based on exploitation. Hidden in the semantic structure of the argument 
theme is the message that communism and Islam share some features. 
Finally, Ikram Sehgal uses religion to promote the alliance. To emphasise his argument, 
Sehgal cites a hadith (Words of the Prophet Muhammad), “Go to China even to seek 
knowledge.”730 It would appear because Prophet Muhammad said “go to China” so, it is 
better to have an association with China. This is a significant way to convince Islamic 
society to have an alliance with Beijing. Seeking knowledge means there are no 
differences, it does not mean that China is communist, and one cannot seek any 
association, so to those who suggest that we cannot believe in Bolshevism, this argument 
will make them convince that having an alliance with an atheist country is not an issue. 
Thus the Pakistani security elites’ writing legitimises the alliance with China. This 
attempt to show the two diverse ideologies as having some common characteristics also 
reveals their fears.   
This chapter has examined the security elite’s domestic propaganda used to construct an 
alliance through a variety of promotional strategies. These strategies construct a certain 
narrative that justifies and promotes the alliance domestically. The propaganda attempts 
to create an image of a flawless China, which is sincerely helpful and necessary for 
Pakistan. Officials construct their propaganda around factors which have enhanced their 
worries: Uighur separatism, terrorist attacks on Chinese and anti-communism. For 
example, as noted, propaganda is developed around Uighur separatism. Pakistan-China 
                                                 
730 Ikram Sehgal, "China in a Bull Shop" The Nation 4 May 1998  
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security is combined and the public is urged to shun support for Uighur separatists, which 
is affecting not only Pakistan’s security but that of China too. Similarly, the religious 
parties are urged not to accept the Uighur in their madrassah and not to impose their 
dogmatic views on them. Propaganda maintains that the Uighur are treated well in China, 
and therefore there is no case the religious elements to interfere in China. 
Similarly, the terrorist attacks on the Chinese - a serious obstruction in the Sino-Pakistan 
alliance - are being addressed. While a few stipulate conspiracy theories - blaming 
enemies for the unrest in Xinjiang - several other quotes admonish public to trust that if 
China-related violence does not end, it will obstruct the nation’s development. The 
chapter also suggested that the anti-communism views (also discussed in chapters three) 
are being responded to by presenting China as a developing major power on the basis of 
communist principles. They argue that China is the best example for Pakistan to learn, 
and even that Pakistan’s future is linked with China. Anti-communism views are also 
addressed by likening Islam and communism.  
However, we also noted that there are other attempts to market the alliance. Firstly, there 
is the representation of India in the propaganda. The impact of a Sino-Indian 
rapprochement on Sino-Pakistan alliance is gauged. Overall India is represented as power 
ambition and unwilling to resolve disputes amicably with China, which will have reduced 
the impact of rapprochement on Pakistan-China relations. But more importantly, its 
emerging alliance with the US is believed to keep the spirit of the Pakistan-China alliance 
intact. While a few see the support on Kashmir, others mention Chinese neutrality of it. 
Finally, noteworthy events are used to make sure that society is familiar with the alliance. 
Here, we saw how the security elites conduct determined propaganda to exaggerate the 
outcomes of the visit to generate public enthusiasm about the alliance.   
When combined, these promotional strategies actually reveal the fears of the elite towards 
their public. For instance, the discussion about Uighur separatism, terrorist attacks and 
anti-communism only appear because the elite are concerned about the attitudes of the 
public – logically, they would have no place in the propaganda if there were no fears 
about protecting the alliance. Additional themes like the vast, enthusiastic propaganda on 
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important events are legitimising the alliance, the intensive coverage and attention to the 
Chinese leaders serve only to capitalise on visits for maximum gains.  
In the next chapter, we conclude this thesis. Before presenting the summary of the thesis, 
it will restate the aims, the main argument, and the findings of the study. It will detail 
suggestions for further research and the contribution of this study to the existing body of 
knowledge. 
 291 
 
 Content analysis of the National Assembly 
and Senate debates  
Introduction 
The database of this chapter is the Pakistani parliamentary debate, recorded between 1990 
and 2010, dedicated to Pakistan-China relations to examine the element of propaganda. 
The method used to analyse lawmakers’ debates is content analysis. For this purpose, 
paragraphs, sentences, and even smallest unit words have been selected as the unit of 
analysis in an attempt to achieve greater precision of the data. The central purpose of this 
chapter is to establish how security elites sustain the notion of the alliance and what their 
propaganda reveals to us about how they view their own society.  
The content analysis of the MPs speeches on the floor of National Assembly and Senate 
reveals interesting results. It is found that some of the themes, conferred in textbooks and 
newspaper articles chapters, are repeated in the parliamentary debates. However, a new 
set of themes emerged from the analysis of the parliamentary debates contents. In the 
previous two chapters, there is a discussion about the terrorist attacks on the Chinese in 
Pakistan, Uighur separatism, and China reliable, US unreliable. While these themes are 
frequently repeated in the MPs discussion, some new categories, namely the Sino-
Pakistani alliance necessary for Pakistan’s progress, and India intruder, and China 
peaceful neighbour emerged during content analysis. The repetition of some of the 
themes gives authenticity to the findings of the research.  
Like previous empirical chapters, this chapter demonstrates that the Pakistani lawmakers 
attach great importance to Sino-Pakistan alliance. MPs are found responding emotionally 
to their country’s alliance with China. The flow of lawmakers’ passionate reactions 
suggests they see alliance incredible, useful for Pakistan and its people. MPs produce 
flattering and hyperbolic language to describe the relationship.  
Despite the Pakistani aspirations of being a leader of Muslims world, lawmakers condone 
Chinese discrimination against Muslim in Xinjiang. The lawmakers’ propaganda cover-
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up Chinese atrocities in Xinjiang. They simply highlight the difficulties that could arise 
for Pakistan if the unrestrained attacks against the Chinese continue to happen. 
India is regarded as hegemon while China is believed to be benign and impeccable power. 
Politicians believe that India represents a major strategic threat to Pakistan. As 
demonstrated in the textbook chapter, China has been reluctant to give Pakistan direct 
military aid in its wars with India, sometimes opting for the role of mediator rather than 
Pakistan’s unconditional ally, in parliamentary debates officials exaggerate China’s role 
in the Indo-Pakistan wars. Finally, as in the textbook chapter, peoples' representatives 
praise Chinese aid while minimizing US aid and support. 
This chapter has following main sections:  
5. Section one explains briefly about the history of Pakistani parliament, its 
sessions and data collection process,   
6. Section two presents content analysis of legislative debates both qualitatively 
and quantitatively.  
A note on the Majlis-e-Shoora [parliament] and its sessions  
Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy based on the British model. The 1973 constitution 
provides a federal-parliamentary system of government headed by the President as head 
of state and a Prime Minister, elected by Majlis-e-Shoora, as head of government. The 
federal parliament consists of two chambers: the national assembly (NA) and the Senate. 
While NA represents the population, the Senate represents four federating units. NA 
members are elected for a period of five years while senators are elected for a period of 
six years. The previous two constitutions of 1962 and 1956 provided unicameral 
legislature, but a federal structure of government.    
The parliament meets no less than three times in a year. NA website states, “The life of 
the national assembly is divided into sessions. It must meet for at least 130 days and there 
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must be at least three sessions in a year.”731 Besides, the government can call unique 
session, i.e. on occasion of foreign dignitaries’ address to the parliament.732 Each 
parliamentary year begins with a head of the state address to the joint session of the 
parliament. Overall, between 1990 and 2010, parliament has met 145 times [total 
sessions] average 8 sessions annually. There has been a periodical breakdown in the 
parliament session. For example, due to General Musharraf Martial Law, parliament 
remained suspended between 1999 and 2001. Therefore, parliament has 18 parliamentary 
years shown in the Figure 6.1. The parliament has not been able to complete its five-year 
terms, except between 2002 and 2007. Not a single prime minister has been able to 
complete the five-year term.  
In our attempt to examine Hansard, we have reviewed hundreds of documents which 
appeared both in English and Urdu languages. We targeted to review every single 
accessible volume of the Hansard between 1990 and 2010. The Hansard reports contain 
verbatim records, but non-parliamentary words have been omitted from the deliberations. 
We have excluded sessions on budget. The addresses of delegates from countries like 
Turkey have also not been included in the analysis.  
                                                 
731 National Assembly of Pakistan, 'National Assembly Sessions', Parliament House (Islamabad: National 
Assembly Secretariat). http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=18 [Accessed 11 March 2017] 
732 One of these examples is the Chinese President/Prime Minister's speech in 1996, 2006, and 2010.  
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Parliamentary Years and Sessions 
 
Figure 6.1: Total parliamentary years and sessions between 1990 and 2010 
Discussion within the parliament takes place in the form of questions and answers, points 
of order, and motions. Politicians discuss entire issues of national importance, including 
foreign affairs, national defence, and internal security. The huge volume of debates 
suggests lawmakers spend more time debating domestic affairs than the foreign relations.  
A final observation needs to be mentioned. Though data collection phase provided us 
numerous discussions on foreign policy (There is a discussion on India-Pakistan, 
Pakistan-US, Pakistan-China, and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations) but we found only 32 
documents on Sino-Pakistani relations. Given the volume of data we analysed, China is 
not given huge coverage in the foreign policy debates but enough to analysis contents of 
propaganda. Much discussion on foreign relations is found in the NA than the Senate. 
Content analysis of the parliamentary debates  
The aggregate representation of data  
Firstly, we begin our analysis with a review of the overall picture of analysed data. We 
present our quantitative results in the form of a bar chart with its descriptions. As stated 
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above, in the Senate and the NA discussions, only 32 documents discuss Pakistan-China 
relations hence for each of the 32 discussions, the total numbers of documents in each of 
the five main categories are counted. The proportions of each theme are reported in 
absolute terms instead of percentages as they provide a clearer picture of the results. In 
the discussion section, we interpret the results of the quantitative analysis. The following 
diagram shows a total number of documents for each theme. 
 
Figure 6.2: Total number of discussion dedicated to five themes in 32 documents  
Looking first at the combined picture, we see that security threats to the Chinese and 
Uighurs separatism are the major emphasis of the MPs deliberations. The diagram 6.2 
shows 09 documents (28%) are devoted to this theme. It means over the course of 20 
years, threats to the Chinese national and Uighur’s militancy has been the major focus of 
the politicians’ discussions. It essentially endorses the thesis argument that the Pakistani 
officials worry threats to the alliance and make efforts to sell the alliance domestically.  
It is followed by 08 documents (25%) devoted to the Incredible alliance category. MPs 
are found describing and celebrating Sino-Pakistan alliance in extremely flattering terms. 
Their fervour and excitement for the Sino-Pakistani alliance show no boundaries. When 
they describe the alliance, they seem to overflow with Chinese praise and Sino-Pakistani 
alliance. In other three categories, 07 (22%) documents are allocated for China’s support 
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must for Pakistan, 05 (15%) for China reliable-US unreliable and 03 (9%) for India 
intruder, China peaceful.  
 
Figure 6.3: Total numbers of MPs taking part in a discussion on Sino-Pakistan 
Relations 
Furthermore, to make statistical analysis more interesting we paid attention to the 
participation of male and female MPs in the discussion. The graph 6.3 shows a total of 
50 MPs spoke on Sino-Pakistani relations including four women (8%). This is an 
extremely trivial ratio of female politicians’ contribution compared to men (92%). The 
four MPs included the NA speaker Fahmida Mirza and lawmaker Marvi Memon. While 
Memon spoke twice, speaker Mirza spoke only once in the NA. Overall, we see that 
males’ politicians chiefly led the Pakistan-China alliance’s advertising campaign 
domestically than their female counterparts. In Pakistan, female lawmakers get fewer 
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chances to speak and often face institution and social barrier to contribute in the national 
politics.733  
One of the noteworthy results worth mentioning is the insignificant participation of 
religious parties on the subject. Following figure 6.4 shows during the entire two decades, 
only three times (6%) a member of religious parties took part in the discussion on the 
alliance.  
 
Figure 6.4: Ratio of discussion based on officials’ designation 
What explains religious parties’ antipathy to the Sino-Pakistani alliance, multiple 
plausible explanations are presented in that regard. Firstly, religious parties do not have 
                                                 
733 For detail see Tahir Mehdi, 'Women in Politics', The Dawn 25 May 2015.; Suzanna Masih, 'Women 
MPAs Find It Hard to Assert Their Roles in PA’', The News 28 February 2018.; Sehar Kamran, 'Politics 
& Pakistani Woman Today', The Nation 14 August 2017. 
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much participation in the parliament.734 Secondly, religious parties may have decided to 
limit their participation in the internal affairs or equally they might have given priority 
other issues such as the Islamisation of Pakistani society or implementation of the 
caliphate. However, perhaps the best explanations are that they disapprove Chinese 
discriminatory policies’ in Xinjiang against the Uighurs Muslims. They have been found 
criticising China repressive policies.735 Militant group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi (TNSM), founded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992 and affiliated with Jamaat-
e-Islami, is accused of supporting Uighur Muslims.736 It is believed that religious parties 
may have limited their participation in the Sino-Pakistani Alliance otherwise; the NA 
platform gave them the best opportunity to expose Chinese’s atrocities in Xinjiang.   
Last observation clarifies the participation of several members in the discussion. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (FM) took the lead in discussing the relationship, followed 
by the Prime Minister (PM), the Minister of the Interior (IM) and the President. The 
miscellaneous section includes other MPs mentioned in the discussion accordingly.  
Qualitative Content Analysis  
After analysing the overall picture, we now focus on the Qualitative Content Analysis 
(QCA) of the five main categories established by the data analysis. The five main 
categories are given below.  
                                                 
734 Javaid-ur-Rahman, 'No Religious Party, except JUI-F, JI, Makes Way to Parliament', The Nation 15 
May 2013. 
735 In third chapter we discussed in detail the feeling of religious parties towards China. Moreover, a 
Pakistani delegation was send to China to verify Uighurs Muslim conditions. All members of delegation 
belonged to religious parties’ and imams of mosque, which shows the influence they wield in Pakistan. 
See Abbasi, Obaid. "Pakistan Team to Probe Reported China Fasting Ban" The Express Tribune 29 June 
2016.; For a discussion about religious parties’ agenda see 'Islamic Parties in Pakistan' 
(Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group 12 December 2011). Report No. 216/ASIA 
736 Jayadeva Ranade, 'Pakistan’s Relations with China and Implications for Regional Stability', in 
Mapping Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics, by Mahin Karim (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2016). Report No. 55 
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1. Terrorist attacks on Chinese, and Uighurs separatism 
2. Incredible alliance: all-weather, time-tested, unique and legendary  
3. China’s support must for Pakistan’s future, progress, and development 
4. China trustable, US dubious alliance partner 
5. India intruder, China peaceful neighbour 
Security threats to the Chinese Citizens and Uighurs separatism  
 
Figure 6.5: Nine documents discusses security threats to the Chinese theme 
Security threats to the Chinese and Uighurs separatism have been the dominant topic of 
discussion in parliament. We find that 09 (28%) out of 32 documents deal this theme. It 
clearly suggests that politicians worried about this problem.  
In chapter three we have discussed the terrorist assaults on Chinese, and fanaticism in 
Xinjiang territory connected to places of sanctuary in Pakistan, stay touchy issues in Sino-
Pakistan relations. It has serious implications for China-Pakistan alliance. Neither China 
nor Pakistan can overlook its negative effect on the stability and viability of the alliance. 
Despite a successful military campaign against militants, China is keen to see Pakistan 
remain stable and intact that do not allow the menace of terrorism to affect Chinese 
national society.  
MPs discuss the challenge of protecting the Chinese citizens. They do this by linking 
terrorist attacks to the Chinese to Pakistan's national security. They believe that the 
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Chinese nationals work under duress and are being subjected to serious security threats 
and that it is a “serious and sensitive matter”, as serious as “the national security of 
Pakistan”.737 Relating security threats to the Chinese with Pakistani national security 
increases the importance of the challenge. National security is very dear to every nation. 
The survival of nations is associated with the security of the state. MPs propaganda 
suggests that Pakistan's survival is assured by China's national security.  
While others lament that, the militants are killing the Chinese discriminatory. It has 
irritated and shocked China. Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali claims that because 
of terrorist attacks, the Chinese are angry and worried. The Chinese have complained to 
Pakistan, which is unprecedented and extremely serious. China is a great friend and 
Pakistan has an exceptional relationship with it. The Chinese pressures will influence the 
alliance on a level that will be difficult to repair.738 Propaganda suggests that something 
unprecedented is damaged. It shows how strong the alliance was and how it was 
influenced by terrorist attacks, it means that terrorist attacks must stop to save what they 
suggest “an exceptional alliance.” The way the discussion is developed is significant, it 
will surely make people think of saving the alliance. 
While some point out the seriousness of the alliance, others aim to teach the benefits of 
the alliance. MPs emphasize that if the terrorist attacks on the Chinese continue to happen, 
Sino-Pakistani cooperation will be seriously compromised in the field of trade, defence 
and, above all, Pakistan may face isolation. Describing China, an important partner, 
Marvi Memon, warns that the Chinese need to be protected in definite ways, further 
                                                 
737 ‘The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report’, 9th Session (22 December 2008) Vol. 
IX, No. 6 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, p.569  
738 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 32 Session (17 February 2006) Vol. 
XXXII, No. 9 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. pp. 629-630 
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elaborating, she mentions that since the establishment of diplomatic relations, both 
nations’ have been strong allies. In the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, China took 
part in the war in the favour of Pakistan. It helped Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. 
It supports Pakistan regionally and internationally. Pakistan cannot lose such a credible 
and important partner.739 While Premier Jamali maintains that, it should be the policy of 
the state to teach the benefits of the alliance. We need to renew Pakistani citizens “this is 
the only alliance that is a true alliance and makes Pakistan stronger and secure.”740 
Propaganda content promotes China as an important sponsor of Pakistan’s security and 
defence.  
The discussion of the teaching of the alliance indicates Pakistani elites’ apprehension, 
similarly considering it only “true alliance” displays their effort to promote the alliance. 
While emphasizing Chinese contribution clearly shows efforts to encourage the alliance, 
in the same way, there are apprehensions that such a close country cannot be lost. 
Essentially, publicizing the benefits of the alliance will likely to appeal to the public.  
Considering terrorist attacks on Chinese a matter of national importance, Foreign 
Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri claims terrorist attacks on Chinese can isolate 
Pakistan internationally. Kasuri states that China is “calling us to tackle terrorism.” 
Chinese citizens are being “singled out for terrorist acts.” This is a globalised world. The 
Chinese are watching it closely. We must stop attacks otherwise face isolation, which is 
nobody interest in Pakistan.741 Kasuri message plays on emotions- a common occurrence 
in propaganda. The intention is clear: a failure to support the alliance means problems for 
                                                 
739 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 10th Session (16 January 2009) Vol. X, 
No. 5 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press.p.507 
740 ibid p.629 
741 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 42 Session (9 August 2007) Vol. XLII, 
No. 9 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. p.1080 
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Pakistani nations, i.e. isolation. In the contemporary era of globalization, international 
isolation is unwelcoming situation. The example of North Korea indicates that 
international isolation can lead to destruction.742 Minister Kasuri affirms that Pakistan 
has a dangerous neighbourhood full of enemies, but the Chinese are the only true friend. 
The people of Pakistan must understand this reality. Pakistan has no choice but to secure 
the alliance with China.743  
The propaganda message encourages Pakistani to join government efforts to secure the 
alliance for their kids and their country. Foreign minister Kasuri maintains that Pakistan 
will not only lose market for its goods, the kids’ future is at stake too. He encourages 
people of Pakistan to support government efforts to help preserve alliance for the future. 
Kasuri argues that   
It does not matter who is in government, we would not like to be an island of 
isolation. China demands that we should behave as a responsible state. If we failed 
to protect Chinese, we will lose trading benefits. We need market access to secure 
future of our kids. We will have to control this menace of terrorism.744  
People are urged to act to support the state effort to secure the alliance. The propaganda 
of the lawmakers reminds people the struggle they and their children will do if the alliance 
is not protected. The aim of this argument, (like Pakistan can face isolation, future of kids 
at stake, or Pakistan will miss trade benefits), appears to be to strike people’s pride, 
persuading them that in the future their children would judge them for their decision to 
support the alliance. This message implies that if the people fail to support the alliance, 
                                                 
742 Zack Beauchamp, 'North Korea Isn’t Crazy. It’s Insecure, Poor, and Extremely Dangerous', VOX 5 
July 2017  
743 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 42 Session (9 August 2007) pp.1085-86 
744 ibid  
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hardships could come to the children. Propaganda is playing with people's mind to accept 
the alliance. Those who see alliance in a different sense will think that alliance is such an 
important that it should be protected. While it is not just rhetoric, attacks on the Chinese 
have affected the presence of Chinese companies in Pakistan. Following the terrorist 
attacks, many companies have packed up and left Pakistan indefinitely in the past.745 
Furthermore, the propaganda aims to challenge people’s love for nation. Lawmakers 
believe that those people who do not support alliance are not Pakistani. They argue 
individuals attacking Chinese are adversaries of Pakistan. MPs suggest that the state must 
take revenge on the aggressors for their attacks on the Chinese and it was a national duty 
to oppose these elements within society. Lawmaker Imran-Ullah maintains:  
The Chinese are being killed in various cities of Pakistan. Government needs to 
take serious notice of it. Terrorists do not want a peaceful Sino-Pakistan relation. 
They do not want Chinese investment in the country. We need to expose them 
and tell the nation that these are enemies in our midst. In fact, the enemy of China 
is the enemy of Pakistan.746  
Another legislator who believes that those involved in the killing of the Chinese are 
enemies of Pakistan makes a similar point. They perceive China against their 
fundamentalist ideology; therefore, they are targeting Chinese.747 Clearly, lawmakers’ 
propaganda emphasises that the extremists are primarily targeting Chinese because 
terrorists see China atheist ideology against their dogmatic views. Extremists are being 
exposed and ostracised from society. In essence, Pakistani legislators are concerned about 
extremism within the society that opposes their policies of seeking balance of power with 
                                                 
745 Lawmakers themselves accept this. ‘The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report’, 
10th Session (15 January 2009) Vol. X, No. 4 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. 
p.396 
746 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 32 Session (17 February 2006), p 637  
747 ibid. p.633 
 304 
 
an allied atheist China. MPs have been clearly observed to disapprove extremist actions 
against China. 
In their efforts to promote the alliance and make people aware of the importance of 
protecting the Chinese, legislators find themselves emphasising morality and religion. 
Using the power of propaganda MPs reach out to the public and hit them in a sensitive 
spot: the use of religion. They claim that killing an innocent human being is prohibited 
in Islam and protecting friends like Chinese is a religious duty. Politician Imran-Ullah 
maintains: 
As a Pakistani Muslim, it is our religious duty to make a commitment that we 
should not allow terrorists to interrupt the Sino-Pakistani relations. Due to their 
acts, Muslims’ feelings have been injured. All Muslims regardless of their party 
affiliation must accept the Sino-Pakistani alliance with an open heart. They are 
not Muslims not even Pakistani if they attack the Chinese. This is our country 
where we will live, and we want the Sino-Pakistani alliance to be eternal.748  
A similar point is made by Senate chairman Farooq Naek. Senator Naek maintains, 
“terrorism has nothing to do with the teaching of Islam and those who are perpetrating 
acts of terror in the name of Islam are in fact doing a disservice to this great religion.”749 
The propaganda of the Pakistani legislators highlights their want their nationals to be 
behind them to support the alliance. However, the use of religion is significant as 
propaganda push people to protect the alliance; failure to do so does not make them 
Pakistani. It may not be wrong to argue that Islam forbade the killing of innocents, but 
the use of religion in promoting national strategies has a propaganda angle.  
Interior Minister Rehman Malik when pointed out by a member that the Chinese are 
working under difficult condition, whether they are being given any security in Pakistan, 
                                                 
748 Ibid.pp.637-638 
749 'Pak-China Friendship July 2010', Senate News, 1 (July 2010)  
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the interior minister replying to question stated that “three paramilitary forces, (frontier 
core, frontier constabulary, and rangers) are providing security to the Chinese nationals 
working in Pakistan. We are giving physical security to all the new Chinese coming to 
Pakistan. Thousands of Chinese are working in Pakistan and we have raised thousands of 
security forces to protect them. As soon as we receive requests from Chinese we provide 
them security.”750 Although it is a simple explanation to provide security to the Chinese, 
both the question and the answer show the importance accorded to the security of the 
Chinese citizen.   
With regard to the Xinjiang separatism, Pakistani lawmakers are found using propaganda 
effectively to mobilise the Pakistani population. In their efforts to promote the alliance, 
lawmakers aim to remove misperception about Chinese Uighur polices. For example, one 
of the officials maintains that Islam is prospering in China. Chinese Muslims are enjoying 
full religious freedom. The Chinese government does not control their religious activities 
in Xinjiang.751 The efforts made by the Pakistani legislator to explain that China is not 
against the Uighur Muslim and are not adopting policies that impede Uighur’s freedom, 
are self-explanatory. It shows that Uighur is free to practice their religion. Ultimately, the 
goal is to reduce militants’ animosity towards China.  
This narrative largely from the seat of democracy will help to control the antagonism 
towards China. Likewise, the focus on Uighurs rights reveals that legislators view their 
own society as a challenge for the maintenance of the alliance. Here is what makes this 
disturbing for the Pakistani elites: although militant groups are in a weak position 
                                                 
750 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 9th Session (22 December 2008) Vol. 
IX, No. 6 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press pp.568-569 
751 ‘The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report’, 2nd Session (21 November 2002) Vol. 
II, No. I Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, pp.33-34; Also see ‘The National 
Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report’, 5th Session (19 March 2003) Vol. V, No. 2 Islamabad: 
Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. p.111 
 
 306 
 
compared to Pakistan and China, they are still relatively strong. They have the potential 
to damage relations between Pakistan and China.752 While Pakistan and China can 
potentially damage militants’ strength with use of force, the cost of such a move would 
be incredibly high. Red Mosque operation (2007) against militants suggests such a 
trend.753 Propaganda seems to be the best option than just using force.  
One of the lawmakers argues that on multiple occasions China has dispelled the notion 
that Chinese Muslims are not free to profess their religious rituals like fasting, teaching, 
learning Quran, and celebrating Eid.754 MPs argue that not only Chinese state laws protect 
Muslim festival, but also Chinese government guarantees Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca.755 Propaganda suggests the traditions of the Muslims are given full consideration 
and respect. Fasting is allowed and call to prayer is uninterrupted in China. Once again, 
talking about the core principles of Islam, lawmakers are trying to create an encouraging 
                                                 
752 Between 2010 and 2016, there have been further, sporadic, attacks in Xinjiang by militants finding 
shelter in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Barely weeks after Nawaz Sharif’s regime came into power in 2013, 
militants disguised as army soldiers killed Chinese climbers and tourists in the Himalayas region of 
Nanga Parbat bringing great humiliation and disgrace to the new government. In March 2015, separatists 
in Chaghi district launched an attack on tankers supplying fuel to Chinese companies. In April 2015, 
militants launched an attack on Jiwani airport radar system near Chinese operated Gwadar port. For detail 
see Zahir Shah Sherazi, "Gunmen Kill Nine Foreign Tourists and Their Guide in Nanga Parbat" The 
Dawn 24 June 2013 ; In 2012 Kashgar attack, Nur Bekri Xinjiang governor said, “We have certainly 
discovered that East Turkestan activists and terrorists in our neighbouring states have a thousand and one 
links”, "China Official Sees Militant Links in Pakistan" The Dawn 7 March 2012 ; In July 2011 terrorist 
attack killed 20 people which “prompted Chinese criticisms of Pakistan for failing to crack down on the 
training of Uighur separatists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan”, Lisa Curtis, "The Limits of 
Pakistan-China Alliance".; Kiyya Baloch, "Chinese Operations in Balochistan Again Targeted by 
Militants" The Diplomat 27 March 2015 ; Zafar Baloch, "Two Killed as Militants Attack Jiwani Airport 
in Balochistan" The Express Tribune 30 August 2015. 
753 In 2007 the militants kidnapped the Chinese massage workers in Islamabad, in retaliation, the 
Pakistani army launched a military operation to flush out the terrorist. Though the terrorists were 
defeated, its consequences were detrimental to Pakistan's security. Militants launched serious attacks 
against Pakistan and China. 
754 ‘The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report’, 5th Session (19 March 2003) Vol. V, 
No. 2 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. pp.111-13 
755 Ibid, p. 113 
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image of China. MPs rhetorical strategies suggest that China allows Islam to prevail and 
Muslims are fulfilling the obligation of offering the payer, going to the Mecca for 
pilgrimage, and fasting during the holy month of Ramzan.  
However, propaganda happens in sharp contrast to the actual situation on the ground. 
Religious freedom is restricted, and Chinese security forces’ exploitive policies have 
made it hard for the Uighurs Muslims to practice their religion. They cannot observe the 
holy month of Ramadan, construct new mosques, or raise their children according to their 
religion. The Han migration into Xinjiang has had a profound impact on the Uighurs’ 
socio-economic and political status.756  
Security elite’s propaganda unscrupulously turns a blind eye on the human rights 
violations in Xinjiang. The leading experts on Uighur issue have criticised Pakistan’s 
silence on Uighurs issue. Faraz Talat maintains  
Ultimately, the Chinese government’s greatest feat is to have its President sit 
beamingly in the same room as the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, without ‘Uighur’ creeping into the conversation. More impressive still, 
is the capacity of the Pakistani political leaders, touting Islamic unity and decrying 
the oppression of Muslims wherever they may be, to ignore the Islamophobia 
raging in its most favoured state. But that’s realpolitik…At the end, I suppose I’m 
just hoping we’d all get to hear our Prime Minister’s next passionate speech on 
                                                 
756 Faraz Talat, "Islamophobia in China and Pakistan’s Vow of Silence" The Dawn 31 March 2015 ; 
"Uighur Man Jailed in China for Six Years," The Dawn 30 March 2015; "China Restricts Ramadan 
Fasting in Xinjiang" UCA News 2 July 2014. http://www.ucanews.com/news/china-restricts-ramadan-
fasting-in-xinjiang/71314 [accessed 5 April, 2016]; "China Bans Beards, Veils from Xinjiang City's 
Buses in Security Bid" The Express Tribune 6 August 2014   
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Sino-Pak friendship over the sound of the invisible elephant blaring in the 
room.757  
Human rights activist Rafia Zakaria sustains  
As a Muslim country, Pakistan has been eager to stand up to the injustices 
committed against Muslims anywhere in the world. This issue with China; it's 
outright banning [fasting in Ramadan] of what is a basic tenet of the Muslim faith 
may prove to be a trickier proposition…Pakistanis ignore the racism and human 
rights abuses perpetrated by those they consider to be their ‘friends’.758  
To highlight which country resembles more closely with the Pakistani culture and 
traditions, Murtaza Haider makes a comparison between India and China 
One neighbour, [India] where Muslims are a minority, has declared Eid festival a 
national holiday for all. The other neighbour [China] discourages Muslims from 
fasting and attending mosques during working hours. One neighbour [India] 
allows Muslim to practice their faith as they see fit; the other [China] tries to 
regulate Islamic practices. One neighbour [India] facilitates Muslims’ annual 
pilgrimage to Makkah by building dedicated complexes near airports. The other 
permits [China] only the elderly, or those who the State finds patriotic, to perform 
the Hajj (pilgrimage). Pakistanis share culture, cuisine, and history with one 
neighbour [India]. With the other [China] no extensive cultural bonds exist.759 
Moreover, one of the core objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy has been the promotion 
of Islamic ideology. Pakistan claims to be the champion of Kashmiri Muslims and the 
Palestinians. Pakistan has not recognised the state of Israel for fear of offending its Arab 
                                                 
757
 Faraz Talat. “Islamophobia in China” 
758
 Rafia Zakaria, "Breaking up with China" The Dawn 4 July, 2014  
759 Murtaza Haider, "Mistaking Handshakes for Friendship" The Dawn, 29 August 2012 
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allies. Therefore, for the protection of Islamic ideology, it has forfeited strategic and 
economic interests, which may have been accumulated having normal relations with 
India and diplomatic relations with Israel. However, when it comes to the discrimination 
of Uighurs, they are eclipsed in the parliamentary debates. The lawmakers use 
propaganda to cover up atrocities of the Chinese state. Contempt for the Uighurs' 
concerns suggests that they view their own society as a threat that by teaching about 
Chinese discrimination they might invite more trouble for the Sino-Pakistani alliance. 
Incredible alliance  
 
Figure 6.6: Eight Documents discuss An Incredible Alliance theme  
A total of 08 (25%) of the 32 documents cover this theme. All the contents used in this 
theme depict alliance as “incredible”, “perfect”, “time-tested” and “extraordinary”, and 
“wonderful” etc. MPs employ particularly a new brand of unique language to attract 
people towards the alliance. In this theme, we find a use of colourful and lavish language, 
there is also a feeling of obligation and compactness, and, finally, the alliance is believed 
to be rooted in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.  
With regard to the effusive language, MPs use hyperbolic words to describe the Sino-
Pakistan relationship. They typically appear poetic in describing the alliance with China. 
In their efforts to show relationship one of the best, and unique, they describe China only 
friend with which Pakistan has smooth diplomatic relations. Hansard's records suggest 
Total 
Documents 
32
Incredible 
Alliance  8
EIGHT DOCUMENTS DISCUSS AN INCREDIBLE ALLIANCE 
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that top-down leadership uses the flattering cliché: presidents, prime ministers, and high-
level cabinet members designate the alliance with a gratifying and optimistic language. 
Speaking to a joint session of parliament, President Khan said:  
Pakistan relations with China are perfect and special. The relationship has 
satisfied a wide range of the test. China is an extremely trustworthy companion 
of Pakistan. Pakistan regards this fellowship with a core of the heart.760  
Another president is found describing the alliance in similar words. During his meeting 
with the vice president of China, President Asif Zardari emphasised that Sino-Pakistan 
relationship is “all-weather and all-encompassing, which is destined to move from 
generation to generation.”761 The use of words, i.e. “special”, “perfect”, and “extremely 
trustworthy” and “all-encompassing” will probably make people feel superior about the 
alliance. A consistent amount of flattering language will produce much more good results 
as the language make feel so great that it overshadows the awkwardness in the alliance. 
The hyperbolic word suggests that the alliance has reached its zenith and does not need 
                                                 
760 'Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 2nd Parliamentary year (2 December 
1989) Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. p.15; On another occasion, President 
Khan emphatically suggested that the Pakistan-China alliance is an example for others to follow. In Khan 
words “We will continue to make efforts to make our neighbourhood peaceful and secure. We will 
endeavour to develop friendly relations with all our neighbours. Our friendship with our great friend and 
neighbouring China is an example for other nations to follow. We will strive to bring this relationship to 
a higher level with great enthusiasm and efforts”, see 'The Parliament of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates- 
Official Report', 3rd Session, Vol. III, No. I (19 December 1991) Manager Printing Corporation of 
Pakistan Press. pp.35-36 
761 'Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang Calls on the President', in Latest Press Releases/Speeches 
(Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 9 June 2010).; President Zardari 
speaking to a joint session said, “our relations with China remains the bedrock of our foreign policy”. See 
'The Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 6th Session (5 April 2010) Vol.VI, 
No.1 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press.p.14 
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improvements. There is so much emphasis on this rhetoric that it acquires propaganda 
status. 
The use of hyperbolic language appears frequently and zealously in every writing of the 
Pakistani elites, including the autobiographies, and the Ministry of Foreign Press 
Releases. The following examples are useful in this context. General Pervaiz Musharraf 
in his autobiography, “In the Line of Fire” has used relatively similar language to those 
of President Ishaq Khan to describe Sino-Pakistan alliance. Musharraf maintains, “China 
remains our time-tested and sincere friend, irrespective of its developing economic 
relations with India.”762 Likewise, ambassador Sultan Khan mentions in his 
autobiography, “…Pakistan is a great friend of China….”763 While in a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs press release, it has been cited “Pakistan and China enjoy a multifaceted 
strategic partnership, based on mutual trust and mutuality of interests.”764 Collectively all 
these writings give an impression that alliance is unprecedented. These could be 
imaginary and unreal words, but they carry heavy messages that can easily have a great 
effect on people’s mind. The use of this language will probably change people's 
behaviour towards the alliance.  
Some of other Pakistani leaders resemble Sino-Pak alliance with evergreen trees, mighty 
mountains, and deeper seas. Addressing to a joint session of parliament Premier Yousuf 
Raza Gillani considering it “a unique relationship” said, “Pakistan-China friendship is 
                                                 
762 Pervez Musharraf, In the line of Fire (Simon and Schuster UK, 2006) p.306  
763 Sultan Khan, Memories and Refection of a Pakistani Diplomat, (London: The centre for Pakistan 
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higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than 
honey.”765 Reiterating his position Gillani mentioned emphatically:  
This most precious friendship and partnership have flourished through nurture 
and care of a successive generation of a leadership. Our people cherish it. It is not 
wonder that this special friendship has stood at the test of the time and grown 
from strength to strength.766  
Prime Minister Gillani speaking on the floor of National assembly continued to add:  
China is our oldest and tested friend. Pakistan-China friendship is higher than K-
2 and deeper than Indian Ocean. With this great neighbour, we will strengthen 
our ideal friendship further.767 
The use of iconic language and the association with things [trees, mountains, and seas] 
that increase the beauty of the universe suggests that the alliance is as beautiful and 
natural similar to those things. Furthermore, resembling it with K-2 means that the 
alliance is high, strong, and indestructible. Indeed, a state can have numerous 
opportunities at its disposal to create narratives and circulate favourable images to its 
audience, however one of the powerful propaganda strategy that can remarkably promote 
the alliance is the use of an effusive and flattering language involving natural objects. 
This is a great tactic used by legislators to strengthen a particular point on the Sino-
Pakistani alliance in order to promote the alliance. 
                                                 
765 'The Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 7th Session (19 December 2010) 
p.13; President Zardari in his op-ed in Chinese newspaper has stated that “No relationship between two 
sovereign states is as unique and durable as that between Pakistan and China.” See Asif Ali Zardari, 
“Sino-Pakistan Relations Higher than Himalayas,” China Daily, 23 February 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.cn/opinion/2009-02/23/content_7501699.htm [accessed 11 November, 2017] 
766 'The Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 7th Session (19 December 2010) 
Vol. VII, No.1 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. p.12  
767 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 3rd Session (29 March 2008) Vol. III, 
No. 1 Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press.p.19  
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Speaking to a joint session of parliament on the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visit 
to Pakistan, opposition leader in the NA Nisar Ali Khan specified that “China is not a 
normal friend of Pakistan” but it is a “selfless friend”, “a time-tested friend” and “a friend 
in need, a friend who has helped Pakistan in every crisis. China is a friend whom we can 
depend on and, a friend who stood the test of time.” Emphasising the importance of the 
relationship, Khan told to visiting guest:  
I would like to stand up here before you and before this august House and salute 
you, salute the leadership of the Chinese Republic, salute the people of China, 
salute your great country for the great and trusted friend that you have been over 
the last six decades.768 
Lawmaker Khan concluded:  
Mr. Prime Minister, our friendship with China transcends personalities. It 
transcends political compulsions and political parties. It transcends the 
Government or the Opposition. Every word that you have spoken over the last 
sixty years, Mr. Prime Minister, you and your predecessors, in support of 
Pakistan, every deed that you have done, every word that you have articulated, is 
edged in our memories, it is edged in our hearts, it is edged in the future legacy 
that you and we are going to give to our children, and rest assure that this is a 
legacy we treasure, the legacy of strong Sino-Pak relations. This is a legacy, 
which we will give to our future generations and they will give to their future 
generations. 769 
                                                 
768 'The Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 7th Session (19 December 2010), 
p.10  
769 ibid p.11 
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Nisar Khan has suggested that the Sino-Pakistani alliance exceeds the personalities; it is 
a heritage, and a treasure that every Pakistani will love in the future. This is one of best 
ways to make alliance promoted.  
Others give a new perspective but are still in line with hyperbolic language. They believe 
it is a guarantee of peace and stability in South Asia. President Zardari categorically 
suggested that “Pakistan considers China to be a factor of stability in the region and 
beyond. The two countries would continue working together for regional peace and 
prosperity.”770 Peoples of Pakistan will tend to believe that Pakistan neighborhood is 
dangerous except China, especially when such statements emerge from high officials like 
presidents. 
Likewise, President Ishaq Khan has stated:  
China is our extraordinary and trusted companion. The changing conditions at the 
global level can’t influence this relationship. It is as incredible alliance as ever 
rather getting deeper with each passing day. We are pleased with this relationship 
and we think of it as a balancing factor in the regional and global issues.771  
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Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in his autobiography gave Sino-Pakistan alliance a 
historical perspective. Premier Aziz elaborates, “Pakistan considers its relationship with 
China…, as one of its most important.” Prime Minister Aziz further maintains: 
It is an all-weather and time-tested friendship, rooted in history, mutual trust and 
understanding. Relations between the two nations go back to antiquity when the 
Silk Road served as a conduit not only for trade but also for ideas and 
knowledge.772 
Similarly, there is a feeling of gratification, fulfillment and satisfaction in the MPs 
discussions. When one of the MPs stated it is a “complete alliance fulfilling security 
requirement of Pakistan” and that they are “satisfied with the performance” of the 
alliance, other members applauded it.773 Given the fact that alliances seldom fulfil 
commitments, security elites’ speeches occur in disregard to this fact. Pakistan cannot 
forget this alliance.  
Still other describe alliance is embedded in the hearts and minds of the people. NA 
speaker Fahmida Mirza has said:  
The Sino-Pak relations are deeply embedded in the hearts and minds of our two 
nations as this friendship has withstood many tests over the years. In this regard, 
we will never forget the manner in which our Chinese brothers and sisters 
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responded to the call for help from the flood-affected people of Pakistan [2009] 
despite the fact that their own citizens were facing the same natural calamity.774 
It means that even if the Chinese were suffering from trouble, they did not forget helping 
Pakistan. It will surely promote the alliance. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir said, 
“Pakistan-China friendship is legendary – a fascinating romance between our peoples, 
deeply rooted in our national ethos, since times immemorial.”775 Further adding, “Our 
peoples will continue to march, hand-in-hand, on the high road to peace and prosperity.” 
Pakistani officials’ uses powerful rhetoric that connects people to the alliance. Adolf 
Hitler maintains, “Propaganda tries to force a doctrine on the whole people... Propaganda 
works on the general public from the standpoint of an idea and makes them ripe for the 
victory of this idea.”776 This rhetorical language has acquired propaganda status as it is 
enforcing a specific ideology on the people of Pakistan.  
                                                 
774 'The Majlis-E-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debate', 7th Session (19 December 2010) 
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Chinese support: A must for Pakistan’s unity, progress, and bright 
future 
 
Figure 6.7: China’s support necessary for Pakistan’s progress and development 
In the absence of an agreement with the militants, which seems far away, the only way 
to reduce the threat to the alliance would be the collapse of the militants. Although this 
is a possibility, now it seems quite remote. The strength of the militants has been reduced, 
but much work is needed to vanish them. There are no obvious signs of a rebellion within 
the militant group; propaganda seems to be a suitable and better option. The Pakistani 
elites are doing it in many ways, sometimes they consider alliance time-tested, and 
sometimes they believe it is must for Pakistan progress and development.  
Quantitatively 07 (22%) out of 32 documents advance this theme. Qualitatively, MPs 
argue that China plays a crucial role in Pakistan’s defence and security. one of the 
lawmakers maintains that China provides access to world-class military technologies, and 
transfers technology to produce weapons locally. China is the largest defence equipment 
provider of Pakistan. China transferred equipment and technology and provided scientific 
knowledge to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. We are very honoured, and very grateful to 
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China. In the coming years, this relationship will be further strengthened.777 Moreover, 
MPs believe that the Sino-Pakistani alliance is essential for growth, job creation, and 
poverty reduction in Pakistan. It offers new market opportunities for national companies, 
increased productivity, and innovation through the transfer of Chinese technology.778 
Essentially, propaganda is explaining the tangible contribution of China, and in a way 
making everyone understand the necessity of the alliance. Everyone will know the 
purpose of the alliance and in one way will promote the alliance. Propaganda highlights 
the centrality of China in the progress and development of Pakistan. Propaganda is 
creating a perception that with the help of China, Pakistan is better.  
Peoples’ representative speeches within the parliament show that China is a source of 
national unity. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan maintains, “Pakistan can differ on anything 
but not on China. Pakistan united for China alliance. Even China unites Pakistan. The 
entire Pakistani nation support alliance with China. There has been complete agreement, 
even among the political parties of Pakistan, all segments of the Pakistani nation 
regarding supporting alliance with China. Thus, alliance with China unites Pakistan. 
China is a source of national unity.”779 Lawmaker Nisar Ali Khan mentions, “… We in 
Pakistan have a lot of issues, we have a lot of problems, we are mired in a lot of 
controversies, but there is one issue on which there is no problem, there is no controversy, 
there is no difference of opinion, and that is our friendship towards China.”780 Still others 
believe that it is an everlasting alliance largely. China is a bulwark against regional 
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hegemony.781 It is clear that Pakistani official’s propaganda is doing a better job 
explaining why China is important. Once the people understand the reasoning behind the 
alliance, the revolt against the alliance can slowly subside. When people feel there is 
something tangible in the alliance, they will probably be motivated. It clearly shows the 
efforts of MPs to encourage the alliance with China.  
One of the politicians’ associates Pakistan’s future with China by stating that the future 
is bright with this great friend. In addition, emerging China is a source of strength for 
Pakistan. The future is going to be a China as a superpower, so Pakistan is proud to have 
an alliance with it. 782 Still other believe a growth in the relationship and arguing that 
“Pakistan looks to entering into the 21st century with a strong and vibrant relationship 
with its closest, China.”783 Pakistan and China are entering the 21st century with great 
pride and happiness. While China is happy to take Pakistan along. It shows how 
tomorrow could be if Islamabad continues to have an alliance with Beijing. However, the 
Pakistan-China alliance can be seen to be odd because it is an alliance between two 
asymmetric powers. From the perspective of a major power, the alliance with a small 
power is based upon its degree of utility in advancing the former’s national interests.784 
It depends how far China go along with Pakistan. China with a major power responsibility 
may behave differently with Pakistan.  
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Propaganda illustrates that a fundamental truth: a situation in which an alliance is 
constantly threatened by militants, there are many ways to counteract it, propaganda is 
one of them. In propaganda, elites try to associate positive words with the alliance partner. 
All this derives from the fundamental insecurity of the Pakistani elite. A lawmaker states 
Chinese are “benevolent, great and noble in character.”785 Due to threats to the alliance, 
MPs aim to destroy negativity with regard to communism and Chinese nation. 
Essentially, Propaganda message promotes harmony between Pakistan and China.  
Reliable China and the unreliable US 
 
Figure 6.8: China Reliable, US unreliable theme  
The Figure 6.8 indicates 05 (14%) out of 32 documents discuss China reliable, US 
unreliable theme. In those five documents, lawmakers see China as a trusted and strong 
partner, while the United States is seen with doubt.   
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Furthermore, one of the MPs believes the relationship between Pakistan and China is 
based on bilateral trust, while there is a lack of trust between Pakistan and the United 
States. Without elaborating further, MPs suggest that China never forces Pakistan for 
self-interest, while the United States forces Pakistan for self-interest.786 Another 
legislator claims that there are many periods of ups and down with the United States, 
while Pakistan relations with China has been smooth. The United States imposes 
sanctions, while China provides assistance.787 This is the feeling, which has been 
announced frequently both in and outside of the parliament. Foreign minister Khawaja 
Asif maintains, “The Americans have been our friends for a long time – since the 60s and 
the 70s – but their reliability is relative.”788  
The comparison of things and/or individuals is a good propaganda strategy. The inclusion 
of the United States as an unreliable partner, which had provided hundreds of thousands 
of dollars during and after the Cold War, is not accidental. When China is painted better 
than the United States, people will see China as a sincere friend. Recently US have taken 
many unilateral actions of self-interest that have increased anti-Americanism in recent 
years. The raid on the Osama Bin Laden complex in Abbottabad, the killing of 24 
Pakistani forces on the Afghan border by the ISAF forces, frequent unilateral drone 
strikes in the tribal areas, all have been significantly adding to the negative image of the 
US in Pakistan. In such a background, lawmaker’s propaganda of China as an alternative 
of US may be justified and accepted within the Pakistanis society.  
Comparing nations who tend to give up easily with states that tend to carry on will surely 
create an element of trust. The notion of persistence, reliability are better words, it creates 
trust and satisfaction (used for Pak-China relationship). On the other hand, the 
unreliability tag will leave people in doubt (used for Pak-America relationship). The 
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reliability unreliability debates make people feel something tangible; the alliance will 
likely be accepted.  
Lawmakers argue that China helps us to stand up to the challenges, while America makes 
us dependent. Politician Haji Pervaiz Khan maintains:  
The United States makes Pakistan dependent on her; it does not give us the 
technology rather than keep it out of Pakistan’s reach. Pakistan must distinguish 
its companions and foes. Contrary to US, China is a friend who makes agreements 
with us and provides us with technology. It gives us the technology that gives us 
fighter planes like JF-17 thunder. The United States has never given us 
technology, however, when it gives us arms, it blackmails us. Therefore, bearing 
in mind, we must reconsider/re-evaluate our relations with the United States in 
addition we must distinguish among friends who are interested in the well-being 
of Pakistan and those who do not want it.789 
Indeed, China has transferred technology to Pakistan, while the US has been reluctant to 
do so. Most recently, China has been transferring its high-quality industrial technology 
to Pakistan as part of the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
project. Pakistani nuclear program is believed to have been based on know-how 
transferred from China. In 1998, Tim Weiner of the New York Times reported:  
China, a staunch ally of Pakistan’s, provided blueprints for the bomb, as well as 
highly enriched uranium, tritium, scientists, and key components for a nuclear 
weapons production complex, among other crucial tools. Without China’s help, 
Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.790  
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While another lawmaker even goes to the extent to give the impression that Pakistan’s 
relationship with the US is Pakistan’s physical destruction while with China its Pakistan's 
progress. The US compelling Pakistan through different means to become it subordinate, 
while China sees Pakistan as a partner in the region. Legislator Mahmood Achakzai 
maintains, “alliance with the US is a destruction, we cannot surrender our national interest 
for the US interests. We cannot become the US lackey. The US uses Pakistan for its own 
interest. China is our extremely close friend we will not seek an alliance with the US at 
the cost of China.”791 The obvious differentiation between a "reliable" and an "unreliable” 
partner explain that MPs objective may not be to project the US badly but to project China 
better in the eyes. Moreover, it makes an example of good propaganda. Pakistan 
Ambassador to the US Aizaz Chaudhry has stated that “relations with the US are very 
important for Pakistan and this realization is prevalent across all segments of Pakistani 
polity.”792 Therefore, lawmaker relates it to unreliable just to make China look better in 
the eyes of the people of Pakistan. 
The feeling of China being reliable and American being unreliable so prevalent in the 
Pakistani discourse that it is often mentioned in various forums. For example, Deputy 
Chairman, Planning Commission Sartaj Aziz has said “Relations between Pakistan and 
China have become a model of State to State relations and China has become a reliable 
partner in our national development efforts.”793 While Hussain Nadim explains Pakistan, 
US relations have been “transactional,” but “lacking a strategic partnership between the 
two countries and their civilian leadership. While Pakistan and the United States 
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developed close ties, at least superficially, as a result of cooperation through two wars in 
Afghanistan, mutual suspicion continues to run deep in the military and intelligence 
communities of both countries.” On the other hand, Nadim argues, “China is considered 
an ‘all-weather friend’ by the Pakistan Army. China has backed Pakistan in turbulent 
times through major arms sales and the provision of nuclear technology and economic 
assistance.”794 Frontier Post editorial maintains “As History is Our Witness,’ China is a 
More Reliable Friend than United States”795 “With Americans haughtily boxing Pakistan 
into a corner, and their Western allies subtly working toward the same end, China has 
again offered a heartening voice to Pakistan, just as it has whenever our country has found 
itself in a distressful predicament.”796  
In their discussion, we found that lawmakers believe that the time is shifting to China. 
The future is better with China, not the US. Legislator Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani 
believes that though we should make efforts to improve relations with the US, but 
Pakistan needs to be forward-looking, we need to understand the changing world scenario 
and seek closer cooperation with China.797 Equally, Gillani believes world is changing it 
is moving from a unipolar to multipolar, where China will be one player. MPs maintain 
that nation needs to take this pressure and make sure that the relations with China remain 
on course. We need to think a decade ahead plan China is the future.798  
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Lawmakers also suggest that when the United States needs our support, then they show 
friendly behaviour, and when the need is over, friendship is transformed into open 
enmity. While China's hand of friendship is everlasting, China does not do this at all; he 
is just a friend of Pakistan. Awami National Party [ANP] Ajmal Khan Khattak states that 
Pakistan is no more US preference. During the cold war and especially during the Afghan 
war, US utilised Pakistan. US want Pakistan to be subservient to India and then keep a 
hold on Pakistan. Contrary to that, China will never want us to be subservient to India. 
China will never leave Pakistan alone the way the US does. Once US objectives have 
been achieved the US leave Pakistan alone, China is a permanent friend.”799 There is a 
complete trust. There is an ideal depiction on every indicator China is up to the mark and 
the US is faltering or unfulfilling those indicators. China is significantly portrayed as a 
blameless and faultless friend. 
Finally, Pakistani politicians believe that America is against Pakistan-China alliance. The 
United States oppose the deepening Pakistan and China alliance. The US wants to see 
China weak. And are totally opposed of Pakistan-China strong relations. Pakistan needs 
to find this out clearly and figure out the friend and the enemy. Marvi Memon maintains 
that  
The US is against Sino-Pakistan alliance. It does not want to see Pakistan-China 
coming closer. Nevertheless, Pakistan is better with China, it is much better and 
in good hands, if it moves closer to the Chinese state than with the US. The best 
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advice is we need to move closer to China than the US. The US wants us to be 
subservient to India. China has no such intentions.800  
Lawmaker Maulana Atta-Ur-Rehman maintains, “America does not want Pakistan to 
have a close alliance with China. The enmity between Pakistan-China will benefit US 
partner India. But we know China is great partner and friend and we trust that partner in 
a great way. China has been our friend and well-wisher.”801 Thus, this rhetoric of 
comparisons shows that the Pakistani state is willing to intensify its propaganda efforts 
to dissuade any kind of action by militants threatening the alliance, thus discouraging 
them from making the slightest move to undermine Pakistan and China alliance. The 
Chinese are depicted reliable and very committed to the cause of Pakistan and its security. 
China-Pakistan-India triangle: China peaceful, India intruder  
Statistically, 03 (9%) out of 32 documents cover this theme. The Pakistan-China-India 
triangle is one of the world’s most volatile and dangerous strategic equations. These 
countries cumulatively are home to half of world’s population. All three nations have one 
of the largest standing armies in the world and possess deadly nuclear weapons. Pakistan 
and India have clashed several times over the past six decades; China and India fought 
briefly in 1962 and, more recently, clashed on the Doklam plateau in the Himalayan 
region.802  
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Figure 6.9: China-Pakistan-India triangle 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s first real accomplishment as Foreign Minister was to negotiate a 
boundary dispute with China in 1963. It is believed that both nations should resolve 
boundary demarcation amicably.803 In contrast, Pakistan’s experience with India to settle 
the demarcation line has been less than unpleasant. India occupies a central place in 
Pakistan’s foreign policy. Kashmir is the prime problem between the two nations. 
Consequently, seeking external alliances has been the central focus of Pakistan foreign 
policy. This element appears in the MPs discussion, and they explain it comparing 
Pakistan’s experience both with China and with India. 
The US is not the only country that is compared with China; lawmakers put India in a 
similar bracket: China better, India enemy. Reflecting on this line of thinking, one of the 
politicians claims that India is an enemy, intruder, and hegemonic while China is great 
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and sincere friend. While India uses power to resolve disputes, China follows the 
principles of discussion and negotiation.804  
Even another politician states that New Delhi makes hard for smaller states of South Asia 
to conduct peacefully in the region. Contrary to that, China is impeccable, peaceful and 
respects national sovereignty. Pakistan’s experience with both India and China explain it 
amply.805 The central goal of the propaganda of Pakistani parliamentarians is to change 
people’s behavior, and the kind of argument they are using will probably change it mainly 
because they first discuss the darker picture (India is portrayed creating problems for the 
smaller nation of South Asia), and then give the clearest picture that China is peaceful. It 
will make China appear good. 
Explaining the actual process of boundary demarcation with China, Foreign Minister 
Gohar Ayub Khan maintains that “boundary demarcation was done in such a friendly 
manner”, explaining it further, Khan elaborates that the Chinese would say to Pakistani 
engineer “you mark out where the boundary has to be where the pillar has to be put”, and 
they would erect the pillar on the marking suggested by the Pakistani engineer. “It was 
done in such a friendly atmosphere.”806 While lawmaker Qaiser Ali Khan explaining 
experience with India argues that “in sharp contrast to the Chinese experience, Indian 
have been an intruder in our territory. Chinese experience was extremely good, it was 
done in great spirit, while the Indian has been a painful experience. They have occupied 
our lands.”807 It essentially means that China believes in peaceful coexistence with the 
neighbours while India believes in supremacy and bullying. It also means that China is a 
principled superpower, while India is not. Lawmakers propaganda encourage people to 
think which is better. Undoubtedly, the unambiguous depiction would likely to make 
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805 Ibid, p.1009 
806 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 20th Session (2 November 1995) p. 357 
807 The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates- Official Report, 17th Session 3rd Parliamentary Year (20 
July 1999), Islamabad: Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press. p.2966 
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people think that India has a sinister feeling while Chinese are genuine about Pakistan. 
People may not accept the rhetoric of Pakistani legislators that China is friendly, but when 
it is compared to India, people will certainly accept it.  
Faced with the dual dangers of domestic instability and terrorist attacks on the Chinese, 
the Pakistani state has devised a strategy for the survival of the alliance that depends on 
explaining the usefulness of the alliance with China. With regards to the Indo-Pakistan 
wars, politicians give similar views found in the textbook's chapter. To mention briefly, 
Foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan maintains that China was fully involved helping 
Pakistan in its conflict with India both in 1965 and 1971 wars. China issued an ultimatum 
to India finish the war otherwise face costs. China provided “blind support to us.”808 MPs 
discussion gives an acceptable impression to the Pakistani public about China. The 
discussion strikingly depicts two important neighbours: one is the aggressor, the other is 
a pacifier, one is intruded, and another is peaceful. It makes China more noble, benign 
than India. The public will surely see China as preferable over India. In a sense, Pakistani 
MPs recall a more glorious past to explain the future. Explaining people of Pakistan, a 
painful past and in that painful moment China was there, it will promote the alliance.  
It is important to report that not all politicians seek propaganda. Unprecedently some 
vices can be heard in the parliament, which represent different perspective rather 
depicting ground realities. A handful of MPs believe Pakistan is isolated on Kashmir 
issue as China no longer support on it. Talking on the floor of the parliament soon after 
the fiasco of the Kargil crisis, Aftab Shaban Mirani maintains that “we stand totally 
isolated on Kargil issue. Which country has supported you? …has China took up the 
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issue…no Mr speaker we are totally isolated.”809 In the same discussion, Naveed Qamar 
belonging to Pakistan People’s Party approving Mirani comments maintained that 
Pakistan must be blamed on the Kargil crisis and whole world including China which has 
been “a steadfast ally of us” distanced from us gradually.810  
Chinese position on Kashmir is unequivocal. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official issued 
following statement on Kashmir issue, “The issue of Kashmir is an issue left over from 
history. Our stance on that is consistent. We hope that the parties concerned will pursue 
a peaceful settlement through dialogue.”811 Satyabrat Sinha explains Chinese Kashmiri 
policy appropriately:  
The changes ushered in by the end of the cold war have altered Asian geopolitics. 
While Islamabad continues to perceive Beijing as a reliable strategic partner, 
China’s foreign policy imperatives have changed considerably and steadily 
become more global. Beijing’s liberalisation strategy has increased the incentives 
to cooperate with the US, Russia, and India-to the relative neglect of Pakistan.812  
Stephen Cohen argues China has moderated stance on Kashmir mainly because of its 
concern “about the rise of jihadis” in Pakistan. Cohen continues, China suspects “Uighur 
separatists receive help from abroad”, mainly from Pakistan as the explosive used in Xi  
This chapter provided a comprehensive description of the Pakistani officials’ coverage 
of the Sino-Pakistan alliance. The chapter discussed both the qualitative and quantitative 
findings generated through the content analysis of the parliamentary debates of the 
Pakistani politicians. It related the results to the research questions raised at the outset of 
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the thesis with the purpose of indicating how security elites promote alliance with China 
and what propaganda of the security elites indicate how they view their own society.  
We focused on the lawmakers’ attitudes and political orientations of the alliance. This is 
what distinguishes this study from other studies on the subject. Statistical findings of this 
chapter indicated that there is a correlation between gender and subject matters. The 
results indicate that the parliamentary discussion on Pakistan’s relations with China are 
dominated by male politicians. Discussion by female MPs account for only 8% of the 
total discussions, while religious parties have not much contributed within the parliament.  
The main findings of this chapter are that the lawmakers are highly concerned with the 
events of terrorist attacks on Chinese and separatist movement in Xinjinag China. This 
theme has occupied great space in the parliamentary debates. MPs concerns are indicated 
in terms of their efforts to explain people of Pakistan about the concerns of the Chinese 
and their feeling about those attacks, and Pakistani MPs efforts to educate people of 
Pakistan that these attacks are putting Sino-Pakistan relations in trouble. They trouble 
they associated are related to the future of Pakistan’s trade relations with China and 
children future, and China may isolate Pakistan. While it was found that the terrorist 
attacks on Chinese are condemned by all the MPs. MPs were not emotional in their 
assessment of the attacks and explained people of Pakistan that attacks on Chinese could 
lead to the challenges in Sino-Pakistan relations.  
Furthermore, the statistical findings and interpretations indicate that the officials describe 
Sino-Pakistan relations with most effusive terms considering it all comprehensive, time-
tested, unique and good for the people of Pakistan. They believe that Pakistan must needs 
this alliance to secure its better future, to sustain unity which come with the alliance with 
China.  
The MPs appear to be adopting the strategy of comparison between Pakistan’s alliance 
partner, i.e. China and USA. In their description, China appear to be better on the basis 
of its support to Pakistan on various occasion like wars with India.  
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Finally, India is projected enemy in the eyes of the Pakistan while China is believed to 
have help against the enemy. The findings of the chapter concur with SEPIA assumptions 
regarding how Pakistani officials promote alliance and what their propaganda tells us.  
In the next chapter, we conclude this thesis. Before presenting the summary of the thesis, 
it will restate the aims, the main argument, and the findings of the study. Also, it will 
detail limitations, suggestions for further research and the contribution of this study to 
the existing body of knowledge. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis has attempted to systematically explore the complex internal dynamics that 
shape contemporary relations between Pakistan and China. It aims to assess the political 
problems of being an openly religious state that is attempting to practice the balance of 
power politics with an atheist ally China. More specifically, the research examines the 
internal challenges of the Pakistan-China alliance and the strategies of Pakistani security 
elites to counter these challenges. It essentially means that the study examines the real 
and potential challenges to the resistance of the Pakistan-China alliance. 
After highlighting the domestic challenges to the alliance, the research aims to assess the 
efforts and strategies of Pakistani security elites to overcome these challenges. It basically 
means that the study evaluates the propaganda strategies of the security elites to cultivate 
the Chinese alliance at the national level. While exposing the Pakistani state propaganda, 
the goal of the research is to highlight the apprehension of the Pakistani elite towards 
their public.  
By offering an analytical model Security Elite Domestic Propaganda and International 
Alliance, this thesis has sought to explain  
• What the real and potential challenges to the endurance of the Pakistan - China 
alliance are?  
• How the security elites in Pakistan sustain and promote the alliance with China 
domestically to counter those threats and challenges? And  
• What their propaganda tells us about how they view their own society?  
As we discussed in the literature review section of chapter one, the logic of international 
alliances (Realist, Neoclassical Relist, Constructivist and Liberalist Approaches) fell 
short of elucidating the Pakistan-China alliance properly. They collectively fail to 
acknowledge the conduct of state’s domestic propaganda to maintain awkward alliances. 
To bridge the apparent theoretical divides and mainly to address this lacuna, this thesis 
operationalises the theoretical framework SEPIA to promote a more comprehensive 
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undertaking of underlying logic behind Pakistan’s alliance making with China. SEPIA 
hypothesis that the states need external alliance(s) to balance external threats but facing 
the anomaly of internal threats and challenges to the alliance, states launch a systematic 
campaign of publicity to sell the alliance domestically. The promotional strategies 
undertaken by the states in their propaganda construction divulge their apprehension 
about their own public.  
Having reiterated the thesis statement, the research questions and the main argument, this 
chapter endeavours to present a summary of the findings of the research keeping in view 
the research questions and objectives, followed by the theoretical implication of SEPIA 
and suggestions for future research on the Pakistan-China alliance. The final section 
outlines the implications of this study for future IR-related investigations of Sino-
Pakistan and, in general, interstate relations that are clouded by nationally conceived 
problems such as internal threats to the alliance. Perhaps, more intensely, it highlights the 
development of IR Realism by means of SEPIA in covering its gap of strange alliances, 
to provide a healthier explanation of state-to-state relations in international politics. 
Empirical findings 
As the centre of interest in this study is to explore the attitudes of the decision-makers 
towards those governed, we have made efforts in the previous three chapters to discover 
who is carrying out the propaganda, what the targets of the propaganda are and what is 
being said. Essentially, we have tried to examine the mindset of the propagandists rather 
than the receivers of the propaganda. Whether the propaganda exposed here has promoted 
the alliance with China or not, we may never know as the influence of this propaganda 
on domestic society is not easy to measure. Martin Moore highlights, “Propaganda, if it 
had any impression at all, could only enhance attitudes, not change them.”813 
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The empirical evidence presented in the previous three chapters shows that there is much 
interesting, overdone and exaggerated, and twisted discourse on Pakistan’s alliance with 
China. The Pakistani security elite had concerns about the effectiveness of the alliance 
with China, and so, demonstrating their faith in a strategy of propaganda, they launched 
a campaign to establish the reputation of the alliance, which, among other techniques, 
included the use of posters, slogans, and the naming of roads and roundabout after China. 
Essentially, this strategy intrinsically demonstrates that the security elites in Pakistan 
believe propaganda is a suitable approach to overcoming some of the challenges to the 
alliance.  
Still, it is exceptionally hard to conclude that there is a correlation between what the 
security elite are writing and what surveys are revealing. Did the Pakistani population 
read what officials were promulgating using textbooks and newspaper articles? 
Textbooks will have exposed much of the population to favourable views of the alliance 
as they are compulsory taught subjects in schools, but the same cannot be said with 
certainty about the newspaper articles and parliamentary debates. Similarly, propaganda 
cannot create a new alliance, but it can augment its worth publicly. Edward Bernays states 
“we are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely 
by men we have never heard of”.814  
To summarise above discussion, it can be emphasised that propaganda impact is hard to 
calculate, but it has significance. Propaganda has been accepted as a useful technique to 
market unpopular decisions, i.e. Propaganda has certainly been used in Pakistan to engage 
people on China alliance, while the major powers have used it for advantages at domestic 
fronts during the major wars. In the following section we summarise the findings of the 
thesis.  
This research highlights Pakistani officials’ efforts to preserve and promote the alliance 
with China domestically to overcome the undesirable impact of domestic threats to the 
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viability and efficacy of the alliance. Empirical evidence gathered to answer the research 
question is mainly presented in chapters three, four, five and six and to a lesser extent in 
chapter one. In the next section, we will summarise the observations and then explore 
how they facilitated the evaluation of the research questions and objectives.  
In chapter two, Walt’s BoT theory was operationalised to scrutinise the main threats to 
Pakistan’s security and the Pakistani state rejoinder. Using the four elements of BoT 
theory, it was emphasised that India, as a contiguous neighbour exhibiting aggressive 
intention and a hostile posture towards Pakistan, acts a serious security threat to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. The chapter underscored that Islamabad 
has given uppermost importance to external security. It is such an important consideration 
that it dominates all other administration activities. Faced with hostile and powerful India 
and an unfriendly Afghanistan on her eastern and western borders respectively, the 
security elites have sought to protect their national borders through a policy of 
international alliances.  
Despite of the fact that the western front with Afghanistan has largely been a war zone, 
India has always been the immediate concern for Pakistan. Considering this, the need for 
the alliance has largely been based on forging a credible deterrent to counterbalance India. 
Therefore, the rationality advocated by Walt’s BoT theory would force Pakistan to seek 
a balancing strategy, mainly against India, and to this end Islamabad pursues an alliance 
with a major power, in this case China.  
Furthermore, we documented the answers to our first research question to explore the real 
and potential challenges to the durability of Pakistan-China alliance. This inquiry found 
that three real and potential threats and challenges place the Pakistan-China alliance in a 
real quandary. Essentially these three challenges are responsible for aggravating Pakistani 
state elites worries about the alliance with China. Firstly, the Pakistani religious parties’ 
embracing of Uighur Muslims into their madrasah, providing Uighur military training 
and financial support poses a threat to the efficacy of the Sino-Pakistan alliance. 
Secondly, jihadi outfits and sub-nationalists subject the Chinese to terrorist acts; for the 
jihadi militants, it is an opportunity to revenge the attacks on their “brothers” in Xinjiang, 
and the separatists to vent their anger against Pakistan and its closest friend China. 
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Finally, a passive, but potentially a dangerous, propensity which survives within the 
society is the widely held perception that communism is incompatible with Islam.  
We discerned that these factors not only pose a threat to the alliance itself, but 
unequivocally reinforce Pakistani officials’ doubts about their own public. Because of 
threats to the alliance, the security elites make efforts to alleviate these anxieties through 
promotional strategies using, for example, the syllabuses implemented in cultural 
institutions, newspaper articles, and parliamentary debates. 
We analysed textbooks, newspaper articles and parliamentary debates to find answers to 
two other research questions: how the Pakistan security elites sustain the alliance in the 
wake of threats? And what security elites propaganda reveals us about how they view 
their own society?  
From data analysis, it became evidently clear that the security elites’ attempt to promote 
alliance through a strategy of propaganda, and that these strategies revealed a great deal 
about their fears and concerns about their own community. One of the key findings in the 
chapter on textbooks suggests that there is a link between militants’ strategies of attacking 
Chinese or supporting Uighur separatists, and Pakistani officials’ propaganda patterns. 
The security elites operate propaganda using analogous tactics like those used by the 
religious element to encourage cracks in the Sino-Pakistan alliance. For example, as 
shown in Chapter three, the militants use Islam (a common faith between Uighur and 
Pakistani society) as a motivation to attack Chinese and to oblige Uighur Muslims in their 
madrasah to spearhead their independence movements. The security elites use similar 
tactics to peddle the alliance domestically using the Glorious Chinese theme.  
The findings emphasis that the Chinese possess similar cultural values and virtues to 
those found in Islam. The common values and features identified were the avoidance of 
alcohol and disinclination from a free-sex society. There is also a dislike of extravagance 
and a love for humility in both nations. The two nations share a simple approach to life. 
To highlight the similarities between the two nations, the chapter explains how the 
Chinese rejected consuming modern drinks (Pepsi Cola, Coca Cola), which are also 
despised by the extremists. It was found that there is a propensity to compare Chinese 
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famous places with Islamic religious places to enhance the legitimacy of the alliance in 
the eyes of the public who submit to those Islamic places.  
In one example, a famous Pakistani visitor shared the ‘common feelings’ that he 
developed while visiting Chinese famous places (Great Wall of China) and Islamic places 
(Saddi shrine, and Abi Waqas tomb). These propaganda strategies are to counter the 
feeling of antagonism towards communism within the public. Another message used to 
improve the image of the Chinese in Pakistan was that the Chinese love Pakistan and its 
people. They are hospitable and caring people and who help Pakistan and its people 
during a crisis; the elite also tried to embed the idea that Pakistan-China are not disjointed, 
rather that they belong to the same family. 
The Pakistani elite propaganda suggested that the Uighur Muslims were living in better 
conditions. It means that they do not experience discrimination as the Chinese 
constitution pledges their political, economic and cultural rights. The Chinese 
government does not interfere in their affairs, rather it allows them to perform their 
religious rituals and obligations, and that the Chinese government is acting with urgency 
to validate that the Uighur Muslims live a life equal to that of fellow Chinese. The 
Chinese state encouraged Uighur to take part in Xinjiang progress and development and 
that the Uighur have been living in China peacefully for centuries. They have a separate 
province to live and they travel to Pakistan without any restrictions. Essentially, the 
argument is aimed to diffuse animosity towards China about Uighur separatism.  
The security narrative of textbooks regarding militant Hindu India and China 
characterises India as a “Hindu state” and, as such, an enemy of “Islamic Pakistan”: this 
theme suggests that India has been a source of constant tension and that the nature of the 
dispute with it affects Islamabad’s survival as a sovereign unit. The historical rivalry (the 
Hindu-Muslim divide, wars of 1965 and 1971), and Indian attempts to dominate (Indian 
hegemony, interference in Balochistan other settled and non-settled areas) are used to 
highlight the security challenges faced by Pakistan. Having established the Indo-Pakistan 
rivalry, the theme argued that all is not gloomy and unsatisfying as there are some good 
neighbours and friends, like China, which support and help Pakistan during crisis and 
wars with India. The logical connection between a threat (traditional enemy) and a 
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balancer (China) indeed market the alliance appropriately to a society which also sees 
India as an enemy.  
The propaganda strategies in chapter four, examining the school textbooks, also compare 
Pakistan’s two main patrons - the US and China - to exaggerate the importance of China. 
For example, the textbooks recognise that Pakistan’s alliance with the US has fallen short 
of Pakistani expectations, while the Chinese have remained faithful. The theme 
Unreliable US, Reliable China, highlights that during times of extreme crisis (Indo-Pak 
wars), the US stepped back and watched Pakistan falling to Indian suzerainty despite its 
pledged alliance with Pakistan, but China rallied round Pakistan during those crises and 
turned out to be a passionate partner. The textbooks also show regret at President 
Kennedy’s decision to arm India to the detriment of Pakistan’s security.  
Finally, the textbooks touched upon the US government’s post-Cold War sanctions on 
Pakistan, barring military and economic assistance to Pakistan, and suggest that China 
agreed to fulfil the void by supplying weapons and meeting security requirements to 
balance Indian threat. Yet again, China is portrayed as the saviour of Pakistan at a crucial 
time. Finally, American unfaithfulness is depicted in the way it fails to appreciate 
Pakistan’s sacrifices in the war against terrorism, while the Chinese are believed to be 
faithful as they have been appreciative of the human and economic damages to Pakistan. 
The arguments found in the textbooks are likely to encourage positive feelings about 
China, with the public being led to believe that it is dedicated to Pakistan’s security.  
It was also established in the theme a Historical Relationship, that Pakistan and China 
were able to establish diplomatic relations smoothly from the outset. In making this 
argument, the texts overlooked many factors which suggested that the relationship had a 
rocky beginning, for example Pakistan formed alliance with the US supposedly against 
China, Pakistani officials’ initial cosiness with India (Ayub Khan shared a defence offer 
to India in 1959, which irked China), the Korean War fallout (where Pakistan favoured 
US military action in Korea) and Pakistani disapproval of PRC UN membership, are 
simply ignored in the texts.  
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Finally, the hyperbolic terms (all-weather partner, time tested friends, sweeter than 
honey, a model alliance and so on) are examined under the theme known as Poetic Terms, 
an effort to naturalise the atypical alliance. These poetic terms associate the Pakistan-
China alliance with green trees, mighty mountains and rivers to emphasise the alliance as 
strong and natural. These exaggerated terms are really significant in the Pakistan-China 
discourse as they bubble up very often to celebrate the alliance, particularly on important 
occasions. 
Some of the arguments discussed in chapter on textbooks are repeated in chapter five 
which examines the propaganda in newspapers. Essentially, the newspapers tried to 
assimilate Islam and communism under the Islam and communism theme. The security 
elite highlighting that the Islamic and Chinese societies reject wealth, live simple lives, 
and work for the collective good of the whole nation, apparently trying to remove any 
incongruity in the alliance. As with the textbooks, security officials use the newspapers 
to emphasise that the Uighur Muslims enjoy lives as affluent and unrestricted as those 
led by the majority Han Chinese.  
We found that a sharp variance existed between texts and newspapers, but the method of 
using propaganda appeared identical. For instance, in textbooks, in an effort to persuade 
sceptical society, Islamic places are equated with places in China to strengthen the 
message of a natural alliance, in newspaper chapter, to convince the Islamic elements, 
under the Islam and communism subject, Pakistani officials quote Hadith, (the words of 
Prophet Muhammad) “to go to China in search of knowledge”.  
While in textbooks the companions of Prophet Muhammad (Abi Waqas) are used, in 
newspapers, the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings are used to push the alliance with China. 
Similarly, it was found that Islamic and communist philosophy is compared by suggesting 
that purpose of both Islam and communism is to create an egalitarian society which 
forbids the concentration of wealth in a few hands and allocates wealth uniformly.  
A significant aspect of propaganda found related to the Uighur issue, under the theme 
Security, which urges Islamic religious elements that the Chinese should not be subject 
to terrorist attacks, and that the Uighur should not be accepted and enrolled in (JUI and 
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JI) Deobandi madrasahs. Pakistani officials believed that if the Uighur continued to 
acquire ideological indoctrination in madrasahs, the sustainability of Pakistan’s alliance 
with China would be vulnerable.  
Another significant aspect found in the Security theme was that the officials endeavoured 
to associate Pakistan’s economic growth, opulence and development with the safety and 
security of the Chinese nationals working in Pakistan. The public is warned that if the 
Chinese continued to be on the terrorists’ radar (mainly in Balochistan), it will distress 
and upset Pakistan’s development, mainly because an unsecure situation will hamper 
their attentiveness to the completion of projects (Gwadar port, roads and energy projects) 
critical for Pakistan prosperity. It is argued that Chinese security is not detached from 
Pakistan’s: if Chinese security is endangered (through a support to Uighur), it in fact 
means Pakistan security is vulnerable. Another empirical idea appearing under the same 
theme argued that the “foreign funded terrorists” are hatching conspiracies against the 
Chinese on Pakistani soil, and provoking unrest in Xinjiang.  
In the newspapers, India is emphasised as an enemy in Sino-Pakistan alliance but the way 
it is portrayed is different to what we saw in the textbooks. Findings under the theme, 
Sino-Indian differences and Pakistan-China alliance, described India as China’s ultimate 
rival in the international system, which will enhance the value of the Pakistan-China 
alliance to balance India. It is argued that India and China both desire a major role in 
world affairs due to the size of their countries, available resources, and military powers. 
These regional and international dynamics will not diminish the importance of Pakistan-
China alliance: they will continue to enjoy vigorous and healthy alliance as India will be 
perceived as a common enemy. Interestingly, other findings, elaborated that the Sino-
Indian rapprochement has altered the Pakistan-China alliance in some way. The deviation 
is seen in China’s policy of adopting a neutral stance on the lingering Kashmir issues. 
We found that the security elite publicised defence and military cooperation between 
Pakistan and China (for example JF-17 fighter jets, Al-Khalid tanks, F-22 naval frigates, 
and civilian nuclear energy) openly to create a feeling of benevolence towards China.  
One of the findings of this present study was the identification of the use of important 
events, such as Chinese dignitary visits to Pakistan for special occasions like diplomatic 
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anniversaries, as important events for display of propaganda. During the occasions people 
are engaged through various public events held both in cultural institutions and in public. 
We discussed the security officials’ actions under the theme, prominent Events: 
Diplomatic anniversaries, visits and public propaganda, and saw excessive claims that 
huge successes have been achieved from the visits. Security officials believe that 
agreements like the Gwadar port construction or Free Trade Agreements, will transform 
the Pakistani economy and that bilateral trade with China will reach new heights. The 
impression given by the writing suggests that Pakistan will now take great strides in its 
national development.  
Another significant finding in the theme World Power China is a belief that a modern, 
developed China should be pursued not ignored. People are told that Chinese communism 
has contributed to the transformation of China from a developing to developed country. 
Having established the notion of an emerging China, officials then linked Pakistan-China 
future together. Essentially, they described a developing and emerging China that is 
frequently pursued globally by virtue of her economy and military power.  
The findings also revealed that as China has emerged on the world stage with a bang, and 
therefore delegates from all parts of the world were going to China to benefit from its 
emerging economy, and in such a situation Pakistan should follow suit. Therefore, they 
also believe that Pakistan, by staying allied to China, will benefit from China’s emergent 
status and that China is happy to support this. An emerging China is not reluctant taking 
Pakistan with it. The elites claimed that China wants Pakistan to progress, develop and 
prosper. Overall, one can conclude that there are significant elites efforts to market the 
alliance with the attempt to convince and engage the masses by setting out the benefits.  
In chapter Six, we presented the content analysis of Pakistani politicians’ discussions and 
debates in parliament. Firstly, most of the themes presented in this chapter have already 
appeared in the previous two chapters. It essentially suggests consistency, validity and 
reliability of the findings of the research. In this chapter, we found that the Pakistani 
legislators insist the importance of the alliances. They consider Pakistan-China alliance 
“time-tested”, “all-weather” and “unique”. They believe that the alliance is imbedded in 
the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan. They appear to believe that the alliance 
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with China is a must for Pakistan’s future, progress and prosperity. Significantly, they 
believe that China unites the people of Pakistan as the entire Pakistani nation support the 
alliance. Lawmakers argue that there is no reservation within the society about the 
alliance. The Pakistani lawmakers envisage Pakistan-China future together. In sum China 
is a source of national unity. 
In their effort to present China favourable to the Pakistani public through the forum of 
parliament, peoples’ representatives believe that the US is unreliable while China is 
reliable. They believe that the US makes Pakistan dependent on it, while China help to 
make independent. The US opposes Pakistan’s alliance making with China. They are of 
the view that the US is declining, and China is emerging. They argue a new world system 
is on the horizon where China will be one of the major power, so Pakistan should not 
worry losing US support in the new system, Pakistan will be better with China. 
Continuing this factor, they contemplate that the alliance with the US is a source of 
destruction of Pakistan while with China is a guarantee of prosperity. Thus, it Pakistan’s 
drives to have good friends and allies Pakistan needs to identify friends and foe, China is 
friend and the US is foe. China is loyal US is not.   
Regarding India, lawmakers from both houses of parliament believe that India has been 
intruder, and violators of Pakistani sovereignty. India has occupied Pakistani territory 
(referring to Kashmir) forcibly, while China does not resort to such tactics. While China 
resolves bilateral issues amicably, India use force to settle disputes. India adopts 
intimidating politics to achieve its national objectives, China eschews such politics.  
Finally, but significantly, MPs highlight that the Chinese are in duress due to their 
treatment at the hands of extremist in Pakistan. They argue that it is a sensitive matter 
and extremely important for nations’ national security which should be avoided at all 
costs. In an attempt to present China as a better partner, lawmakers in their debates repress 
Uighur Muslims suffering at the hands of the Chinese security forces, rather implausibly 
suggest that Uighur enjoy greater rights. They also tell people of Pakistan Uighur enjoy 
freedom to profess religion and the Chinese state protects their economic and social 
rights. 
 344 
 
Officials argue Chinese are in Pakistan to take Pakistan’s progress and development, 
attacks on them is harmful. Hurting Chinese interest can isolate Pakistan internationally. 
They believe the future of the kids is at stake if Chinese isolated us it will not allow a 
market for our goods and will not invest in Pakistan. They also try to correct people 
ethically by invoking religious teachings; they elucidate Islam forbade killings of friends 
and guests. The Chinese are friends and guests, so they should be protected.  
An appraisal  
This study has attempted to find answers to its research questions. The discussion of real 
and potential challenges (Uighur separatism, attacks on Chinese and traditional anti-
communistic views in Pakistan) in chapter three responded to the first research question, 
what are the real and potential challenges within the alliance. The discussion of 
promotional strategies in chapters four, five and six presented evidence to address how 
Pakistani officials promote the alliance with China. It was recognised that Pakistani 
officials encourage the alliance with China domestically using the medium of textbooks, 
newspaper articles and parliamentary discussions. We have already discussed in detail 
these strategies to promote the alliance in chapters four, five and six along with the 
summary in the previous section. However, if we put all the strategies together, it 
becomes evident that to overcome the challenges and the threat to the alliance, Pakistani 
officials promote the alliance with China domestically.  
The critical analysis of propaganda strategies is self-evident in answering to the 
supplementary questions of what does their propaganda tell us about how they view their 
own society? The propaganda strategy contains a discourse which is interrelated to 
counter threats to the alliance. Essentially, this correlation between threats to the alliance 
and the propaganda strategy aiming to diffuse those threats revealed that they view their 
own society sceptically. For instance, to counter the threat of Uighur separatism to the 
alliance, the security elites produced a counter narrative which suggests that the Uighur 
are leading good lives shielded and protected by the Chinese laws and constitution, and 
that there is no threat to the Uighur life or property. The security elites attempt to 
assimilate Islam and communism through various ways. 
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Although the promotional strategies are ostensibly validating and endorsing the alliance, 
they are also simultaneously revealing the concerns of Pakistani officials. The idea of 
comparing Islam and communism (though far from reality), depicting the Uighur as 
enjoying outstanding and remarkable lives and the comparison between Islamic and 
Chinese places are essentially representing their fears. They are mentioning it in their 
propaganda because they fear it and they want their society to shun violence and 
antagonism towards China so that they can maintain their alliance with Beijing. As we 
observed in chapter three, the Deobandi madrasah are important vehicles for 
disseminating fundamentalist ideology affecting Chinese national security, by using 
religion and the Uighur protected rights, security officials are trying to convince them 
that China is not different and is actually rather like them.  
Furthermore, they argue that Chinese security is Pakistan's security, and that the Chinese 
should not be attacked as they are working for the betterment of Pakistan and its people. 
This strategy also gives an idea that they want their public to behave rationally and shows 
Pakistani officials’ misgivings about the Pakistani public.  
In essence, an in-depth analysis of propaganda strategies clearly shows us how the 
security elites are viewing their society. It can be argued that they consider their society 
as a threat and a challenge to maintain the alliance. Otherwise, the propaganda strategies 
may not have been conceived around the factors that are important in the society. For 
example, the Chinese are portrayed having traits that resemble them with Islam. The 
Chinese are told to have features of Muslims, such as antipathy to alcohol, free sexual 
society, and aversion to modern drinks, etc. Similarly, elites efforts to equate Islam and 
Communism, and efforts to promote Uighur rights clearly answers research question, that 
is, what propaganda tells us about how security elites’ view their own society. Why they 
feel the need to explain this to their own society, no doubt to sell the alliance, but to 
eliminate the suspicion of society vis-à-vis China. They realise that individuals ought to 
be clarified about Chinese strategies in Xinjiiang so individuals' enmity towards China 
can be diminished. 
The propaganda strategy relating to India is another example of this because officials 
have used Indian rivalry to market the alliance. India is considered an enemy. Comparison 
 346 
 
between China and India represent China as a better country. Claiming that a powerful 
India, determined to destroy Pakistan (through war, hegemonic politics and so on), has 
been balanced with Chinese friendship, people will likely to be stimulated by rhetoric.  
Parliamentarians argue that China is necessary for the progress and development of 
Pakistan. It means that Pakistan’s survival is associated securing an alliance with China. 
The propaganda tells us that China is an important country, if the Pakistani society 
continues to launch terrorist attacks, Pakistan will miss support of a massive country. It 
will get People thinking why to attack a nation that is so important to Pakistan. To the 
anti-communist positions in society, the Pakistani officials describe China as emerging 
and progressing on the Communist principle. The security elites try to promote the 
alliance, as it seems to highlight their concerns about their society. 
MPs also compare which is better for Pakistan; the US or China. Clearly, they prefer for 
China based on the latter support for Pakistan in crisis without any precondition, while 
the former is believed to have been looking for its own interests. While China is 
considered as sincere, loyal to Pakistan, the US is believed to have betrayed Pakistan in 
time of countrywide crisis.  
Theoretical Implications of SEPIA  
We discussed in the introductory chapter that the approaches in international politics to 
alliances (Realist, Liberalist, and Social Constructivists) touch upon the topic of alliance 
formation. While the Realists in their assumptions stipulate that the state will form an 
external alliance if there is an imbalance globally or a grave threat to the national security, 
the Liberals, on the other hand, see the common good, benefit and universal cooperation 
as the logic of alliance formation. Conversely, Constructivist suggests all aspects of 
international politics, including international alliance are socially constructed.  
Having introduced rigidly divided theories, we argued these approaches are handicapped 
explaining the awkward alliances in international politics. More specifically, these 
theories have been found wanting to provide complete explanation that accounts for 
domestic factors like local propaganda role in selling awkward alliances. To 
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accommodate the awkward alliance, and to sell it domestically with a strategy of 
propaganda, a theatrical foundation was needed to interpret its dynamics, its formation, 
and sustenance. SEPIA has helped bridge the gap left by mainstream and alternative 
theories. 
We also argued that the BoP theories of alliance formation are appropriate in findings 
answers to the questions: why, when, and with whom states form alliances to have an 
integrated security policy. However, they are not without weaknesses, as they are not 
applicable to the all cases. For instance, what would the behaviour be of a state facing 
internal threats to its external alliance? A model solely based on rudimentary calculations 
of power and threat does not provide a valid theoretical perspective applicable to all 
states. Both sets of variables, alliance formation based on threat and alliance promotion 
within society through propaganda, are possible solutions. Propaganda aimed at the home 
population to promote the alliance should be part of the solution and may be included in 
an integrated and proper theoretical framework of studying alliances. This empirical 
research aimed to recognise and demarcate the interconnection between internal threats 
to the alliance and the acceptance of promotional strategies by the decision makers to 
promote the alliance.  
To overcome this seeming analytical myopia, this research presented SEPIA to 
operationalise propaganda within its essentially realist-based construct to find answers to 
the stipulated research questions. The theoretical framework functioned suitably in 
accomplishing answers to the research questions and achieving research objectives. In 
fact, unlike the major theories of international alliances which disregard internal threats 
to the alliance and ignore the role of propaganda, this theoretical approach offered 
perspective on the propaganda and sufficiently explained the Pakistan-China alliance. 
SEPIA helps achieving research questions  
The theoretical framework of SEPIA ensued comparatively well in completing study 
objectives. It helped to identify real and potential threats to the alliance. Similarly, it was 
very obliging towards the second question - how do the security elites sustain the alliance 
with China? – We were able to address a significant level. We explained that the Pakistani 
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security elites sustain alliance with China by conducting propaganda utilising multiple 
strategies. We systematically evaluated propaganda techniques operationalising content 
analysis. SEPIA gave adequate emphasis to the propaganda where other theories fail to 
accommodate. In sum SEPIA hospitality accepting propaganda variables in explaining 
awkward alliances helped theoretically bridge the evidently incompatible assumptions of 
Realist, Liberalist, and Constructivists. In a way it facilitated to create relatively fresh, 
Realist-based supposition about Pakistan’s alliance making with China.   
SEPIA’s unambiguous accepting of leaders’ propaganda helped identify worries and 
concerns of the Pakistani officials which ultimately helped to find answer to the 
supplementary research questions: what their propaganda discloses us about their own 
society. In all three-data set majority of the propaganda contents appeared to be sensitive 
(those relating to Uighur Muslims, terrorist attacks on Chinese, discussion about India, 
discussion of religion etc.) that exposed underlaying security elites concerns about their 
own society. Overall we are satisfied that the answers to the research questions were 
adequately dealt with the help of SEPIA theoretical approach.  
SEPIA helps achieving research objectives 
The thesis satisfactorily achieved its objectives. They were: 1) to assess how a state 
responds when confronted threats and challenges to the alliance, and 2) to highlight the 
difficulties of an overtly religious state aiming to exercise balance of power politics in 
the international system with an ally which have ostensibly a different outlook in 
ideology. The first objective can be broken down into two sections. Pakistan needs to 
form an alliance (practicing power politics) with China (which is very different in outlook 
and ideology) to balance external threats (India, as established in chapter two), but it faces 
internal threats (jihadi militant and sub-nationalists, as demonstrated in chapter three). Its 
dogmatic society is a hurdle to achieving that policy of power politics. All these factors 
suggest a dilemma for the Pakistani decision makers. The Pakistani state responds to 
overcome these dilemmas by conducting propaganda (discussed in chapter four and five). 
So this research has clearly demonstrated and modestly achieved the important objectives 
and presented answers to the research queries.  
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Theoretical and scholarly significance of the thesis  
This thesis has theoretical and scholarly significance. Regarding theoretical 
contributions, this thesis has demonstrated that the dynamics of international alliance 
should include the study of awkward alliances. We cannot discount that odd the alliances 
like Pakistan-China will not occur in the future, but there is a possibility that they will.815 
The applicability of this thesis may increase for the students and researchers of 
international politics in the future striving to understand unlikely alliances. So with the 
likelihood of domestic threats to the alliance, the study of problematic alliances is likely 
to grow and may be part of the mechanism of how to secure an unsecure alliance in 
international politics.   
The theoretical framework of the SEPIA offers deep insight into the internal challenges 
which the Pakistan-China alliance faces and how the Pakistani policy making is working 
to neutralise these challenges, which mainstream theories and alternative ignore. This 
approach facilitated the systematic assessment of domestic propaganda as an important 
casual path for sustaining the awkward alliances through a host of issues and challenges 
from the domestic public. From a comparative perspective, its flexibility to include 
propaganda as an important factor in explaining Pakistan-China alliances, compared to 
other theories of international politics, makes it a dynamic and viable consideration.  
Certainly, it has advantages over the rigid constructs of mainstream theories on the one 
hand and Constructivist on the other hand mainly because SEPIA showed flexibility to 
incorporate propaganda in explaining Pakistan-China relations. Therefore, it possesses 
robust explanatory power and better equipped to analysing state behaviours when 
                                                 
815 For example, there is a possibility that Iran and Saudi Arabia will form an alliance against their 
common enemy, Iran. see Alwaght, "The Saudi-Israeli Alliance: Saudi Fm Secretly Visits Israel after 
Israeli Officials Visit Riyadh to Counter Iran," Global Research (2016), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-saudi-israeli-alliance-saudi-fm-secretly-visits-israel-after-israeli-
officials-visit-riyadh-to-counter-iran/5511526 (accessed 1 May 2016) ; Dan Sanchez, "Saudi Arabia and 
Israel: An Axis of Convenience" https://medium.com/dan-sanchez/saudi-arabia-and-israel-an-axis-of-
convenience-d553f4b1fb46#.3rlksa2rd (accessed 12 April 2016 ).; Ragıp Soylu, "Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel: A New Alliance in the Region?," Daily Sabah 7 January 2016   
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confronted strategic challenges to its alliance politics. Specifically, SEPIA offers far 
better insight into Pakistan’s alliance making with China that other theories of 
international politics usually missed out or disregarded due to their obsession on 
structural-material and norms-values emphasis.  
SEPIA appears much better than Neoclassical Realism in explaining Sino-Pakistani 
relations. Indeed, NCR is useful theoretical consideration as it pays attention to the 
domestic intervening variables, but it is not the primary driver of Pakistan’s alliance 
preserving with China. Undoubtedly it possesses explanatory power and provides a 
convincing explanation to study state foreign policy behaviours. NCR incorporates both 
the systemic and unit level variables which increases its strength. However, in case of 
Pakistan’s alliance making with China, we agree that systemic factors are important, but 
states internal dynamics like threats to the alliance and domestic propaganda are crucial 
factors in studying awkward alliances, which NCR fails to acknowledge.  
NCR suggests a different explanation than SEPIA. Though from a distance, it appears 
that NCR better explains Pakistan’s alliance making with China. We are not arguing that 
Pakistan perception about China, or its state power help to determine its external 
behaviour. If we do so, then it conforms NCR assumptions. In such a scenario we needed 
to go beyond the NCR model and the mainstream (Realist, Liberalist) and alternative 
(Constructivist) theories to help find flexible explanations that can explain Pakistan’s 
alliance with China.  
This shortcoming and desperate search helped us to construct SEPIA model, which is 
flexible, acknowledges the earlier studies contribution but disregard them due to their 
inhospitality to explain Sino-Pakistan alliance. It is, henceforth, reasonable to conclude 
that the SEPIA theoretical approach has generated robust interpretation and has provided 
insightful explanations of the Pakistan-China alliance, and the security elites’ propaganda 
efforts to sustain the alliance. It provided a clear, flexible operational theoretical 
framework through which the interplay between internal threats and power politics 
became identifiable in Pakistan-China relations. Finally, it has helped to fill a gap which 
has existed in the alliance approaches. Altogether it has facilitated a fresh international 
relations-based conclusion to the specified research problems.  
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Future research 
With the help of SEPIA and content analysis of the textbooks, newspaper articles, and 
lawmaker’s debates, this study has tried to bridge the anomalies which exist in the 
theories of international politics. It establishes the need to integrate the propaganda model 
into the alliance approaches to better understand the dynamics of unlikely alliances in 
international politics. This research is a novel effort to study the Pakistan-China alliance 
based on textbooks, newspaper articles and officials’ speeches applying SEPIA. So it has 
filled a vacuum which existed in studies of the Sino-Pakistan alliance.  
There are, however, noticeable limits to this modestly defined research. Hypothetically, 
critics may possibly underline that though the internal threats to the preservation of 
alliance have been given adequate attention in this study, some areas of external threats 
to the alliance have remained ignored. The criticism may spring from findings which 
were uncovered during the study: Pakistani security elites maintain that ‘hostile foreign 
agencies’ are creating cleavages in the Sino-Pakistan alliance by provoking unrest in 
Xinjiang using militants and carrying terrorist attacks on Chinese in Pakistan. Recently 
this narrative has emerged more forcefully. India is training Baloch separatists to carry 
attacks on the Chinese working on CPEC projects.816 So these are obvious examples of 
external vulnerabilities to the alliance which are worthy or further investigation. Elite 
interviews and data available openly could be used for such a study.  
Another question related to that raised above emerges during the process of research: new 
developments have taken place between Pakistan and China, as the Chinese have 
                                                 
816 See "Raw at Frontline to Sabotage Economic Corridor, China Warns Pakistan," The Express Tribune 
22 May 2015 http://tribune.com.pk/story/890650/raw-at-frontline-to-sabotage-economic-corridor-china-
warns-pakistan/ [accessed 1 January 2016]; Baqir Sajjad Syed, "‘Indian Plots against CPEC Part of 
Strategy to Contain China’" The Dawn 6 November 2015 http://www.dawn.com/news/1217811 [accessed 
1 May 2016]  
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acquired the control of Gwadar port. Pakistan and China have signed the $46 billion 
CPEC project which faces both internal and external challenges. Externally, India is 
allegedly acting to make it fail.817 Internally, Baloch separatist are poised to challenge 
CPEC execution smoothly, purportedly with Indian help.818 Given the significance of 
CPEC and its potential to change the future significantly, it is worth studying how 
Pakistan will react to these internal and external challenges. How would these 
developments affect the Pakistan-China alliance, and China-India and Pakistan-India 
relations?  
The theoretical framework used in this research can also be operated to explore analogous 
research problems. We have focused on the incongruity of the Pakistan-China alliance, 
but other alliances found in different parts of the world with different contexts and 
cultures could be studied using the SEPIA framework. The new context could be from 
Middle East, such as the feasible alliance between two antagonists, Israel and Saudi 
Arabia. Like Pakistan and China, Saudi Arabia and Israel share nothing politically, 
socially or culturally; the only thing they share is their fear of Iran, a common strategic 
challenge due to its nuclear weapons. An alliance between the two states is highly 
possible819, however, due to the domestic outlook, Saudi Arabia, as a leader of the 
Muslim world will see the Palestine issue as an impediment to such an alliance. 
Therefore, before this becomes a reality, Saudi Arabia (and Israel to a lesser extent) would 
need to carry out an exercise of enhancing Israeli images domestically.  
                                                 
817 General Raheel Sharif has said, “We all know that hostile intelligence agencies are averse to this grand 
project [CPEC]. Here, I would like to make a special reference to Indian intelligence agency, RAW, 
which is blatantly involved in attempts aimed at destabilising Pakistan”, quoted in Saleem Shahid, "India 
out to Sabotage CPEC: Raheel" The Dawn 13 April 2016 http://www.dawn.com/news/1251784 [accessed 
21 April 2016]  
818Ali Ahsan, "Balochistan: An Insurgent’s Cul-De-Sac?" The Nation 22 August 2015 
http://nation.com.pk/blogs/22-Aug-2015/balochistan-an-insurgent-s-cul-de-sac [accessed 28 April 2016]  
819 "The Alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia," New Eastern Outlook, September 2015 
http://www.mintpressnews.com/the-alliance-between-israel-and-saudi-arabia/209548/ [accessed 29 April 
2016]; Alwaght, "The Saudi-Israeli Alliance: Saudi FM secretly visits israel after israeli officials visit 
riyadh to counter iran." 
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A related area for further research could be the use of alternative data. In this research we 
have used textbooks and newspaper articles to unearth Pakistani elite propaganda. Other 
significant areas of empirical data, for example billboard posters, music propaganda 
(Pakistan-China friendship songs, run by Pakistan television), or the naming of roads 
(like China Road, China Roundabout, Chou en-Li road as already briefly mentioned in 
this research) could be used to endorse the validity of this research. Content analysis and 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) techniques may be useful research tools to empirically 
interpret the meaning of the data.  
Finally, the trilateral relationship involving Pakistan, Afghanistan and China is an area 
which needs to be explored further. Though we noted that the instability in Afghanistan 
affects China’s western region, a robust and systematic study is needed to discuss this 
factor from all angles. We also noted that the Chinese have been in discussions with the 
Taliban, and we also found that in the past, Pakistan have arranged a meeting between 
the Taliban and China. What security interests do the Chinese have apart from security 
in Afghanistan? How can Pakistan fulfil Chinese interest in Afghanistan? These are very 
important empirical questions which can be examined using Chinese, Pakistani and 
Afghan sources. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods can be used to study 
this research, and/or an in-depth case study.  
Policy implication  
Alliances are the linchpin of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan feels that it can’t achieve 
its national goals relying on its own meagre resources, and cannot fight the larger enemy 
next door, and therefore it needs to import power to achieve these objectives. Pakistan 
seeks alliances mainly with the major powers, which can provide a security guarantee 
during the conflict with India, and offer an uninterrupted supply weapons to strike 
balance with India, even though Pakistan has nuclear weapons to balance India. Pakistan 
secures help from major powers, mainly China, to ensure its continuity.  
Evidently, alliances are seen as a source of nation building in Pakistan, and are a central 
part of the national security plan. Given the centrality of external alliances in Pakistan’s 
security mechanism, Pakistan policy makers need to understand alliances properly lest 
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they land themselves in hot waters again. In 1971, Pakistan expected China to come to 
its rescue, only to be disappointed.
820
 Misinterpretations or misunderstandings can lead to 
the disastrous consequences. In this research, Pakistani security officials are found to 
make high claims; China is portrayed in a way that the only item on its foreign policy 
agenda is to look after Pakistan and China appears to be crucial to Pakistan's survival.  
As we suggested in the previous chapter, Pakistani security officials need to be careful in 
their propaganda: China is not a different major power than the US and will not commit 
major economic and military aid to Pakistan unless its national interests suggest so. They 
are a major power now, and have interests in other regions of the world too. The Pakistan 
connection is no more than a peripheral issue to China’s own security problems. China 
has undergone tremendous social, political, and economic transformations -over the last 
30 years. Today’s China is not the China of Mao: Beijing’s attention is now firmly 
focused on developing itself economically, socially and militarily. Its economic growth 
is fantastic under the circumstances; it is only natural that China would not like to be 
distracted by any regional conflict form the reconstruction goals it has set before it. 
Hence, as suggested in last chapter, Pakistan needs to exercise caution.  
Final thoughts  
External alliances are central to international politics. However, they are increasingly 
threatened or challenged from inside national boundaries in the form of organised 
resistance from certain social elements. It highlights the need to advance an accepted 
approach to deal with evolving situations. How states will react are issues pertinent to the 
theories of alliances. This study undertakes to examine a state’s reactions in greater depth. 
   
                                                 
820
 This was interpreted on Chinese government assurance on date that they will support Pakistan 
sovereignty. 
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August 2011 
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Permanent UN Representative (2000-
2002) 
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Lahore June-
August 2011 
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